Jeramie Schuling, V. Sarah Sears
CourtCourt of Appeals of Washington
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket88738-6
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Parenting and
Support of No. 88738-6-I
T.S. and J.S. DIVISION ONE
JERAMIE SCHULING, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant,
and
SARAH SEARS,
Respondent.
BIRK, J. — Jeramie Schuling appeals several aspects of the final order and
parenting plan providing for the care and support of the two children he shares with
Sarah Sears. Because substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s
findings and Schuling fails to otherwise establish error or abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
I
Schuling and Sears were in a relationship, off and on, for more than a
decade and had two children together. The parties shared a residence for several
years, but sometime between 2013 and 2015, before their second child was born,
the mother moved to her parents’ home and has resided there with the children
ever since. After the parties no longer lived together, neither sought a court order
or other formal arrangement for residential time with the father, who spent time
No. 88738-6-I/2
with the children primarily at the grandparents’ home. Conflicts began to arise
starting in 2020 about how and when the father would spend time with the children.
In January 2022, the father filed a petition for entry of a parenting plan. Each
party requested that the court impose restrictions on the other parent and asked
to be the parent with whom the children would reside the majority of the time.1
The matter proceeded to a bench trial over seven days in February and
March 2025. The father represented himself at trial and the mother was
represented by counsel. The court considered approximately 40 exhibits and the
testimony of the parties, the maternal grandfather, the mother’s older child from a
prior relationship, and a social worker employed by King County Superior Court
Family Court Services (FCS) who conducted a parenting plan evaluation. The trial
focused primarily on allegations of domestic violence (DV), mental health issues,
drug and alcohol issues, and interference with parental relationships.
On June 27, 2025, the trial court entered a parenting plan with findings in
an attached appendix and a final order. The court concluded there was sufficient
evidence in the record to warrant a finding that the father has a history of DV. The
court also made findings that both parents had impairments that interfere with their
ability to parent. Specifically, the court found that the father has a long-term
impairment related to alcohol abuse and the mother has a long-term “emotional or
physical problem.” As a result of these findings, the court imposed a condition that
prohibits the father from consuming alcohol during or 12 hours before his
1 The father initially proposed a parenting plan that maintained the children’s
primary residence with the mother but changed his position over the course of the
litigation.
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residential time. The court imposed a condition on the mother that requires her to
continue behavioral health treatment, including individual therapy and medication
management, and follow all treatment recommendations. The court did not impose
supervised visitation or otherwise limit either parent’s contact or residential time
based on the findings of impairments or DV history and did not require that the
father engage in DV treatment.
The trial court allocated sole decision-making authority to the mother in
several areas, including education and non-emergency health care. The parenting
plan provides for the children to continue to reside the majority of the time with the
mother and maternal grandparents but allocates residential time to the father every
other weekend, every other Wednesday evening, and additional time during the
summer.
The father unsuccessfully sought reconsideration and now appeals.2
II
A
The father contends the court’s finding that he has a “history of acts of
domestic violence” under former RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) (2021)3 is legally
insufficient. And based on this premise, the father also claims the trial court erred
in allocating sole decision-making to the mother.
2 The mother’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, but she has
neither cross-appealed nor filed briefing in response to the father’s appeal.
3 The legislature recently made significant changes to RCW 26.09.191 that
went into effect on July 27, 2025. See LAWS OF 2025, ch. 166, § 1. The
amendments do not affect our analysis and, in any event, we review the court’s
orders under the prior statute that was in effect at the time of its decisions.
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The parenting plan states that the father “has a history of domestic violence
as defined in RCW 7.105.010.” The appendix includes the following more detailed
finding:
The court finds there is a sufficient basis to conclude the father has
engaged in a history of acts of domestic violence. The Court does
not find all the domestic violence-related allegations raised by the
mother to be credible, as some of her claims could not be
corroborated and reported deviations in accounting raise a question
of possible exaggeration as discussed in the FCS report. The father
admitted to some historic acts of violence and coercive control
behavior as outlined in the FCS report. Although not recent, there
were enough DV related acts in the past to warrant this finding
against the father, but the Court is not imposing limitations on the
father due to this history and is not requiring DV treatment.
