R.A. Hoffman Architects v. Baird, K.

J-A19035-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 R.A. HOFFMAN ARCHITECTS, INC. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KEVIN R. BAIRD AND JILL ANN BAIRD : : Appellants : No. 1749 EDA 2025 Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 3, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-09360-CT BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. * MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 2, 2026 Kevin R. Baird and Jill Ann Baird (together, Appellants) appeal from the judgment entered June 3, 2025, in favor of R.A. Hoffman Architects, Inc. (Appellee).1 Appellants raise challenges to the admission and weight of the ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 Appellants purport to appeal from orders entered April 10, 2025, and May 23, 2025. See Notice of Appeal, 6/23/25. Nevertheless, this appeal properly lies from the judgment entered on the docket on June 3, 2025, after the court disposed of the relevant post-trial motions by molding the verdict. See Printed Image of York v. Mifflin Press, Ltd., 133 A.3d 55, 58 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2016) (noting, in civil case in which post-trial motions are filed, appeal lies from entry of judgment); see also Sopko v. Murray, 947 A.2d 1256, 1256-57 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2008) (finding appeal properly lies from judgment entered after trial court molds verdict). We have amended the caption accordingly. Resultantly, we may address challenges to the April 10 and May 23 orders in this appeal. See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132, 149 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that “Once an appeal is filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory orders become reviewable.”). J-A19035-26 evidence at trial and the court’s subsequent award of attorney fees. We affirm. This case arises out of a contract dispute concerning the architectural design of a custom home, the factual history for which the trial court set forth as follows: On March 30, 2022, Appellants[ . . .] contracted with Appellee[. . .] through its [p]resident, Rene Hoffman, for architectural services. The parties agreed that Appellee would design a custom home and create the corresponding drawings and preliminary building plans. Pursuant to their agreement, the home was slated to be a custom-designed two-story [building,] approximately 5,500 to 6,500 square feet[,] to be built in Willistown, Chester County. The “work was to include[] cover sheet with code[- ]related details, footing/foundation plan for house and garage, floor plans for all levels of the home, as well as the garage, exterior elevations of all sides of the home and garage (depicting finish materials), sections as required to explain construction through various wings of the home, typical details as required, electrical layout diagram locating lights, switches and receptacles and outline specifications to specify building components.” The architectural firm staff would bill hourly, as set forth in the contract, for their work. The costs associated with the use of outside consultants obtained by the firm would also be charged to the clients. The parties understood that Appellants wanted to break ground by October 1, 2022[,] and have the shell of the home built by December 2022. From March 30, 2022[,] through September 19, 2022, [Appellee’s staff] communicated with Appellants continuously via text message, email, and telephone to discuss design plans and ideas. Furthermore, in an effort to accomplish Appellants’ goals, the parties would meet one to two times a month to discuss design ideas. After the meetings, new drawings and plans would be sent to [Appellants] for their input. It is estimated that Appellee’s staff spent between 360-480 hours creating design ideas and preparing the drawings and preliminary building plans for Appellants. -2- J-A19035-26 Unfortunately, despite repeatedly being advised that the work was “amazing” or otherwise generally acceptable, in the end Appellants were not satisfied with the drawings prepared by Appellee. Importantly, however, the evidence presented at trial indicated that the parties continued to work together on what the final product would look like. In August[] 2022, Appellee enlisted the services of Structural Design Engineers at a chargeable cost of $6,500.00 to complete the structural design of the home consistent with Kevin Baird’s request. Between May and September, Kevin Baird customarily requested copies of the work done by Appellee’s staff in order to send it to his contractors so that they could price materials for the foundation, face of the home[,] and the windows. Appellee