Full Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two October 27, 2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II In the Matter of the Marriage of: No. 60626-7-II BENJAMIN ALMON MAVY, Appellant, and MEGAN MAE COELHO, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Respondent. LEE, J. — Benjamin A. Mavy appeals a December 2024 parenting plan and relocation order entered by the trial court in the dissolution of his marriage to Megan M. Coelho. Specifically, Mavy argues that: (1) the trial court erred by declining to enter limitations on Coelho under RCW 26.09.191, (2) the trial court erred by declining to enter a phased parenting plan, (3) the trial court relied on findings of fact that were not supported by the record in entering the parenting plan, (4) the trial court erred in denying relocation, (5) the trial court abused its discretion in dividing property at dissolution, (6) the trial court’s division of property failed to promote finality, and (7) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mavy’s motion to find Coelho in contempt. We hold that Mavy’s challenges to the parenting plan and relocation order are moot in light of a new parenting plan and relocation order entered in 2026.1 We also hold that Mavy’s 1 After this appeal was filed, the trial court entered a new parenting plan and entered an order allowing Mavy to relocate to Wyoming with the three younger children. No. 60626-7-II challenges to the division of property fail and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for contempt. Accordingly, we affirm. FACTS A. BACKGROUND Mavy and Coelho were married in 2002. During their marriage, Mavy and Coelho had seven children. The family lived in Wyoming prior to moving to Washington. In September 2021, while the family still lived in Wyoming, Mavy and Coelho received $1,518,103 for their interest in a business Mavy had been involved in. In November 2021, Mavy and Coelho created an irrevocable trust pursuant to Wyoming law to protect their assets and for estate planning. The trust was funded with personal property valued at $125,000 at the time. In addition, Mavy and Coelho transferred $250,000 into the trust. The trust also held Mavy and Coelho’s Wyoming house, which had a value of about $500,000. Under the terms of the trust, Mavy was the trust advisor, and he retained almost absolute control over the management of the trust assets. For example, the trust property could be used by either Mavy or Coelho but only at Mavy’s discretion. Mavy and Coelho’s children were the beneficiaries of the trust. Mavy and Coelho moved their family from Wyoming to Washington, and they purchased a home in Sequim. B. PETITION FOR DISSOLUTION AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO MOVE On November 22, 2022, Mavy filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. At the time of dissolution, only five of the seven children were minors: L.M., N.M., A.M., H.M., and M.M. Along with the petition for dissolution, Mavy filed a proposed parenting plan for the remaining five minor children. The proposed parenting plan sought limitations on Coelho pursuant 2 No. 60626-7-II to RCW 26.09.191, based on emotional or physical problems, substance abuse, unavailability, and parental alienation. Mavy also sought sole decision-making, and he requested that the children reside with him except for three weekends per month. In March 2024, the trial court entered a temporary parenting plan which remained in effect through trial. Under the temporary parenting plan, the two older children, L.M. and N.M., were scheduled to live with Coelho. The temporary parenting plan required N.M. to live with Mavy every other weekend and alternating Thursday nights but did not require L.M. to spend time with Mavy. The three younger children, A.M., H.M. and M.M., were scheduled to live with Mavy, except for Wednesdays after school and every other weekend when they were scheduled to live with Coelho. On May 31, 2024, Mavy filed a notice of intent to move to Wyoming with A.M., H.M., and M.M. Coelho objected to the move based on the younger children’s relationships and support systems in Washington. C. DISSOLUTION TRIAL In August 2024, the trial court held an informal bench trial on the dissolution of Mavy and Coelho’s marriage.2 At trial, the trial court considered a parenting time evaluation from Dr. Steve Tutty, who conducted an evaluation to assist in the development of a permanent parenting plan. In his evaluation, Dr. Tutty found that the older children, L.M. and N.M., had more stability with Coelho 2 Mavy and Coelho stipulated to an informal family law trial under GR 40. The stipulation provided that the trial judge would question the witnesses, only the parties and experts would be presented as witnesses, and the rules of evidence would not apply. 3 No. 60626-7-II than Mavy. Dr. Tutty noted that the older children “desire no contact” with Mavy, while the younger children were “in no position to express reasoned and independent preferences,” but stated that it was “likely a matter of time before the younger children manifest visit-refusal behaviors [toward Mavy] without sufficient intervention.