Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Argued September 8, 2026 Decided November 17, 2026 No. 25-5175 SEAN NEALY, APPELLANT v. HUNG CAO, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, APPELLEE Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 1:20-cv-03820) Dylan T. Thayer argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was David P. Sheldon. Mason D. Bracken, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Jeanine Ferris Pirro, U.S. Attorney, and Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney. Before: PAN and GARCIA, Circuit Judges, and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PAN. 2 PAN, Circuit Judge: Sean Nealy is a Navy veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Whether he can retire from service with pay and benefits due to that condition depends on the disability rating assigned to him by the Navy. The Navy initially rated him ten-percent disabled, which entitled him to only a one-time severance payment and no retirement benefits. Nealy appealed that determination to the Physical Disability Board of Review (“PDBR”), which retroactively assigned him a six-month temporary disability rating of fifty percent and a permanent disability rating of ten percent. The Navy adopted the PDBR’s recommended modification. Nealy accepts the temporary rating of fifty percent and wishes to maintain that rating because it would entitle him to retirement benefits. He contends that (1) the Navy lacked authority to effectively lower that rating to a ten- percent permanent rating without first conducting a physical examination of him; and (2) even if the Navy had authority to lower his rating, the ten-percent rating was arbitrary and capricious. The district court rejected those arguments, holding that the Navy lawfully and reasonably applied the relevant statute. We affirm. I. Nealy served in the Navy from 1996 to 2008. He was tasked with “surveilling battle zones, coordinating and directing airstrikes, and then assessing the aftermath of the strikes.” Nealy Br. 10. On one mission, in May 2006, he reviewed imagery from a battlefield and counted the casualties. After that assignment, Nealy reported changes in mood and personality, heightened aggression, hypervigilance, difficulty concentrating, and intrusive nightmares. In September 2006, a Navy medical examiner diagnosed Nealy with PTSD and he began psychological counseling. 3 Soon after, Nealy’s commander deemed him unqualified for flight duty. A Medical Evaluation Board examined him and confirmed that he suffered from PTSD and a single episode of major depressive disorder. The Medical Evaluation Board referred Nealy to a Physical Evaluation Board for a formal determination of his “[f]itness to continue naval service, degree of disability, and entitlement to disability pay” Sec’y of the Navy Instr. 1850.4E, Department of the Navy Disability Evaluation Manual ¶ 1004(c) (Apr. 30, 2002). The Physical Evaluation Board was tasked with taking a “snapshot” of Nealy’s condition at the time of his evaluation to see how his disability impacted his ability to perform his military role. Schmidt v. McPherson, 806 F. App’x 10, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2020). It concluded that Nealy had major depressive disorder, which subsumed his earlier PTSD diagnosis. The Board assigned him a disability rating of ten percent based on the Department of Veterans Affairs Schedule for Rating Disability (“VASRD”). See 10 U.S.C. § 1216a; 38 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 4. A ten-percent rating is appropriate when a servicemember demonstrates “[o]ccupational and social impairment due to mild or transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress.” 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. Because Nealy was unfit for duty but received a disability rating of less than thirty percent, he qualified only for a one- time severance payout. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1203. After his discharge from the Navy on August 17, 2008, Nealy filed a claim for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). Although the VA, like the Navy, uses the VASRD disability-rating system, its ratings serve a different purpose: The VA “determine[s] disability ratings based on an evaluation of the individual’s capacity to function and perform tasks in the civilian world,” while the Navy 4 focuses on the servicemember’s ability to perform his specific military role. Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11. The VA assessed Nealy on November 12, 2008. It noted that he had recently secured a job in information technology and was “generally performing well at work and getting along well with co-workers and bosses.” J.A. 79. The VA observed that Nealy “experience[d] some anxiety at work” but tied that to “wanting to perform well.” J.A. 79. It found that he did not suffer from delusions, memory loss, or panic attacks, but noted that he exhibited ritualistic “checking” behavior and sleep impairment. J.A. 80. It determined that his PTSD symptoms were “moderate” and assessed his Global Assessment of Functioning — a scale used to measure mental health — at 70, J.A. 81, which connotes “mild” impairment, J.A. 96. After considering all those factors, the VA concluded that Nealy experienced “mild social/occupational impairment” with an “occasional decrease in work efficiency” and “intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks.” J.A. 81. It assigned Nealy a disability rating of thirty percent for PTSD. In 2016, Nealy appealed his Navy disability rating to the Physical Disability Board of Review. The PDBR is an appellate panel that “review[s] the findings and decisions of the Physical Evaluation Board” for servicemembers who were “separated from the armed forces due to unfitness for duty due to a medical condition with a disability rating of 20 percent disabled or less” between September 11, 2001, and December 31, 2009. