Sean Nealy v. John Phelan
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-5175
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued September 8, 2026 Decided November 17, 2026
No. 25-5175
SEAN NEALY,
APPELLANT
v.
HUNG CAO, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
APPELLEE
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:20-cv-03820)
Dylan T. Thayer argued the cause for appellant. With him
on the briefs was David P. Sheldon.
Mason D. Bracken, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the
cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris
Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S.
Attorney.
Before: PAN and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PAN.
2
PAN, Circuit Judge: Sean Nealy is a Navy veteran who
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Whether
he can retire from service with pay and benefits due to that
condition depends on the disability rating assigned to him by
the Navy. The Navy initially rated him ten-percent disabled,
which entitled him to only a one-time severance payment and
no retirement benefits. Nealy appealed that determination to
the Physical Disability Board of Review (“PDBR”), which
retroactively assigned him a six-month temporary disability
rating of fifty percent and a permanent disability rating of ten
percent. The Navy adopted the PDBR’s recommended
modification. Nealy accepts the temporary rating of fifty
percent and wishes to maintain that rating because it would
entitle him to retirement benefits. He contends that (1) the
Navy lacked authority to effectively lower that rating to a ten-
percent permanent rating without first conducting a physical
examination of him; and (2) even if the Navy had authority to
lower his rating, the ten-percent rating was arbitrary and
capricious. The district court rejected those arguments,
holding that the Navy lawfully and reasonably applied the
relevant statute. We affirm.
I.
Nealy served in the Navy from 1996 to 2008. He was
tasked with “surveilling battle zones, coordinating and
directing airstrikes, and then assessing the aftermath of the
strikes.” Nealy Br. 10. On one mission, in May 2006, he
reviewed imagery from a battlefield and counted the casualties.
After that assignment, Nealy reported changes in mood and
personality, heightened aggression, hypervigilance, difficulty
concentrating, and intrusive nightmares.
In September 2006, a Navy medical examiner diagnosed
Nealy with PTSD and he began psychological counseling.
3
Soon after, Nealy’s commander deemed him unqualified for
flight duty. A Medical Evaluation Board examined him and
confirmed that he suffered from PTSD and a single episode of
major depressive disorder. The Medical Evaluation Board
referred Nealy to a Physical Evaluation Board for a formal
determination of his “[f]itness to continue naval service, degree
of disability, and entitlement to disability pay” Sec’y of the
Navy Instr. 1850.4E, Department of the Navy Disability
Evaluation Manual ¶ 1004(c) (Apr. 30, 2002).
The Physical Evaluation Board was tasked with taking a
“snapshot” of Nealy’s condition at the time of his evaluation to
see how his disability impacted his ability to perform his
military role. Schmidt v. McPherson, 806 F. App’x 10, 11–12
(D.C. Cir. 2020). It concluded that Nealy had major depressive
disorder, which subsumed his earlier PTSD diagnosis. The
Board assigned him a disability rating of ten percent based on
the Department of Veterans Affairs Schedule for Rating
Disability (“VASRD”). See 10 U.S.C. § 1216a; 38 C.F.R. ch.
I, pt. 4. A ten-percent rating is appropriate when a
servicemember demonstrates “[o]ccupational and social
impairment due to mild or transient symptoms which decrease
work efficiency and ability to perform occupational tasks only
during periods of significant stress.” 38 C.F.R. § 4.130.
Because Nealy was unfit for duty but received a disability
rating of less than thirty percent, he qualified only for a one-
time severance payout. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203.
After his discharge from the Navy on August 17, 2008,
Nealy filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Although the VA, like the Navy,
uses the VASRD disability-rating system, its ratings serve a
different purpose: The VA “determine[s] disability ratings
based on an evaluation of the individual’s capacity to function
and perform tasks in the civilian world,” while the Navy
4
focuses on the servicemember’s ability to perform his specific
military role. Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11.
The VA assessed Nealy on November 12, 2008. It noted
that he had recently secured a job in information technology
and was “generally performing well at work and getting along
well with co-workers and bosses.” J.A. 79. The VA observed
that Nealy “experience[d] some anxiety at work” but tied that
to “wanting to perform well.” J.A. 79. It found that he did not
suffer from delusions, memory loss, or panic attacks, but noted
that he exhibited ritualistic “checking” behavior and sleep
impairment. J.A. 80. It determined that his PTSD symptoms
were “moderate” and assessed his Global Assessment of
Functioning — a scale used to measure mental health — at 70,
J.A. 81, which connotes “mild” impairment, J.A. 96. After
considering all those factors, the VA concluded that Nealy
experienced “mild social/occupational impairment” with an
“occasional decrease in work efficiency” and “intermittent
periods of inability to perform occupational tasks.” J.A. 81. It
assigned Nealy a disability rating of thirty percent for PTSD.