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2733. In examining whether limitations on a parent would be appropriate, Dr. Tutty concluded that neither parent demonstrated neglect to warrant RCW 26.09.191 restrictions. Dr. Tutty found that Coelho exhibited an emotional impairment, which could impair her ability to sufficiently parent her children. Dr. Tutty did not find a significant emotional or physical impairment that would interfere with Mavy’s capacity for parenting functions. Dr. Tutty proposed a 50-50 residential schedule with Mavy and Coelho for the three younger children. Dr. Tutty also proposed a 50-50 residential schedule for N.M. after the relationship bond with Mavy is restored. On August 29, 2024, at the conclusion of trial, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion with findings of fact and conclusions of law related to dissolution, a parenting plan, and relocation. In the memorandum opinion, the trial court explained that because the parties chose not to present a full accounting of their debts, the trial court could not determine who should be awarded certain debt with precision and thus divided the debt equally. Because other parties may have interest in the businesses, the trial court noted that “[i]f they cannot agree [on how to proceed with operating or liquidating the businesses], they can institute separate legal proceedings related to each business to resolve those concerns.” CP at 108. Further, the trial court stated that Coelho would be awarded the Sequim house and would assume any debt secured by the house. The trial court found that this award created “little to no risk to [Mavy] regarding financial exposure.” CP 4 No. 60626-7-II at 111. The trial court’s findings in the memorandum opinion informed the final divorce order, parenting plan, and relocation order. D. FINAL DIVORCE ORDER On December 12, 2024, the trial court entered a final divorce order. The final divorce order stated that the court made findings and conclusions in the case. The findings and conclusions about marriage and incorporated the August 29, 2024 memorandum opinion. The divorce order awarded property and assigned debt to Mavy and Coelho. Each party received one half of the community shares or units of four businesses they owned throughout their marriage. Mavy and Coelho were each assigned 50 percent of any debts incurred by either party prior to the date of separation, including any debts personally guaranteed by either party in the name of their businesses. Further, the divorce order awarded the Sequim house to Coelho and assigned the mortgage to Coelho. The trial court found that there was $300,000 in equity in the house and that the parties owed $428,572. The trial court specified that it was not ordering Coelho to refinance or sell the property within a set period of time. In addition, so long as Mavy was listed on the mortgage, the trial court ordered that he have access to the mortgage account to ensure payments were made timely. The divorce order also provided that if one party failed to pay a debt as ordered and a creditor sought to collect the debt from the other party, the party ordered to pay must hold the other harmless from any collection action for the debt. In addition, the divorce order required that Coelho transfer control of Mavy’s e-mail address to Mavy within 48 hours of the order. And the trial court entered a money judgment, requiring Coelho to pay $50,000 to Mavy. 5 No. 60626-7-II The trial court also entered findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the marriage. In relevant part, the trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction to divide real property in the Wyoming trust because it did not have personal jurisdiction over the trust, and the real property was not located in Washington. The trial court concluded that the division of property and debt described in the final order was just and equitable. E. DECEMBER 2024 PARENTING PLAN On December 12, 2024, the trial court entered a final parenting plan, which incorporated the trial court’s August 2024 memorandum opinion. The December 2024 parenting plan provided for the five children who were minors at the time: L.M., N.M., A.M., H.M., and M.M. The trial court declined to place limitations on either parent under RCW 26.09.191. The trial court concluded that neither parent had problems with abandonment, neglect, child abuse, domestic violence, assault, sex offense, or other problems that may harm the children’s best interest. Further, the trial court entered a parenting time schedule for the school year, holidays, and the summer. The trial court ordered that the two older children, L.M. and N.M., live with Coelho and gave Coelho the authority to make major decisions about the older children, including for school/education and healthcare. The trial court ordered that N.M. visit Mavy every other weekend and every other Thursday night after school. The trial court did not require L.M. to visit Mavy. The three younger children, A.M., H.M., and M.M., were ordered to live with Mavy, except every other Thursday and weekend. Mavy obtained sole authority to make school and educational decisions and healthcare decisions for the three youngest children. 