Seligman Liberty Station v. City of San Diego CA3

Filed 10/23/26 Seligman Liberty Station v. City of San Diego CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) SELIGMAN LIBERTY STATION, LLC et al., C101420 Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 34-2022- v. 80003837-CU-WM-GDS) CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendants and Respondents. Plaintiffs and appellants Seligman Liberty Station, LLC, et al. (collectively referred to as the plural Seligman), petitioned for a writ of mandate requiring respondent City of San Diego (City) to sell certain specified properties the City had retained as “future development” properties following the dissolution of California’s redevelopment agencies. (See Assem. Bill No. 26 (2011-2012 1st Ex. Sess.) enacted by Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012, chs. 5-6 (Assembly Bill No. 1X 26); see also Assem. Bill No. 1484 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) enacted by Stats. 2012, ch. 26, §§ 6-35 (Assembly No. Bill 1484).) 1 The trial court granted Seligman’s petition for writ of mandate in part and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City to take certain actions with respect to the retained subject properties. 1 We refer to the cumulative operation of Assembly Bill No. 1x 26 and Assembly Bill No. 1484 as the Dissolution Law. 1  Seligman filed a postjudgment motion for attorney fees. The trial court found that Seligman were entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5,2 but it awarded fees in an amount substantially less than the amount Seligman sought. In this appeal from the order awarding attorney fees, Seligman contend the court abused its discretion when it awarded fees in a reduced amount. No abuse of discretion appears, and therefore we will affirm the order. BACKGROUND Dissolution Law The California Supreme Court has explained the history of redevelopment in this state and the events leading to the demise of former redevelopment agencies, and we need not repeat that detailed explanation here. (California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 242-252.) It suffices to say that in 2011, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1X 26, which dissolved all redevelopment agencies in California and transferred their assets to successor agencies. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34172, subd. (a)(1) & (b), 34173, subd. (a); Assem. Bill No. 1X 26, § 7.) Among other things, successor agencies were required to expeditiously wind down the affairs of and dispose of all assets and properties of the former redevelopment agency, and transfer proceeds from asset sales to the county auditor-controller for distribution to the taxing entities. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34177, subds. (d), (e), (g), (h), 34181, subd. (a), 34188.) In 2012, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1484, which required successor agencies to prepare a long-range property management plan addressing the disposition and use of the real properties of the former redevelopment agency; the plan was required 2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 2 to be submitted for approval to the “oversight board” and the Department of Finance. 3 (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34191.3, 34191.5.) The law as amended required the liquidation and sale of all non-housing assets and properties of the dissolved redevelopment agency unless the property fell within one of three exceptions identified in the long-range property management plan: (1) properties retained for governmental use; (2) properties retained to fulfill an enforceable obligation; and (3) properties retained for future development. (Id., § 34191.5, subd. (c)(2).) For properties temporarily retained by the city or successor agency for future development, the Legislature required the city or successor agency to enter into a compensation agreement with the affected taxing entities to provide the taxing entities with payments in proportion to their shares of the base property tax for the value of the retained property. (Id., §§ 34180, subd. (f), 34191.5, subd. (c)(2)(A)(iii).) The Long Range Plan and The Seligman Parcels The City of San Diego Redevelopment Agency was dissolved in 2012 as a result of the enactment of the Dissolution Law; the City was designated as the successor agency. In 2015, the City finalized, and the Department of Finance and oversight board approved, the City’s long-range property management plan (Long Range Plan). With respect to future development properties, the Long Range Plan provided that the City would execute a compensation agreement with the affected taxing entities in exchange for the transfer of each future development property to the City in accordance with the Long Range Plan. The Long Range Plan further provided that the City reserved the right to transfer ownership of any future development property back to the successor agency for prompt liquidation in the event the City was unable to execute a compensation agreement with the affected taxing entities. 3 An oversight board has supervisory power over successor agencies. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 34171, subd. (f), 34179.) 