Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON In the Matter of the Parenting and Support of No. 88738-6-I T.S. and J.S. DIVISION ONE JERAMIE SCHULING, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant, and SARAH SEARS, Respondent. BIRK, J. — Jeramie Schuling appeals several aspects of the final order and parenting plan providing for the care and support of the two children he shares with Sarah Sears. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s findings and Schuling fails to otherwise establish error or abuse of discretion, we affirm. I Schuling and Sears were in a relationship, off and on, for more than a decade and had two children together. The parties shared a residence for several years, but sometime between 2013 and 2015, before their second child was born, the mother moved to her parents’ home and has resided there with the children ever since. After the parties no longer lived together, neither sought a court order or other formal arrangement for residential time with the father, who spent time No. 88738-6-I/2 with the children primarily at the grandparents’ home. Conflicts began to arise starting in 2020 about how and when the father would spend time with the children. In January 2022, the father filed a petition for entry of a parenting plan. Each party requested that the court impose restrictions on the other parent and asked to be the parent with whom the children would reside the majority of the time.1 The matter proceeded to a bench trial over seven days in February and March 2025. The father represented himself at trial and the mother was represented by counsel. The court considered approximately 40 exhibits and the testimony of the parties, the maternal grandfather, the mother’s older child from a prior relationship, and a social worker employed by King County Superior Court Family Court Services (FCS) who conducted a parenting plan evaluation. The trial focused primarily on allegations of domestic violence (DV), mental health issues, drug and alcohol issues, and interference with parental relationships. On June 27, 2025, the trial court entered a parenting plan with findings in an attached appendix and a final order. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant a finding that the father has a history of DV. The court also made findings that both parents had impairments that interfere with their ability to parent. Specifically, the court found that the father has a long-term impairment related to alcohol abuse and the mother has a long-term “emotional or physical problem.” As a result of these findings, the court imposed a condition that prohibits the father from consuming alcohol during or 12 hours before his 1 The father initially proposed a parenting plan that maintained the children’s primary residence with the mother but changed his position over the course of the litigation. 2 No. 88738-6-I/3 residential time. The court imposed a condition on the mother that requires her to continue behavioral health treatment, including individual therapy and medication management, and follow all treatment recommendations. The court did not impose supervised visitation or otherwise limit either parent’s contact or residential time based on the findings of impairments or DV history and did not require that the father engage in DV treatment. The trial court allocated sole decision-making authority to the mother in several areas, including education and non-emergency health care. The parenting plan provides for the children to continue to reside the majority of the time with the mother and maternal grandparents but allocates residential time to the father every other weekend, every other Wednesday evening, and additional time during the summer. The father unsuccessfully sought reconsideration and now appeals.2 II A The father contends the court’s finding that he has a “history of acts of domestic violence” under former RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) (2021)3 is legally insufficient. And based on this premise, the father also claims the trial court erred in allocating sole decision-making to the mother. 2 The mother’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, but she has neither cross-appealed nor filed briefing in response to the father’s appeal. 3 The legislature recently made significant changes to RCW 26.09.191 that went into effect on July 27, 2025. See LAWS OF 2025, ch. 166, § 1. The amendments do not affect our analysis and, in any event, we review the court’s orders under the prior statute that was in effect at the time of its decisions. 