invoiced Appellants monthly. During the life of the contract, Appellants never disputed the bills, as required by their agreement, if they wanted to challenge the costs. Yet, Appellants only ever made two payments on the underlying contract: the initial retainer fee of $2,500.00 and one subsequent payment of $6,808.25 on July 7, 2022[,] totaling $9,308.25. From the outset, it was estimated that the job could cost between $40,000[.00] and $52,000[.00] for the architectural work. On September 5th or 6th, [] Kevin Baird[] asserted that he would be dropping off a payment to [Appellee] to get Appellants caught up on their bill. Appellants now contend that they did not pay more of the bills because Jill Baird wanted a 3D rendering of the prospective house []. While Appellee’s staff provided Appellants one 3D rendering, Appellants were dissatisfied with it. Accordingly, Appellee utilized the services of a third-party contractor to obtain the second 3D rendering for Appellants. It took over two months to get the consultant’s 3D rendering completed. Notably, the underlying agreement did not call for the creation of 3D modeling for this project. Again, their agreement indicated that [Appellants] would be responsible for additional costs incurred for work done by third- party contractors utilized by [Appellee]. The second 3D [m]odel qualified as such an additional cost.² ² There was an oral agreement between the parties that a 3D model would be rendered prior to the completion of the work on the home. As summer turned into fall, Appellants continued to demand changes, additions, revisions, substitutions and updates to the -3- J-A19035-26 plans. Appellee’s staff made the revisions, additions and changes etc., to the plans at [Appellants’] direction and with their approval. Appellants took the work done by Appellee’s staff and provided it to his contractors and the township to continue to keep the project on the timetable they wanted. Appellee produced the second 3D model on September 19, 2022, but it ultimately did not meet Appellants’ standards[, d]espite the Appellants telling Appellee that the model was very helpful and that they hoped the project would be wrapped up soon. This 3D model was a photorealistic 3D model only, not one that was movable. When it became clear that this was not what the Appellants wanted, Appellee offered to let Appellants come to his office to view the model in the software it was developed in. Appellants opted not to do so. Instead on September 20, 2022, Appellants advised Appellee that they were terminating Appellee’s services. On September 27, 2022, Appellee informed [] Kevin Baird[] that, considering the termination of the contract, Appellee[] was owed money for the work completed by Appellee. At this point, Appellee stopped working and stopped invoicing Appellants for work. Appellee did not bill for work done by its staff after September 20, 2025. On October 12, 2022, Appellants sent a follow up letter to Appellee, committing to their intention to terminate services. To date, the bills have not been paid. Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/25, 2-5 (citations, footnote, original brackets, and some unnecessary articles omitted). The court held a two-day bench trial on March 10 and April 7, 2025. Appellants, after being represented by counsel on the first day of trial, represented themselves on the second day of trial. Appellants were initially represented by Stanley Ellenberg, Esquire, but they dismissed Attorney Ellenberg prior to the second day of trial, then favoring pro se representation. On April 10, 2025, the court entered an order announcing its verdict, finding that Appellants breached the contract, dismissing Appellee’s quantum meruit -4- J-A19035-26 claim and Appellants’ breach of contract counterclaim, and ordering Appellants to pay $43,947.24 to Appellee. On April 15, 2025, Appellees filed a post-trial motion to mold the verdict to include attorney fees. On May 8, 2025, Appellants, still acting pro se, filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 10 order. Eric B. Freedman, Esquire, entered his appearance on behalf of Appellants on May 12, 2025, and has since represented Appellants in this case. Also, on May 12, 2025, Attorney Freedman filed a notice of appeal on Appellants’ behalf, which was docketed at 1430 EDA 2025.2 On May 23, 2025, the court granted Appellee’s post-trial motion to mold the verdict—molding the verdict to $66,277.64, reflecting Appellee’s damages for breach of contract and attorney fees—and denied Appellants’ reconsideration motion. On June 3, 2025, judgment was entered on the docket. On June 5, 2025, Appellants filed a counseled “post-trial motion for reconsideration” purportedly pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1, in connection with the May 23 order. On June 23, 2025, Appellants timely filed their counseled notice of appeal from the entry of judgment. See supra at n.1. The court denied Appellants’ June 5 post-trial motion on July 23, 2025. ____________________________________________ 2 On September 16, 2025, this Court quashed the appeal at 1430 EDA 2025 as duplicative of this appeal. -5- J-A19035-26 Appellants and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.3 On September 30, 2025, this Court issued a rule to show cause, observing that the trial docket reflected that Appellants failed to file any post- trial motions and directing Appellants to explain how their issues are preserved for appeal. See Rule to Show Cause, 9/30/25 (citing: (1) Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c)(2) (requiring post-trial motions be filed within ten days after another party files timely post-trial motion); (2) Behar v. Frazier, 724 A.2d 943, 945 (Pa. Super. 1999) (reiterating Rule 227.1 provides post-trial motions must be filed after filing of decision in non-jury trial); and (3) D.L. Forrey & Assocs., Inc. v. Fuel City Truck Stop, Inc., 71 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa. Super. 2013) (reiterating issues not raised in post-trial motions are waived)). ____________________________________________ 3 On June 5, 2025, the court ordered Appellants to file a Rule 1925 concise statement. On June 25, 2025, Appellants filed a timely concise statement raising three issues. The court issued a Rule 1925 opinion on July 28, 2025, in response to those issues. On August 26, 2025, Appellants filed, in this Court, an application seeking: (1) consolidation of this appeal with the appeal at 1430 EDA 2025; (2) a stay of this appeal; and (3) remand of the consolidated appeals to permit the trial court to prepare a supplemental Rule 1925 opinion addressing the trial court’s award of attorney fees. On November 21, 2025, this Court issued an order that: (1) denied Appellants’ request to consolidate this appeal with the appeal at 1430 EDA 2025—noting that the order disposing of that prior appeal stated that all properly preserved issues may be raised in this present appeal; (2) granted a stay of the briefing schedule; and (3) granted Appellants’ requested remand, not to exceed sixty days, for the trial court to address the attorney fee issue in a supplemental Rule 1925 opinion. On January 14, 2026, the trial court filed the ordered supplemental Rule 1925 opinion. -6- J-A19035-26 On October 14, 2025, Appellants filed a response to this Court’s rule to show cause. See Response to Rule to Show Cause, 10/14/25. On January 22, 2026, this Court entered an order discharging the rule to show cause and advised the parties that the issues raised in the rule may be revisited by this merits panel. See Order, 1/22/26. On that same date, this Court reestablished the briefing schedule, ordering Appellants to file their brief by March 3, 2026. This merits panel ultimately heard argument from the parties in this case on August 12, 2026. After our review of the post-trial issue preservation requirements in this case, we conclude that Appellants’ motions for reconsideration (pro se and counseled) served as the functional equivalent of post-trial motions where those filings sought a change of the trial court’s decision. See Gemini Equipment Co. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 595 A.2d 1211, 1213-14 (Pa. Super. 1991) (construing motion for reconsideration as post-trial motion under Rule 227.1 where filing intended to perform substantive function of post-trial motion). Specifically, in their motions, Appellants contend that: (1) the court wrongly prevented them from introducing evidence, testimony, and argument in support of their breach of contract counterclaim, see Pro Se Motion for Reconsideration, 5/8/25, at 5-6; (2) the court wrongly prevented them from amending their counterclaims, see id. at 7-8; (3) the court erred in failing to consider the testimony of their experts, all of whom testified that Appellee’s failure to first obtain the “preliminary design” before moving on to the “working drawings” was a deviation from customary industry standards -7- J-A19035-26 and Appellee’s practices, see Post-Trial Motion for Reconsideration, 6/5/25, at 6; and (4) the court wrongly molded the verdict to include attorney fees, see id. at 16. Further, where, as here, a trial court ignores the untimely filing of the appellant’s post-trial motions and rules on the merits of the alleged errors, appellate courts will decline to find waiver due to untimeliness under Rule 227.1.4 See Kurtas v. Kurtas, 555 A.2d 804, 806 (Pa. 1989) (concluding that trial court