6 No. 60626-7-II The parenting plan also established a notice requirement for any parent with majority residential time who would like to move with the children. The other parent received a right to object to the move under the parenting plan. F. DECEMBER 2024 RELOCATION ORDER In December 2024, the trial court also entered an order on relocation, which prohibited Mavy from relocating to Wyoming with the three younger children. The trial court first established a parenting plan based upon RCW 26.09.187 and then considered the relocation factors under RCW 26.09.520. The trial court reasoned that under In re Marriage of Abbess,3 it was appropriate to first address the underlying custody issues and then address relocation. The trial court found that based on the history of the case and because Mavy only had custody of the three younger children for a few months under the temporary parenting plan, neither parent enjoyed a presumption for or against relocation. The trial court further stated that “even if [Mavy] did enjoy a presumption, the court would find based upon the [relocation] factors, that the presumption is overcome, and relocation would be denied.” CP at 58. G. MOTION FOR CONTEMPT On December 31, 2024, Mavy moved for the trial court to find Coelho in contempt based on a missed visitation with N.M. on December 12, when Mavy was supposed to pick up N.M. from school. Mavy also sought contempt based on an incident on December 14, when N.M. failed to participate in visitation with Mavy. 3 23 Wn. App. 2d 479, 487-88, 516 P.3d 443 (2022). 7 No. 60626-7-II During the hearing on Mavy’s contempt motion, Coelho argued that she has made “more than just reasonable efforts” to help N.M. follow the parenting plan, including changing N.M.’s attitude to support visitation and reunification therapy. 2 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 848. Coelho also contended that she was not involved in the exchange on December 12 because Mavy was required to pick up N.M. at school. Regarding the missed visitation on December 14, Coelho explained that N.M. locked himself in the bathroom so she could not bring N.M. to the exchange with Mavy. Coelho further asserted that she had been the “driving force in reunification therapy with the child and father,” she has “hired . . . a third-party driver[] to drive the child to the father,” and she “established a track record in trying to do everything she can to change the child’s attitude towards the father.” 2 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 848, 849. The trial court found that there was no evidence that Coelho interfered with the December 12 visit; rather, electronic communication showed that Coelho told N.M. to meet Mavy at school. The trial court declined to find that Coelho was in contempt related to the December 14 visit because the trial court could not find that Coelho acted intentionally or in bad faith to prevent visitation. The trial court filed a memorandum opinion and order declining to find Coelho in contempt. Mavy also sought contempt for Coelho’s failure to transfer the contents of the e-mail account awarded to Mavy in the divorce order. Mavy admitted that Coelho transferred control of the e-mail account to him but stated that the account was “without any of [his] data.” 2 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 846. The trial court declined to find Coelho in contempt, explaining: 8 No. 60626-7-II The court does not recall evidence being presented at trial that the email account contained property (photographs, contact lists, etc.). Regardless, [Mavy] cite[d] no authority for the proposition that the court can find [Coelho] in contempt of court for failing to comply with the terms of a property decree as opposed to a support order or parenting plan provision. In re Marriage of Curtis, 106 W[n.] App. 191, 199[, 23 P.3d 13, review denied, 145 Wn.2d 1008] (2001). . . . [W]hile [Mavy] may have other remedies to obtain this information, holding [Coelho] in contempt is not one of them. CP at 116-17. H. 2026 PARENTING PLAN AND ORDER ON RELOCATION In December 2025, while this appeal was pending, the trial court held a trial on relocation and modification of the parenting plan. On December 31, 2025, the trial court filed a memorandum opinion with its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mavy filed a motion with this court to allow the trial court to implement the December 2025 order on relocation, which this court’s commissioner granted in January 2026. Accordingly, in May 2026, the trial court entered a new parenting plan, reflecting the findings in the December 2025 memorandum opinion. At the time of the May 2026 parenting plan, only four children were still minors: N.M., A.M., H.M., and M.M. Similar to the final parenting plan entered in December 2024, the trial court declined to enter limitations on a parent under RCW 26.09.191 or .192. The trial court noted that neither parent argued that limitations should be imposed and that it “d[id] not find evidence which would justify the court in imposing restrictions on either parent” under RCW 26.09.191 or .192. Mot. for Authorization to Implement Trial Ct. Ruling, Ex. A at 28 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan 2, 2026). 