In denying the father’s challenge to the DV finding on reconsideration, the court
explained that “past interactions” warranted a finding of a history of DV, including
a “key incident of violence . . . in 2012, as well as additional incidents of coercive
control” that occurred when the father was abusing alcohol. The court also
confirmed that its finding was “independent of the FCS report’s similar conclusion.”
The father contends the finding of DV history is conclusory and inadequate
because it fails to identify the specific acts that occurred or explain how those acts
met the definition of DV under RCW 7.105.010(10) (definition of DV set forth in
civil protection order statute, ch. 7.105 RCW). We disagree.
“RCW 26.09.191 governs restrictions and limitations in parenting plans.” In
re Marriage of Mishko, 23 Wn. App. 2d 571, 577, 519 P.3d 240 (2022). Relevant
here, former RCW 26.09.191(1) provides that “[t]he permanent parenting plan shall
not require mutual decision-making . . . if it is found that a parent has engaged in
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. . . a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 7.105.010.”4 DV
includes the “infliction of fear of physical harm” and coercive control. RCW
7.105.010(10)(b). “ ‘Coercive control’ ” is “a pattern of behavior that is used to
cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in purpose
or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty.”
RCW 7.105.010(4)(a). As examples of coercive control, the statute mentions,
among other things, “monitoring” or “surveillance,” “[c]arrying, exhibiting, [or]
displaying” a firearm, and controlling another’s finances. RCW 7.105.010(4)(i)(B),
(C), (H)(iv).
A trial court must make express findings under RCW 26.09.191 to impose
restrictions in a parenting plan. In re Marriage of Katare, 125 Wn. App. 813, 826,
105 P.3d 44 (2004). And Washington’s superior court civil rules generally require
a trial court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law”
where, as here, an action is tried without a jury. CR 52(a)(1). Findings of fact must
include sufficient detail to allow for meaningful review. In re Dependency of A.D.,
193 Wn. App. 445, 462, 376 P.3d 1140 (2016). To satisfy that standard, findings
must “suggest the factual basis for the ultimate conclusions.” Lawrence v.
Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683, 686, 20 P.3d 972 (2001). We may remand for
additional findings of fact if we are unable to “discern the reasoning or underlying
4 The father acknowledges that the trial court imposed no restrictions on his
residential time based on the finding of DV history. See former RCW
26.09.191(2)(a), (n) (providing for mandatory restrictions on residential time based
on finding of DV history unless the court finds that restrictions are not in the
children’s best interest).
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facts supporting [a trial court’s] decision.” Noll v. Special Elec. Co., 9 Wn. App. 2d
317, 319, 444 P.3d 33 (2019).
Here, the trial court specifically referenced the father’s admissions to the
FCS evaluator as the factual basis for its finding.5 Those admissions largely
related to the 2012 “key incident.” The father described the 2012 incident, which
led to a criminal charge that was designated as a crime of DV and was the basis
for a petition for a protection order the mother filed in 2012. The father reported
that he suspected the mother of having an affair, searched her text messages,
bought her flowers, and arranged for a coworker to assist him in a ruse so that the
mother would believe he would be out of the home for the day. According to the
father, the incident culminated in a confrontation with the mother that involved
yelling, putting his fist through a closet door, breaking a vase, and punching his
vehicle forcefully enough to cause injuries to his hand and damage to the side door
of his truck. When he left the residence, he reversed his truck while the mother
was standing behind it.
The father’s admissions aligned in several respects with the mother’s
testimony. The mother testified that when she encountered the father on the day
of the 2012 incident, the father was drinking and his hands were bloody after
damaging various parts of the house, including walls and closet doors. The mother
5 We reject the father’s claim that the court’s reliance on admissions to the
FCS evaluator suggests that the court abdicated its responsibility to “independently
evaluate the full trial record.” The court expressly acknowledged its consideration
of the testimony of all witnesses and all evidence admitted at trial. And the record
reflects that the court did not adopt the FCS evaluator’s recommendations
wholesale. Nothing in the record supports the contention that the trial court failed
to consider any evidence before it.
