KP Invest. v. Caples, C.

J-E02002-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 KATHERINE M. PURCELL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : CAROLE CAPLES : No. 1818 EDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-C-1929 CAROLE LEE CAPLES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : KATHERINE M. PURCELL : No. 1963 EDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-C-2083 KATHERINE M. PURCELL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CAROLE CAPLES : : Appellant : No. 1964 EDA 2023 Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2019-C-1929 J-E02002-26 CAROLE LEE CAPLES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KATHERINE M. PURCELL : : Appellant : No. 1210 EDA 2024 Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 21, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 2021-C-2083 BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., BECK, J., and NEUMAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 5, 2026 In these consolidated cases, Katherine M. Purcell appeals and Carole Lee Caples cross-appeals from the judgment entered by the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Caples and against Purcell in the amount of $168,107 and in favor of Purcell and against Caples in the amount of $77,461.86. After careful review, we affirm. The trial court provided a thorough recitation of the facts in this case, which properly laid out the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner on the respective claims, as follows: Carole Caples (Caples) is the mother of Katherine Purcell (Purcell), Kimberly D’Alessandro (D’Alessandro), and Christine Cullen (Cullen). In 2010, Caples lived in Maryland, but wanted to downsize and live closer to family. On February 5, 2010, Caples purchased a home located at 3214 S. 5th Street, Whitehall, Pennsylvania (Whitehall Property), located less than a mile from Purcell and her family’s home. The deed to the Whitehall Property was transferred to Caples and Purcell as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Caples put Purcell on the deed because her -2- J-E02002-26 deceased husband believed it was good practice to put another family member’s name on documents like deeds. In addition, Purcell was added to the deed so Purcell could streamline the inheritance process by selling the house and distributing the proceeds in accordance with Caples’ wishes if Caples passed away. At that time, Caples wished her estate to be equally distributed between her three daughters. Purcell advanced money to Caples to purchase the Whitehall Property; Caples immediately paid Purcell back with the proceeds of the sale of Caples’ Maryland home. In addition, Caples paid all bills and utilities associated with the Whitehall Property. Purcell never resided at the Whitehall Property and never paid bills or utilities related to that home. In 2012, Purcell began two investment companies, KP Investments, LLC (KP) and KC Property Investments, LLC (KC), the purpose of each company was to purchase, renovate and rent properties in the Baltimore, Maryland area. Caples became a 2% member in KP with an initial investment of $1,500 and a 50% member in KC with an initial investment of $75,898.89. Accounts for KP and KC were opened with the Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (PSECU) and Purcell and Caples were listed as authorized signers on both accounts; both were authorized signers as of April 15, 2019. On March 6, 2019, Caples sold her membership interest in KP to her grandson Corey Purcell for $2,400. In 2018, following hip surgery and rehabilitation and a second multi-day hospitalization for illness, Caples decided she wanted to move to Fellowship Community, a continuing care retirement community. On May 11, 2018, Caples executed a Fellowship Community Independent Living Residency Agreement; she subsequently moved into independent living at Fellowship Community on July 1, 2018. In order to enter Fellowship Community, Caples had to pay an entrance fee of approximately $203,000. Purcell agreed to loan Caples $192,850 in order for Caples to pay the entrance fee. A promissory note for $192,850 was signed by Caples and Purcell on July 1, 2018 (Note). The Note included an attached Loan Amortization Schedule Calculator that required Caples to make monthly payments to Purcell in the amount of $975.60 per month for 240 months beginning on November 1, 2018. -3- J-E02002-26 Also in 2018, while Caples contemplated moving into Fellowship Community, but while she still resided at the Whitehall Property, Caples requested to update her estate planning; Purcell took Caples to meet with Gail Shearer, Esquire. On May 21, 2018, a General Power of Attorney for Carol Caples was executed appointing Purcell as her agent; Purcell accepted the appointment. Caples updated her will on the same date, but maintained the same estate plan as previously documented which was to distribute her estate equally to each of her three daughters. The will included an attestation by Caples, Attorney Shearer, and Robin Kovaleski that included, in part, that Caples was of sound mind and under no constraint or undue influence. On October 11, 2018, Stanley Vasiliadis, Esquire, prepared a new Power of Attorney for Caples appointing Purcell as her agent; Purcell accepted the appointment. In addition, a health care power of attorney was executed naming Purcell as agent and D’Alessandro and Cullen as alternative agents. On October 15, 2018, a subsequent meeting was held at Attorney Shearer’s office. Although the meeting was originally to correct mistakes on the estate planning documents related to Cullen’s address, Caples decided she wanted to designate Purcell, D’Alessandro and Cullen as co-agents. A new health care power of attorney was executed appointing all three sisters as agents, not in the alternative. Purcell was unhappy about this arrangement. While living in Fellowship Community, Caples sold her Whitehall Property and on October 18, 2018, closed on the Whitehall Property. The net proceeds from the sale of the Whitehall Property were $262,519.75. At closing, a refund for overpayment of a sewer bill was issued in the amount of $63.33. At closing, Purcell and Caples each received half of the proceeds of the sale, each receiving $131,259.88 in proceeds and each receiving $31.67 for the sewer refund. A document was signed by both Purcell and Caples at the time of closing indicating that they each received 50% of the proceeds of the sale. After the closing and settlement on the Whitehall Property, Caples wanted to know how much she owed Purcell to pay off the Note from the Fellowship Community loan; D’Alessandro texted Purcell and requested the payoff amount, but did not receive a response. -4- J-E02002-26 D’Alessandro took Caples to Bank of America to deposit Caples’ check and Caples again inquired how much she owed Purcell. D’Alessandro called Purcell to get the information, but Purcell did not know the amount and said she would have to check her records. Caples deposited her $131,259.87 share of the proceeds of the sale of her home into an account Caples shared jointly with D’Alessandro. From October 18, 2018 to November 24, 2018, Purcell received communications from both D’Alessandro and Cullen requesting the payoff figure for Caples because Caples was feeling very anxious about owing Purcell money. Purcell did not respond to D’Alessandro, Cullen or Caples about the loan amount until November 24, 2018. On November 24, 2018, Purcell invited Caples to Purcell’s home. Purcell instructed Caples to write a check to Purcell for $100,000, to sign a check payable to Caples for $30,850, and for Caples to sign a new Loan Amortization Schedule Calculator. The $100,000 check was paid toward the principal of the Note. A new Loan Amortization Schedule Calculator was attached to a copy of the $100,000 check and included a new principal of $92,850, with monthly payments of $469.71, to be paid over 20 years, i.e., November 2038. A handwritten notation was added to the original Note documenting the $[100,000] payment and new Loan Amortization Schedule Calculator. The handwritten notation was signed by Purcell, Caples and Deirdre Lockman. In addition, Caples deposited $30,850 to a PSECU account in the joint names of Caples and Purcell (8699 Account) in order for monthly loan payments to be automatically paid in the amount of$469.71 from that account to Purcell’s money market account for a duration of over five years. During this time, Purcell continued to have concerns about the logistics of the three sisters being co-agents and how that could be problematic during an emergency situation. Purcell wanted the healthcare power of attorney to name only Purcell as agent with D’Alessandro and Cullen as alternative agents. Purcell’s requests for such change went unanswered, and, therefore, on January 14, 2019, she resigned as health care power of attorney agent. Thereafter, on January 20, 2019, Purcell removed $28,528.39 of the $30,850 from the 8699 Account and placed it into Purcell’s personal PSECU account she held with her husband (0213 -5- J-E02002-26 Account). The remaining balance in the 8699 Account was $1,412.35. Purcell then made automatic monthly payments in the amount of $469.71 from that joint 8699 Account to the 0213 Account Purcell shared with her husband. Monthly payments in the amount of $469.71 were made from the 8699 Account on February 7, 2019, March 7, 2019 and April 7, 2019 to the 0213 Account. However, the 8699 Account did not have enough funds to cover the April 7, 2019 loan payment. Therefore, on April 5, 2019, Purcell transferred $469.71 from her 0213 Account to the 8699 Account; on April 7, 2019, Purcell transferred the same amount back to her 0213 Account. On February 21, 2019, Caples, Cullen and Purcell met with William J. Fries, Esquire. At that time, the October 11, 2018 Power of Attorney naming Purcell as agent was revoked by Notice of Revocation of Power of Attorney dated February 21, 2019. In addition, a February 21, 2019 Power of Attorney appointed D’Alessandro and Cullen as agents for Caples. As of that date, Purcell was aware she was no longer Caples’ agent and that D’Alessandro and Cullen were Caples’ agents. From December 2018 through February 2019, Purcell admitted that D’Alessandro and Cullen continually asked her to provide them information on Caples[’] finances, but Purcell refused to provide any information. D’Alessandro, Cullen and Attorney Fries sent Purcell a letter on February 26, 2019, instructing Purcell to tum over account information; Purcell refused stating in a letter that Caples was competent and the information should be obtained from Caples. Purcell never sent any information to Caples’ agents, D’Alessandro and Cullen, explaining why she was holding Caples’ money. In March of 2019, Caples moved out of Fellowship Community and moved to Alabama with D’Alessandro. D’Alessandro began to help Caples understand where her money was located. D’Alessandro and Caples discovered that Caples’ name was