Butlak v. Dhs
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-1501
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-1501 Document: 53 Page: 1 Filed: 11/18/2026
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
GEOFFREY BUTLAK,
Petitioner
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondent
______________________
2025-1501
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. AT-0752-23-0120-I-1.
______________________
Decided: November 18, 2026
______________________
JEFF T. SCHRAMECK, Schrameck Law, PLLC, Canton,
MI, argued for petitioner.
JANA MOSES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by ELIZABETH
MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
Before LOURIE, REYNA, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
Case: 25-1501 Document: 53 Page: 2 Filed: 11/18/2026
2 BUTLAK v. DHS
HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
Geoffrey Butlak petitions for review of a final decision
of the Merit Systems Protection Board, which denied re-
view of his removal for lack of candor and conduct unbe-
coming an officer. Because Mr. Butlak does not identify
any error, we affirm.
I
Mr. Butlak served as a Customs and Border Protection
Officer with the Department of Homeland Security. On
April 26, 2022, Mr. Butlak was scheduled to work in the
Nashville Global Entry Enrollment Center (GEEC) begin-
ning at 1:00 pm.
Shortly before his shift, Mr. Butlak called a fellow of-
ficer, Ms. Cote, to inform her that he was headed to Nash-
ville Federal Inspection (FIS) in case anyone was looking
for him. Ms. Cote then informed another officer, Mr. Fer-
guson, of Mr. Butlak’s intended destination. As a result,
Mr. Ferguson called Mr. Butlak to inform him that he was
expected to report to the GEEC, not the FIS. Mr. Butlak
responded that he was running 15 minutes late for his shift
due to traffic, so he asked Mr. Ferguson to tell the GEEC
Port Director, Mr. Allen, that he had mistakenly reported
to the FIS.
Mr. Butlak arrived at the GEEC at 1:18 pm. Shortly
thereafter, Mr. Allen emailed Mr. Butlak, directing him to
input leave for being late. Mr. Butlak contested this re-
quest, explaining that he “showed up to the FIS not know-
ing [he] was in GE[EC].” J.A. 3. To verify Mr. Butlak’s
excuse, Mr. Allen obtained FIS video surveillance and at-
tendance logs, which revealed that Mr. Butlak had never
reported to the FIS.
In August 2022, the agency’s Discipline Review Board
proposed removing Mr. Butlak based on two
charges: (1) lack of candor, for fabricating the reason be-
hind his tardiness, and (2) conduct unbecoming a customs
Case: 25-1501 Document: 53 Page: 3 Filed: 11/18/2026
BUTLAK v. DHS 3
and border protection officer, for asking Mr. Ferguson to lie
on his behalf. J.A. 38–39. The deciding official sustained
the charges, and Mr. Butlak appealed to the Board.
An administrative judge of the Board ordered the par-
ties to submit stipulated facts and respective witness lists
in advance of the hearing. Mr. Butlak’s submission con-
tained two items of note. First, Mr. Butlak’s stipulation
stated that he “asked [Mr.] Ferguson to inform Port Direc-
tor Allen that he had reported to the FIS.” J.A. 432. Sec-
ond, Mr. Butlak’s witness list did not include
Mr. Ferguson. J.A. 435. The agency’s list did. J.A. 448. Af-
ter receiving the parties’ submissions, the administrative
judge denied the agency’s request to call Mr. Ferguson, rea-
soning that Mr. Butlak had stipulated “to attempting to in-
fluence this witness as alleged by the agency.” J.A. 46.
After the hearing, the administrative judge issued an
initial decision affirming the agency’s removal of Mr. But-
lak, finding that the agency proved both charges by prepon-
derant evidence and that removal was a reasonable
penalty. J.A. 4–6, 9–11. Mr. Butlak filed a petition for re-
view, which the Board denied in its final order affirming
the initial decision. J.A. 21. Mr. Butlak timely appeals, and
we have jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) and
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
II
We affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(c).
On appeal, Mr. Butlak argues that the administrative
judge abused his discretion in excluding Mr. Ferguson as a
witness and erred in finding the removal penalty reasona-
ble.
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4 BUTLAK v. DHS
A
We first address Mr. Butlak’s argument that excluding
Mr. Ferguson from testifying amounted to an abuse of dis-
cretion. Mr. Butlak alleges that the exclusion of Mr. Fergu-
son was premised on an impermissible expansion of his
stipulation. Pet. Br. 13. Mr. Butlak explains that he had
only stipulated to having “asked [Mr.] Ferguson to inform
Port Director Allen that he had reported to the FIS,” yet
the administrative judge denied Mr. Ferguson as a witness
on the basis that Mr. Butlak already “admit[ted] to at-
tempting to influence this witness.” Id. (emphasis added).
According to Mr. Butlak, “asking” someone to relay infor-
mation is markedly different from “attempting to influ-
ence” someone. Not so. We agree with the Board that
“asking an individual to do something is an attempt to in-
fluence, a solicitation, and an attempt to involve the indi-
vidual in whatever is being asked.” J.A. 22. “A
determination to allow or exclude witness testimony is
within the sound discretion of the administrative judge.”
Guise v. Dep’t of Just., 330 F.3d 1376, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2003). The administrative judge did not abuse his discre-
tion. 1
1 Mr. Butlak also argues that the alleged expansion of
his stipulation constitutes a violation of due process be-
cause he was given no notice that his stipulation would be
later characterized as an “attempt to influence” or that this
characterization would be relied upon to exclude a witness.
Pet. Br. 14–15. We disagree. We find that Mr. Butlak fails
to raise an issue of due process because the administrative
judge did not rely upon any new information of which
Mr. Butlak was entitled to receive notice. Cf. Young
v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 706 F.3d 1372, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“When an employer obtains new and ma-
terial information through ex parte communications, an
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BUTLAK v. DHS 5
Mr. Butlak also contends that, because Mr. Ferguson
is the only individual with first-hand knowledge of their
phone call, the exclusion of Mr. Ferguson’s testimony de-
prived Mr. Butlak of the ability to effectively defend his
case. Pet. Br. 14. Mr. Butlak explains that Mr. Ferguson’s
testimony could have provided further detail as to the
“scope and intent of [his] stipulation,” such that the admin-
istrative judge may not have characterized Mr. Butlak’s
conduct as a “scheme” or a “solicitation of another officer.”
Id. And since these unrebutted characterizations served as
the basis for his removal, Mr. Butlak argues that Mr. Fer-
guson’s exclusion constitutes outcome-determinative error.
Id. We disagree. Mr. Butlak stipulated to having “asked”
Mr. Ferguson to relay false information. J.A. 432. Mr. But-
lak does not, and cannot, identify anything that Mr. Fergu-
son could have said to alter the outcome of his case. No
testimony can alter the reality that asking another to lie is
the same as “attempting to encourage another to partici-
pate in his lie.” J.A. 6. Therefore, not only does Mr. Butlak
fail to show an abuse of discretion, but he also fails to per-
suasively identify any resulting harm. See Curtin v. Off. of
Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[Peti-
tioner] must prove that the error caused substantial harm
or prejudice to his rights which could have affected the out-
come of the case.”).
B
We now turn to the purported deficiencies in the ad-
ministrative judge’s determination that removal of
Mr. Butlak was a reasonable penalty for his conduct.
employee’s constitutional due process guarantee of no-
tice . . . are undermined.” (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted)). Rather, the administrative judge appropriately relied
on a reasonable characterization of the parties’ agreed
upon facts.
Case: 25-1501 Document: 53 Page: 6 Filed: 11/18/2026
6 BUTLAK v. DHS
Mr. Butlak first challenges the administrative judge’s
finding of potential Giglio impairment as an aggravating
factor in his penalty assessment. 2 Mr. Butlak argues that
this potential Giglio impairment finding is not supported
by the record because it rests on the administrative judge’s
finding of a “scheme,” which is a characterization that itself
is not supported by the record. Pet. Br. 17. We disagree.
Mr. Butlak admitted that he made an “intentional decision
to lie,” J.A. 433, and that he involved another officer while
doing so, see J.A. 432. There is no material difference be-
tween involving another in an “intentional decision to lie,”
J.A. 433, and a “deceitful scheme,” J.A. 10 n.2, so we reject
Mr. Butlak’s attempt to differentiate the two.
Mr. Butlak challenges the potential Giglio impairment
finding for another reason. He contends that the “CBP Gi-
glio Policy requires an individualized assessment of
whether misconduct renders an employee unfit to serve in
a law enforcement position,” so the administrative judge’s
failure to order such an assessment is legal error. Pet.
Br. 17. But Mr. Butlak misunderstands this policy. The
CBP Giglio policy sets forth procedures on how to disclose
potential witness credibility issues to prosecutors in ad-
vance of a criminal proceeding. J.A. 88–95. The policy does
not opine on officer removal proceedings, much less require
an “individualized assessment” before the Board may find
2 Giglio v. United States provides that “[w]hen the reli-
ability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt
or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibil-
ity” of this witness violates Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
The Board therefore considers an agent “Giglio-impaired”
if “there is potential impeachment evidence that would ren-
der the agent’s testimony of marginal value in a case.” Ben-
nett v. Dep’t of Just., 119 M.S.P.R. 685, 688 n.2 (2013)
(citation omitted).
Case: 25-1501 Document: 53 Page: 7 Filed: 11/18/2026
BUTLAK v. DHS 7
potential Giglio impairment. See J.A. 88–95. We therefore
decline to disturb the administrative judge’s aggravation
finding on this ground.
Mr. Butlak also argues that the administrative judge
erred in his penalty analysis by failing to consider the com-
parators Mr. Butlak submitted. Pet. Br. 19. Mr. Butlak
contends that failure to analyze comparators violates the
administrative judge’s obligation to consider the con-
sistency factor as set forth in Douglas v. Veterans Admin-
istration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981). Id. at 19–20. But
“[w]e have not required that each and every factor of the
twelve Douglas factors be considered. We have only re-
quired that the penalty selected be reasonable when con-
sidered against the relevant factors.” Hansen v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 911 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (cita-
tion omitted). Here, Mr. Butlak’s submitted comparators
are not analogous and therefore irrelevant. He highlights
three cases, each of which involve a lack-of-candor charge
that was not sustained. See Pet. Br. 19. In contrast, not
only was Mr. Butlak’s lack-of-candor charge sustained, but
also a second charge—of conduct unbecoming—was sus-
tained. We therefore find that Mr. Butlak fails to demon-
strate reversible error in the administrative judge’s
decision on this basis.
III
We have considered Mr. Butlak’s other arguments and
find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.