3 No. 88738-6-I/4 The parenting plan states that the father “has a history of domestic violence as defined in RCW 7.105.010.” The appendix includes the following more detailed finding: The court finds there is a sufficient basis to conclude the father has engaged in a history of acts of domestic violence. The Court does not find all the domestic violence-related allegations raised by the mother to be credible, as some of her claims could not be corroborated and reported deviations in accounting raise a question of possible exaggeration as discussed in the FCS report. The father admitted to some historic acts of violence and coercive control behavior as outlined in the FCS report. Although not recent, there were enough DV related acts in the past to warrant this finding against the father, but the Court is not imposing limitations on the father due to this history and is not requiring DV treatment. In denying the father’s challenge to the DV finding on reconsideration, the court explained that “past interactions” warranted a finding of a history of DV, including a “key incident of violence . . . in 2012, as well as additional incidents of coercive control” that occurred when the father was abusing alcohol. The court also confirmed that its finding was “independent of the FCS report’s similar conclusion.” The father contends the finding of DV history is conclusory and inadequate because it fails to identify the specific acts that occurred or explain how those acts met the definition of DV under RCW 7.105.010(10) (definition of DV set forth in civil protection order statute, ch. 7.105 RCW). We disagree. “RCW 26.09.191 governs restrictions and limitations in parenting plans.” In re Marriage of Mishko, 23 Wn. App. 2d 571, 577, 519 P.3d 240 (2022). Relevant here, former RCW 26.09.191(1) provides that “[t]he permanent parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-making . . . if it is found that a parent has engaged in 4 No. 88738-6-I/5 . . . a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 7.105.010.”4 DV includes the “infliction of fear of physical harm” and coercive control. RCW 7.105.010(10)(b). “ ‘Coercive control’ ” is “a pattern of behavior that is used to cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.” RCW 7.105.010(4)(a). As examples of coercive control, the statute mentions, among other things, “monitoring” or “surveillance,” “[c]arrying, exhibiting, [or] displaying” a firearm, and controlling another’s finances. RCW 7.105.010(4)(i)(B), (C), (H)(iv). A trial court must make express findings under RCW 26.09.191 to impose restrictions in a parenting plan. In re Marriage of Katare, 125 Wn. App. 813, 826, 105 P.3d 44 (2004). And Washington’s superior court civil rules generally require a trial court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law” where, as here, an action is tried without a jury. CR 52(a)(1). Findings of fact must include sufficient detail to allow for meaningful review. In re Dependency of A.D., 193 Wn. App. 445, 462, 376 P.3d 1140 (2016). To satisfy that standard, findings must “suggest the factual basis for the ultimate conclusions.” Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683, 686, 20 P.3d 972 (2001). We may remand for additional findings of fact if we are unable to “discern the reasoning or underlying 4 The father acknowledges that the trial court imposed no restrictions on his residential time based on the finding of DV history. See former RCW 26.09.191(2)(a), (n) (providing for mandatory restrictions on residential time based on finding of DV history unless the court finds that restrictions are not in the children’s best interest). 5 No. 88738-6-I/6 facts supporting [a trial court’s] decision.” Noll v. Special Elec. Co., 9 Wn. App. 2d 317, 319, 444 P.3d 33 (2019). Here, the trial court specifically referenced the father’s admissions to the FCS evaluator as the factual basis for its finding.5 Those admissions largely related to the 2012 “key incident.” The father described the 2012 incident, which led to a criminal charge that was designated as a crime of DV and was the basis for a petition for a protection order the mother filed in 2012. The father reported that he suspected the mother of having an affair, searched her text messages, bought her flowers, and arranged for a coworker to assist him in a ruse so that the mother would believe he would be out of the home for the day. According to the father, the incident culminated in a confrontation with the mother that involved yelling, putting his fist through a closet door, breaking a vase, and punching his vehicle forcefully enough to cause injuries to his hand and damage to the side door of his truck. When he left the residence, he reversed his truck while the mother was standing behind it. The father’s admissions aligned in several respects with the mother’s testimony. The mother testified that when she encountered the father on the day of the 2012 incident, the father was drinking and his hands were bloody after damaging various parts of the house, including walls and closet doors. The mother 5 We reject the father’s claim that the court’s reliance on admissions to the FCS evaluator suggests that the court abdicated its responsibility to “independently evaluate the full trial record.” The court expressly acknowledged its consideration of the testimony of all witnesses and all evidence admitted at trial. And the record reflects that the court did not adopt the FCS evaluator’s recommendations wholesale. Nothing in the record supports the contention that the trial court failed to consider any evidence before it. 6 No. 88738-6-I/7 said she was “terrified” as the father yelled at her, cornered her in the bedroom, and tried to prevent her from leaving the house. She testified that the father eventually left after she called 911, but before he did so, he kicked in the front door, threw a vase, and retrieved a shotgun. According to the mother, she tried to prevent the father from driving because he was intoxicated and because he said he intended to find