R.F. v. O.O.

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1367-25 R.F.,1 Plaintiff-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent, v. O.O., Defendant-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant. ________________________ Argued October 14, 2026 – Decided October 28, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FD-07-1282-24. Obayomi Awoyinfa (The Law Office of Obayomi Awoyinfa) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for appellant/cross-respondent (Ejike 1 We use initials to protect the privacy interests of the parties and child. See R. 1:38(d)(3) and N.J.S.A. 9:17-42.  Uzor, attorney; Ejike Uzor and Obayomi Awoyinfa, on the briefs). Elena K. Weitz argued the cause for respondent/cross- appellant (Offit Kurman, attorneys; Elena K. Weitz, on the briefs). PER CURIAM In this non-dissolution matter, plaintiff R.F. appeals from a November 18, 2025 Family Part order finding defendant O.O. is the psychological parent of plaintiff's biological child born in December 2017, and awarding the parties joint legal custody and parenting time. Defendant cross-appeals contending the judge sua sponte ordered a temporary parenting time schedule without consideration of the best interests standard and the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Having reviewed the record and applicable legal principles, we affirm the ruling and order finding defendant is the child's psychological parent and awarding joint legal custody. However, we remand the parenting time portion of the order so that the judge can make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Rule 1:7-4. I. Factual Background We derive the factual and procedural history from the record. In 2016, the parties met online and began a romantic relationship. Plaintiff became A-1367-25 2 pregnant in 2016 but miscarried around Thanksgiving. She became pregnant a second time in early 2017 with the child involved in this case. Plaintiff represented to defendant that he was the child's biological father while she was pregnant. In early 2018, defendant performed a home paternity test, which revealed he was not the child's biological father. Plaintiff listed defendant as the father on the child's birth certificate and the certification of parentage. Defendant claimed he performed the paternity test because plaintiff communicated she was going to seek child support from him. Plaintiff alleged that defendant "surreptiously" conducted the DNA test because he did not want to pay medical bills. Plaintiff claimed the parties "drifted apart" after defendant learned he was not the child's biological father, and he withdrew his affection for the child. According to plaintiff, she asked defendant to remove the child's name from his health insurance he obtained as a member of the National Guard. The Litigation On October 16, 2023, plaintiff filed a self-represented verified complaint seeking to disestablish paternity, to remove defendant's name from the child's birth certificate, and for sole legal custody. Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking: to deny the relief plaintiff sought in her complaint; to prevent her from A-1367-25 3 removing the child from the continental United States without written permission from both parties or an order of the court; an order finding him to be the psychological parent of the child; to have his name remain on the birth certificate; an award of joint custody; to be designated as the parent of primary residence; an equal parenting time schedule, alternating weeks; and counsel fees and costs. In his certification in support of his cross-complaint, defendant stated he considered plaintiff's involvement in a charity organization she founded, which sent school supplies to her home country of Jamaica, "very impressive." Defendant began assisting plaintiff with her organization and traveling to Jamaica with her. In 2017, when plaintiff became pregnant again, defendant certified he "supported her throughout the pregnancy" as plaintiff advised him the baby was his. Defendant certified he was there for the child's birth, and his name was placed on the birth certificate by plaintiff. According to defendant, pl aintiff asked him to "choose a name" for the child, which he did. Defendant certified he began residing with plaintiff and the child at plaintiff's home for two years. Defendant claimed he was the child's "primary caretaker" and provided "financial support." A-1367-25 4  The parties discussed separation when the child turned about five months old. Defendant certified plaintiff indicated she would seek child support from him. After the paternity test revealed defendant was not the child's biological father, defendant certified he was "devastated." After confronting plaintiff with the paternity test results, defendant claimed she was "shocked" but "realized it was possible based upon her having an affair" with a man she had met in Jamaica, but she "did not know his name or how to contact him." Defendant certified plaintiff "explicitly" asked him to stay with her and the child and wanted the child "to grow up with [him] as [the] father." The parties reconciled, and defendant certified he is "closely bonded" with the child, and plaintiff "supported [his] role as father at all times." In 2019, defendant was deployed to Africa on a combat operation. He certified that during this time, plaintiff "was unable to keep up with the caregiving" of the child and with his "permission," the child went to Jamaica to "temporarily stay" with plaintiff's grandmother. In 