on three PSECU accounts and she was an authorized signer on each account: the 8699 Account, the KP Account, and the KC Account. On April 11, 2019, after discovering more than $28,000 had been removed from the 8699 Account into a personal account owned by Purcell, D’Alessandro contacted PSECU to determine Caples’ -6- J-E02002-26 options regarding the three PSECU accounts. After learning the accounts could not be frozen, D’Alessandro withdrew the remaining balance of $473.12 from the 8699 Account in order to prevent Purcell from taking additional funds from Caples. In addition, D’Alessandro removed $25,000 from the KP business account and $20,000 from the KC business account and put them in an account she set up in Caples’ name with D’Alessandro as joint owner. Purcell was not informed that the funds had been removed. The $45,000 from the business accounts remains in the Caples and D’Alessandro PSECU account with a balance of $45,177.54. Although Purcell retained the $28,528.39 in her 0213 Account, on May 10, 2019, Purcell sent Caples’ agents a letter stating Caples was in default for not making monthly loan payments. At the time of trial, no additional payments on the Note had been made. Purcell began to notice memory loss in Caples beginning in 2016. On August 27, 2018, Purcell was told by Dr. Jacobus that Caples has Alzheimer’s disease without behavioral disturbance. Dr. Robert M. [Gordon], Ph.D. opined that Caples’ suffered from a weakened intellect during the time Pur[c]ell served as Caples’ power of attorney. Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at 3-10 (citations omitted). The trial court further thoroughly summarized the extensive procedural history of the separate matters included in this consolidated action as follows: Caples v. Purcell; 2021-C-2083 (breach of fiduciary duty) (“Caples Action”) Procedurally, this case began with the filing of a petition to compel respondent, Purcell, to file an accounting pursuant to 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5610 at docket file number 2019-0897 in the orphans’ court []. Cullen and D’Alessandro, as co-agents for Caples, requested an accounting of Purcell’s activities as agent under the May 21, 2018 power of attorney of Caples, that included: 1. The circumstances regarding the issuance of a check for $100,000 on November 26, 2018, from the checking account of Caples, including the purpose of the check and the disposition of the proceeds; -7- J-E02002-26 2. The withdrawal of funds from the PSECU account of Caples; 3. The disposition of the net settlement proceeds check of $262,519.75 received on October 18, 2018, from the sale of the Whitehall Property, including the 50% share of Caples; 4. A complete accounting and copies of all documentation regarding the limited liability corporations established for the real estate located at Barkley Street, Baltimore, Maryland; 5. A complete accounting and documentation concerning the limited liability corporation established for the real estate located at Lafayette Street, Baltimore, Maryland; 6. Documentation concerning an account that was to be established in the name of Caples for the benefit of her three children; and 7. Information concerning a “trickledown” account believed to have been established by Purcell using assets of Caples. In addition to requesting the above accounting, Cullen and D’Alessandro asserted that Purcell acted contrary to the best interests of Caples, acted in bad faith, and beyond her scope of authority, and otherwise violated her duties as agent for the principal. Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, an order was entered requiring Purcell to provide an accounting. An accounting was filed on August 30, 2019; Cullen and D’Alessandro subsequently filed objections to the accounting on September 18, 2019. Also on September 18, 2019, Cullen and D’Alessandro filed a petition for Purcell’s breach of fiduciary duties as agent for Caples. Purcell responded to both the objections and the petition. On June 25, 2020, Purcell filed a petition for dismissal for lack of orphans’ court jurisdiction of (A) Caples’ objections to respondent Purcell's accounting dated August 30, 2019, and (B) petition for respondent Purcell’s breach of fiduciary duties as agent for Caples. After Cullen and D’Alessandro’s response to Purcell’s petition and after argument held thereon, the [orphans’ court], by order dated August 19, 2020, granted Purcell’s petition and dismissed the objections to the accounting and the petition for breach of -8- J-E02002-26 fiduciary duties for lack of orphans’ court jurisdiction. The dismissal of the petition for breach of fiduciary duties was without prejudice to Caples filing a civil action raising a counterclaim in any civil actions as to the same subject matter. After Cullen and D’Alessandro's motion for reconsideration was denied [], the issue of jurisdiction was appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On August 16, 2021, the Superior Court vacated the orphans’ court order that dismissed Caples’ petition for breach and remanded to the orphans’ court to transfer the petition for breach to the civil division of the court of common pleas of Lehigh County; the order was affirmed in all other respects. Pursuant to the Superior Court’s order and by order dated December 8, 2021, the orphans’ court transferred the petition for respondent Purcell’s breach of fiduciary duties as agent for Caples to the civil division of this court. The transferred civil division docket number