could reach merits of late-filed post-trial motion because trial courts have latitude to overlook any procedural defect which does not prejudice rights of parties); see also D.L. Forrey, 71 A.3d at 920 (noting that “judges have wide latitude in considering whether to address the merits of post-trial motions that are filed outside the 10-day period required by Rule 227.1” and distinguishing between cases in which late post-trial motions are filed as compared with cases in which no post-trial motions are filed); see also Behar, 724 A.2d at 945 (finding that where post-trial motions were due on October 27, 1997, but were filed on December 12, 1997, trial court could either strike untimely motions under Rule 227.1 or entertain motions). Accordingly, we decline to find waiver and proceed to reach the issues presented in this appeal. ____________________________________________ 4 We recognize that Appellants’ post-trial motions were not due until April 25, 2025, as Appellee filed a post-trial motion on April 15, 2025. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c)(2) (providing that “If a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other party may file a post-trial motion within ten days after the filing of the first post-trial motion.”). Further, we observe that the court denied both Appellants’ motions for reconsideration—which we treat as post-trial motions under the circumstances of this case—on the merits. -8- J-A19035-26 On appeal, Appellants raise four issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and/or error of law in disregarding the undisputed and credible expert testimony of Appellants’ expert and [President Hoffman’s] own admissions at trial, which established that Appellee deviated from customary industry standards and [President Hoffman’s] own established practices by proceeding to the [“]Working Drawings[”] phase without first obtaining Appellants’ approval of the [p]reliminary [d]esign? 2. Whether the trial court’s finding that Appellants breached the contract was against the weight of the evidence where the record demonstrates that Appellee’s claimed billing for the construction documentation phase was mathematically impossible and inconsistent with the contractual time estimates, expert testimony, and Appellee’s own admissions? 3. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion and/or error of law by barring Appellants from fully introducing evidence, testimony, and argument to support their breach of contract counterclaim relating to delay damages, despite Appellants’ counterclaim being properly pled? 4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law in granting Appellee’s motion to mold the verdict to include an award of attorney’s fees where Appellee committed a predicate material breach of the parties’ [a]greement by initiating litigation in the court of common pleas instead of proceeding with the mandatory binding arbitration required under the contract drafted by Appellee, thereby forfeiting Appellee’s right to recover contractual attorney’s fees? Appellants’ Brief at 3-5 (suggested answers omitted). We address Appellants’ first two issues on appeal together as they both pertain to the trial court’s weighing of the evidence. Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is as follows: Our review of challenges to the weight of the evidence is extremely limited. We will respect the trial court’s findings with -9- J-A19035-26 regard to credibility and weight of the evidence unless it can be shown that the lower court’s determination was manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious, or flagrantly contrary to the evidence. Additionally, this Court’s review of a weight of the evidence claim is a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in weighing the evidence, not of the underlying question of whether we believe that the verdict is, in fact, against the weight of the evidence. Wytiaz v. Deitrick, 954 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). A challenge to the weight of the evidence concedes that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. See Zarrin v. Jeffries-Baxter, 937 A.2d 1126, 1130-31 (Pa. Super. 