the person he believed she was romantically involved with. The father also admitted to the FCS evaluator that he had intimidated, scared, and “snapped at” the mother. And he reported that he used tracking technology to ascertain the mother’s location and provided the information to the parties’ daughter. The father also admitted to twice retrieving a shotgun and removing it from the parties’ shared residence during confrontations with the mother. Considering the finding in the context of the evidence presented at trial, including the FCS evaluator’s reports and testimony, and the additional specificity included in the trial court’s order on reconsideration, the court’s finding allows for meaningful appellate review. It is readily apparent that the court found a history of acts of domestic violence based on acts that occurred in 2012 and were admitted to and/or corroborated. The finding also indicates an additional basis—the father’s admitted use of tracking technology and sharing the results of his surveillance with the parties’ child. We are able to discern the factual basis for the court’s ultimate decision from its findings.6 See Noll, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 319, 323. And because 6 The father’s reliance on an unpublished decision of Division Two of this court in In re Marriage of Sooto, No. 58056-0-II, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. June 17, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2058056- 7 No. 88738-6-I/8 the father’s challenge to the allocation of sole decision-making to the mother is premised on his claim of insufficiency of the finding of DV history, that argument fails as well.7 B Under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) the trial court may impose restrictions in a parenting plan when the court finds “[a] long-term impairment resulting from drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of parenting functions.” The trial court did not limit the nature or amount of the father’s contact with the children based on the finding under former section .191(3)(c), but the court did impose alcohol-related conditions and he challenges the finding of long-term impairment related to alcohol abuse. He again maintains that the court’s finding is legally insufficient because it did not find a current impairment that presently interferes with parenting functions. And even if the trial court did make 0.II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. There, the court’s findings were insufficient to support the ultimate conclusion of a history of domestic violence because it was not clear what factual evidence the court relied on, there was no request for a domestic violence finding to provide clarity, and there was no evidence in the record of physical harm or fear of harm on the part of the alleged victim. Sooto, slip op. at 18-19. We address unpublished authority only because the father relies on it. See GR 14.1. 7 The father otherwise fails to establish that the court abused its discretion with respect to the decision-making provisions. Nothing in RCW 26.09.184(5) limits decision-making provisions to issues of health care, education, and religious upbringing unless the parties agree to expanded areas. Although the father now characterizes the provisions related to passport issuance and international travel as a restriction on his ability to travel, this was not the basis for his objection below. To the extent the father suggests the court exceeded its authority, he fails to adequately support this claim of error with legal authority and argument. See Christian v. Tohmeh, 191 Wn. App. 709, 728, 366 P.3d 16 (2015) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit appellate review.”). 8 No. 88738-6-I/9 such a finding, the father contends there is no substantial evidence in the record to support it. The parenting plan includes the following finding: “[The father] has a long- term problem with drugs, alcohol, or other substances that gets in the way of [his] ability to parent.” The trial court thus expressly found that the father has an existing long-term impairment that interferes with parenting functions. The trial court’s duplicative finding in the appendix stating that the father’s impairment “interfered,” in the past tense, with parenting functions, does not undermine the legal sufficiency of the parenting plan’s finding or suggest any lack of connection between the existence of a long-term impairment and parenting abilities. As to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding, when the trial court has weighed the evidence, our role is “simply to determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law.” In re Marriage of Wilson, 165 Wn. App. 333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 (2011). “Substantial evidence is that which is sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, weigh evidence, or adjudge the credibility of witnesses. Wilson, 165 Wn. App. at 340. Findings that do not affect the trial court’s conclusions are not prejudicial and, thus, do not warrant reversal. State v. Coleman, 6 Wn. App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). The father does not dispute that he (1) was diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder, (2) has a history of approximately five arrests