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1554a(b), (c). Nealy’s case falls within the PDBR’s jurisdiction. The PDBR is empowered to evaluate “the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented,” id. § 1554a(c), and to recommend either the “modification of the disability rating previously assigned” to the servicemember or the “issuance of a new disability rating,” id. §§ 1554a(d)(3), (4). Based on the 5 PDBR’s recommendation, the Secretary of the Navy can “correct the military records” of the servicemember. Id. § 1554a(e). The PDBR concluded that the Physical Evaluation Board correctly assigned Nealy a disability rating of ten percent. After reviewing Nealy’s service treatment record and 2008 examination by the VA, the Board determined that Nealy exhibited “generally satisfactory functioning” with “very mild” symptoms and was “performing well at work and getting along well with co-workers and supervisors.” J.A. 96. Accordingly, it recommended no change to Nealy’s disability rating. The PDBR declined to apply § 4.129 of the Veterans Affairs Schedule. 38 C.F.R. § 4.129 (“VASRD § 4.129”). That provision, enacted in 2008, requires the evaluator to assign an automatic minimum fifty-percent disability rating to servicemembers separated for “a mental disorder that develops in service as a result of a highly stressful event [and] is severe enough to bring about a veteran’s release from active military service.” Id. That rating remains in effect at least until the servicemember undergoes an examination within six months of discharge “to determine whether a change in evaluation is warranted.” Id. The Board determined that § 4.129 did not apply to Nealy because his condition was “not directly related to combat” and the panel was “unable to locate any documentation of a highly stressful event.” J.A. 96. Nealy challenged the PDBR’s determination by filing suit against the Secretary of the Navy. Soon thereafter, the parties agreed to a voluntary remand for the PDBR to reconsider Nealy’s disability rating. The parties stipulated that Nealy could submit supplemental materials on remand. The district court granted the parties’ request and remanded the case. 6 In March 2022, the PDBR issued a revised recommendation. This time, it determined that Nealy was entitled to an automatic disability rating of fifty percent for six months, under VASRD § 4.129, but that his permanent disability rating should remain at ten percent. The PDBR’s recommendation was based on its review of Nealy’s service treatment record and his examination by the VA in 2008. The PDBR found that Nealy’s PTSD stemmed from “combat exposure while deployed in a war zone,” which was sufficient for him to be covered by § 4.129. J.A. 99. That determination entitled Nealy to be assigned a temporary, six- month disability rating of fifty percent. The Board thus recommended that Nealy be retroactively and constructively placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List (“TDRL”), at a fifty-percent disability rating, for the six months after his date of separation from the Navy (i.e., from August 17, 2008, until February 17, 2009). The TDRL is a list of servicemembers unfit to continue military duties because of a physical disability that is not yet determined to be stabilized or permanent. Sec’y of the Navy Instr. 1850.4E, Department of the Navy Disability Evaluation Manual ¶ 2081. The PDBR also reviewed Nealy’s permanent disability rating, which would retroactively go into effect after the six- month period of fifty-percent disability that was mandated by § 4.129. Consistent with the findings of the Physical Evaluation Board and the previous review by a different PDBR panel, the Board determined that Nealy’s permanent disability rating was ten percent, based on “mild or transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress.” J.A. 100 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 4.130). The PDBR again relied on Nealy’s 2008 VA examination, which was the “source of evidence most proximate to” the relevant timeframe, as it was 7 performed just three months after Nealy’s separation from the Navy. J.A. 99. The PDBR noted that Nealy “did not mention any [mental health] symptoms significantly interfering with his work performance” and exhibited no “workplace anger” or “inability to concentrate” that impaired his new job. J.A. 99. It also observed that Nealy had not experienced “negative performance feedback, missed work, or [shown any] inability to complete occupational tasks.” J.A. 99. The PDBR acknowledged that Nealy had suffered some “marital difficulties related to anger” but stated that those improved with counseling. J.A. 99. It also observed that Nealy did not require medication and that his mental health did not prevent him from engaging in leisure activities. J.A. 99–100. Unsatisfied with the Board’s revised determination, Nealy returned to the district court. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Nealy argued that the Board “lacks the statutory authority” to “retroactively remove someone” from the TDRL without first conducting a physical examination. See J.A. 197–201; see also Cook v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 277, 307–09 (2015). He relied on 10 U.S.C. § 1210 — a statute concerning the TDRL — and VASRD § 4.129. Both of those provisions require servicemembers to be re-examined after receiving an initial disability rating, so that their status can be updated to account for changes in their condition. Nealy also asserted that the ten-percent permanent disability rating assigned to him by the PDBR was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. The government responded that the authorities cited by Nealy were not relevant because they do not apply to retroactive reviews conducted by the PDBR under 10 U.S.C. § 1554a, and that the PDBR’s rating recommendation was adequately explained and supported by the record evidence. On March 20, 2025, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the government. Nealy timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 8 II. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Young v. United States, 943 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Absent a delegation of discretionary interpretive authority to an agency, we “exercise independent judgment” to identify the “best” reading of the statute, without deference to agency interpretations. Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394, 400 (2024). We may “hold unlawful and set aside” an armed service’s determination regarding a servicemember’s disability status if the action was “unsupported by substantial evidence” or was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (E); Sissel v. Wormuth, 77 F.4th 941, 947 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The arbitrary- and-capricious standard is “highly deferential and presumes the validity of agency action.” Sissel, 77 F.4th at 947 (cleaned up). Under that standard, a rating decision may be set aside only if the armed service “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). To uphold the armed service’s decision, the court need only find that it “examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (cleaned up). And the court will not “direct” the armed service “in a choice between rational alternatives.” N.M. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Fish & 9 Wildlife Serv., 148 F.4th 755, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). III. A. The Navy adopted the PDBR’s recommendation that Nealy be retroactively and constructively placed on the Temporary Disability Retired List for six months with a fifty- percent disability rating, but otherwise be assigned a ten- percent permanent disability rating. The PDBR’s recommendation was based entirely on its review of Nealy’s service records and the evidence presented, as permitted by 10 U.S.C. § 1554a. Although Nealy accepts the PDBR’s authority under § 1554a to retroactively recommend a temporary status of fifty-percent disability, he argues that the PDBR was not empowered to retroactively recommend a ten-percent permanent disability rating without first conducting a physical examination. We disagree. The PDBR’s review of Nealy’s disability rating embodied a straightforward application of § 1554a. That statute authorizes the Board to examine “the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented,” id. § 1554a(c)(2), and then to recommend either the “modification of the disability rating previously assigned” to the servicemember or the “issuance of a new disability rating,” id. §§ 1554a(d)(3), (4). Here, after reviewing Nealy’s service treatment record and his 2008 examination by the VA, the PDBR recommended a modification. It determined that the Navy should (1) deem Nealy fifty-percent disabled under § 4.129 for the six-month period following his medical separation, (2) retroactively and constructively place him on the TDRL for that time, and (3) thereafter assign him a ten- 10 percent permanent disability rating. The Board weighed the relevant facts and explained its reasoning in a detailed written recommendation. The Secretary of the Navy then ratified the Board’s recommendation. Nealy nevertheless contends that the Navy acted unlawfully because his fifty-percent temporary rating could not be reduced to his ten-percent permanent rating without a new physical examination. He cites two sources of authority to support his claim: the physical-examination requirements in 10 U.S.C. § 1210 and VASRD § 4.129. Nealy first argues that once the Navy retroactively and constructively placed him on the TDRL, 10 U.S.C. § 1210 barred his removal from that list until he received a physical examination to determine if his condition had changed. Section 1210 establishes procedures for transitioning servicemembers off of the TDRL: It provides that any servicemember on the list shall receive a “physical examination . . . at least once every 18 months . . . to determine whether there has been a change in the disability for which he was temporarily retired.” Id. § 1210(a). That statute also provides that if the examination shows that the servicemember’s disability has stabilized, he must be removed from the TDRL and separated or retired in accordance with his permanent disability rating. Id. §§ 1210(c)–(e). Section 1210 is inapplicable to Nealy’s case. That provision applies when a Physical Evaluation Board contemporaneously and actually places a servicemember on the TDRL, after evaluating him and finding him temporarily disabled. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 1210(a); Coleman v. Kendall, 74 F.4th 610, 617–18 (4th Cir. 2023). Under those circumstances, a servicemember who is rated “temporarily disabled” must undergo periodic physical examinations to 11 determine how long he should remain on the TDRL — a list that, by definition, includes only those whose disabilities are “temporary.” In other words, all servicemembers on the TDRL must eventually be removed from the list. They may be (1) retired with pay and benefits, if their disability is permanent, stable, and rated at least thirty percent, (2) separated without retirement pay and benefits, if their permanent, stable rating is lower than thirty percent, or (3) returned to duty if they are found fit. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1210(b)–(f), (h), 1211. Section 1210 in no way impinges on the PDBR’s independent authority under § 1554a to recommend retroactive changes to a disability rating, based solely on service records and the evidence presented. Id. §§ 1554a(c)(2), (d) (authorizing PDBR to recommend “modify[ing]” a servicemember’s previously assigned disability rating or “issu[ing]” a new one, “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented”). Here, in 2022, the PDBR recommended a retroactive and constructive modification to Nealy’s disability rating: It determined that Nealy should be deemed temporarily disabled at a rate of fifty percent, for six months from the date of his separation — i.e., from August 17, 2008, until February 17, 2009. That retroactive and constructive placement on the TDRL allowed Nealy to collect six-months-worth of disability benefits at the fifty-percent rate, but he was never actually placed on the TDRL. Thus, there was no reason for him to undergo a physical examination to ascertain whether he should remain on the list. And the recommended modification of his rating without an examination was authorized by § 1554a. Under such circumstances, § 1210’s physical-examination requirement is simply inapposite. Nealy’s alternative argument is that a physical examination was required under VASRD § 4.129. Section 12 4.129 provides that, after a qualifying servicemember receives the automatic fifty-percent disability rating due to mental illness, the armed service must conduct an “examination within the six month period following the veteran’s discharge to determine whether a change in evaluation is warranted.” 38 C.F.R. § 4.129. Nealy asserts that § 4.129’s examination requirement bars the PDBR from recommending a retroactive and constructive permanent disability rating that is lower than the initial fifty-percent rating because that would deprive him of his right to have his rating changed only after an examination within the six-month period following his discharge. We are unpersuaded. As already explained, the PDBR relied on § 1554a to recommend a modification of Nealy’s disability rating “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented,” and that provision does not require a physical examination. Section 4.129 does not change the analysis: Its follow-up examination requirement does not apply when the PDBR recommends a retroactive adjustment due to a reconsideration of a servicemember’s mental condition under § 1554a. The plain text of § 4.129 addresses only contemporaneous findings of disability. It requires a physical examination to take place “within the six month period following the veteran’s discharge” due to the disability in question — not years later, after a retroactive application of the regulation. 38 C.F.R. § 4.129. Moreover, the purpose of the follow-up examination is to determine whether “a change in evaluation is warranted” soon after discharge, which indicates that the provision is not intended to apply retroactively. A backward-looking evaluation that considers whether a rating change would have been warranted years ago would be “impossible or, at best, wholly irrelevant to assessing [a servicemember’s actual] disability.” Coleman, 74 F.4th at 618. 