United States v. Bayron-Ramos

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 25-1366 UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. CARLOS BAYRON-RAMOS, Defendant, Appellant. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. María Antongiorgi Jordán, U.S. District Judge] Before Barron, Chief Judge, Lipez and Rikelman, Circuit Judges. Samuel P. Carrión, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom Rachel Brill, Federal Public Defender, and Franco L. Pérez-Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellant. Jacob H. Larson, with whom W. Stephen Muldrow, U.S. Attorney, and Juan Carlos Reyes-Ramos, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee. November 10, 2026  PER CURIAM. A defendant taken into custody for allegedly violating a condition of supervised release is entitled to a prompt hearing to determine if probable cause supports the allegations. Appellant Carlos Bayron Ramos ("Bayron") admitted at such a hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico that probable cause existed for several alleged supervised- release violations. Based on statements that the district court made at a subsequent merits hearing, Bayron challenges the resulting revocation of his supervised release. He further challenges the top-of-the-Guidelines sentence of twenty-four months' imprisonment, plus three additional years of supervised release, that the district court imposed. We affirm the revocation of supervised release but vacate and remand the revocation sentence for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background A. Events Preceding the Final Revocation Hearing This case stems from Bayron's 2019 conviction, based on a guilty plea, for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine within a protected location. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 846, 860. Bayron was sentenced to time served and six years' supervised release. In 2023, he admitted violating the conditions of his supervised release barring the possession and use of controlled substances. As a result, he received an eighteen-month prison sentence and a new four-year term of - 2 - supervised release. In March 2025, eight months after Bayron began his second supervised-release term, his probation officer filed a motion asserting that Bayron had again violated conditions of his supervised release. The motion stated that he had tested positive for cocaine four times since December 2024, provided a diluted urine sample for one drug test, failed to attend seven scheduled appointments for mental health and substance abuse therapy, failed to inform his probation officer of an address change, acted aggressively toward his probation officer on one occasion, and, the same evening, had been arrested for possession of firearms while a rear passenger in a car driven by another convicted felon. In a supplemental motion filed the next day, the probation officer listed the firearms and ammunition found in the vehicle, a Hyundai, and stated that Bayron's firearms-related violation "trigger[ed] a mandatory revocation" of supervised release. At the preliminary revocation hearing before a magistrate judge, Bayron's counsel stated that they would not be contesting three positive drug tests and the missed therapy sessions,1 and the magistrate judge thus instructed the prosecutor 1 Defense counsel first informed the court that Bayron would not contest the drug tests. Then, after receiving and reviewing Bayron's treatment records before the hearing formally began, counsel stated that Bayron also "would not be contesting the no- shows to treatment." - 3 - that he did "not need to present evidence [on those violations] for probable cause purposes." In addition to finding probable cause for the uncontested violations, the magistrate judge found probable cause that Bayron was in constructive possession of two loaded firearms and ammunition found under the front passenger seat of the vehicle in which he had been riding in the backseat. According to a probation officer who testified at the preliminary hearing, one of the two firearms under the front seat was modified with a visible "chip" -- a device that would allow it to be fired automatically.2 The officer also testified at the preliminary hearing that the two guns would not have been visible from Bayron's 2 Near the end of the hearing, Bayron's attorney accurately pointed out that, contrary to testimony presented at the hearing, the probation motion listing Bayron's supervised release violations stated that the modified gun was found under the driver's seat rather than under the front passenger seat. Counsel argued that, because of that inconsistency, the magistrate judge should not find probable cause with respect to that firearm. The magistrate judge responded that the "point [was] well taken," but that the issue was one of credibility "that the [c]ourt takes into account but that does not necessarily mean that the [c]ourt has to discredit or completely disbelieve the testimony." The magistrate judge then reiterated its finding of probable cause for the two firearms that, according to the probation officer's testimony, were located under the front passenger seat. At the final revocation hearing, the same probation officer again testified that the modified firearm was found under the front passenger seat. That probation officer was called to the scene and participated in the search of the vehicle because he supervised the driver of the car, Jose Javier Rodriguez-Jamie. The probation officer also testified that Rodriguez-Jamie admitted "possessing or owning" that firearm. - 4 - position in the rear of the car.3 The magistrate judge did not find probable cause for Bayron's possession of a third firearm, located in the trunk of the car, or for nine loaded magazines that were in a bag on the floor near the driver's seat. Nor did the 3 The following exchange occurred during cross-examination of the officer at the preliminary hearing: DEFENSE COUNSEL: The firearms that you said were found under the passenger seat of the car, those were only revealed after you moved the seat. WITNESS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: The front passenger seat. WITNESS: Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: They would not have been visible to Mr. Bayron the way the seat was originally. WITNESS: I'm sorry, what's the question? DEFENSE COUNSEL: They were not visible the way the front passenger seat was positioned originally[?] WITNESS: Visible to who? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Visible to anyone. WITNESS: No. Earlier in the proceeding, during direct examination by the government, the probation officer responded as follows to a question about a photograph in evidence that was taken after he pushed the front passenger seat forward: "[Y]ou can see the rear and then you can see the plastic clear bag that was full with ammunitions and then you can see the bottom of a Coyote pistol." - 5 - magistrate judge find probable cause for the allegations of a fourth positive drug test, failure to appear for random drug testing on one occasion, provision of a diluted urine sample on another occasion, or failure to provide probation with a change of address.4 At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge stated the following: "[A]s to the matters that I have made a finding of probable cause, this matter is respectfully referred to the attention of [the district court] for the scheduling of a final revocation hearing." A few days later, and a day before the scheduled final revocation hearing, Bayron's counsel submitted an informative motion to the district court stating that Bayron would "contest all allegations of violations of supervised release for which the [magistrate judge] found 4The probation officer's original motion also listed a bag of cash found in the vehicle containing $1,613 in "different denominations of dollars." The magistrate judge noted that "having cash is not a crime" and then stated that "there's no evidence that those are drug proceeds or anything like that but to the extent that the parties need a ruling from the [c]ourt, I do not make a finding of probable cause as there was no testimony about that." However, the magistrate judge did find probable cause for several alleged violations in addition to the firearms under the passenger seat and the violations for which Bayron conceded probable cause: that Bayron had reacted aggressively when his probation officer suggested inpatient treatment for his substance-abuse problem, that he admitted verbally to using marijuana on March 18, 2025, and that he had been "in the company of a convicted felon" that evening. - 6 - probable cause at the preliminary revocation hearing." B. The Final Revocation Hearing At the outset of the final revocation hearing, the district court reviewed the background recounted above, noting Bayron's 2019 conviction, his prior supervised-release violations, and the findings of the magistrate judge at the recent preliminary hearing. The court then referred to the motion filed the previous day "inform[ing] that [Bayron] will be contesting all violations for which [the magistrate judge] had found probable cause, which includes the one[s] that he already said that he was not going to contest." The following exchange between the court and defense counsel then took place: COURT: So I'm asking the defense if you are contesting all violations or just the ones that you did not consent to and that probable cause was found by a magistrate judge. DEFENSE COUNSEL: All violations that [the magistrate judge] found probable cause for, even the ones we stipulated to at the preliminary hearing . . . . COURT: Very well. If you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing. You can call it a de novo hearing. And I'm going to allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, your honor, in that case, we would object to that because . . . this is a different standard. This is preponderance. This is . . . before a different fact finder. - 7 -  So, while I lodge my objection because I think that's incorrect, if that's the [c]ourt's position, then we would proceed only then with what the defense contested at the preliminary hearing. COURT: I'm sorry. Say that again. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So, given the [c]ourt's position, under objection, we will proceed with just the offenses for which we contested at the preliminary revocation hearing. Defense counsel then asked about a reference the judge made to a Grade A violation -- the most serious level of supervised-release violations, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1) -- in an effort to determine which of the alleged violations the judge believed would qualify as Grade A. The judge stated that, "if there is conduct that amounts to a state or federal offense, then, depending on the conduct, that might be a [G]rade A violation." In response, defense counsel emphasized that Bayron was entitled to notice of "what exactly is the [G]rade A violation that the government has alleged" and stated that the most serious allegation -- possession of firearms -- "would be a [G]rade B violation." The court stated that it would "take that into consideration in [its] final ruling," and the hearing then proceeded with witness testimony. The scope of the hearing came up three times during the proceeding. First, when it appeared the government was about to - 8 - elicit testimony about a positive drug test, the following exchange