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said she was “terrified” as the father yelled at her, cornered her in the bedroom,
and tried to prevent her from leaving the house. She testified that the father
eventually left after she called 911, but before he did so, he kicked in the front door,
threw a vase, and retrieved a shotgun. According to the mother, she tried to
prevent the father from driving because he was intoxicated and because he said
he intended to find the person he believed she was romantically involved with.
The father also admitted to the FCS evaluator that he had intimidated,
scared, and “snapped at” the mother. And he reported that he used tracking
technology to ascertain the mother’s location and provided the information to the
parties’ daughter. The father also admitted to twice retrieving a shotgun and
removing it from the parties’ shared residence during confrontations with the
mother.
Considering the finding in the context of the evidence presented at trial,
including the FCS evaluator’s reports and testimony, and the additional specificity
included in the trial court’s order on reconsideration, the court’s finding allows for
meaningful appellate review. It is readily apparent that the court found a history of
acts of domestic violence based on acts that occurred in 2012 and were admitted
to and/or corroborated. The finding also indicates an additional basis—the father’s
admitted use of tracking technology and sharing the results of his surveillance with
the parties’ child. We are able to discern the factual basis for the court’s ultimate
decision from its findings.6 See Noll, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 319, 323. And because
6 The father’s reliance on an unpublished decision of Division Two of this
court in In re Marriage of Sooto, No. 58056-0-II, slip op. (Wash. Ct. App. June 17,
2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2058056-
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No. 88738-6-I/8
the father’s challenge to the allocation of sole decision-making to the mother is
premised on his claim of insufficiency of the finding of DV history, that argument
fails as well.7
B
Under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) the trial court may impose restrictions
in a parenting plan when the court finds “[a] long-term impairment resulting from
drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes with the performance of
parenting functions.” The trial court did not limit the nature or amount of the father’s
contact with the children based on the finding under former section .191(3)(c), but
the court did impose alcohol-related conditions and he challenges the finding of
long-term impairment related to alcohol abuse. He again maintains that the court’s
finding is legally insufficient because it did not find a current impairment that
presently interferes with parenting functions. And even if the trial court did make
0.II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. There, the court’s findings were insufficient
to support the ultimate conclusion of a history of domestic violence because it was
not clear what factual evidence the court relied on, there was no request for a
domestic violence finding to provide clarity, and there was no evidence in the
record of physical harm or fear of harm on the part of the alleged victim. Sooto,
slip op. at 18-19. We address unpublished authority only because the father relies
on it. See GR 14.1.
7 The father otherwise fails to establish that the court abused its discretion
with respect to the decision-making provisions. Nothing in RCW 26.09.184(5)
limits decision-making provisions to issues of health care, education, and religious
upbringing unless the parties agree to expanded areas. Although the father now
characterizes the provisions related to passport issuance and international travel
as a restriction on his ability to travel, this was not the basis for his objection below.
To the extent the father suggests the court exceeded its authority, he fails to
adequately support this claim of error with legal authority and argument. See
Christian v. Tohmeh, 191 Wn. App. 709, 728, 366 P.3d 16 (2015) (“Passing
treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit appellate
review.”).
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such a finding, the father contends there is no substantial evidence in the record
to support it.
The parenting plan includes the following finding: “[The father] has a long-
term problem with drugs, alcohol, or other substances that gets in the way of [his]
ability to parent.” The trial court thus expressly found that the father has an existing
long-term impairment that interferes with parenting functions. The trial court’s
duplicative finding in the appendix stating that the father’s impairment “interfered,”
in the past tense, with parenting functions, does not undermine the legal sufficiency
of the parenting plan’s finding or suggest any lack of connection between the
existence of a long-term impairment and parenting abilities.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding, when the trial
court has weighed the evidence, our role is “simply to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the findings of fact and, if so, whether the findings
in turn support the trial court's conclusions of law.” In re Marriage of Wilson, 165
Wn. App. 333, 340, 267 P.3d 485 (2011). “Substantial evidence is that which is
sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” In
re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). We do not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, weigh evidence, or adjudge the
credibility of witnesses. Wilson, 165 Wn. App. at 340. Findings that do not affect
the trial court’s conclusions are not prejudicial and, thus, do not warrant reversal.