13 Adopting Nealy’s interpretation of § 4.129 would undermine the disability-review process, which seeks to ensure fair and accurate assessments of servicemembers’ disabilities. Nealy posits that the PDBR can recommend a servicemember’s retroactive placement on the TDRL, but cannot recommend any subsequent alterations to his status until an impossible-to- conduct physical examination takes place, effectively transforming the temporary rating into a permanent one. Yet, § 4.129 expressly provides that a servicemember’s rating should change if his disability changes. See VASRD § 4.129 (requiring follow-up examination “to determine whether a change in evaluation is warranted”). Nealy’s reading of § 4.129 would effectively freeze his disability rating at fifty percent, forcing the PDBR to recommend an inaccurate permanent disability rating that could never be corrected. That cannot be the best reading of the regulation. Cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“[I]nterpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); see also Coleman, 74 F.4th at 618 (requiring retroactive physical examinations under § 4.129 would “swallow up” the disability-review process). Finally, our conclusion that § 4.129’s physical- examination requirement does not apply to retroactive disability-rating adjustments aligns with Defense Department policy and the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Coleman. Recognizing that § 4.129 is a poor fit for retroactive applications, the Department of Defense issued a guidance memo that instructs the PDBR to retroactively apply the automatic fifty-percent temporary disability rating to qualified servicemembers for six months but to assign the “subsequent fitness and PTSD ratings based on the applicable evidence,” without a physical examination. J.A. 262. The PDBR 14 followed that guidance here. And the Fourth Circuit held in Coleman that § 4.129, “by its terms does not contemplate retroactive reviews by the Board.” 74 F.4th at 617. We agree.1 In sum, the PDBR properly applied § 1554a to recommend a retroactive modification of Nealy’s disability status based on his treatment records and the evidence presented. It acted well within its authority when it proposed a temporary fifty-percent disability rating under § 4.129 for a constructive six-month period, and a permanent disability rating of ten percent. Nealy’s attempt to benefit from the recommended temporary rating while barring the imposition of the permanent rating fails. His reliance on § 1210 to demand a physical examination is misplaced because that statute does not apply to his case and has no bearing on the PDBR’s authority to recommend a rating adjustment under § 1554a. And his interpretation of § 4.129’s examination provision is erroneous because that provision likewise does not apply to retroactive disability-rating adjustments under § 1554a. B. Nealy argues that the ten-percent permanent disability rating assigned to him by the PDBR is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706. He effectively asserts that the record compels a 1 Nealy relies on Cook v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 277 (2015), a Court of Federal Claims decision holding that the physical- examination requirements of 10 U.S.C § 1210 and VASRD § 4.129 apply to retroactive reviews conducted by the PDBR. We disagree with the reasoning of that non-binding opinion. The Cook court did not consider that § 1554a authorizes the PDBR to recommend modifications to servicemembers’ ratings “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented.” 15 permanent rating of thirty percent, which would entitle him to disability retirement pay and medical benefits. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), (b)(3). The criteria for assigning a ten-percent rating versus a thirty-percent rating are similar and overlapping, and Nealy’s preferred result would not be unreasonable. But our review of the Navy’s action is deferential and we discern no error: The PDBR’s recommended rating of ten percent was adequately explained and supported by substantial evidence. See N.M. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n, 148 F.4th at 764 (agency need only “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” (cleaned up)). The distinction between a ten-percent rating and a thirty- percent rating is relatively minor. In both scenarios, the servicemember experiences “occupational and social impairment,” and “a decrease in work efficiency.” 38 C.F.R. § 4.130. The difference is in degree. For a ten-percent rating, the servicemember’s symptoms are “mild or transient” and they must impair his ability to perform occupational tasks “only during periods of significant stress.” Id. For a thirty- percent rating, the servicemember must demonstrate “occasional” decreases in work efficiency and “intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks” due to symptoms such as “depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, [and/or] mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events).” Id. In Nealy’s case, the key to the PDBR’s recommendation of a ten-percent permanent disability rating was its conclusion, based on the 2008 VA examination, that Nealy’s impairment was “mild.” J.A. 99–100 (noting that the 2008 examiner characterized Nealy’s social and occupational impairment as “mild”). The Board observed that Nealy successfully started a 16 new job and “did not mention any [mental health] symptoms significantly interfering with his work performance.” J.A. 99. The Board further noted that Nealy’s PTSD had not led to “negative performance feedback, missed work, or an inability to complete occupational tasks.” J.A. 99. In