for driving under the 9 No. 88738-6-I/10 influence (DUI) and more than 20 failure to appear warrants, and (3) his impairment has interfered with his parenting, to the extent that he missed a significant amount of parenting time as a result of his alcohol abuse and was incarcerated for more than 300 days between 2005 and 2019. Yet, pointing to his 2022 discharge from substance use disorder treatment and his claim of sobriety since 2020, the father maintains that the record does not support a finding of a current impairment. But the trial court was not required to credit the father’s self-serving and unsubstantiated claim of continued sobriety. And the FCS evaluator, the only witness the court specifically found to be credible, noted that the father’s current sobriety was unverified by objective evidence and suggested reasons to question the assertion that the issue is entirely resolved. Specifically, the FCS evaluator reported that, although she had no information that the father was currently using alcohol during the period of her investigation of the case, he failed to provide test results that would have confirmed approximately three months of abstinence, despite negotiating the type of testing requested due to cost. The evaluator further observed that the father had no robust sobriety or relapse prevention plan, beyond reliance on “willpower,” and he attends no sober support meetings. And the evaluator noted that, although the father had not missed residential time due to alcohol use during the period of her involvement in the case, prior periods when he missed parenting time may still interfere with parenting to the extent that the children recollect and were affected by those experiences. In sum, substantial 10 No. 88738-6-I/11 evidence in the record supports the court’s finding of the existence of a long-term impairment due to alcohol use that interferes with parenting functions. And even if we were to agree that the trial court failed to make the finding required under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) or that substantial evidence did not support the finding, reversal would be unwarranted. Again, the father does not challenge the condition requiring that he abstain from alcohol before and during his residential time. Nor does he challenge the condition that he must provide proof of a valid driving license and insurance before driving the children. Even though the court exercised its discretion in his favor by not limiting his residential time based on an alcohol-related impairment, the father insists that the finding is prejudicial because it carries “collateral consequences” and could affect placement and other provisions in “subsequent modifications.” The father does not identify the collateral consequences and cites no authority supporting the position that, absent a finding under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) in the 2025 parenting plan, the court would be unable to revisit any provisions or apply discretionary limitations based on alcohol abuse in a future modification proceeding. See RCW 26.09.260(4) (court may enter provisions addressing contact with a parent in the child’s best interests “using the criteria in RCW 26.09.191”). The father fails to establish error or prejudice stemming from the finding under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c). 11 No. 88738-6-I/12 C The father claims that the court abused its discretion in determining the residential provisions of the parenting plan. The father asserts that the trial court failed to engage in the correct legal analysis required by RCW 26.09.187(3).8 In reviewing challenges to findings related to child placement, we give “broad deference” to the trial court’s findings. In re Custody of SA-M, 17 Wn. App. 2d 939, 951, 489 P.3d 259 (2021). We do not lightly disturb child placement decisions “[b]ecause the trial court hears evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Parenting & Support of C.T., 193 Wn. App. 427, 442, 378 P.3d 183 (2016). The court’s decision will stand absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993). RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) lists the seven criteria a trial court must consider when establishing residential provisions for children, with the “relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent” being given the “greatest weight.” The statute also requires consideration of agreements between the parties, each parent’s past and potential future performance of parenting functions, the children’s emotional and developmental needs, relationships with siblings and other significant adults, children’s connections to physical surroundings, school, and activities, the wishes of parents and children of sufficient 8 The legislature amended RCW 26.09.187 after the trial in this matter. See LAWS OF 2025, ch. 166, § 4. Because the amendments do not impact the applicable statutory analysis, we refer to the current statute. 