In 2016, Nealy appealed his Navy disability rating to the
Physical Disability Board of Review. The PDBR is an
appellate panel that “review[s] the findings and decisions of the
Physical Evaluation Board” for servicemembers who were
“separated from the armed forces due to unfitness for duty due
to a medical condition with a disability rating of 20 percent
disabled or less” between September 11, 2001, and December
31, 2009. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1554a(b), (c). Nealy’s case falls within
the PDBR’s jurisdiction. The PDBR is empowered to evaluate
“the records of the armed force concerned and such other
evidence as may be presented,” id. § 1554a(c), and to
recommend either the “modification of the disability rating
previously assigned” to the servicemember or the “issuance of
a new disability rating,” id. §§ 1554a(d)(3), (4). Based on the
5
PDBR’s recommendation, the Secretary of the Navy can
“correct the military records” of the servicemember. Id.
§ 1554a(e).
The PDBR concluded that the Physical Evaluation Board
correctly assigned Nealy a disability rating of ten percent.
After reviewing Nealy’s service treatment record and 2008
examination by the VA, the Board determined that Nealy
exhibited “generally satisfactory functioning” with “very mild”
symptoms and was “performing well at work and getting along
well with co-workers and supervisors.” J.A. 96. Accordingly,
it recommended no change to Nealy’s disability rating.
The PDBR declined to apply § 4.129 of the Veterans
Affairs Schedule. 38 C.F.R. § 4.129 (“VASRD § 4.129”).
That provision, enacted in 2008, requires the evaluator to
assign an automatic minimum fifty-percent disability rating to
servicemembers separated for “a mental disorder that develops
in service as a result of a highly stressful event [and] is severe
enough to bring about a veteran’s release from active military
service.” Id. That rating remains in effect at least until the
servicemember undergoes an examination within six months of
discharge “to determine whether a change in evaluation is
warranted.” Id. The Board determined that § 4.129 did not
apply to Nealy because his condition was “not directly related
to combat” and the panel was “unable to locate any
documentation of a highly stressful event.” J.A. 96.
Nealy challenged the PDBR’s determination by filing suit
against the Secretary of the Navy. Soon thereafter, the parties
agreed to a voluntary remand for the PDBR to reconsider
Nealy’s disability rating. The parties stipulated that Nealy
could submit supplemental materials on remand. The district
court granted the parties’ request and remanded the case.
6
In March 2022, the PDBR issued a revised
recommendation. This time, it determined that Nealy was
entitled to an automatic disability rating of fifty percent for six
months, under VASRD § 4.129, but that his permanent
disability rating should remain at ten percent. The PDBR’s
recommendation was based on its review of Nealy’s service
treatment record and his examination by the VA in 2008.
The PDBR found that Nealy’s PTSD stemmed from
“combat exposure while deployed in a war zone,” which was
sufficient for him to be covered by § 4.129. J.A. 99. That
determination entitled Nealy to be assigned a temporary, six-
month disability rating of fifty percent. The Board thus
recommended that Nealy be retroactively and constructively
placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List (“TDRL”), at
a fifty-percent disability rating, for the six months after his date
of separation from the Navy (i.e., from August 17, 2008, until
February 17, 2009). The TDRL is a list of servicemembers
unfit to continue military duties because of a physical disability
that is not yet determined to be stabilized or permanent. Sec’y
of the Navy Instr. 1850.4E, Department of the Navy Disability
Evaluation Manual ¶ 2081.
The PDBR also reviewed Nealy’s permanent disability
rating, which would retroactively go into effect after the six-
month period of fifty-percent disability that was mandated by
§ 4.129. Consistent with the findings of the Physical
Evaluation Board and the previous review by a different PDBR
panel, the Board determined that Nealy’s permanent disability
rating was ten percent, based on “mild or transient symptoms
which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform
occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress.”
J.A. 100 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130). The PDBR again relied
on Nealy’s 2008 VA examination, which was the “source of
evidence most proximate to” the relevant timeframe, as it was
7
performed just three months after Nealy’s separation from the
Navy. J.A. 99. The PDBR noted that Nealy “did not mention
any [mental health] symptoms significantly interfering with his
work performance” and exhibited no “workplace anger” or
“inability to concentrate” that impaired his new job. J.A. 99.
