Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-3881 _____________________________ REBECCA JANE THOMAS, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County. Michael A. Flowers, Judge. January 20, 2021 PER CURIAM. Appellant, Rebecca Jane Thomas, appeals the trial court’s order imposing three years of probation for possession of a controlled substance and challenges the denial of her motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. Around midnight on November 17, 2018, a deputy with the Okaloosa County Sheriff’s Office stopped for gas in Crestview, Florida. While at the gas station, the deputy ran every tag in the parking lot, as was his usual practice. One of the cars was a BMW with a dealer tag, and the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DHSMV”) records indicated that it was registered to a Betty Kaucher in Holt, Florida. The vehicle had three occupants—Appellant was one of the passengers, and Travis Ryan Lucas was the driver. Nothing indicated to the deputy that the vehicle was connected to a dealership. Suspecting the crime of dealer license misuse, the deputy conducted an investigatory stop, during which a K9 alerted to the vehicle. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence and accepted her no contest plea. This appeal followed. A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is presumed correct, and we must interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling. Channell v. State, 257 So. 3d 1228, 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo the application of the law to those facts. Id. “[T]o effect a constitutionally-permissible investigatory stop, a law enforcement officer must have a well-founded, articulable suspicion that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Tobin v. State, 146 So. 3d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014); see also § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2018) (Florida Stop and Frisk Law). The officer must be able to point to specific facts that, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant an investigatory stop. State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 425 (Fla. 2014). In deciding whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the totality of the circumstances must be assessed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer. Id. at 426. Factors that may be considered in making that determination include the time of day, the suspect’s appearance and behavior, and anything unusual in the situation as interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge and experience. Huffman v. State, 937 So. 2d 202, 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). “‘[I]nnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis’ for reasonable suspicion. ‘[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent or guilty, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’” Teamer, 151 So. 3d at 426 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 4 (1989)). Section 320.261, Florida Statutes (2018), provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly attaches to any motor vehicle . . . any registration license plate . . ., which plate . . . was not issued and 2 assigned or lawfully transferred to such vehicle, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree . . . .” Section 320.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), further provides that: Any licensed motor vehicle dealer . . . may, upon payment of the license tax imposed by s. 320.08(12), secure one or more dealer license plates, which are valid for use on motor vehicles . . . owned by the dealer to whom such plates are issued while the motor vehicles are in inventory and for sale, or while being operated in connection with such dealer’s business, but are not valid for use for hire. . . . (Emphasis added.) Appellant argues that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop based solely on the fact that the vehicle had a dealer tag that was not assigned to that vehicle. That argument, however, ignores relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether the deputy had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The deputy observed the vehicle at a gas station in Crestview around midnight with three occupants. The vehicle had a dealer tag that was registered to a Betty Kaucher in Holt. There was nothing to indicate that the vehicle was connected to a dealership. Under those circumstances, the deputy had reasonable suspicion that the vehicle with three occupants was not being operated in connection with a motor vehicle dealer’s business around midnight, thus warranting an investigatory stop to resolve his suspicion that the dealer license was being misused, in violation of Florida law. Cf. Teamer, 151 So. 3d at 424–30 (holding that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the investigatory stop where the sole basis for the stop was the observation of “one completely noncriminal factor,” a color discrepancy; specifically, the car observed was a bright green Chevrolet, whereas its license plate was registered in the DHSMV database to a blue Chevrolet, and emphasizing that it is not against the law to change the color of one’s vehicle without notifying the DHSMV). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the order of probation. 3 AFFIRMED. LEWIS, NORDBY, and LONG, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Gary Lee Printy of Gary Lee Printy Attorney at Law, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Benjamin L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4