State v. Coleman, 6 Wn. App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018).
The father does not dispute that he (1) was diagnosed with severe alcohol
use disorder, (2) has a history of approximately five arrests for driving under the
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influence (DUI) and more than 20 failure to appear warrants, and (3) his
impairment has interfered with his parenting, to the extent that he missed a
significant amount of parenting time as a result of his alcohol abuse and was
incarcerated for more than 300 days between 2005 and 2019. Yet, pointing to his
2022 discharge from substance use disorder treatment and his claim of sobriety
since 2020, the father maintains that the record does not support a finding of a
current impairment.
But the trial court was not required to credit the father’s self-serving and
unsubstantiated claim of continued sobriety. And the FCS evaluator, the only
witness the court specifically found to be credible, noted that the father’s current
sobriety was unverified by objective evidence and suggested reasons to question
the assertion that the issue is entirely resolved. Specifically, the FCS evaluator
reported that, although she had no information that the father was currently using
alcohol during the period of her investigation of the case, he failed to provide test
results that would have confirmed approximately three months of abstinence,
despite negotiating the type of testing requested due to cost. The evaluator further
observed that the father had no robust sobriety or relapse prevention plan, beyond
reliance on “willpower,” and he attends no sober support meetings. And the
evaluator noted that, although the father had not missed residential time due to
alcohol use during the period of her involvement in the case, prior periods when
he missed parenting time may still interfere with parenting to the extent that the
children recollect and were affected by those experiences. In sum, substantial
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evidence in the record supports the court’s finding of the existence of a long-term
impairment due to alcohol use that interferes with parenting functions.
And even if we were to agree that the trial court failed to make the finding
required under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) or that substantial evidence did not
support the finding, reversal would be unwarranted. Again, the father does not
challenge the condition requiring that he abstain from alcohol before and during
his residential time. Nor does he challenge the condition that he must provide
proof of a valid driving license and insurance before driving the children. Even
though the court exercised its discretion in his favor by not limiting his residential
time based on an alcohol-related impairment, the father insists that the finding is
prejudicial because it carries “collateral consequences” and could affect placement
and other provisions in “subsequent modifications.” The father does not identify
the collateral consequences and cites no authority supporting the position that,
absent a finding under former RCW 26.09.191(3)(c) in the 2025 parenting plan,
the court would be unable to revisit any provisions or apply discretionary limitations
based on alcohol abuse in a future modification proceeding. See RCW
26.09.260(4) (court may enter provisions addressing contact with a parent in the
child’s best interests “using the criteria in RCW 26.09.191”). The father fails to
establish error or prejudice stemming from the finding under former RCW
26.09.191(3)(c).
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C
The father claims that the court abused its discretion in determining the
residential provisions of the parenting plan. The father asserts that the trial court
failed to engage in the correct legal analysis required by RCW 26.09.187(3).8
In reviewing challenges to findings related to child placement, we give
“broad deference” to the trial court’s findings. In re Custody of SA-M, 17 Wn. App.
2d 939, 951, 489 P.3d 259 (2021). We do not lightly disturb child placement
decisions “[b]ecause the trial court hears evidence firsthand and has a unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Parenting & Support of C.T., 193 Wn.
App. 427, 442, 378 P.3d 183 (2016). The court’s decision will stand absent an
abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239
(1993).
RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) lists the seven criteria a trial court must consider
when establishing residential provisions for children, with the “relative strength,
nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent” being given the
“greatest weight.” The statute also requires consideration of agreements between
the parties, each parent’s past and potential future performance of parenting
functions, the children’s emotional and developmental needs, relationships with
siblings and other significant adults, children’s connections to physical
surroundings, school, and activities, the wishes of parents and children of sufficient
8 The legislature amended RCW 26.09.187 after the trial in this matter. See
LAWS OF 2025, ch. 166, § 4. Because the amendments do not impact the
applicable statutory analysis, we refer to the current statute.
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No. 88738-6-I/13
maturity, and the parents’ employment schedules. See RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(ii)-
(vii).