9 No. 60626-7-II In July 2026, the trial court entered a new order on relocation, incorporating the findings from the December 2025 memorandum opinion. The trial court allowed Mavy to relocate to Wyoming with the three younger children. Mavy appeals the December 2024 parenting plan, relocation order, and divorce order. Mavy also appeals the trial court’s denial of his December 2024 motion for contempt. ANALYSIS Mavy challenges the December 2024 parenting plan and relocation order on several grounds. Mavy also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the Sequim house to Coelho without requiring that she refinance the debt. Mavy further argues that the trial court failed to provide finality in distributing property at dissolution. And Mavy contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for contempt. We address each argument in turn. A. MOOTNESS “A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.” Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 790, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). We generally do not review moot cases; however, we may review issues of substantial and continuing interest. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn. App. 715, 720, 230 P.3d 233 (2010). To determine whether an issue is of substantial and continuing interest, we consider: “(1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature, (2) whether an authoritative determination is desirable to provide future guidance of public officers, and (3) whether the issue is likely to recur.” Id. Here, Mavy appeals the trial court’s parenting plan and relocation order entered on December 12, 2024. However, the December 2024 parenting plan and relocation order are no longer in effect because the trial court entered a new parenting plan in May 2026 and a new 10 No. 60626-7-II relocation order in July 2026. In a supplemental brief, Mavy contends that the issues on appeal are not moot. We first address Mavy’s mootness arguments. 1. Parenting Plan a. RCW 26.09.191 findings Mavy argues that the trial court erred by declining to enter RCW 26.09.191 findings in the December 12, 2024 parenting plan. Mavy contends that his challenge is not moot because the new parenting plan, relocation order, and memorandum opinion “do not supply the missing formal findings” and because “[t]he absence of those findings continues to control decision-making authority.” Suppl. Br. of Appellant (Aug. 25, 2026) at 4. However, there is no effective relief that this court can provide. This appeal relates to the December 2024 parenting plan, and there is no indication that the May 2026 parenting plan incorporates the findings upon which the trial court relied in entering the December 2024 parenting plan. Further, in the December 2025 memorandum opinion which is incorporated into the May 2026 parenting plan, the trial court stated that it “d[id] not find evidence which would justify the court in imposing restrictions on either parent” under RCW 26.09.191 or .192. Mot. for Authorization to Implement Trial Ct. Relocation Ruling, Ex. A at 28 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2026). Moreover, the trial court stated that “[n]either parent has argued that such restrictions should be imposed.” Mot. for Authorization to Implement Trial Ct. Relocation Ruling, Ex. A at 28 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2026). Accordingly, the record shows that the trial court’s decisions in the December 2024 parenting plan on appeal in this case had no continuing effect on the May 2026 parenting plan. 11 No. 60626-7-II b. Authority for phased parenting plan In his opening brief, Mavy also argues that the trial court erred in the December 2024 parenting plan when it concluded that it lacked authority to enter a phased or conditional parenting plan. Mavy contends that this challenge is not moot because “the operative [p]arenting [p]lan was entered under the challenged legal premise” such that effective relief remains available. Suppl. Br. of Appellant (Aug. 25, 2026) at 6. However, nothing in the record shows that the trial court relied on this premise in entering the May 2026 parenting plan, nor does the record support that the trial court held this belief when it entered the December 2024 parenting plan. Rather, the record shows that the trial court believed it generally would not have the authority to modify a permanent parenting plan after entering final orders.4 Thus, the issue is moot because Mavy’s alleged premise is not supported by the record 4 Mavy relies on the following excerpts to support his argument that the trial court believed it lacked authority to enter a phased or conditional plan: We’re two months away from a trial, and I don’t know that the trial, where that’s going to get us, because I will tell you, that I’ve become less convinced that parenting plans that require the court to adopt graduated schedules or changed schedules post-entry of final orders, the law really doesn’t allow that. And so, if you think that you’re going to come to court and say, hey, this is how we’re going to move from where we’re at, to where we’re going to be, you may be disappointed, unless you can find some authority under [RCW] 26.09.260, for the court post- entry of a final parenting plan, to continue to modify it just by fiat or something of that nature. 