It also observed that Nealy had not experienced “negative
performance feedback, missed work, or [shown any] inability
to complete occupational tasks.” J.A. 99. The PDBR
acknowledged that Nealy had suffered some “marital
difficulties related to anger” but stated that those improved
with counseling. J.A. 99. It also observed that Nealy did not
require medication and that his mental health did not prevent
him from engaging in leisure activities. J.A. 99–100.
Unsatisfied with the Board’s revised determination, Nealy
returned to the district court. The parties filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. Nealy argued that the Board “lacks the
statutory authority” to “retroactively remove someone” from
the TDRL without first conducting a physical examination.
See J.A. 197–201; see also Cook v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl.
277, 307–09 (2015). He relied on 10 U.S.C. § 1210 — a statute
concerning the TDRL — and VASRD § 4.129. Both of those
provisions require servicemembers to be re-examined after
receiving an initial disability rating, so that their status can be
updated to account for changes in their condition. Nealy also
asserted that the ten-percent permanent disability rating
assigned to him by the PDBR was arbitrary and capricious and
unsupported by substantial evidence. The government
responded that the authorities cited by Nealy were not relevant
because they do not apply to retroactive reviews conducted by
the PDBR under 10 U.S.C. § 1554a, and that the PDBR’s rating
recommendation was adequately explained and supported by
the record evidence. On March 20, 2025, the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the government. Nealy
timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8
II.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
See Young v. United States, 943 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Absent a delegation of discretionary interpretive authority to
an agency, we “exercise independent judgment” to identify the
“best” reading of the statute, without deference to agency
interpretations. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S.
369, 394, 400 (2024).
We may “hold unlawful and set aside” an armed service’s
determination regarding a servicemember’s disability status if
the action was “unsupported by substantial evidence” or was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E); Sissel v.
Wormuth, 77 F.4th 941, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The arbitrary-
and-capricious standard is “highly deferential and presumes
the validity of agency action.” Sissel, 77 F.4th at 947 (cleaned
up). Under that standard, a rating decision may be set aside
only if the armed service “relied on factors which Congress has
not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or
is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in
view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983). To uphold the armed service’s decision,
the court need only find that it “examined the relevant data and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (cleaned up). And the court
will not “direct” the armed service “in a choice between
rational alternatives.” N.M. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Fish &
9
Wildlife Serv., 148 F.4th 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned
up).
III.
A.
The Navy adopted the PDBR’s recommendation that
Nealy be retroactively and constructively placed on the
Temporary Disability Retired List for six months with a fifty-
percent disability rating, but otherwise be assigned a ten-
percent permanent disability rating. The PDBR’s
recommendation was based entirely on its review of Nealy’s
service records and the evidence presented, as permitted by 10
U.S.C. § 1554a. Although Nealy accepts the PDBR’s authority
under § 1554a to retroactively recommend a temporary status
of fifty-percent disability, he argues that the PDBR was not
empowered to retroactively recommend a ten-percent
permanent disability rating without first conducting a physical
examination. We disagree.
The PDBR’s review of Nealy’s disability rating embodied
a straightforward application of § 1554a. That statute
authorizes the Board to examine “the records of the armed
force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented,”
id. § 1554a(c)(2), and then to recommend either the
“modification of the disability rating previously assigned” to
the servicemember or the “issuance of a new disability rating,”
id. §§ 1554a(d)(3), (4). Here, after reviewing Nealy’s service
treatment record and his 2008 examination by the VA, the
PDBR recommended a modification. It determined that the
Navy should (1) deem Nealy fifty-percent disabled under
§ 4.129 for the six-month period following his medical
separation, (2) retroactively and constructively place him on
the TDRL for that time, and (3) thereafter assign him a ten-
10
percent permanent disability rating. The Board weighed the
relevant facts and explained its reasoning in a detailed written
recommendation. The Secretary of the Navy then ratified the
Board’s recommendation.
Nealy nevertheless contends that the Navy acted
unlawfully because his fifty-percent temporary rating could not
be reduced to his ten-percent permanent rating without a new
physical examination. He cites two sources of authority to
support his claim: the physical-examination requirements in
10 U.S.C. § 1210 and VASRD § 4.129.
Nealy first argues that once the Navy retroactively and
constructively placed him on the TDRL, 10 U.S.C. § 1210
barred his removal from that list until he received a physical
examination to determine if his condition had changed.