2023, defendant stated he went to Jamaica to bring the child back and live with him. The child was six years old at the time and began her formal education. Since plaintiff filed her complaint, defendant certified she "actively interfered" with his relationship A-1367-25 5 with the child and restricted his access to the child to the point it was denied altogether. The Plenary Hearing On June 4, 2024, the judge ordered the disputed issues be determined at a plenary hearing. On July 9, 2024, the judge entered an interim parenting time schedule for defendant. The plenary hearing spanned six days between July 2024, and August 2025. At the September 11, 2024 hearing, the judge addressed the need for expert reports and testimony. The judge heard testimony from the parties, plaintiff's mother and brother, a babysitter, defendant's two friends, his expert, Dr. Erik Dranoff, a licensed psychologist, a babysitter, and Kadian Peynado, a licensed mental health counselor, plaintiff's expert. The Judge's Decision On November 13, 2025, the judge rendered an oral opinion. In determining whether defendant was the child's psychological parent, the judge framed the issue as whether he satisfied the four-part test established by our Court in V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 223 (2000). The judge explained "the biological parent must consent to and foster" the formation and development of a "parent-like relationship"; the "petitioner" and the child must have lived together, the petitioner "must perform parental functions" to a "significant A-1367-25 6 degree"; and "a parent/child bond must be forged." The judge considered the testimony of the parties and witnesses and evidence consisting of a police report , WhatsApp communications, the child's passport documents, life insurance policy information for the child, videos of defendant and the child, the certificate of parentage, certificate of birth, plaintiff's Family and Medical Leave Act form, a bank statement, screenshots of chats, plaintiff's United States and Jamaican passports, Western Union wire history, various photographs, receipts, and emails between the parties. The judge found plaintiff credible "initially," but highlighted her credibility was "hampered" by her testimony on whether she believed another man was the child's father. The judge noted plaintiff's credibility was "negatively" affected by her attempts to avoid answering questions about certain text messages between her and defendant being "at odds" with what she claimed she said to him during a phone conference. In contrast, the judge found defendant "credible throughout his testimony," and "candid" with his answers. The judge observed defendant's demeanor "was appropriate" at all times. The judge determined plaintiff's mother had a "diminished" level of credibility because she tried to avoid answering a question on cross-examination A-1367-25 7 about her "strained relationship" with plaintiff. The judge noted plaintiff's brother was "credible," but his testimony was not "persuasive" because he could not speak to the child's whereabouts except in limited circumstances. The judge found the other fact witnesses generally credible. Regarding the experts, the judge found Dr. Dranoff's conclusion "about whether there [is] a father/child relationship" to be "credible" and "based on a specific assessment" of the process he described. The judge highlighted Dr. Dranoff "included observations" as to how the child referred to defendant and their "interaction," and concluded they were "dearly bonded." The judge credited Dr. Dranoff's testimony that without defendant in the child's life, the child would suffer a "major attachment" loss. The judge found Peynado concluded that plaintiff "consented to the relationship between . . . defendant and the child, but that she did so for defendant's benefit." The judge determined Peynado did not "formulate a really clear opinion" and emphasized she was "unclear" whether defendant "satisfies all four prongs of the psychological parent test." The judge pointed out Peynado's testimony was "largely a restatement" of items included in the child custody questionnaire and her assessment process was "less robust" than Dr. A-1367-25 8 Dranoff's. Thus, the judge concluded Dr. Dranoff was the more "convincing" expert. Under the first V.C. factor, the judge concluded plaintiff consented to defendant making doctor's appointments for the child, he obtained medical authorizations for school enrollment, conferred with the child's teacher about school progress, and provided insurance coverage for the child's birth. The judge reasoned plaintiff allowed defendant to "set up parental controls" and to "monitor" the child's iPad and consented to him selecting the child's first name— linked to his country of origin. The judge rejected plaintiff's claim that defendant was merely a "casual" family friend. As to the second V.C. factor, the judge explained there was conflicting testimony as to whether the parties ever lived together, but he was "convinced" the parties and child lived together in plaintiff's residence "for at least the first few months of the child's life." The judge noted that defendant "continued to have his own apartment elsewhere." In addition, the judge determined there was "no dispute" that defendant and the child lived together when the child returned from Jamaica from June 2023, "through parts" of September 2023. Under the third V.C. factor, the judge held defendant "performed a multitude of parental functions" during "much