3  The Long Range Plan identified 22 properties to be retained for future development. According to a 2019 memorandum authored by the city attorney, in mid- 2016 the City was unable to negotiate a “master” compensation agreement with the affected taxing entities for the 22 future development properties. The City subsequently recategorized 10 of the future development properties to liquidation sites and sold them, and it entered into compensation agreements for three others. In November 2018, Seligman acquired a ground leasehold interest in several parcels contained within one of the future development properties that had been retained by the City and was lacking a compensation agreement (Seligman Parcels). In 2021, Seligman unsuccessfully attempted to purchase the City’s leased fee interest in the Seligman Parcels. Seligman’s Petition for Writ of Mandate In March 2022, Seligman filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging that the City violated the Dissolution Law by retaining at least 26 properties it was legally required to sell (which they referred to as the Wrongfully Retained Properties), including the Seligman Parcels, and had failed to meaningfully attempt to develop or sell the sites or enter into compensation agreements. Seligman requested that the trial court issue a writ directing the City to recategorize the subject properties from “future development” to “liquidation/sale,” to transfer title to the subject properties to the successor agency, and for the successor agency to expeditiously sell the subject properties and disburse the net sale proceeds to the affected taxing entities. Seligman further requested that the court retain continuing jurisdiction until the subject properties had been sold and the proceeds transferred, and for “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.” Seligman attached the Long Range Plan to the petition. The parties filed briefs in advance of the hearing. Seligman’s brief requested relief similar to that sought in the petition, and further proposed an extensive and specific process for the sale of the subject properties. In opposition, the City argued in part that it 4 did not have a duty to sell any property, the Dissolution Law did not establish a time frame for entering into compensation agreements, Seligman’s requested relief would violate the Dissolution Law and the Long Range Plan, and forcing it to sell the subject properties would amount to a windfall for Seligman and a substantial loss for everyone else. Trial Court Ruling The trial court issued a tentative ruling rejecting the City’s affirmative defenses and agreeing in part with Seligman. The court agreed with the City that the Dissolution Law did not mandate any particular time frame within which a compensation agreement must be reached for a future development property, but it observed that interpreting the Dissolution Law to impose no deadline for negotiating compensation agreements would render the language directing a city to negotiate such agreements effectively meaningless. The court noted there was no evidence that the City had taken any action to negotiate a compensation agreement (after the failure to enter into a master compensation agreement in mid-2016) or liquidate any of the subject properties in the eight years after the approval of the Long Range Plan, and thus there was no indication that the City had “complied with its obligation to exercise its discretion to either pursue Compensation Agreements or transfer specific Future Development properties for liquidation.” The trial court concluded that Seligman had not demonstrated entitlement to any of the specific relief prayed for in the petition for writ of mandate. However, based on the petition’s request for “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper,” the court determined that the City had a mandatory duty to begin exercising in good faith its discretion to either actively pursue compensation agreements or transfer ownership of the subject properties for which compensation agreements could not be 5 reached. 4 The court’s tentative ruling declined Seligman’s request that it retain jurisdiction over the matter until compensation agreements were reached or the subject properties were sold. On October 2, 2023, after the hearing, the trial court issued its final ruling. The court noted Seligman’s argument, made at the hearing, that the relief outlined in the tentative ruling was insufficient, and that the court should either: (1) require the City to transfer the subject properties to the successor agency because the “ ‘reasonable time’ ” for negotiating compensation agreements had passed; (2) provide a deadline for the City to reach compensation agreements for the subject properties, or; (3) retain jurisdiction until the City had completed negotiation of all compensation agreements or had transferred the properties for which compensation agreements could not be reached to the successor agency for liquidation. The court declined to adopt Seligman’s recommendations, and instead modified its tentative ruling to order the City to make and file a return within 60 days after issuance of the writ, and each 60 days thereafter, setting forth what it had done to comply therewith. The court retained jurisdiction over the matter until it received and granted a request to discharge the writ. The trial court incorporated its ruling into the judgment and subsequently issued the writ. No party