2007). Appellants argue that the trial court wrongly characterized their instant challenge as a matter of credibility, where their claim is that the court ignored consistent, undisputed testimony from multiple witnesses, including Appellee’s own witnesses. See Appellants’ Brief at 15. Appellants’ core factual contention is that all three architectural professionals who testified agreed that industry standard practice requires client approval of a preliminary design before proceeding to working drawings. See id. at 16-17. Critically, Appellants emphasize that President Hoffman admitted he never obtained that approval from Appellants and could not explain why he deviated from industry standard practice. See id. at 16. Appellants contend that their expert corroborated this standard, and that expert testimony went uncontradicted. See id. Appellants maintain that every witness who testified agreed on what the standard required and that Appellee failed to follow it, resulting in circumstances where there was nothing to weigh because there existed no - 10 - J-A19035-26 conflicts to resolve, and, instead, the court disregarded a consensus. See id. at 17. Appellants assert that the court’s framing of the issue as a credibility determination was therefore legal error or an abuse of discretion. See id. In reaching this conclusion, Appellants cite to our decision in Fudula v. Keystone Wire & Iron Works, Inc., 424 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 1981), for the proposition that a trial court abuses its discretion when it capriciously disbelieves the evidence. See Appellants’ Brief at 15. Nevertheless, we conclude no relief is due on this issue. After our review, we discern no manifest error, arbitrary and capricious decision, or determination that is flagrantly contrary to the evidence in the trial court’s denial of relief based on the weight of the evidence, especially where the record and weight of the evidence could support a finding that Appellants breached the contract.5 See Wytiaz, 954 A.2d at 645. In reaching our conclusion, we find that Appellee’s alleged failure to adhere to industry standards, even if accepted as true, neither necessarily amounts to a breach of the contract nor requires that the trial court find in Appellants’ favor on this weight issue, especially where Appellants’ argument on this claim necessarily concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellants ____________________________________________ 5 The court ultimately found that outstanding bills remain unpaid under the contract, after Appellee provided hundreds of hours of bargained-for services. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/25, at 5; N.T. Trial, 3/10/25, at 168-69, 170, 192. Further, the court found that Appellants failed to dispute any of the monthly bills they received, as required by the contract. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/25, at 3. - 11 - J-A19035-26 breached the parties’ contract. See Zarrin, 937 A.2d at 1130-31. We emphasize that, in this case, the trial judge had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, and the appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons set forth by the trial judge when reviewing the court’s determination whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See Gold v. Rosen, 135 A.3d 1039, 1042 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that “One of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we find no relief is due. Next, we observe that Appellants’ second weight issue is waived for failure to raise it in their post-trial motions and because they raised it for the first time in their appellate brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (noting issues must be raised for first time in trial court or will be waived on appeal). Specifically, we note that Appellants’ assertion that the verdict was mathematically impossible and inconsistent with the contractual time estimates, expert testimony, and Appellee’s admissions, was never raised in the trial court, including in Appellants’ post-trial motions. See id.; see also D.L. Forrey, 71 A. 3d at 919 (noting issues not preserved in post-trial motion are waived). Further, Appellants’ waiver of this issue was not cured by the inclusion of the issue in their supplemental Rule 1925 concise statement. See Diamond Reo Truck Co. v. Mid-Pacific Indus., 806 A.2d 423, 430 (Pa. Super. 2002) (noting that failure to preserve issues in post-trial documents cannot be - 12 - J-A19035-26 rectified by proffering them under Rule 1925). Accordingly, no relief is due on Appellants’ second issue. In their third issue, Appellants assert that the court wrongly prevented Appellants from admitting leases into the record that would have provided “critical” evidence of delay damages resulting from Appellee’s alleged failure to timely deliver the preliminary design. See Appellants’ Brief at 21-22. We conclude this issue, too, is waived. After our review, although we note that Appellants raised an issue relating to delay damages and admission of evidence in their post-trial motion, we conclude that Appellants’ claim on that point was too vague in that it failed to specifically raise the issue of admission of the leases into evidence. See Post-Trial Motion for Reconsideration, 6/5/25, at 10-12. Accordingly, we find that the issue relating to the admission of the leases is waived. 