of, if not most of the child's life." A-1367-25 9 Specifically, the judge noted defendant set up the "parent portal" for the child's school, worked on school assignments, requested the child be excused for a doctor's visit, and taught the child "Yoruba culture." Between 2017 and 2023, the judge found defendant purchased formula, clothing, groceries, toys, and maintained healthcare insurance for the child. Finally, the judge determined defendant traveled to and from Jamaica with the child and attended PTA meetings there. The judge found defendant performed "parental functions to a significant degree." The judge denied plaintiff's application for sole custody and granted defendant's application to be deemed the child's psychological parent, concluding this was in the child's best interest. The judge stated the matter would be listed for a hearing on legal custody and parenting time. In the interim, the judge ordered the current visitation schedule remain in effect. However, on November 18, 2025, an order was issued in which the judge "sua sponte" determined the parties shall share joint legal custody, and the current parenting time order "shall remain in effect." The judge also ordered defendant's name to remain on the child's birth certificate. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. Before us, plaintiff argues there was no exceptional circumstance warranting her to lose her right as a legal parent to care for and nurture the child. A-1367-25 10 Plaintiff claims defendant failed to satisfy the four-factor test for psychological parenting established in V.C. Plaintiff also contends all redacted documents utilized at the hearing should have been inadmissible in evidence, and the judge should not have ordered discovery in the middle of trial. Defendant cross-appeals seeking affirmance of the judge's ruling that he is the child's psychological parent. Defendant argues the judge incorrectly ordered a parenting time schedule "sua sponte" without considering the statutory factors, warranting reversal and a remand. II. "We review the [family court's] findings in accordance with a deferential standard of review, recognizing the court's 'special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-83 (2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998)). As such, we defer to the family court's factual findings and decision unless such decision constitutes an abuse of discretion because "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974))) (internal quotation marks omitted). A-1367-25 11  Our Court has held that to establish psychological parentage, [1] the legal parent must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the child; [2] the third party must have lived with the child; [3] the third party must perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and [4] most important, a parent-child bond must be forged. [V.C., 163 N.J. at 223.] Our Court was "satisfied that that test provides a good framework for determining psychological parenthood in cases where the third party has lived for a substantial period with the legal parent and her child." Ibid. Our Court explained that "[p]rong one is critical because it makes the biological . . . parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with the child." Id. at 224. Thus, "the legal parent must have fostered the formation of the parental relationship." Ibid. In describing the meaning of "fostered," our Court stated it "meant that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant." Ibid. Indeed, our Court stated: The requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it places control within his or her hands. That parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself [or himself] and [t]he[] child. However, if she [or he] wishes to A-1367-25 12  maintain that zone of privacy she [or he] cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her [or his] child and cannot cede over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the child. [Ibid.] Our Court clarified "[t]wo further points concerning the consent requirement." Ibid. First, "the focus is on [the legal parent]'s intent during the formation and pendency of the parent-child relationship." Ibid. "[S]econd . . . participation in the decision to have a child is not a prerequisite to a finding that one has become a psychological parent to the child." Id. at 225. However, "joint participation in the family's decision to have a child is probative evidence of the legally recognized parent's intentions." Ibid. The V.C. Court stated that "[e]stablishing psychological parenthood is not an easy task and the standards . . . should be scrupulously applied in order to protect the legal parent-child relationship." Id. at 230. "Once a third party has been determined to be a psychological parent to a child, under the . . . standards, he or she stands in parity with the legal parent." Id. at 227. Thereafter, "[c]ustody and visitation issues between them are to be determined on a best interests standard giving weight to the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4." Id. at 227-28. A-1367-25 13  III. We reject plaintiff's argument that "exceptional circumstances" are required to establish psychological parenthood, and defendant did not meet his burden. Likewise, we reject plaintiff's contention that she lost parental rights. In V.C., the Court recognized psychological parenthood as a subset of the exceptional circumstances doctrine, rather than a doctrine available only after a third party independently establishes a separate exceptional circumstance. V.C., 163 N.J. at 222. A third party establishing exceptional circumstances by proving psychological parentage "may rebut the presumption in favor of a parent seeking custody even if he or she is deemed to be a fit parent." Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 246 (2000). "In such circumstances, the legal parent has created a family with the third party and the child . . . essentially giving [the child] another parent[.]" V.C., 163 N.J. at 227. Once the judge determines a third party is a child's psychological parent, "he or she stands in parity with the legal parent" such that "[c]ustody and visitation issues between them are to be determined on a best interests [of the child] standard[.]" Id. at 227-228 (citing Zack v. Fiebert, 235 N.J. Super. 424, 432 (App. Div. 1989)). Plaintiff maintains she is a "fit legal parent" to raise her child, and there is no "exceptional circumstances" category in this case that warrants court A-1367-25 14 intervention. Plaintiff mischaracterizes the law regarding psychological parenthood. Notably, V.C. involved a fit biological mother, and our Court applied the four factors to determine psychological parenthood. Id. at 221-222. Therefore, we conclude the judge here properly applied the four-factor test set forth in V.C. to determine psychological parenthood status. Plaintiff contends none of the V.C. factors were met. We disagree and address each in turn. Factor One The Court explained that "[p]rong one is critical because it makes the biological . . . parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with the child." Id. at 224. Thus, "the legal parent must have fostered the formation of the parental relationship." Ibid. In describing the meaning of "fostered," the Court stated it "meant that the legal parent ceded over to the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted to that third party rights and duties vis-a-vis the child that the third party's status would not otherwise warrant." Ibid. Indeed, our Court stated: The requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it places control within his or her hands. That parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself [or himself] and [t]he [] child. However, if she [or he] wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she [or he] cannot invite A-1367-25 15  a third party to function as a parent to her [or his] child and cannot cede over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with the child. [Ibid.] Our Court clarified two further points concerning the consent requirement. Ibid. First, "the focus is on [the legal parent]'s intent during the formation and pendency of the parent-child relationship." Ibid. "[S]econd . . . participation in the decision to have a child is not a prerequisite to a finding that one has become a psychological parent to the child." Id. at 225. However, "joint participation in the family's decision to have a child is probative evidence of the legally recognized parent's intentions." Ibid. Plaintiff alleges she did not consent to defendant's relationship with the child and that she did not foster the relationship between them. Plaintiff argues defendant had to seek her permission to talk to or visit the child, and the first request for assistance by plaintiff to defendant was in 2022, when the child needed someone to take her to Jamica. Plaintiff also claims that between 2019 and 2022, defendant played no role in the child's education. Plaintiff further argues that defendant taking the child to a doctor's appointment should not count as to her consenting or fostering a parental relationship because the parties believed he was the father at the time. A-1367-25 16  Here, the judge properly found the first prong of the V.C. factor was satisfied. In particular, the judge referenced plaintiff's consent in allowing defendant to make doctor's appointments, obtain medical authorizations for school enrollment, meeting with school teachers, and providing insurance for the child's birth. Moreover, the judge noted plaintiff's consent to continuous phone and video contact during the time of defendant's military deployments, his setting up parental controls on the child's iPad, and his selecting the child's name. The engagement between the parties about the child's health, medical needs, hair care, and overall care is relevant in assessing the first V.C. factor. The record shows the judge acknowledged that plaintiff withdrew some consent after defendant refused to cooperate with the child's passport renewal. Saliently, plaintiff involved defendant in the child's life from the time of her pregnancy under the belief that he was the biological father. This mutual participation in the decision to have the child is probative evidence of the legal parent's intention to form a parent-child relationship under V.C. The record supports the judge's determination that plaintiff consented to and fostered defendant's relationship with the child. A-1367-25 17  Factor Two The second factor requires that the third party and the child must have lived together. V.C., 163 N.J. at 223. Plaintiff alleges defendant and the child spent nights at the same location but did not live together. Plaintiff distinguished defendant and the child's relationship from that of V.C., where the third party resided with the children in the same house for years. Id. at 229. Plaintiff also maintains that defendant did not live at her residence, and the testimony of witnesses corroborated her position. Again, we disagree. The