Full Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 6D2025-0339 Lower Tribunal No. 2005-CF-015869 _____________________________ ALVARO MARTIN PEREZ, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. _____________________________ Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County. Bruce Kyle, Judge. November 6, 2026 MIZE, J. In 2005, Appellant Alvaro Martin Perez (“Perez”) pled guilty to and was adjudicated guilty of one count of lewd or lascivious molestation. The trial court sentenced him to sixteen years in prison followed by ten years of sex offender probation, and the trial court imposed a $250 fine along with court costs and fees. Perez began the probation portion of his sentence on November 23, 2018. He violated his probation twice by using marijuana, admitted to the violation each time, and each time was sentenced to jail time and modifications to his probation. This appeal arises from Perez’s third violation of probation – this time for testing positive for methamphetamines, THC, and amphetamines. After Perez admitted to violating his probation, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced Perez to thirty years in the Department of Corrections, with credit for time served. The trial court also orally pronounced the imposition of a $50 Public Defender application fee, $100 for the cost of prosecution, and a $100 defense counsel fee. The trial court subsequently entered a written judgment and sentence that reflected Perez’s 30-year prison sentence but imposed costs and fees that were inconsistent with its oral pronouncement. Perez timely filed this appeal of his judgment and sentence. On appeal, Perez argues that the trial court erred by considering an impermissible sentencing factor and by imposing costs and fees that did not comport with the trial court’s oral pronouncement. We find no error in the imposition of Perez’s 30-year prison sentence and affirm the sentence without further discussion. As to the imposition of costs and fees, however, the trial court erred by imposing a Public Defender application fee under section 27.52, Florida Statutes (2025), of $190.00 when it orally pronounced $50.00 for the fee, $328.00 for the cost of prosecution under section 938.27(1), Florida Statutes (2025), instead of $100.00 as was orally pronounced, and $300.00 2 under section 938.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), for a defense counsel fee at conviction instead of the $100.00 fee that it orally pronounced. When there is a discrepancy between the trial court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence and its written order, the written order “must be corrected to conform to the oral pronouncement.” Rowan v. State, 396 So. 3d 634, 635-36 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024) (citing Guerra v. State, 927 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Williams v. State, 957 So. 2d 600, 603 (Fla. 2007) (“This Court has held that a court’s oral pronouncement of a sentence controls over the written sentencing document.”)); State v. Akins, 69 So. 3d 261, 269 (Fla. 2011) (“Generally, courts have held that a written order must conform to the oral pronouncement . . . because the written sentence is usually just a record of the actual sentence required to be pronounced in open court.” (quoting Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla. 1996) (citing Vasquez v. State, 663 So. 2d 1343, 1349 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995))). This principle applies to the oral pronouncement of court costs and fees. Vavra v. State, 390 So. 3d 1276, 1277-78 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) (reversing for correction where the trial court’s oral pronouncement of costs and fees totaled $1,020 but the written sentencing order imposed $3,788 in fees, costs, and restitution); Tumblin v. State, 302 So. 3d 914, 915-16 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (remanding written judgment imposing a $500 public defender fee to conform with the oral pronouncement of a $100 public defender fee); Croissy v. State, 404 So. 3d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 4th DCA 3 2025) (reversing final judgment for correction when trial court orally pronounced “$100 attorney fee, $50 application fee, $100 cost of prosecution, all fees and costs are reduced to judgment liens as there is no supervision to follow,” but “the written sentencing order doubled the prosecution costs and contained a new $50 investigation fee”). Accordingly, because the above-described costs and fees in the written judgment do not conform to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of those costs and fees, the portion of the judgment pertaining to these costs and fees is reversed and this case is remanded for the costs and fees imposed for the Public Defender’s application fee, the cost of prosecution, and the defense counsel fee to be corrected to comport with the trial court’s oral pronouncement. 1 AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED with instructions. NARDELLA and SMITH, JJ., concur. 1 Perez’s initial brief mentions additional costs and fees that appear in the judgment and sentence but that the trial court did not orally pronounce. However, Perez makes no attempt to argue that those costs and fees are not statutorily authorized costs and fees that are not required to be orally pronounced, and so he has waived any argument to that effect. Kim v. State, 421 So. 3d 862, 864 n.1 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025); Coolen v. State, 696 So. 2d 738, 742 n.2 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting additional arguments because “failure to fully brief and argue these points constitutes a waiver of these claims”); Lynn v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 81 So. 2d 511, 513 (Fla. 1955) (“It is elementary that when a decree of the trial court is brought here on appeal the duty rests upon the appealing party to make error clearly appear.” (emphasis added)). 4 Blair Allen, Public Defender, and Karen M. Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Nicole Rochelle Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED 5