The trial court in this case expressly considered the required factors on the
record and made the following finding:
[T]he children will continue to reside primarily with the mother and
grandparents. The mother and both children reside with the mother’s
parents and have lived with them for several years. The presence of
the mother’s parents in the family home is a protective factor and
provides a safety net of support and caretaking for the children. The
father will continue to have unsupervised parenting time, with some
expanded time to include 3 hours on Wednesday evenings during
the week the father will not see the children that weekend, as well as
increased visitation over the summer break. The Court finds this
residential schedule is in the best interests of the children.
Contrary to the father’s argument, the court’s consideration of the
grandparents’ presence, support, and caretaking is not at odds with the analysis
required by RCW 26.09.187. The court was required to give primary consideration
to the strength, nature, and stability of the children’s relationships with each parent.
RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i). According to the evidence, the children have lived with
the mother their entire lives and with the grandparents in their home for more than
decade, since before the youngest child was born. The statute specifically
required the court to consider the children’s relationships with “significant adults”
other than the parents. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(v). The father conceded that the
grandparents were a consistent presence in the children’s lives and actively
participated in their care.
Also, the court’s statement in the order on reconsideration that it considered
the “comparative risk of harm to the child posed by each parent” in light of the .191
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findings does not indicate a failure to apply the proper statutory analysis. The
statute requires the court to provide a residential schedule that is “consistent” with
RCW 26.09.191. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a). It was not error for the court to consider
the implications of its .191 findings.
The father fails to establish an abuse of discretion with respect to the
residential provisions.
D
The father claims the trial court failed to rule on his request for .191 findings
against the mother for an alleged abusive use of conflict and his request for
attorney fees based on alleged intransigence. However, after acknowledging the
father’s request for, among other things, a finding of abusive use of conflict, the
court found that “the evidence presented at trial supports some of the 191 findings
requested by the parties, but not all of them.” Likewise, the court acknowledged
requests for attorney fees but expressly declined to award fees or costs to either
party. The court properly ruled on the record as to both requests. And here too,
because the basis for the court’s rulings are clear—the court found the evidence
insufficient to support a finding of abusive use of conflict or warrant an award of
attorney fees—the rulings are sufficiently specific to allow for appellate review.
While the father views the record differently, we decline the invitation to draw
different conclusions from, or reweigh, the evidence on appeal.
E
Finally, the father claims the trial court erred by incorporating certain terms
into the final orders that “contradict” its oral ruling or “address subjects that the
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court did not rule on at all.” For example, the father asserts that the court’s final
order expands upon or varies from the oral ruling by (1) designating an exchange
location; (2) imposing conditions on the mother for behavioral health treatment that
did not include all recommendations of the FCS evaluator; (3) allocating sole
decision-making to the mother for extracurricular activities, international travel, and
issuance or renewal of passports, (4) delaying implementation of the father’s
summer expanded residential time until 2026; and (5) providing for children to
reside with the mother on dates of certain specific school events.
But it is well settled that an oral decision is not a final judgment. Grien v.
LaPomma, 47 Wn.2d 40, 41, 286 P.2d 97 (1955); State v. Goard, 32 Wn.2d 705,
707-08, 203 P.2d 355 (1949). A trial court is free to revisit any decision until entry
of a final judgment or order. Earl v. Geftax, 43 Wn.2d 529, 530, 262 P.2d 183
(1953). Even a written memorandum of opinion filed prior to the entry of a formal
judgment or order does not deprive a trial court of the power to change its indicated
ruling. Fogelquist v. Meyer, 142 Wash. 478, 482, 253 P. 794 (1927). An oral ruling
is merely an “informal opinion” and generally has “no final or binding effect, unless
formally incorporated into the findings, conclusions, and judgment.” Ferree v.
Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 566-67, 383 P.2d 900 (1963). And here, the final orders
incorporated by reference the trial court’s oral ruling, but only to “the extent
consistent with its written orders.”
No authority supports the father’s apparent position that the court’s oral
decision precluded it from entering provisions that were not specifically addressed
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in the oral ruling or were different from the provisions as outlined in the oral
decision.
We affirm.9
WE CONCUR:
9 Because we do not remand for “further discretionary determinations,” we
need not address the father’s request for reassignment to a different judge.
16