12 No. 88738-6-I/13 maturity, and the parents’ employment schedules. See RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(ii)- (vii). The trial court in this case expressly considered the required factors on the record and made the following finding: [T]he children will continue to reside primarily with the mother and grandparents. The mother and both children reside with the mother’s parents and have lived with them for several years. The presence of the mother’s parents in the family home is a protective factor and provides a safety net of support and caretaking for the children. The father will continue to have unsupervised parenting time, with some expanded time to include 3 hours on Wednesday evenings during the week the father will not see the children that weekend, as well as increased visitation over the summer break. The Court finds this residential schedule is in the best interests of the children. Contrary to the father’s argument, the court’s consideration of the grandparents’ presence, support, and caretaking is not at odds with the analysis required by RCW 26.09.187. The court was required to give primary consideration to the strength, nature, and stability of the children’s relationships with each parent. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i). According to the evidence, the children have lived with the mother their entire lives and with the grandparents in their home for more than decade, since before the youngest child was born. The statute specifically required the court to consider the children’s relationships with “significant adults” other than the parents. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(v). The father conceded that the grandparents were a consistent presence in the children’s lives and actively participated in their care. Also, the court’s statement in the order on reconsideration that it considered the “comparative risk of harm to the child posed by each parent” in light of the .191 13 No. 88738-6-I/14 findings does not indicate a failure to apply the proper statutory analysis. The statute requires the court to provide a residential schedule that is “consistent” with RCW 26.09.191. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). It was not error for the court to consider the implications of its .191 findings. The father fails to establish an abuse of discretion with respect to the residential provisions. D The father claims the trial court failed to rule on his request for .191 findings against the mother for an alleged abusive use of conflict and his request for attorney fees based on alleged intransigence. However, after acknowledging the father’s request for, among other things, a finding of abusive use of conflict, the court found that “the evidence presented at trial supports some of the 191 findings requested by the parties, but not all of them.” Likewise, the court acknowledged requests for attorney fees but expressly declined to award fees or costs to either party. The court properly ruled on the record as to both requests. And here too, because the basis for the court’s rulings are clear—the court found the evidence insufficient to support a finding of abusive use of conflict or warrant an award of attorney fees—the rulings are sufficiently specific to allow for appellate review. While the father views the record differently, we decline the invitation to draw different conclusions from, or reweigh, the evidence on appeal. E Finally, the father claims the trial court erred by incorporating certain terms into the final orders that “contradict” its oral ruling or “address subjects that the 14 No. 88738-6-I/15 court did not rule on at all.” For example, the father asserts that the court’s final order expands upon or varies from the oral ruling by (1) designating an exchange location; (2) imposing conditions on the mother for behavioral health treatment that did not include all recommendations of the FCS evaluator; (3) allocating sole decision-making to the mother for extracurricular activities, international travel, and issuance or renewal of passports, (4) delaying implementation of the father’s summer expanded residential time until 2026; and (5) providing for children to reside with the mother on dates of certain specific school events. But it is well settled that an oral decision is not a final judgment. Grien v. LaPomma, 47 Wn.2d 40, 41, 286 P.2d 97 (1955); State v. Goard, 32 Wn.2d 705, 707-08, 203 P.2d 355 (1949). A trial court is free to revisit any decision until entry of a final judgment or order. Earl v. Geftax, 43 Wn.2d 529, 530, 262 P.2d 183 (1953). Even a written memorandum of opinion filed prior to the entry of a formal judgment or order does not deprive a trial court of the power to change its indicated ruling. Fogelquist v. Meyer, 142 Wash. 478, 482, 253 P. 794 (1927). An oral ruling is merely an “informal opinion” and generally has “no final or binding effect, unless formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.” Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 566-67, 383 P.2d 900 (1963). And here, the final orders incorporated by reference the trial court’s oral ruling, but only to “the extent consistent with its written orders.” No authority supports the father’s apparent position that the court’s oral decision precluded it from entering provisions that were not specifically addressed 15 No. 88738-6-I/16 in the oral ruling or were different from the provisions as outlined in the oral decision. We affirm.9 WE CONCUR: 9 Because we do not remand for “further discretionary determinations,” we need not address the father’s request for reassignment to a different judge. 16