J. Parker v. PPB
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket612 C.D. 2025
JudgeWojcik
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Joseph Parker, :
:
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 612 C.D. 2025
: Submitted: June 16, 2026
Pennsylvania Parole Board, :
:
Respondent :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: November 19, 2026
Joseph Parker (Parolee) petitions for review of the Pennsylvania Parole
Board’s (Board) decision mailed April 14, 2025, which affirmed its earlier January
8, 2025 action rescinding Parolee’s automatic reparole date. We affirm.
The Certified Record (C.R.) shows that Parolee had been serving a 9‑
to 18‑year sentence for robbery and was paroled on September 15, 2023. C.R. at 1.
He was declared delinquent effective October 25, 2024, which is reflected in the
Board’s administrative action recorded October 28, 2024. Id. at 18.
After Parolee was detained, the Board issued a decision on December
5, 2024, recommitting him as a technical parole violator (TPV) for up to six months
based on multiple violations of parole conditions, including changing residence
without permission and failing to report as required. The same decision established
an automatic reparole date not to exceed May 11, 2025, conditioned on successful
program completion and Parolee remaining in good standing. The Board also made
clear that reparole could not take effect until Parolee signed his release
documentation, Forms PBPP‑10 and PBPP‑11, and that until such signing, he
remained under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (DOC). See id. at
22 (“The decision announced by this Board Action ([Form] PBPP-15) will not take
effect until you have signed the conditions ([Form] PBPP-11), and the Release
Orders ([Form] PBPP-10) have been issued. You remain under the jurisdiction and
control of the [DOC] until you have signed the [Form] PBPP-11, and the [Form]
PBPP-10 has been issued.”).
The events underlying this rescission occurred shortly before the
Board’s December 5, 2024 decision. On November 24, 2024, while confined at the
State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Smithfield, Parolee engaged in a confrontation
with a correctional officer. The misconduct report, see C.R. at 26, and the hearing
examiner’s decision, see id. at 27, establish that Parolee refused several direct orders
to return to his cell, causing staff to draw pepper spray. After eventually returning
to his cell, Parolee threatened the officer, telling him, “I’m going to f**k you up and
your family when I get out of here.” Id. at 26. The hearing examiner found Parolee
guilty of three Class I misconducts—threatening an employee, using abusive or
obscene language, and refusing an order—and sanctioned him to 30 days of
disciplinary custody with loss of his institutional job.
DOC did not notify the Board about this misconduct until December
31, 2024. That notification appears in the DOC memorandum at C.R. 31,
accompanied by a formal request to rescind Parolee’s automatic reparole pursuant
2
to Section 6138(d)(3)1 and (5)(i) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code),2 due to his
assaultive behavior. The Board’s Automatic Reparole Rescission Report, executed
on January 7, 2025, see C.R. at 32-35, shows that the Board reviewed the misconduct
and relied upon it as documentary evidence supporting rescission.
At the time DOC notified the Board, Parolee had already been
transferred on December 30, 2024, to Progress Community Corrections Center
(CCC), which the record expressly describes as a “secure facility” within
SCI‑Greene. C.R. at 50. The Board’s January 8, 2025 action rescinded Parolee’s
automatic reparole on the basis that he had committed an assaultive disciplinary
infraction while incarcerated. The decision, see id. at 36-37, explains that Parolee
would remain eligible for reparole consideration at a future review date in December
2025.
On February 7, 2025, Parolee filed an Administrative Remedies Form
alleging that the Board’s action violated his due process rights as “[a]ny misconduct
occurred before the initial hearing, the 12/9/2024 decision, [and] before his release
on parole.” See C.R. at 38-48. The Board denied relief on April 14, 2025, see id. at
49-50,3 and Parolee then filed the instant petition for review.
1
61 Pa. C.S. §6138(d)(3). Section 6138(d)(3) states, in pertinent part: “Except as set forth
in paragraph (4) or (5), the offender shall be recommitted for one of the following periods, at which
time the offender shall automatically be reparoled without further action by the [B]oard[.]”
2
61 Pa. C.S. §6138(d)(5)(i). Section 6138(d)(5)(i) states, in relevant part: “The time limit
under paragraph (3) shall not be applicable to an offender who [. . .] committed a disciplinary
infraction involving assaultive behavior, sexual assault, a weapon or controlled substances[.]”
3
In relevant part, the Board explained:
[Section 6138(d)(5) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code)]
provides that automatic reparole does not apply to [TPVs] who
(Footnote continued on next page…)
3
On appeal,4 Parolee claims that the Board erred in determining that his
transfer from an SCI to a CCC, contained within an SCI, did not create a sufficiently
significant liberty interest so as to require the Board to provide him greater due
process rights than those afforded him herein. We do not agree.