filed an appeal. Seligman’s Motion for Attorney Fees Seligman filed a postjudgment motion for attorney fees. They claimed $322,798.50 in fees for 442.2 attorney hours and 71.8 paralegal hours, plus anticipated time for preparation of the reply brief and attending the hearing, pursuant to section 4 The trial court excepted certain sites that were held by the successor agency, not the City. 6 1021.5, 5 the common fund doctrine, and the substantial benefit theory. The motion noted that Seligman had been represented throughout the litigation by two attorneys, “one of whom took ‘senior counsel’ or ‘of counsel’ status and has recently retired from the practice of law.” Declarations filed in support of the motion by Seligman’s two attorneys, William Ihrke and Jeffrey Oderman, clarified that Oderman had gone on inactive status with the California Bar Association on February 1, 2023. Oderman attached as an exhibit to his declaration detailed records of the time he spent working on the case after he went on inactive status. In opposition to Seligman’s motion, the City argued that Seligman was not the prevailing party because it did not obtain the relief sought in the petition, and that Seligman’s fees were duplicative and unreasonable. Trial Court’s Attorney Fees Award The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting Seligman’s attorney fee motion in part under section 1021.5. The court noted that although Seligman did not obtain the relief requested, and indeed had argued that the relief the court granted was insufficient, Seligman had prevailed because the court issued a writ of mandate directing the City to take action with respect to the subject properties, and the relief granted was directly related to the issues raised by the petition. The court added that the litigation “resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, and a significant benefit has been conferred on the persons living in the San Diego area.” 5 As we set forth in greater detail in the Discussion, section 1021.5 provides that a court may award attorney fees to a successful party under certain circumstances “in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest.” 7  Turning to the amount of fees, the trial court deemed it appropriate to award fees in an amount significantly less than the amount requested. First, the court denied compensation for time Oderman spent working on the case after going on inactive status, observing that Seligman “buried this fact in Mr. Oderman’s declaration” and did not cite any authority supporting the proposition that time spent by an attorney on inactive status was compensable. The court calculated the amount of fees requested for hours Oderman spent working on the case after going on inactive status to be $108,080. Second, the trial court applied a negative multiplier to the remaining requested fees because Seligman was “only moderately ‘successful’ in the litigation” and had significantly over-litigated what the court considered to be “a fairly straight-forward statutory construction matter.” Specifically, the court found that Seligman had over- litigated the case by: (1) spending seven pages of their 59-page opening brief describing the subject properties, although little of that information was relevant to the court’s analysis; (2) filing an objection to a notice of joinder on the basis that the party was attempting to be relieved of its default, although default judgment was not permitted in a petition for writ of mandate; (3) repeatedly arguing that the future development properties were “ ‘wrongly’ ” identified as such, and subsequently clarifying that they were not asking the court to determine that the properties were improperly classified as future development properties; and (4) repeatedly arguing that many of the properties were fully developed, while acknowledging that the development status of the properties was irrelevant to their claims. The court tentatively awarded Seligman 20 percent of the remaining fees sought after denying the request as to Oderman’s time spent after going on inactive status, or $42,943.70. Following a hearing, the trial court issued its final ruling. The court observed that Seligman did not challenge its decision to deny the motion as to the hours Oderman spent working on the case after he went on inactive status. It noted, however, that Seligman challenged its decision to reduce the remaining requested award of $214,718.50 by 80 8 percent, and had argued that the application of any negative multiplier constituted reversible error. The court determined that reduction of a fee award is not an abuse of discretion where a party is partially successful in a matter resulting in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public. It pointed to Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 761 at page781, in which the court stated that “ ‘degree of success is a “crucial factor” ’ for the determination of reasonableness of attorney’s fees.” The court reasoned that while Seligman was entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5 for having enforced an important right, Seligman did not achieve any of the relief sought in the petition, 6 and accordingly had not obtained “excellent results,” but rather very limited relief in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole. Finally, the trial court