1 VRP (June 21, 2024) at 370-71. Mavy also argues that the trial court disclaimed the authority to enter a phased parenting plan during trial: At the end of this trial, I’m going to issue a decision and that decision will be a final parenting plan, which in theory, would end the court’s jurisdiction to tinker with this case, absent some kind of modification procedure or maybe a contempt procedure, to affirm what I’ve already done, but the ability for the court to sort of 12 No. 60626-7-II and the December 2024 parenting plan has no continuing effect to allow this court to grant effective relief. c. Additional challenges to the December 2024 parenting plan Mavy presents several other challenges to the December 2024 parenting plan in his opening brief but fails to explain why those issues are not moot in light of the new parenting plan entered in May 2026. As previously stated, the December 2024 parenting plan is no longer in effect, and there is nothing in the record that shows the rulings in the December 2024 parenting plan were incorporated into the new May 2026 parenting plan. And Mavy does not argue those additional challenges to the December 2024 parenting plan have any continued effect that would allow this court to grant effective relief. Accordingly, Mavy’s challenges to the trial court’s December 2024 parenting plan are moot. 2. Relocation Order Mavy also appeals the December 2024 relocation order, under which Mavy was prohibited from relocating to Wyoming. However, the order denying relocation from December 2024 is no longer in effect. Instead, the parties are now governed by the July 2026 relocation order, which allows Mavy to relocate. reserve jurisdiction to tinker with and adjust endlessly, frankly, isn’t supported by statute or law, that this court, at least, isn’t aware of, and so, at some point, I’ve got to make a decision and so, I’m not gonna make a decision that says, well, if this and this and this and this and this, then that. 1 VRP (Aug. 19, 2024) at 447-48. 13 No. 60626-7-II Mavy argues that this court should consider his challenges to the trial court’s December 2024 relocation order because “they reflect a broader pattern of departures from governing legal standards and the evidentiary record.” Suppl. Br. of Appellant (Aug. 25, 2026) at 9-10. However, beyond a bare statement that the new relocation order does not “eliminate the evidentiary significance of the manner in which [the December 2024] decision was reached,” Mavy does not explain what continued effect would allow this court to grant effective relief. Suppl. Br. of Appellant (Aug. 25, 2026) at 10. Thus, the issues relating to the relocation order are moot. Alternatively, Mavy contends that the trial court’s failure to apply the relocation presumption in favor of Mavy in December 2024 warrants review under the continuing and substantial public interest exception. Mavy argues that our Supreme Court’s opinion in In re Marriage of Hauk5 addressed how residential time is measured for the relocation presumption for phased-in parenting plans but failed to address “whether a trial court may diminish or eliminate an otherwise applicable presumption because the qualifying residential schedule has been in effect for only a relatively short period.” Suppl. Br. of Appellant (Aug. 25, 2026) at 12. Mavy argues that the issue presents an ambiguity in the statutory scheme and that the issue is capable of recurring. The applicable presumption for child relocation when a final parenting plan and relocation request are before the court is an issue of public interest, and the issue is likely to recur. However, Division I of this court addressed the issue at hand in Abbess, 23 Wn. App. 2d at 489.6 The Abbess 5 7 Wn.3d 1, 594 P.3d 679 (2026). 6 Notably, the trial court here explicitly cited Abbess and proceeded to make a custody determination before analyzing relocation. The trial court recognized that the younger children 14 No. 60626-7-II court held that “when both a residential schedule and a petition to relocate are contested issues at trial, a trial court must determine whether one parent is entitled to a majority of residential time using criteria for a permanent residential schedule before applying the relocation factors.” Id. The Abbess court reasoned that our legislature expressed a preference that permanent orders rest on evidence presented at trial rather than temporary orders and that temporary orders serve a different purpose and are based on different standards and criteria compared to permanent orders. Id. at 488. Thus, the Abbess court held that the trial court erred in relying on a temporary parenting plan in presuming relocation. Id. at 488-89. Accordingly, although the issue is of public interest and is likely to recur, an authoritative determination to provide future guidance is unnecessary as the issue has already been addressed: The trial court was required to first determine the permanent residential schedule to then apply the presumption and relocation factors. Id. at 489. Regardless, the fact remains that Mavy’s challenge to the December 2024 relocation order is now moot because the parties are now governed by the July 2026 relocation order, which allows Mavy to relocate. B. DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY Next, Mavy challenges the trial court’s award of the Sequim house to Coelho without requiring that she refinance the debt. 1. Legal Principles In dissolution proceedings, courts must make a “just and equitable” distribution of property. RCW 26.09.080. In determining a just and equitable distribution of property, the trial court considers: resided with Mavy since March 2024 pursuant to a temporary order and that the temporary order was not based upon a full analysis of the RCW 26.09.187 factors. 