occurred: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Excuse me, your Honor. It was my understanding that we were not -- given the [c]ourt's ruling, we were not going to contest the positives. So I don't know if this line of direct is necessary. If we could just go to what's the issue. GOVERNMENT: In my response, your Honor, I'm happy to move on and move to something else if the defense is stipulating to that. Given that there is an objection to the way we're proceeding, I just don't want this to come back on appeal somehow and have to re-do it. So if the defendant wants to waive his right to appeal that particular issue, I'm happy to move on. But I don't want to create an issue on appeal later on as well. COURT: Yes, counsel. DEFENSE COUNSEL: No, your Honor. We're not going to waive that. But in the interests of expediency, given the [c]ourt's ruling, I have no issue with proceeding to what's at issue, obviously with our objection. COURT: All right. Then you can proceed. The government then elicited testimony from Bayron's supervising probation officer to confirm documentary evidence that Bayron had tested positive for cocaine on the three dates for which he had conceded probable cause5: December 20, 2024, and January 29 and March 14, 2025. The probation officer also reported that, on 5 The documents included the forms that Bayron signed admitting drug use. - 9 - March 18, 2025, Bayron admitted that he would test positive for marijuana if a sample were taken that day, acknowledged that he had not been going to treatment appointments, and reacted aggressively when she suggested the option of inpatient treatment. On cross-examination, the probation officer acknowledged that Bayron was not tested for drugs on March 18 and that she did not ask why he assumed his test would be positive that day.6 The scope of the hearing came up again during the testimony of the probation officer who supervised Rodriguez-Jamie, the driver of the car in which Bayron had been a passenger and the firearms and ammunition were found. When the government started to elicit testimony about the bag found near the driver's seat, defense counsel objected, observing that "[t]he magistrate judge found no probable cause as to the magazines that were in that bag. So I don't see the relevance of going into this." The government's attorney then expressed his "understanding . . . that the defense agreed to proceed on all of the allegations, including the ones that no probable cause were found." In response, defense counsel stated "that was not the defense's position. We objected, but we proceeded on what was found on probable cause." The court then said it would allow the question, which concerned the visibility 6The probation officer also acknowledged that the drug tests with positive results were performed locally and were not sent for confirmation to a national laboratory, which was the usual practice "if the patient does not admit the use." - 10 - of the bag's contents, "just so that I can have some background of what happened." The third reference to the scope of the hearing occurred when the government started to introduce evidence about the firearm in the trunk of the car. Defense counsel interjected: "Your Honor, just to the extent to move things along, there was no probable cause as to the trunk as well. So, if we're going to go down what's inside of the trunk, I would object as to relevance." Government counsel then said he would "move along," and he turned to questioning the probation officer about the items that were under the front passenger seat -- for which the magistrate judge had found probable cause. During that questioning, the officer stated that he "pushed the front seat just to see what was underneath, and then I pulled out the guns to have a better picture of how things were under the seat." Although he had earlier in the hearing answered "[y]es" when asked by the judge if someone "sitting in the back of the car[] could . . . see what was underneath" the front passenger seat, his testimony otherwise indicated that only the bag containing ammunition was visible, and only partially so.7 7 The probation officer testified that, before the car door was opened on the passenger side of the vehicle, he could see "a plastic bag under the passenger seat with ammunitions, yellow color." It is unclear from the testimony, however, whether the ammunition inside the bag was visible, or identifiable as such, before the bag was opened. When the court sought to clarify "what - 11 -  At the conclusion of the testimony, and following brief arguments by counsel, the district court took the case under advisement and scheduled another hearing to announce its decision on the violations and, if warranted, to impose sentence. C. The District Court's Findings At the outset of the continued final revocation hearing, the district court recapped the defendant's choice at the beginning [he] saw from outside the vehicle when the vehicle was closed," the officer referred to photographs that were in evidence: "We saw this plastic bag that is in the picture. I believe the parties have another picture where you can see just the bottom of the plastic bag. That is what I saw from outside of the car before opening the door." At one point during cross-examination, the officer agreed that, in one photograph taken when the car door was open, the plastic bag was visible, but it was not possible to determine if the contents were ammunition. The officer's testimony at the preliminary hearing was similarly imprecise. He had described the bag as "a plastic clear bag with ammunition, gold colored," but he did not say when he first recognized the bag's contents as ammunition. On cross-examination, the officer responded "[n]o" when asked by defense counsel if he could "see any bullets" in a photo showing the plastic bag "the way it looked when [the police] stopped the car." By contrast, as described above, see supra note 3, the probation officer testified unequivocally at the preliminary hearing that the firearms were visible only after he moved the front passenger seat forward. And he confirmed that account at the final hearing. He first confirmed in response to questioning from defense counsel that "the butt of a firearm" was visible when the front seat was moved forward, and he subsequently agreed that he had pushed the front seat forward "to reveal these firearms." He explained that he "pushed the front seat just to see what was underneath, and then [he] pulled out the guns to have a better picture of how things were under the seat." Earlier in that hearing, the officer said the items under the seat were "reachable" without difficulty. - 12 - of the previous proceeding: I am just going to say for the record, to have the record clear, that before we began the final revocation hearing last week, [d]efendant had informed that he intended to contest all the . . . probable cause findings made by the magistrate judge . . . , including those that he stated to the magistrate judge that he was not going to contest. The [c]ourt ruled at that moment that if that was going to be the case, the [c]ourt was going to allow the government to present evidence as to all violations. The defendant objected. And then he stated that if that was going to be the case, then he was not going to contest the violations which he had not contested before the magistrate judge. After obtaining defense counsel's agreement that the court had accurately described the scenario, the court went on to list the violations that Bayron had agreed not to contest and noted that, despite that agreement, "the government, in an abundance of caution, decided to present evidence as to all of those." The court then stated its finding that "the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [d]efendant possessed and used illicit substances on December 20, 2024, January 29, 2025, and March 14th, 2025" -- i.e., the three conceded positive-test-result dates. In support of its finding, the court cited the testimony of Bayron's probation officer and "forms that were signed by the defendant showing the accuracy of the positive - 13 - test results."8 It then noted that Bayron "did not introduce any evidence that called these facts into question." The court went on to say that, by statute, "three failed drug tests within a year span require mandatory revocation"9 and that "case law is clear that when conducting a revocation hearing, a positive test is sufficient to show that the defendant possessed the drugs." The court also found that, by missing a number of therapy appointments, Bayron violated the mandatory condition that he participate in a mental health treatment program. For that violation, the court cited the testimony of Bayron's probation officer and noted that "[d]efendant introduced no evidence that called that fact into question." However, the court found that "the government ha[d] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [Bayron] possessed firearms or committed a federal, state[,] or local crime."10 The court concluded that "the weapons and the 8 The probation officer's original motion stated that Bayron had admitted using cocaine and had signed "drug admission forms." 9 In fact, the statute the court cited -- 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4) -- calls for mandatory revocation if the defendant tests positive "more than 3 times over the course of 1 year." (Emphasis added.) 10 Despite Bayron's drug use, the court evidently found no violation of the condition barring Bayron from committing another offense -- at least initially, see infra Section I.D -- because the government had failed to prove the specific crime cited in the probation officer's motion as a basis for finding a violation of - 14 - ammunitions" found under the front passenger seat of the Hyundai were visible from where Bayron was sitting and, hence, the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Bayron "knew the weapons were in the car."11 But, the court stated, the government had not adduced evidence showing that Bayron intended to exercise control over them as needed to establish "constructive possession of the firearms in question, which would have been a [g]rade A violation." The court then summed up that Bayron violated "two of the three conditions of supervised release that were challenged"12 -- presumably meaning the positive drug tests and missed therapy appointments, but not the gun possession -- and found "a basis in fact to have the term of that condition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of firearms by a felon. In drawing that conclusion, the court stated that the 11 probation officer had "testified that the plastic bag with the ammunition was in plain view, but, most importantly, that the weapons and the ammunitions were clearly seen from the backseat, behind the passenger seat, where the defendant was sitting." Given the testimony recounted above, see supra notes 3 & 7, we think the court's finding on the visibility of the weapons was clearly erroneous. That error, however, plays no role in our analysis of the issues before us in this appeal. Although the court referred to "the three conditions of 12 supervised release that were challenged," two of the violations the court had just addressed were those Bayron had agreed -- over objection -- not to challenge. In addition, as described above, see supra note 4, the magistrate judge had found other violations supported by probable cause, and Bayron had said he was challenging all such violations. But we think it clear