Section 1210 establishes procedures for transitioning
servicemembers off of the TDRL: It provides that any
servicemember on the list shall receive a “physical
examination . . . at least once every 18 months . . . to determine
whether there has been a change in the disability for which he
was temporarily retired.” Id. § 1210(a). That statute also
provides that if the examination shows that the
servicemember’s disability has stabilized, he must be removed
from the TDRL and separated or retired in accordance with his
permanent disability rating. Id. §§ 1210(c)–(e).
Section 1210 is inapplicable to Nealy’s case. That
provision applies when a Physical Evaluation Board
contemporaneously and actually places a servicemember on
the TDRL, after evaluating him and finding him temporarily
disabled. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1210(a); Coleman v.
Kendall, 74 F.4th 610, 617–18 (4th Cir. 2023). Under those
circumstances, a servicemember who is rated “temporarily
disabled” must undergo periodic physical examinations to
11
determine how long he should remain on the TDRL — a list
that, by definition, includes only those whose disabilities are
“temporary.” In other words, all servicemembers on the TDRL
must eventually be removed from the list. They may be (1)
retired with pay and benefits, if their disability is permanent,
stable, and rated at least thirty percent, (2) separated without
retirement pay and benefits, if their permanent, stable rating is
lower than thirty percent, or (3) returned to duty if they are
found fit. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1210(b)–(f), (h), 1211.
Section 1210 in no way impinges on the PDBR’s
independent authority under § 1554a to recommend retroactive
changes to a disability rating, based solely on service records
and the evidence presented. Id. §§ 1554a(c)(2), (d)
(authorizing PDBR to recommend “modify[ing]” a
servicemember’s previously assigned disability rating or
“issu[ing]” a new one, “based on the records of the armed force
concerned and such other evidence as may be presented”).
Here, in 2022, the PDBR recommended a retroactive and
constructive modification to Nealy’s disability rating: It
determined that Nealy should be deemed temporarily disabled
at a rate of fifty percent, for six months from the date of his
separation — i.e., from August 17, 2008, until February 17,
2009. That retroactive and constructive placement on the
TDRL allowed Nealy to collect six-months-worth of disability
benefits at the fifty-percent rate, but he was never actually
placed on the TDRL. Thus, there was no reason for him to
undergo a physical examination to ascertain whether he should
remain on the list. And the recommended modification of his
rating without an examination was authorized by § 1554a.
Under such circumstances, § 1210’s physical-examination
requirement is simply inapposite.
Nealy’s alternative argument is that a physical
examination was required under VASRD § 4.129. Section
12
4.129 provides that, after a qualifying servicemember receives
the automatic fifty-percent disability rating due to mental
illness, the armed service must conduct an “examination within
the six month period following the veteran’s discharge to
determine whether a change in evaluation is warranted.” 38
C.F.R. § 4.129. Nealy asserts that § 4.129’s examination
requirement bars the PDBR from recommending a retroactive
and constructive permanent disability rating that is lower than
the initial fifty-percent rating because that would deprive him
of his right to have his rating changed only after an examination
within the six-month period following his discharge. We are
unpersuaded.
As already explained, the PDBR relied on § 1554a to
recommend a modification of Nealy’s disability rating “based
on the records of the armed force concerned and such other
evidence as may be presented,” and that provision does not
require a physical examination. Section 4.129 does not change
the analysis: Its follow-up examination requirement does not
apply when the PDBR recommends a retroactive adjustment
due to a reconsideration of a servicemember’s mental condition
under § 1554a. The plain text of § 4.129 addresses only
contemporaneous findings of disability. It requires a physical
examination to take place “within the six month period
following the veteran’s discharge” due to the disability in
question — not years later, after a retroactive application of the
regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 4.129. Moreover, the purpose of the
follow-up examination is to determine whether “a change in
evaluation is warranted” soon after discharge, which indicates
that the provision is not intended to apply retroactively. A
backward-looking evaluation that considers whether a rating
change would have been warranted years ago would be
“impossible or, at best, wholly irrelevant to assessing [a
servicemember’s actual] disability.” Coleman, 74 F.4th at 618.
13
Adopting Nealy’s interpretation of § 4.129 would
undermine the disability-review process, which seeks to ensure
fair and accurate assessments of servicemembers’ disabilities.
Nealy posits that the PDBR can recommend a servicemember’s
retroactive placement on the TDRL, but cannot recommend
any subsequent alterations to his status until an impossible-to-
conduct physical examination takes place, effectively
transforming the temporary rating into a permanent one. Yet,
§ 4.129 expressly provides that a servicemember’s rating
should change if his disability changes. See VASRD § 4.129
(requiring follow-up examination “to determine whether a
change in evaluation is warranted”). Nealy’s reading of
§ 4.129 would effectively freeze his disability rating at fifty
percent, forcing the PDBR to recommend an inaccurate
permanent disability rating that could never be corrected. That
cannot be the best reading of the regulation. Cf. Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982)
(“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd
results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent
with the legislative purpose are available.”); see also Coleman,
74 F.4th at 618 (requiring retroactive physical examinations
under § 4.129 would “swallow up” the disability-review
process).
Finally, our conclusion that § 4.129’s physical-
examination requirement does not apply to retroactive
disability-rating adjustments aligns with Defense Department
policy and the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Coleman.
Recognizing that § 4.129 is a poor fit for retroactive
applications, the Department of Defense issued a guidance
memo that instructs the PDBR to retroactively apply the
automatic fifty-percent temporary disability rating to qualified
servicemembers for six months but to assign the “subsequent
fitness and PTSD ratings based on the applicable evidence,”
without a physical examination. J.A. 262. The PDBR
14
followed that guidance here. And the Fourth Circuit held in
Coleman that § 4.129, “by its terms does not contemplate
retroactive reviews by the Board.” 74 F.4th at 617. We agree.1
In sum, the PDBR properly applied § 1554a to recommend
a retroactive modification of Nealy’s disability status based on
his treatment records and the evidence presented. It acted well
within its authority when it proposed a temporary fifty-percent
disability rating under § 4.129 for a constructive six-month
period, and a permanent disability rating of ten percent.
Nealy’s attempt to benefit from the recommended temporary
rating while barring the imposition of the permanent rating
fails. His reliance on § 1210 to demand a physical examination
is misplaced because that statute does not apply to his case and
has no bearing on the PDBR’s authority to recommend a rating
adjustment under § 1554a. And his interpretation of § 4.129’s
examination provision is erroneous because that provision
likewise does not apply to retroactive disability-rating
adjustments under § 1554a.
B.
Nealy argues that the ten-percent permanent disability
rating assigned to him by the PDBR is arbitrary and capricious,
in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706. He effectively asserts that the record compels a
1
Nealy relies on Cook v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 277 (2015),
a Court of Federal Claims decision holding that the physical-
examination requirements of 10 U.S.C § 1210 and VASRD § 4.129
apply to retroactive reviews conducted by the PDBR. We disagree
with the reasoning of that non-binding opinion. The Cook court did
not consider that § 1554a authorizes the PDBR to recommend
modifications to servicemembers’ ratings “based on the records of
the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be
presented.”
15
permanent rating of thirty percent, which would entitle him to
disability retirement pay and medical benefits. 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1201(a), (b)(3). The criteria for assigning a ten-percent
rating versus a thirty-percent rating are similar and
overlapping, and Nealy’s preferred result would not be
unreasonable. But our review of the Navy’s action is
deferential and we discern no error: The PDBR’s
recommended rating of ten percent was adequately explained
and supported by substantial evidence. See N.M. Cattle
Growers’ Ass’n, 148 F.4th at 764 (agency need only “examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action” (cleaned up)).
The distinction between a ten-percent rating and a thirty-
percent rating is relatively minor. In both scenarios, the
servicemember experiences “occupational and social
impairment,” and “a decrease in work efficiency.” 38 C.F.R.
§ 4.130. The difference is in degree. For a ten-percent rating,
the servicemember’s symptoms are “mild or transient” and
they must impair his ability to perform occupational tasks
“only during periods of significant stress.” Id. For a thirty-
percent rating, the servicemember must demonstrate
“occasional” decreases in work efficiency and “intermittent
periods of inability to perform occupational tasks” due to
symptoms such as “depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness,
panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment,
[and/or] mild memory loss (such as forgetting names,
directions, recent events).” Id.
In Nealy’s case, the key to the PDBR’s recommendation
of a ten-percent permanent disability rating was its conclusion,
based on the 2008 VA examination, that Nealy’s impairment
was “mild.” J.A. 99–100 (noting that the 2008 examiner
characterized Nealy’s social and occupational impairment as
“mild”). The Board observed that Nealy successfully started a
16
new job and “did not mention any [mental health] symptoms
significantly interfering with his work performance.” J.A. 99.