15 No. 60626-7-II (1) The nature and extent of the community property; (2) The nature and extent of the separate property; (3) The duration of the marriage . . . ; and (4) The economic circumstances of each spouse or domestic partner at the time the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to a spouse or domestic partner with whom the children reside the majority of the time. RCW 26.09.080. Trial courts have broad discretion in determining a just and equitable division based on the facts of each case. In re Marriage of Doneen, 197 Wn. App. 941, 949, 391 P.3d 594, review denied, 188 Wn.2d 1018 (2017). “A just and equitable division ‘does not require mathematical precision, but rather fairness, based upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the marriage, both past and present, and an evaluation of the future needs of parties.’” In re Marriage of Larson, 178 Wn. App. 133, 138, 313 P.3d 1228 (2013) (quoting In re Marriage of Crosetto, 82 Wn. App. 545, 556, 918 P.2d 954 (1996)), review denied, 180 Wn.2d 1011 (2014). “‘Just and equitable distribution does not mean that the court must make an equal distribution.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of DewBerry, 115 Wn. App. 351, 366, 62 P.3d 525, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1006 (2003)). The trial court is in the best position to determine what is fair; thus, this court will reverse its decision only if there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Doneen, 197 Wn. App. at 949. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Muhammad, 153 Wn.2d 795, 803, 108 P.3d 779 (2005). A trial court also abuses its discretion if a finding from which a court has drawn a conclusion of law is not supported by substantial evidence. In re Marriage of Byerley, 183 Wn. App. 677, 685, 334 P.3d 108 (2014). 16 No. 60626-7-II 2. No Abuse of Discretion Mavy challenges the trial court’s award of the Sequim house to Coelho without requiring her to refinance the debt. Specifically, Mavy argues that the trial court’s finding that there was “‘little to no risk’” in Mavy remaining on the mortgage is not supported by the record. Br. of Appellant at 67. Mavy contends that the divorce order left Mavy “indefinitely liable on a debt he no longer benefits from [which] undermines his financial independence and the stability he can provide for his children.” Br. of Appellant at 68. Here, Mavy fails to show that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding. And the trial court acted within its broad discretion in awarding the Sequim house to Coelho and assigning the remaining debt to her without requiring that she refinance the debt. Mavy cites to no legal requirement that the trial court must order Coelho to refinance the mortgage on the home after awarding the home to her. DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”). Here, the trial court determined that there was “little to no risk” based on the equity in the home, Mavy’s ability to ensure payments were timely made, and the provision requiring that Coelho hold Mavy harmless. CP at 111. The record shows that there is approximately $300,000 in equity in the house; the market value at the time of trial was around $735,000, and the outstanding principal was $428,572.32. The divorce order equalized the equity in the home by awarding a judgment of $50,000 to Mavy against the house. Moreover, under the divorce order, so long as Mavy is listed on the mortgage, Mavy has access to the mortgage account to ensure 17 No. 60626-7-II payments are timely, which would allow Mavy to monitor payments to ensure that Coelho is making payments and avert any potential default on the obligation by Coelho. And Coelho is required to hold Mavy harmless if she fails to pay a debt and a creditor tries to collect the debt from Mavy. Thus, given this record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Sequim house to Coelho without requiring her to refinance the debt. This challenge fails. 3. Finality Mavy also argues that the trial court erred by failing to provide finality. However, the trial court entered a divorce order which divides the marital property based on the evidence presented. Mavy fails to provide legal authority as required by RAP 10.3(a)(6) to support his argument that the trial court failed to achieve finality in entering the final divorce order based on the evidence presented by the parties. In re Guardianship of Ursich, 10 Wn. App. 2d 263, 278, 448 P.3d 112 (2019), review denied, 194 Wn.2d 1022 (2020); RAP 10.3(a)(6). Accordingly, we decline to consider this issue. C. CONTEMPT Finally, Mavy contends that the trial court erred by failing to find Coelho in contempt for alleged violations of the divorce order and December 2024 parenting plan. We disagree. 