agreed with Seligman’s argument at the hearing that further award should be permitted for time spent reviewing records, although it determined that the time spent reviewing records was disproportionate to Seligman’s success in the litigation. Accordingly, the court awarded compensation for 14 hours of Oderman’s time spent reviewing records while on active status, and it awarded Seligman 25 percent of their requested fees, or $53,679.63. The court entered its order granting an award of attorney fees consistent with its final ruling. Seligman timely filed a notice of appeal. DISCUSSION Seligman contend the trial court abused its discretion by determining: (1) unlicensed attorneys cannot recoup attorney fees; (2) Seligman did not obtain “excellent results” and “over-litigated their case”; and (3) common fund or substantial benefit theories did not change that result. As we will explain, Seligman has forfeited their first and third arguments, and they fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion as to the second. 6 The trial court reiterated that it had fashioned the relief granted out of Seligman’s request for “ ‘such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.’ ” 9  I. General Legal Principles Pursuant to section 1021.5, a trial court may “award attorney[] fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action [that] has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” “The intent of section 1021.5 fees is not ‘to punish those who violate the law but rather to ensure that those who have acted to protect public interest will not be forced to shoulder the cost of litigation.’ ” (Friends of Spring Street v. Nevada City (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1107.) “The determination whether a party has met the requirement for an award of fees and the reasonable amount of such an award are matters best decided by the trial court in the first instance. [Citation.] That court ‘ “ ‘must realistically assess the litigation and determine from a practical perspective whether the statutory criteria have been met.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We will uphold the trial court’s decision to award attorney fees under section 1021.5 unless the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation.] In making this determination we review the entire record, noting the trial court’s stated reasons for awarding fees and whether it applied the proper standards of law in reaching its decision. [Citation.] Where, as here, litigation ends at the trial court level, we owe ‘the trial court a full measure of deference in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion.’ [Citation.] Thus, we will reverse the award ‘only if it is clearly wrong or has no reasonable basis.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary Sch. Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 980 (Sweetwater).) II. Attorney Fees for Time Spent by Attorney on Inactive Status Seligman contend the trial court abused its discretion by denying their claim for attorney fees for time Oderman spent working on the case after he went on inactive 10 status. They challenge the court’s observation that they were not forthright about Oderman’s transition to inactive status, and they argue attorneys on inactive status should be deemed eligible to have their time included in a fee award. Seligman has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. At the hearing on the motion for attorney fees, Ihrke argued that Seligman had intended to be forthright with the court about Oderman’s “intent to eventually go on inactive status,” but he had not found any case addressing whether a party could recover fees for time spent on a case by an attorney on inactive status. At the conclusion of Ihrke’s argument, the trial court asked Ihrke to clarify Seligman’s position: “Are you conceding Mr. Oderman’s fees since he was not a licensed attorney, he went inactive at the time, and that the Court should simply as it did in its Tentative Ruling reduce[] the requested amount by Mr. Oderman’s fees?” Ihrke responded, “We understand the Court’s position on that, yes.” Ihrke subsequently added, “And, again, we would like to focus on what would be minus that [the requested fees for time spent after Oderman went on inactive status].” Counsel for the City thanked the trial court for noticing that Oderman had gone on inactive status, and stated, “it sounds like it [the request for Oderman’s fees after going on inactive status] was withdrawn.” In his rebuttal argument, Ihrke reiterated: “I understand the Court’s position on that [the fees request as to Oderman].” Accordingly, the court’s final ruling observed that Seligman “did not challenge the Court’s analysis declining to award fees for Mr. Oderman’s work from February 2023 to the present.” “[W]hen a trial court announces a tentative decision, a party who failed to bring any deficiencies or omissions therein to the trial court’s attention forfeits the right to raise such defects or omissions on appeal.” (Porterville Citizens for Responsible Hillside Development v. City of Porterville (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 885, 912; see Quiles v. Parent (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [“ ‘Failure to raise specific challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal’ ”].) “ ‘ “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” ’ ” (Oiye v. 11 Fox (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1065.) Otherwise, it “is unfair to the trial judge and the adverse party to attempt to take advantage of an alleged error or omission on appeal when the error or omission could have been, but was not, brought to the attention of the trial court in the first instance.” (Porterville, at p. 912.) Similarly, “ ‘an appellant may waive his [or her] right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the ruling or procedure objected to on appeal.’ ” (Hood v. Gonzales (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 57, 70.) Seligman forfeited their right to challenge the trial court ruling on appeal by expressly conceding the issue during the hearing. III. Reducing Fees for Limited Success Seligman contend the trial court abused its discretion by reducing their claimed fees because of their limited success in the litigation. They argue that while they did not achieve their private objectives for the litigation because the relief granted by the court did not match the relief sought in the petition, they achieved the entirety of their public interest objectives by obtaining relief that enforced the Dissolution Law and the Long Range Plan. They further argue that they were entitled to full compensation because all their efforts in arguing for the relief sought in the petition directly served the interest of achieving the remedy the trial court ultimately granted. A. Legal Background Where a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees under section 1021.5, the lodestar method is used to determine the appropriate amount of fees. (Environmental Protection Information Center v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 238 (EPIC).) “ ‘Under this method, a court assesses attorney fees by first determining the time spent and the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. [Citation.] The court next determines whether that lodestar figure should be adjusted based on various relevant factors [citation], including a plaintiff’s limited success in the litigation [citations].’ [Citation.] California law, like federal law, considers the extent of a plaintiff’s success a crucial factor in determining the amount of a prevailing party’s 12 attorney fees.” (Ibid.; see Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1239 [reduced fee award is appropriate where claimant achieves only limited success]; Sokolow v. San Mateo (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 248 [extent of success in obtaining the result sought must be considered in determining the extent of attorney fees it would be reasonable for prevailing party to recover].) “We apply a two-step inquiry in analyzing whether section 1021.5 fees are appropriate where a plaintiff achieves limited success.” (Sweetwater, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 996.) “The first step is to determine whether the [plaintiff’s] successful and unsuccessful claims are related.” (Id. at p. 997.) “ ‘If the different claims are based on different facts and legal theories, they are unrelated; if they involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories, they are related.’ ” (Ibid.) “Where claims are related, the second step requires the trial court to evaluate the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation and reduce the lodestar calculation if the relief is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” (Sweetwater, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) “Full compensation may be appropriate where the plaintiff has obtained ‘excellent results,’ but may be excessive if ‘a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success.’ ” (EPIC, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 239.) But “ ‘[t]he fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.’ ” (Sweetwater, at p. 997.) “ ‘Litigants in good faith may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is what matters.’ ” (Ibid.) B. Analysis Seligman contend that they achieved excellent results, not limited success, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion by applying the improper legal standard. (See Doe v. Westmont College (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 753, 763 [court abuses discretion 13 where it applies incorrect legal standard].) In support, Seligman argue that the relief they obtained exceeded that obtained by the plaintiff in Hogar Dulce Hogar v. Community Development Com. of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358 (Hogar). In Hogar, the petitioner challenged a redevelopment agency’s failure to set aside the proper amount of tax increment funds for affordable housing purposes. The agency took corrective action before the petitioner filed its complaint, and thereafter argued that the petitioner was not a successful party within the meaning of section 1021.5. The reviewing court disagreed, and determined that the petitioner’s litigation motivated the agency to provide the primary relief sought. (Id, at p. 1365.) The agency in Hogar further argued that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to reduce the attorney fee award on the basis that some of the petitioner’s claims were unsuccessful. (Hogar, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368.) The reviewing court rejected that argument as well, observing that a plaintiff that achieved excellent results “ ‘should recover a fully compensatory fee,’ ” and that the fee award “ ‘should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit.’ ” (Id. at p. 1369, quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 435-436.) The court added: “It is only when a plaintiff has achieved limited success or has failed with respect to distinct and unrelated claims, that a reduction from the lodestar is appropriate.” (Hogar, at p. 1369, citing Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 250.) The court concluded that the trial court could have reasonably found that Hogar achieved excellent results, and, given the relationship between the plaintiff’s claims and the results achieved, the trial court was not required to reduce the lodestar amount. (Ibid.) Seligman further point to Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Blythe (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1641, in which the reviewing court upheld the trial court’s award of “full compensation” after it issued an injunction imposing restrictions on anti-abortion demonstrators. The reviewing court noted that the “plaintiff got virtually all it asked for,” 14 although noting that the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to increase “speech-free” zones; the court observed that the plaintiff “did not avidly pursue” that relief and that it was “an insignificant portion of [the] plaintiff’s attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 1674.) Seligman fail to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined they had obtained limited success. Initially, in both Hogar and Feminist Women’s Health Center, the trial court awarded full compensation, and the reviewing court was called upon to determine whether that determination constituted an abuse of discretion. In neither case did the prevailing party in the trial court challenge that court’s determination regarding the level of its success. Thus, while in Hogar the reviewing court concluded that the trial court could have reasonably found that the prevailing party had achieved excellent results, and in Feminist Women’s Health Center the reviewing court noted that the plaintiff “got virtually all it asked for,” here the trial court found that the relief obtained “is very ‘limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole’ ” because Seligman “did not obtain any of the relief they sought, as identified in the operative pleading or in the arguments they presented when arguing the merits of their petition.” Instead, as the court recognized, it fashioned the remedy provided out of Seligman’s request for “ ‘such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.’ ” We cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion when it determined that Seligman did not achieve excellent results where it is undisputed that Seligman achieved none of the specific relief it requested in its petition for writ of mandate. Seligman argue that they obtained excellent results because they achieved all their public interest objectives, and only failed to achieve “their incidental private interest for filing this litigation.” But this is not a case in which Seligman prevailed on causes of action related to public interest objectives and failed to prevail on causes of action related to their private interests. Instead, as we have discussed, Seligman did not achieve any of the relief it sought in the litigation. The trial court recognized that Seligman had not asked it to order the City to exercise its discretion to enter into compensation agreements, 15 that indeed Seligman had argued at the hearing that the Court’s proposed relief was inadequate, and that it had fashioned the remedy provided out of Seligman’s request for “ ‘such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.’ ” Thus, the court could reasonably conclude that Seligman had achieved limited success in the litigation in terms of the relief it sought, and it could reasonably reduce Seligman’s requested fees based on that limited success. IV. Reducing Fees for Over-Litigating Case Seligman contend the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that they had over- litigated their case by: (1) extensively reviewing thousands of pages of evidence Seligman contended were essential to their claims, or providing in their brief a seven- page description of the subject properties, when the gravamen of Seligman’s claims was a straightforward matter of statutory and contractual interpretation; (2) repeatedly arguing that many of the future development properties were already fully developed, while subsequently acknowledging that the development status of the properties was irrelevant to their claims; (3) objecting to a party’s late-filed joinder and arguing that the party was seeking relief from default, despite the fact that default judgment is not permitted for a petition for writ of mandate; and (4) challenging the classification of properties as future development in the Long Range Plan, despite later abandoning those arguments in response to the trial court’s request for supplemental briefing. Initially, the trial court made the findings that Seligman challenge on appeal in its tentative ruling, not its final ruling. “Tentative rulings ‘indicate the way the judge is prepared to decide the matter based on the information before him or her when the ruling was prepared.’ ” (Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1245.) “[A] trial court’s tentative ruling is not binding on the court; the court’s final order supersedes the tentative ruling.” (Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300; see In re Marriage of Ditto (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 643, 646-647 [court not bound by intended decision]; see 16 Fagelbaum & Heller LLP v. Smylie (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1363, fn. 3 [following general rule that written orders supersede tentative decisions, and disregarding tentative ruling].) Here, the trial court’s tentative ruling “agree[d] with the City Respondents that this case was significantly over-litigated,” and accordingly concluded that a negative multiplier was appropriate. The court added that Seligman “were only moderately ‘successful’ in this litigation, thus supporting a significant reduction of ‘reasonable’ attorneys’ fees.” However, the court’s final ruling adopted different reasoning for its decision. The court’s final ruling reasoned that, even if Seligman’s successful and unsuccessful claims were related, Seligman “did not achieve a ‘level of success that makes the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for making a fee award’ ” (quoting EPIC, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at page 239). As we have discussed previously, the court found that Seligman had not achieved any of the relief they sought and therefore had obtained only “very ‘limited [relief] in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole’ ” (quoting EPIC, at page 239). The court concluded that an award for reviewing records was appropriate, but the time Seligman spent reviewing records “is out of proportion to the success of Petitioners’ claims, and thus Petitioners are not entitled to recovery for all requested fees.” The court’s final ruling did not indicate that it reduced Seligman’s claimed fees on the basis of over-litigation, but rather on limited success. 7 Nevertheless, as we next explain, even if the reduced attorney fee award were based in part on the trial court’s finding of over-litigation, the court’s findings were not an abuse of discretion. 7 At oral argument, counsel for the City stated her understanding that the trial court’s final ruling was also based on its finding of over-litigation, as the court had reasoned in its tentative ruling. However, counsel indicated that she would defer to this court’s interpretation of the order. 17  A. Reviewing the Record Seligman argue that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that they over-litigated their case by reviewing thousands of pages of evidence because it bore the burden to show that the City had taken no meaningful effort to actively pursue compensation agreements or to sell the properties, and to disprove the City’s arguments that it had engaged in regular, ongoing, and successful activities to implement the Long Range Plan; had completed many of the activities it was required to complete; and was diligently pursuing compensation agreements for the future development properties at issue. Seligman add that they prevailed in the litigation by showing the City’s failure to take any action after mid-2016 to pursue compensation agreements for each of the future development properties, and the trial court’s ruling included an extensive review of the history of the City’s actions with respect to the future development properties, which was based on the evidence Seligman had provided. Seligman fail to show an abuse of discretion. In its final ruling and in response to Seligman’s argument at the hearing that an 80 percent reduction in fees was excessive, the trial court determined: “The Court has further reviewed the time records and its own Ruling on Submitted Matter regarding the petition for writ of mandate. The Court agrees that further award should be permitted for time spent reviewing records in this matter. However, the Court still finds that the time actually spent on this task is out of proportion to the success of [Seligman’s] claims, and thus [Seligman] are not entitled to recover for all requested fees.” In other words, the court agreed with Seligman that they were entitled to compensation for time they spent reviewing the record, but it reduced the fee award based on Seligman’s limited success in the litigation. 18  B. Describing the Future Development Properties and Arguing Improper Classification In its tentative ruling, the trial court found that Seligman had over-litigated their case in part by describing the “Wrongly Retained Properties” for seven pages in their opening brief, although little of that information was relevant to the court’s analysis, and by repeatedly arguing that the future development properties were wrongly classified, although they subsequently abandoned those arguments in response to the court’s request for supplemental briefing. Seligman contend these findings were an abuse of discretion. Regarding the finding that Seligman over-litigated the case by appearing to argue that the subject properties were wrongly classified as “future development” properties because they were already fully developed, Seligman argue that they did not challenge the classificatio