judge properly found the second prong satisfied despite the conflicting testimony because defendant and the child undisputably lived together from June 2023 through September 2023. The judge was also convinced the parties and the child lived together for the first few months of the child's life, even though defendant maintained a separate residence , thus satisfying factor two. Factor Three The third factor necessitates "a finding that a third party assumed the obligations of parenthood, [and] is not contingent on financial contributions made by the third party." Id. at 226. Financial contributions can be considered, A-1367-25 18 but our Court found "the assumption of a parental role much more complex than mere financial support." Ibid. Plaintiff asserts there is no evidence of defendant taking responsibility for the child, and if he did, it was for financial compensation. She argues the judge erred by relying on the "forceful enrollment" of the child, which led to this litigation, to support factor three. Plaintiff classified the enrollment as defendant "usurping" her parental rights because his name was still on the child's birth certificate. Plaintiff points out that defendant provided healthcare coverage for the child's birth because he believed he was the biological father at the time, and therefore, this should not be construed as plaintiff consenting to the parental relationship. The judge properly found factor three was satisfied because defendant clearly assumed the role of a parent. Specifically, the judge noted that defendant performed parental functions for most of the child's life, such as enrolling the child in school, helping with homework, attending school matters, teaching the child about Yoruba culture, traveling with the child, and providing healthcare coverage for the child's birth. The judge acknowledged the numerous purchases defendant made for the child between 2017 and 2023, which included necessities, toys, supplies, and healthcare insurance. The record supports the A-1367-25 19 determination that defendant performed parental functions to a significant degree. The judge found defendant's contributions were both financial and non- financial throughout the child's life. Therefore, the judge properly found the third V.C. factor was satisfied. The fourth V.C. factor requires the existence of a parent-child bond and is deemed the "most important". Id. at 226. The nature of the relationship is paramount, and the amount of time necessary to develop the bond will be determined based on the facts of each case, considering the stage of the child's life and development actions that were taken, as well as what functions were performed. Id. at 226-227. "Most importantly, a determination will have to be made about the actuality and strength of the parent-child bond. Generally, that will require expert testimony." Id. at 227. Plaintiff challenges the judge's determination that defendant satisfied factor four. As noted in V.C., it is the nature of the relationship that is crucial, not the length of time. Id. at 226-227. Plaintiff also asserts that "[d]efendant was not in [the child's] life at all, other than presenting [the child] with occasional gifts, as would a family friend." Plaintiff attributes the child calling defendant "dad" to her being a friendly child. A-1367-25 20  We conclude the judge properly found the fourth V.C. factor was satisfied, evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Dranoff, who opined defendant and the child are "dearly bonded," and that his absence would cause a "major attachment" problem for the child. The judge highlighted that the child called defendant "dad" in plaintiff's presence. And, plaintiff's brother testified defendant and the child's relationship was that of a father and daughter. Accordingly, the judge properly found that a parent-child bond was forged under factor four. IV. Next, we consider plaintiff's argument that the judge improvidently admitted redacted documents in evidence. We review a trial court's evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion "because, from its genesis, the decision to admit or exclude evidence is one firmly entrusted to the trial court's discretion." State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 580 (2018) (quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 383-84 (2010)). The trial court's evidentiary rulings are not disturbed unless "there has been a clear error of judgment." State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012) (quoting State v. Brown, 170 N.J. 138, 147 (2001)). A-1367-25 21  Plaintiff's counsel objected to the admissibility of defendant's exhibits fourteen through nineteen on the grounds that they were redacted. Defendant testified that the redactions were based on his purchase history: [s]o there are reasons—there are private reasons that some of these things were redacted. Maybe they are purchases I made for other people, purchases I made for myself for my health that I do not want to be in public record. So I'm here for trial on [the child's] psychological parenting. I'm not here on trial for . . . the medication I bought for myself off Amazon, or what I bought for my mother. I don't think you want to see my mother's purchases here. The judge overruled plaintiff's objection, given there was no sufficient basis to exclude the records in light of the context they were being offered and the testimony explaining the redactions. We discern no abuse of discretion in the admission of the redacted exhibits. Additionally, plaintiff