The Board further noted that Nealy’s PTSD had not led to
“negative performance feedback, missed work, or an inability
to complete occupational tasks.” J.A. 99. In addition, the
PDBR considered parts of the VA report that appeared to favor
a higher disability rating and explained why a ten-percent
rating was nonetheless appropriate. E.g., J.A. 99–100
(acknowledging Nealy’s symptoms were chronic but
explaining that his clinical condition was stable, and that
although he had difficulty sleeping, the 2008 examiner “did not
address the nature of that impairment”). Moreover, the PDBR
stated that there was “no evidence that [he] participated in any
form of [mental health treatment] during the constructive
TDRL period.” J.A. 100. The PDBR thus provided a reasoned
explanation for its ultimate conclusion that Nealy’s symptoms
supported a ten-percent disability rating. It reached the same
conclusion as the Physical Evaluation Board and the prior
panel of the PDBR that had reviewed Nealy’s case six years
earlier, in 2016. The PDBR’s rating decision and the process
by which it reached its ultimate conclusion were reasonable.
Nealy nevertheless claims that the PDBR’s
recommendation was deficient because it failed to adequately
consider the VA’s assignment of a thirty-percent disability
rating based on the same facts. He argues that because the
VA’s rating was higher, the Board’s departure from it was
arbitrary and capricious. Nealy also contends that the PDBR
should have recommended a higher rating because Congress
created the Board “in part, in response to reports that the
military consistently assigned disability ratings lower than
those assigned by” the VA. Nealy Br. 37 (quoting White v.
Mattis, No. 18-cv-02867, 2019 WL 6728448, at *2 (D.D.C.
Dec. 11, 2019)). We remain unconvinced.
17
First, the PDBR was not bound to follow a prior disability
determination by the VA. The Navy and the VA issue
disability ratings using different methods and for different
purposes, so “disparities between” the two “are
commonplace.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 12; see also
Coleman, 74 F.4th at 613 (“Notably, VA disability ratings and
associated benefits are distinct from the [Navy’s].”). As noted,
“the Navy uses the VA schedule to decide whether or not the
service member is fit to perform [his duties, while the] VA uses
the schedule to determine disability ratings based on an
evaluation of the individual’s capacity to function and perform
tasks in the civilian world.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11.
(cleaned up); see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 21:3–11 (noting that in
the military setting, a servicemember is “shoulder to shoulder
with other service members who have experienced similar
things,” and “has regular access to psychologists [and]
therapists that he can talk to that [are] less immediately
available to him in a civilian setting”). Additionally, “the Navy
assigns disability percentages only to conditions found to be
unfitting for military service” at a given moment in time, while
the VA “evaluates and adjusts disability ratings throughout the
individual’s lifetime.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11–12
(cleaned up). The mere fact that Nealy’s two ratings are
different, therefore, is no indication that the PDBR’s
determination was arbitrary.
In any event, the PDBR did not ignore Nealy’s VA rating
and took it into account. The Board noted that the VA had
rated Nealy thirty-percent disabled, and took care to review the
facts presented in the VA’s 2008 examination report. Although
the PDBR did not explain why Nealy’s ratings under the VA
and the Navy systems diverged, such an explanation was not
required. Arbitrary and capricious review necessarily
contemplates that different decisionmakers could review the
same evidence and reach different conclusions, so long as those
18
conclusions reflect a reasoned determination. See Nader v.
FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“That reasonable
persons evaluating the record could draw different inferences
does not prove that the Commission was arbitrary and
capricious or lacked substantial evidence.”).
Nealy’s observation that the PDBR was created in part to
correct erroneously low military disability ratings has little
relevance here. That background information sheds no light on
the PDBR’s evaluation of the specific facts before it in this
case. The Board’s mandate was to consider Nealy’s service
records and “such evidence as may be presented,” and it did so.
See 10 U.S.C. § 1554a. The PDBR reviewed the Navy’s
records and Nealy’s 2008 VA examination, drew a reasonable
conclusion from those sources, and then articulated a “rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.”
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (cleaned up). Nothing more was
required.
* * *
The PDBR properly recommended a modification of
Nealy’s disability rating “based on the records of the armed
force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented.”
10 U.S.C. § 1554a(c)(2). Nealy’s argument that he was
entitled to a physical examination fails because the authorities
he cites are inapposite where the PDBR recommends a
retroactive and constructive modification to a servicemember’s
disability rating. Moreover, the Board’s modification
recommendation rested on an adequate review of the relevant
evidence and a reasoned articulation of its decision. For the
foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
So ordered.