enough that the court was referring here to the three alleged violations for which it had just announced findings. - 15 - supervised release revoked." The court then invited defense counsel to speak before the sentence was imposed. Counsel pointed out that the statute cited by the court for mandatory revocation requires more than three positive drug tests, and he urged the court to consider the option of an inpatient drug treatment program rather than incarceration. In support of either no prison time or a downward departure from the applicable Guidelines range, counsel emphasized Bayron's longstanding struggle with substance abuse, noting that "[m]ost of Mr. Bayron's relapses . . . have really only harmed himself," and that his criminal history involves drug-related conduct to support his addiction. Bayron then spoke on his own behalf, acknowledging his addiction and observing that if he were "given the opportunity to get the therapies, either outpatient or internal, . . . [he] would be very much better than . . . in jail" and "would still have an opportunity to continue with [his] work." A brief discussion then followed in which the scope of the hearing again came up. The district court realized that it had erroneously stated the dates of Bayron's missed therapy appointments, and, in making a correction, listed the seven dates specified in the probation officer's original motion alleging supervised release violations. Defense counsel then noted that Bayron had told him that, on some of those dates, he was hospitalized, but acknowledged that "we didn't offer anything - 16 - during the hearing." Nonetheless, counsel continued that his memory was that there was no testimony at the final revocation hearing "about these particular dates," and he reiterated his request that, instead of a prison sentence, Bayron be sent to "an intensive inpatient [program], where he can be monitored and treated under the highest conditions." In response, the court said the following: Just to have the record clear, . . . there was indeed testimony as to that.13 But not only that, Counsel, these are . . . some of the findings from the magistrate judge that you said that you were not contesting. Defense counsel responded: "Understood." Given a turn to speak, the prosecutor noted Bayron's history of repeated drug use and urged a top-of-the-range sentence of twenty-four months, which he described as "reasonable given the history, given who he was with and what was in the vehicle." The prosecutor stated his belief that the high-end sentence was justified because "as [the court] found, he knew those firearms and that ammunition were there." 13 Bayron argues in his reply brief that, contrary to the district court's assertion, defense counsel accurately recalled that there was no testimony at the final revocation hearing on the specific dates that Bayron missed treatment appointments. Specifically, he asserts that "[t]hose dates . . . appear only in the probation officer's unsworn petition to revoke supervised release." - 17 - D. The Sentencing Pronouncement Concluding that the violations warranted revoking Bayron's supervised release, the district court determined that the guideline for a Grade B violation applied and that, accordingly, the applicable imprisonment range was eighteen-to- twenty-four months. The court said that he had "incurred in a violation of the conditions of supervision involving conduct that amounts to a state or federal offense, which [is] illegal possession of controlled substances." It stated that "[o]ther violations include the use of illegal substances and failure to commit to mental health and substance abuse treatment." After noting Bayron's prior revocation, the court explained its chosen sentence as follows: This time, . . . violations occurred . . . within nine months of Mr. Bayron's commencing his second supervised release term. In this occasion, once again, he faces violations regarding possession and use of illegal substances and failure to commit to treatment. But, in addition, in this instance, he got inside a car in which two Glock pistols with ammunition were visible and accessible to him, which constitute[s] relevant conduct only for purposes of assessing his poor prognosis of rehabilitation and overall attitude with compliance of supervision. Given the seriousness of the offenses, the defiant and disrespectful attitude towards the probation officer, the fact that this is his second revocation in two years, the second one only nine months after he commenced his second supervised release term, his lack of - 18 -  respect for the law and [c]ourt orders[,] and his poor prognosis of rehabilitation, which are all intangibles not considered by the sentencing guidelines, coupled with the nature of the violations, the [c]ourt deems that a sentence in the upper end of the applicable guidelines is a sentence that is not harsher than necessary. The court then imposed the twenty-four-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a new three-year term of supervised release. II. The Coercion Challenge We begin with Bayron's challenge to the district court's decision to revoke his supervised release. Bayron argues that the district court erred by forcing him to choose between waiving his right to contest the drug and missed-treatment allegations or defending against all allegations, including the firearm charges for which the magistrate judge found no probable cause. As we recounted above, the colloquy at issue went as follows: The district court asked the defense "if [it was] contesting all violations or just the ones that [it] did not consent to and that probable cause was found by a magistrate judge." Defense counsel answered: "All violations that [the magistrate judge] found probable cause