6 See D.L. Forrey, 71 A. 3d at 919; see also Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/25, at 8 (stating that “It is unclear what exactly Appellants are referring to here, as nothing in the record indicates that this [c]ourt ‘barred’ [Appellants] from raising these issues. The record does not support the claim that[,] at trial, the Appellants were barred from putting on evidence of their counterclaims and defenses. ____________________________________________ 6 In any event, even if not waived, we would decline to find Appellants’ proposed lease evidence critical to their case where they could testify to the nature of their delay damages, without specific reliance on the documentary leases. See Smith v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 55 A. 768, 768 (Pa. 1903) (concluding lay witnesses may testify regarding alleged damages where they possess sufficient knowledge to qualify them to offer intelligent estimate). - 13 - J-A19035-26 Without a more specific claim set forward in their [c]oncise [s]tatement, th[e trial c]ourt finds the claim to be meritless.”). Further, we observe that Appellants fail to cite to any relevant case law in connection with their claim regarding admission of evidence7 and fail to cite to the location in the record where they raised and preserved that evidentiary claim. See Piston v. Campbell, 62 A.3d 440, 444 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding claim waived where appellants failed to direct Court’s attention to record or case law supporting their assertion); Young v. S. B. Conrad, Inc., 216 A.3d 267, 274-75 (Pa. Super. 2019) (noting that appellant who does not follow Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) waives related issues due to brief defects); Pa.R.E. 103(a) (providing that party may claim error in admission of evidence only by preserving claim with timely and specific objection); Heffelfinger v. DDS, 342 A.3d 711, 720-21 (Pa. Super. 2025) (finding appellate evidentiary claim waived where not timely preserved at trial); Foster v. McKeesport Hospital, 394 A.2d 1031, 1032 (Pa. Super. 1978) (noting that objection to excluded evidence may be deemed waived if party acquiesces in exclusion without obtaining ruling by trial court). To the extent that Appellants now raise a claim relating to the court’s failure to permit amendment of their counterclaim, see Appellants’ Brief at 21, that issue is waived where it was not raised in Appellants’ statement of questions involved. See Koller Concrete, Inc. v. ____________________________________________ 7 For instance, the appellate standard of review for challenges to the court’s rulings on the admission of evidence is for an abuse of discretion. See Feldman v. CP Acquisitions 25, L.P., 325 A.3d 691, 713 (Pa. Super. 2024). - 14 - J-A19035-26 Tube City IMS, LLC, 115 A.3d 312, 320 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2015) (explaining that issue not explicitly raised in appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 2116 statement, or fairly suggested thereby, is waived). Accordingly, no relief is due on Appellants’ third issue. In their final issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in molding the verdict to include attorney fees on the ground that Appellee forfeited its right to invoke the contractual fee-shifting provision by breaching the parties’ contract. See Appellants’ Brief at 22-23. First, Appellants emphasize that Pennsylvania follows the “American Rule,” where attorney fees are generally not recoverable unless authorized by statute, court rule, or agreement. 8 See id. at 23. Second, Appellants allege that Appellee materially breached the contract by filing litigation in the court of common pleas rather than pursuing the mandatory arbitration provided for in the contract. See id. at 23-24. Appellants cite LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 639 (Pa. 2009), for the proposition that a party in material breach of a contract cannot enforce contractual provisions designed to benefit itself. See Appellants’ Brief at 23. Appellants further argue, relying on Keystone Tech. Group, Inc. v. Kerr Group, Inc., 824 A.2d 1226 (Pa. Super. 2003), and Kwalick v. Bosacco, 478 A.2d 50 (Pa. Super. 1984), that Appellee’s conduct ____________________________________________ 8 “Under the American Rule, applicable in Pennsylvania, a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse party unless there is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the parties, or some other established exception.” Trizechahn Gateway LLC v. Titus, 976 A.2d 474, 482-83 (Pa. 2009). - 15 - J-A19035-26 in pursuing litigation through trial and post-trial proceedings constitutes a waiver of all rights tied to the arbitration provision. See id. at 24-25. Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Appellee’s post-trial motion to mold the verdict without addressing this material breach argument and request vacatur of the attorney fees award. See id. We find no relief is due. The trial court explained that it granted the award of attorney fees when molding the verdict based on its interpretation of paragraph two of the “Terms of Payment” section of the parties’ contract. See Supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 1/14/26, at 2. The court found that the language of that paragraph—providing for recovery of legal expenses of collection related to overdue payments under the contract—was sufficiently broad to include recovery for related attorney fees.9 See id. at 2-3. The trial court further rejected Appellants’ claim that Appellee breached the contract, especially because it found Appellants’ claim regarding arbitration is waived for failure to include it in their preliminary objections. See id. at 3. Our standard of review for challenges to the interpretation of the terms of a contract is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 773 (Pa. 2009). Further, the reasonableness of an ____________________________________________ 9 The contractual provision cited by the court states, in relevant part, that “Legal action may be taken against accounts overdue sixty (60) days or more. Legal expenses for collection will be charged as a direct [e]xpense.” Complaint, 11/27/23, at Exhibit 1, at 6 (unpaginated). - 16 - J-A19035-26 award of attorney fees is a decision vested in the sound discretion of the trial court and will be changed by an appellate court only when there is a clear abuse of discretion. See Vinculum, Inc. v. Goli Techs., LLC, 310 A.3d 231, 242 (Pa. 2024). When reviewing contracts, we endeavor to ascertain the parties’ intent as manifested by the terms of the agreement. See Palmieri v. Partridge, 853 A.2d 1076, 1078 (Pa. Super. 2004). “If the express terms of the contract are clear, we determine the parties’ intent by the language employed in the agreement, not by the parties’ silent intentions.” Id. at 1079. Important to this case, Pennsylvania courts have found that certain broad contractual language concerning costs of collection warrants awarding attorney fees. See Wrenfield Homeowners Ass’n v. DeYoung, 600 A.2d 960, 963-64 (Pa. Super. 1991) (finding that contract providing for “costs of collection” includes attorney fees). After our review, we agree with the trial court’s analysis. See McMullen, 985 A.2d at 773. Indeed, based on the similarity to other cost collection clauses interpreted by Pennsylvania courts, we conclude that the expense collection language used by the parties in their contract similarly includes attorney fees in the instant case. See Complaint, 11/27/23, at Exhibit 1, at 6 (unpaginated); see also Wrenfield Homeowners Ass’n, 600 A.2d at 963-64. Further, we find, as did the trial court, that Appellants have - 17 - J-A19035-26 waived any10 argument regarding arbitration where they failed to raise that issue via preliminary objection and they acceded to the instant litigation until they received adverse rulings at trial, and Appellee would suffer unreasonable prejudice if relief were granted to Appellants on this basis. 11 See DiDonato v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 242 A.3d 312, 318-19 (Pa. Super. 2020) (discussing factors to consider when deciding whether party accepted judicial process to constitute waiver of claim to arbitration); see also Keystone Tech. Group, Inc., 824 A.2d at 1226 (noting that party’s conduct may constitute waiver of its right to enforce specific contractual provisions). Accordingly, we find no relief is due on Appellants’ fourth issue. Judgment affirmed. ____________________________________________ 10 Appellants assert that instead of a claim requesting to compel arbitration, their present issue pertains to Appellee’s breach of the arbitration provision as an alleged basis for recovery of attorney fees under the parties’ contract. See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 18-20. However, we conclude that Appellants’ dilatory conduct in acquiescing to the instant litigation until they received an unfavorable verdict after a trial, rather than protecting their rights and interests, results in waiver. See DiDonato v. Ski Shawnee, Inc., 242 A.3d 312, 318-19 (Pa. Super. 2020); see also Keystone Tech. Group, Inc., 824 A.2d at 1226. 11 Waiver is “a question of law, and, as such, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 260, 269 (Pa. 2020). - 18 - J-A19035-26 Date: 11/2/2026 - 19 -