Here, the record shows that Parolee was never “at liberty on parole” at
the time that the Board rescinded his automatic reparole. Indeed, as this Court has
recently explained:
[The parolee] repeatedly references that the Board violated
his due process rights by rescinding his parole without a
commit disciplinary infractions involving assaultive behavior. 61
Pa. C.S. §6138(d)(5). Because he incurred a qualifying misconduct
under the statute, the Board acted within its authority by rescinding
automatic reparole in this case. In this incident, [Parolee] threatened
staff by yelling, “I’m going to f[**]k you up and your family when
I get out of here.” The Board acted within its discretion by taking
this action without conducting an additional evidentiary hearing
because he was already afforded due process to challenge the
misconducts at issue in the hearing held at the SCI[-]Smithfield.
There is no reason for the Board to re-litigate those facts.
Additionally, [Parolee] was never reparoled as you assert in
your correspondence. He was transferred to a secure facility
(Progress CCC) on December 30, 2024[,] to complete his
programming while awaiting automatic reparole. Also, even though
the misconduct occurred before the recommitment Board decision
was issued, it still occurred during the six-month TPV
recommitment period in question. Notification of the misconduct
was not made to the Board until after the original TPV
recommitment decision was issued.
C.R. at 49-50.
4
“This Court’s review of an automatic reparole rescission action ‘is limited to determining
whether the findings were supported by substantial evidence, whether constitutional rights were
violated, or whether the Board committed an error of law.’” Anderson v. Pennsylvania Parole
Board, 266 A.3d 106, 108 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (citations omitted).
4
hearing. However, “[i]t is well[ ]settled that[,] under
Pennsylvania law[,] a grant of parole by itself does not vest
a prisoner with any protected liberty interest in that
parole.” Johnson v. P[ennsylvania] B[oard] of Prob[ation
and] Parole, [532 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Cmwlth.] 1987). Thus,
in order to determine whether the Board violated [the
parolee’s] due process rights,
it is necessary to determine his status at the
time the Board rescinded its prior grant of
parole. There is no question that a “parolee”
has a vested liberty interest in the limited
liberty offered by parole that cannot be taken
away without affording the parolee minimal
due process guarantees of prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
Johnson, 532 A.2d at 52. However, “a prisoner does not
attain the status of a ‘parolee’ until the grant of parole is
actually executed[,]” which is when the inmate signs the
acknowledgement of his parole conditions and the Board
issues the release order. Id.; see also Gruff v.
P[ennsylvania] B[oard] of Prob[ation and] Parole, 986
A.2d 953 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Therefore, parole
revocation, where a parolee’s liberty is at stake, carries
with it a constitutionally guaranteed right to a hearing,
while parole rescission, where the inmate is still confined,
does not. See Gruff; see also Johnson. Specifically, a
Board’s parole rescission decision due to prison
misconduct is not subject to a hearing. See Lockett [v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 141 A.3d
613 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)]; Johnson.
Anderson, 266 A.3d at 110 n.7.
It is clear, then, that a parolee acquires a liberty interest only once he
signs the Form PBPP‑11 and the Board issues a Form PBPP‑10. Because Parolee
had not signed either document herein, and remained under DOC jurisdiction in a
“secure facility,” he never attained the liberty interest that would trigger the
procedural protections associated with parole revocation. Thus, the more robust
5
hearing requirements recognized in Parolee’s cited case law do not apply to the
automatic rescission herein.
As indicated, the statutory basis for rescission is found in Section
6138(d)(5)(i) of the Code, which prohibits automatic reparole where a TPV commits
a disciplinary infraction involving assaultive behavior while incarcerated. The
misconduct established in this record meets this standard: Parolee threatened a staff
member with bodily harm and escalated the confrontation with additional statements
such as, “I’m going to take this block over.” The Board’s rescission report, see C.R.
at 33-35, identifies assaultive behavior as the justification for rescission. Under
Anderson, Dunkleberger v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 573 A.2d
1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), and Moore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 505 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), such threatening communications
qualify as assaultive behavior even absent physical contact.
Furthermore, DOC afforded Parolee all the process constitutionally
required for inmate discipline. The DOC misconduct hearing establishes notice, an
opportunity to present a written version, consideration of video evidence, and a
reasoned adjudication. See C.R. at 27. Under Hill v. Department of Corrections, 64
A.3d 1159 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), this satisfies Parolee’s due process requirements;
and Feliciano v. Department of Corrections, 250 A.3d 1269 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021),
confirms that misconduct decisions are internal prison‑management actions not
subject to judicial re‑litigation.
Within this framework, the Board was entitled to rely exclusively on
DOC’s established findings. As Anderson makes clear, DOC disciplinary findings
constitute substantial evidence supporting rescission of automatic reparole, and the
Board need not conduct a duplicative evidentiary hearing. The record shows the
6
Board followed that approach here. Moreover, because Parolee never attained a
liberty interest; because his misconduct involved assaultive behavior; because DOC
afforded due process; and because the Board acted squarely within its statutory
authority, we discern no constitutional violation, legal error, or lack of substantial
evidence supporting the rescission of his automatic reparole.
Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision.
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
7
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Joseph Parker, :
:
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 612 C.D. 2025
:
Pennsylvania Parole Board, :
:
Respondent :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 19th day of November, 2026, the decision of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board dated April 14, 2025, is AFFIRMED.
__________________________________
MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge