Full Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D19-2069 _____________________________ EMMANUEL LEE DRAYTON, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradford County. Mark W. Moseley, Judge. June 3, 2021 NORDBY, J. While serving a prison sentence, Emmanuel Lee Drayton resisted an attempt by corrections officers to remove him from his cell. During the scuffle that ensued, Drayton bit one of the officer’s hands. As a result, a jury found Drayton guilty of resisting an officer with violence. At sentencing, the State argued Drayton qualified as a prison releasee reoffender (“PRR”) under section 775.082(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2018). The trial court agreed and sentenced Drayton as a PRR to 60 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his existing sentence. In the sole issue on appeal, Drayton argues the plain language of section 775.082(9)(a) authorizes PRR sentencing only when the offender has been previously released from prison. We disagree and affirm. Because this case turns on a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Lewars, 259 So. 3d 793, 797 (Fla. 2018). We first look to the language of the statute and consider its words, not in isolation, but in the context of the entire section. Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we must adhere to the statute’s plain meaning and forego the use of any additional tools of statutory construction. Id. The relevant portions of section 775.082(9)(a) read as follows: 1. “Prison releasee reoffender” means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: .... o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual; .... within 3 years after being released from a state correctional facility . . . . 2. “Prison releasee reoffender” also means any defendant who commits or attempts to commit any offense listed in sub-subparagraphs (a)1.a.-r. while the defendant was serving a prison sentence . . . . 3. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows: .... § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. 2 The statute thus defines a PRR in two ways. First, a PRR is any defendant who commits or attempts to commit an enumerated offense within three years after being released from prison. § 775.082(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. Second, a PRR is any defendant who commits or attempts to commit an enumerated offense while serving a prison sentence. § 775.082(9)(a)2., Fla. Stat. This latter definition was inserted into (a)2. by a 1999 amendment that also shifted the operative sentencing provision down to (a)3. See Ch. 99- 188, § 2, Laws of Fla. Drayton’s argument rests on the language of (a)3. Although conceding he meets the PRR definition set forth in (a)2., Drayton argues that the plain language of (a)3. limits PRR sentencing to only those “as defined in subparagraph 1.” We reject this reading of the statute. Drayton’s interpretation is too narrow; he isolates the first part of (a)3. and ignores the broader language that immediately follows. Although the first sentence of (a)3. refers to the sentencing of PRR defendants “as defined in subparagraph 1.,” the very next sentence encompasses all PRRs “as defined in this section.” § 775.082(9)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Florida’s statutes are organized by a standard numbering system in which “[c]hapters are identified by whole Arabic numbers; sections, by numbers containing a decimal point; . . . [and] subparagraphs, by whole Arabic numbers followed by a period; . . . .” Preface, at vii, Fla. Stat. (2018) (“Each section within a chapter is identified by a decimal number consisting of the chapter number followed by two to five digits appearing to the right of the decimal point. For example, ‘s. 16.01’ would identify a section in chapter 16 of the Florida Statutes.”). Under this hierarchical arrangement, the phrase “this section” in (a)3. refers to the entirety of 775.082, which includes not only (a)1. but also (a)2. We thus conclude the plain language of the statute allows PRR sentencing for defendants, like Drayton, who fall under the definition in (a)2. This interpretation also aligns with the statute’s express purpose: “to provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this section.” § 775.082(11), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). What is more, Drayton’s reading renders (a)2. superfluous, allowing some defendants to fall within the PRR definition but not 3 within the PRR sentencing structure. And to that point, Drayton’s interpretation contradicts the express purpose of the statute— uniform punishment—because punishment would differ based on the two PRR definitions. Because the trial court properly sentenced Drayton as a PRR, we affirm his sentence. AFFIRMED. ROWE and MAKAR, JJ., concur. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Laurel Cornell Niles, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. 4