for, even the ones we stipulated to at the preliminary hearing." The district court responded: "Very well. If you are going to assume that position, it's going to be then a brand new hearing. You can call it a de novo hearing. And I'm going to allow the government then to offer - 19 - proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause." This comment prompted the following objection: "Well, your Honor, in that case, we would object to that because . . . this is a different standard. This is preponderance. This is . . . before a different fact finder." Bayron contends on appeal that "[b]ecause the district court here did not permit [him] to contest all the alleged violations at issue without facing exposure for an allegation that had already been dismissed for lack of probable cause, he was denied adequate process in violation of the Constitution and Rule 32.1." He further argues that the District Court's presentation of the choice "between waiving his right to contest the allegations at issue under Rule 32.1(b)(2) or fac[ing] potential culpability for a previously dismissed firearm possession allegation . . . rendered his waiver involuntary." We review a district court's decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion when the challenge to that decision is preserved. United States v. Navarro-Santisteban, 83 F.4th 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2023). Our review is de novo when a defendant alleges a denial of due process or an error of law in a decision to revoke supervised release and the challenge is preserved. United States v. Ortiz-Rodríguez, 177 F.4th 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2026). - 20 -  The government urges us to find that Bayron "did not preserve his claim on appeal that the court violated his Fifth Amendment and Rule 32.1 rights to contest evidence or that his decision to waive those rights was involuntary." Therefore, the government argues, we "should review that claim, if at all, for plain error only." We need not resolve this question because we conclude that Bayron's coercion claim fails under a lower standard of review given the limited arguments he has made to us for concluding otherwise. Importantly, Bayron notes that "the government is correct that a district court retains authority to review a magistrate judge’s findings" and that he has "never contended otherwise." This concession makes it difficult to understand the basis for his coercion-based challenge on appeal, at least when we consider the fact that the district court stated that it was "going to allow the government then to offer proof as to all violations, even including the ones that the magistrate judge didn't find probable cause" (emphasis added), and did not state that it was going to require or encourage the government to do so. To be sure, Bayron claims that "[t]he issue here is not, as the government contends, whether the district could theoretically review the magistrate judge’s findings; it is whether the court could use the threat of that review to coerce the abandonment of a separate, independent right." But Bayron - 21 - does not offer any developed reasoning to explain why we must conclude that the district court's statements about future proceedings that it was concededly authorized to conduct constituted a "threat" of review that "coerce[d] the abandonment of a separate, independent right." Nor does Bayron identify any authority that speaks to whether that conclusion about the nature of those statements is required. For example, Bayron cites to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), in seeming support of this challenge. But that precedent establishes only that he had the right to contest the supervised release violation allegations. It does not shed any light on whether it was appropriate for the district court to say what it said in the colloquy at issue. Similarly, Bayron cites United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003), for the conclusion that the waiver of rights in this context must be voluntary, which no one disputes. And, while Bayron also attempts to use Correa-Torres to support the dispositive nub of his claim -- that the choice he faced made his waiver involuntary -- we fail to see how that precedent provides support for Bayron's contention. The analysis in Correa-Torres focused largely on the "knowing" part of the "knowing and voluntary" requirement. Because Bayron's challenge is to voluntariness, not knowledge, we fail to see much in the opinion to support his argument. To the extent - 22 - Correa-Torres did analyze voluntariness, we concluded that the waiver was involuntary because it "yielded [the defendant] no discernible benefit." Id. at 24-25. As to that particular conclusion, Bayron has failed to explain how the facts of that case map on here. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Bayron has shown that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his supervised release because he has not established legal or constitutional error in the district court's actions. Thus, his coercion claim fails even assuming that it is preserved.14 III. The Sentencing Challenge Bayron asserts that the district court also erred when it imposed a twenty-four-month sentence based, in part, on certain factors that are off-limits when a court sentences a defendant to a term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release. In Esteras v. United States, the Supreme Court examined the statutory provisions that govern sentencing for a defendant's original crime and for violating conditions of supervised release. See 606 U.S. at 191-93 (comparing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)). 14 Although Bayron has failed to develop an argument that persuades us on the merit