1. Compliance with December 2024 Parenting Plan Mavy challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for contempt based on Coelho’s alleged failure to comply with the December 2024 parenting plan. Mavy argues that the trial court “applied the wrong legal standard by placing on [Mavy] the burden to prove [Coelho’s] ‘bad faith,’ rather than shifting the burden to the noncomplying party to show an inability or lawful excuse.” Br. of Appellant at 70-71. 18 No. 60626-7-II “Failure to comply with a provision in a parenting plan or a child support order may result in a finding of contempt of court.” RCW 26.09.184(7). A parent is “deemed to have the present ability to comply with the order establishing residential provisions” unless by a preponderance of the evidence they establish “a reasonable excuse for failure to comply.” RCW 26.09.160(4). The noncomplying parent has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they lacked the ability to comply with the parenting plan or had a reasonable excuse for noncompliance. In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 352, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003). A parent is in contempt “[i]f, based on all the facts and circumstances, the court finds after hearing that the parent, in bad faith, has not complied with the order establishing residential provisions for the child.” RCW 26.09.160(2)(b). “A parent seeking a contempt order to compel another parent to comply with a parenting plan must establish the contemnor’s bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Marriage of Eklund, 143 Wn. App. 207, 215, 177 P.3d 189 (2008). Here, Coelho demonstrated reasonable efforts to help N.M. comply with the parenting plan: Coelho explained that she could not bring N.M. to visitation because N.M. had locked himself in the bathroom. Coelho also asserted that she has been the “driving force in reunification therapy with the child and father,” she has “hired . . . a third-party driver[] to drive the child to the father,” and she asserted that she had “established a track record in trying to do everything she can[] to change the child’s attitude towards the father.” 2 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 848, 849. The trial court declined to find that Coelho was in contempt because it could not find that Coelho acted intentionally or in bad faith to prevent visitation. Although Mavy is correct that Coelho was required to show inability to comply or a reasonable excuse for noncompliance, Mavy was also 19 No. 60626-7-II required to show bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence as the parent seeking a contempt order. Eklund, 143 Wn. App. at 215. Based on the record, the trial court applied the proper legal standard, and Mavy’s argument fails. 2. E-mail Account Mavy argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold Coelho in contempt for deleting the digital contents of an e-mail account awarded to Mavy in the divorce order. Mavy contends that the trial court erred by concluding it lacked authority to hold Coelho in contempt for violating a property provision. The trial court declined to find Coelho in contempt, reasoning: [Mavy] seeks contempt for [Coelho’s] failure to comply with the allocation of property (i.e. turning over the contents of the email account). The court does not recall evidence being presented at trial that the email account contained property (photographs, contact lists, etc.). Regardless, [Mavy] cites no authority for the proposition that the court can find [Coelho] in contempt of court for failing to comply with the terms of a property decree as opposed to a support order or parenting plan provision. In re Marriage of Curtis, 106 W[n.] App. 191, 199 (2001). CP at 116. Even assuming without deciding that the trial court misstated the law, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Coelho in contempt. See Moreman v. Butcher, 126 Wn.2d 36, 40, 891 P.2d 725 (1995). The divorce order required that Coelho “transfer control of [Mavy’s] email address to [Mavy] within 48 hours of entry” of the divorce order “by taking all actions necessary to ensure [Mavy] can log into this account, including, but not limited to, providing [Mavy] the current password and timely responding to, or forwarding as necessary, any two-factor authentication requests.” CP at 29. Mavy stated during the hearing that Coelho 20 No. 60626-7-II delivered the e-mail account to him but claimed that the account was “without any of [his] data.” 2 VRP (Jan. 10, 2025) at 846. Under the plain terms of the divorce order, Coelho complied with the divorce order by transferring access to the account to Mavy. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find Coelho in contempt. D. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL Coelho requests attorney fees on appeal under RCW 26.09.140 and RAP 18.1. Under RAP 18.1(a), this court may award a party reasonable attorney fees or expenses if applicable law grants a party the right to recover. Under RCW 26.09.140, “the appellate court may, in its discretion, orde