addition, the PDBR considered parts of the VA report that appeared to favor a higher disability rating and explained why a ten-percent rating was nonetheless appropriate. E.g., J.A. 99–100 (acknowledging Nealy’s symptoms were chronic but explaining that his clinical condition was stable, and that although he had difficulty sleeping, the 2008 examiner “did not address the nature of that impairment”). Moreover, the PDBR stated that there was “no evidence that [he] participated in any form of [mental health treatment] during the constructive TDRL period.” J.A. 100. The PDBR thus provided a reasoned explanation for its ultimate conclusion that Nealy’s symptoms supported a ten-percent disability rating. It reached the same conclusion as the Physical Evaluation Board and the prior panel of the PDBR that had reviewed Nealy’s case six years earlier, in 2016. The PDBR’s rating decision and the process by which it reached its ultimate conclusion were reasonable. Nealy nevertheless claims that the PDBR’s recommendation was deficient because it failed to adequately consider the VA’s assignment of a thirty-percent disability rating based on the same facts. He argues that because the VA’s rating was higher, the Board’s departure from it was arbitrary and capricious. Nealy also contends that the PDBR should have recommended a higher rating because Congress created the Board “in part, in response to reports that the military consistently assigned disability ratings lower than those assigned by” the VA. Nealy Br. 37 (quoting White v. Mattis, No. 18-cv-02867, 2019 WL 6728448, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2019)). We remain unconvinced. 17 First, the PDBR was not bound to follow a prior disability determination by the VA. The Navy and the VA issue disability ratings using different methods and for different purposes, so “disparities between” the two “are commonplace.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 12; see also Coleman, 74 F.4th at 613 (“Notably, VA disability ratings and associated benefits are distinct from the [Navy’s].”). As noted, “the Navy uses the VA schedule to decide whether or not the service member is fit to perform [his duties, while the] VA uses the schedule to determine disability ratings based on an evaluation of the individual’s capacity to function and perform tasks in the civilian world.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11. (cleaned up); see also Oral Arg. Tr. at 21:3–11 (noting that in the military setting, a servicemember is “shoulder to shoulder with other service members who have experienced similar things,” and “has regular access to psychologists [and] therapists that he can talk to that [are] less immediately available to him in a civilian setting”). Additionally, “the Navy assigns disability percentages only to conditions found to be unfitting for military service” at a given moment in time, while the VA “evaluates and adjusts disability ratings throughout the individual’s lifetime.” Schmidt, 806 F. App’x at 11–12 (cleaned up). The mere fact that Nealy’s two ratings are different, therefore, is no indication that the PDBR’s determination was arbitrary. In any event, the PDBR did not ignore Nealy’s VA rating and took it into account. The Board noted that the VA had rated Nealy thirty-percent disabled, and took care to review the facts presented in the VA’s 2008 examination report. Although the PDBR did not explain why Nealy’s ratings under the VA and the Navy systems diverged, such an explanation was not required. Arbitrary and capricious review necessarily contemplates that different decisionmakers could review the same evidence and reach different conclusions, so long as those 18 conclusions reflect a reasoned determination. See Nader v. FCC, 520 F.2d 182, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“That reasonable persons evaluating the record could draw different inferences does not prove that the Commission was arbitrary and capricious or lacked substantial evidence.”). Nealy’s observation that the PDBR was created in part to correct erroneously low military disability ratings has little relevance here. That background information sheds no light on the PDBR’s evaluation of the specific facts before it in this case. The Board’s mandate was to consider Nealy’s service records and “such evidence as may be presented,” and it did so. See 10 U.S.C. § 1554a. The PDBR reviewed the Navy’s records and Nealy’s 2008 VA examination, drew a reasonable conclusion from those sources, and then articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (cleaned up). Nothing more was required. * * * The PDBR properly recommended a modification of Nealy’s disability rating “based on the records of the armed force concerned and such other evidence as may be presented.” 10 U.S.C. § 1554a(c)(2). Nealy’s argument that he was entitled to a physical examination fails because the authorities he cites are inapposite where the PDBR recommends a retroactive and constructive modification to a servicemember’s disability rating. Moreover, the Board’s modification recommendation rested on an adequate review of the relevant evidence and a reasoned articulation of its decision. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. So ordered.