relied on Rule 4:10, which addresses protective orders in discovery. However, Rule 4:10 does not establish a separate rule of evidentiary exclusion requiring a party to obtain a protective order before redacting irrelevant personal material from business records later offered at trial. Moreover, the Rule does not state that the absence of a protective order renders a document inadmissible. Therefore, the judge's evidentiary rulings were appropriate. A-1367-25 22  V. Next, plaintiff argues the judge should not have ordered discovery in the middle of trial. Rule 5:3-3 addresses the broad, inherent authority of a court to seek discovery—here expert assistance—to resolve issues. Rule 5:3-3(a) specifically provides: Whenever the court, in its discretion, concludes that disposition of an issue will be assisted by expert opinion, and whether or not the parties propose to offer or have offered their own experts' opinions, the court may order any person under its jurisdiction to be examined by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or other health or mental health professional designated by it. As explained in the commentary to Rule 5:3-3, the Rule broadened the court's express authorization to obtain expert input, which had long been recognized as part of it's inherent power even before the Rule's adoption. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules on Rule 5:3-3 at comment 1 provides: [w]hile this [R]ule constitutes a significant expansion of the express authorization of the court to appoint experts to assist in the resolution of specific issues involved in family litigation, the authority of the court to do so has long been regarded as a matter within its inherent power, and such appointments have been routinely made in family as well as in other civil actions without express rule authorization. A-1367-25 23  [Ibid.] Plaintiff's characterization of the judge's action as "ordering discovery in the middle of trial" is inaccurate. Rather, the judge rightfully exercised his broad and inherent authority to obtain expert assistance. We conclude the judge properly exercised his authority under Rule 5:3-3 in seeking expert input on the nature of the bond between defendant and the child. Plaintiff's characterization of that request as "ordering discovery in the middle of trial" lacks merit. VI. We now turn to defendant's cross-appeal. Defendant argues the judge incorrectly ordered a parenting time schedule sua sponte without consideration of the statutory factors. Defendant's argument has merit. Although typically non-natural parents are not entitled to the same custodial rights as natural parents, "psychological parents" may have standing to contest custodial rights. P.B. v. T.H., 370 N.J. Super. 586, 604-05 (App. Div. 2004). Once a third party is found to be a psychological parent, he or she "steps into [the] shoes" of a natural parent, and determinations between the natural and psychological parent are made pursuant to a best interests analysis. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 437 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting V.C., 163 N.J. at 227-28). A-1367-25 24  The best interests analysis regarding custody and parenting time is guided by the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Specifically, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(f) states, "[t]he court shall specifically place on the record the factors which justify any custody arrangement not agreed to by both parents." "In contested cases, the necessity for such a record of the court's reasons is mandatory." Luedtke v. Shobert, 342 N.J. Super. 202, 218 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317(1997)). The judge must specifically reference the statutory criteria found in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) in reaching his or her decision. Ibid. (citing Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J. Super. 105, 119 (App.Div.1994)). Additionally, the trial court is required to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). See Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 96(App. Div. 2006). A court's "[f]ailure to perform that duty 'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980) (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)). Even though the scope of review is generally limited in family cases, where inadequate findings of fact are made, or where issues are not addressed or the court's reasoning was not explained, the appellate court is constrained to remand for further proceedings. A-1367-25 25 Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 443 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Ducey v. Ducey, 424 N.J. Super. 68, 74 (App. Div. 2012)). Here, the judge erred by continuing the temporary parenting time plan without conducting a hearing. After finding defendant a psychological parent, the judge should have conducted a hearing pursuant to the best interests standard guided by the factors enumerated in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), warranting a remand. Accordingly, we remand for the judge to schedule a hearing, conduct a best interests analysis under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), make the requisite findings under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(f), and provide findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4(a), on the issue of parenting time. We express no opinion as to what the outcome should be. Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1367-25 26