is 2021-C-2083. KP v. Caples, D'Alessandro; 2019-C-1595 (conversion/ theft of funds, unjust enrichment) On May 21, 2019, KP brought suit against Caples and D’Alessandro for conversion/theft of funds and unjust enrichment. KP is a limited liability company, and as of March 27, 2019, Purcell was a 98% interest member and managing member and Corey Purcell, her son, was a 2% interest member. The lawsuit asserted that Caples and D’Alessandro illegally transferred bank funds in the amount of $25,000 from KP’s business checking account with PSECU to a joint account of Caples and D’Alessandro within the same credit union. On October 30, 2019, Caples and D’Alessandro filed an answer with new matter to Purcell’s complaint. KP replied to the new matter on November 25, 2019. KC v. Caples, D’Alessandro; 2019-C-1627 (conversion/theft of funds, unjust enrichment) On May 23, [2019,] KC Property Investments, LLC (KC) filed suit against Caples and D’Alessandro for conversion/theft of funds and unjust enrichment. KC is a limited liability company, in which from its inception the members have been Purcell (50% interest) and Caples (50% interest). The lawsuit asserted that Caples and -9- J-E02002-26 D’Alessandro illegally transferred bank funds in the amount of $20,000 from KC’s business checking account with PSECU to a joint account of Caples and D’Alessandro maintained at the same credit union. On October 30, 2019, Caples and D’Alessandro filed an answer with new matter to Purcell’s complaint. KC replied to the new matter on November 25, 2019. Purcell v. Caples; 2019-C-1929 (“Purcell Action”) On June 21, 2019, Purcell filed a breach of contract action asserting that Caples borrowed $192,850 from Purcell in order for Caples to enter Fellowship Community. Caples executed a promissory note dated July 1, 2018, in the amount of $192,850; a $100,000 payment was made on the loan making the principal balance $91,587. Purcell asserted that Caples breached the terms of the Note by failing to make the monthly payments of $469.71. Purcell sought judgment in the amount of $91,948.33 as of June 18, 2019 plus pre- and post-judgment interest at the rate of 6%. On October 30, 2019, Caples filed an answer, new matter and counterclaim claiming that Purcell unlawfully took $131,259.88 from the proceeds of the sale of the Whitehall Property and unlawfully took $31.67 from a sewer refund from the Whitehall Property. Caples asserted that at the time Purcell unlawfully took the money, Purcell was acting as Caples’ power of attorney and was in a confidential relationship with her. Caples averred that Purcell’s behavior was egregious and Caples was entitled to punitive damages. Purcell replied to the new matter and filed new matter on November 25, 2019. Caples filed a counter-reply on December 16, 2019. On October 27, 2020, Caples filed a motion to amend her counterclaim, which was granted on November 2, 2020. Caples’ answer with new matter and amended counterclaim were filed on November 5, 2020 and included the following: Count I−Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Count II—Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation. Purcell filed a reply with new matter on December 11, 2020; and Caples filed her counter-reply on December 31, 2020. Id. at 10-14 (some citations and unnecessary capitalization omitted). - 10 - J-E02002-26 The trial court subsequently consolidated the four actions. The cases proceeded to a six-day jury trial. Prior to the jury rendering factual findings, the trial court found that Purcell’s October 7, 2018 removal of $23,873.70 from a joint PSECU account she shared with Caples was not wrongful and awarded that amount to Purcell as a matter of law, thereby precluding the jury from deciding that issue. The jury otherwise made separate findings in each of the actions on January 31, 2023. Specifically, the jury found:  Caples and D’Alessandro deprived KP of $25,000 belonging to KP, it would be inequitable for them to retain the money, and awarded KP $25,000;  Caples and D’Alessandro deprived KC of $20,000, it would be inequitable for them to retain the money, and awarded KC $20,000;  Caples breached the loan agreement with Purcell and awarded Purcell $61,973.06 plus interest, which it calculated to be a total of $70,201.80;  Caples did not prove her claim of fraud against Purcell regarding the proceeds from the sale of the Whitehall Property; and  Purcell breached her fiduciary duty with regard to the proceeds from the sale of the Whitehall Property and awarded Caples $131,291.54. On February 9, 2023, KC, KP, and Purcell filed a motion for post-trial relief. Of relevance to this appeal, Purcell sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) in favor of her and against Caples on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, or in the alternative, a new trial. KP, KC, and Purcell further argued that the amounts awarded to them should be molded to include pre- and post-judgment interest. On February 17, 2023, Caples, through Cullen and D’Alessandro, filed a motion for post-trial relief, raising numerous claims. Ultimately, the trial court granted the motion to mold the verdict raised - 11 - J-E02002-26 by KP, KC, and Purcell, and denied the motions in all other respects. Relevantly, the trial court molded the verdict in favor of Purcell to $77,461.86. Relevant herein, in the Purcell Action, judgment was entered on June 21, 2023, in favor of Caples and against Purcell in the amount of $168,107 and in favor of Purcell and against Caples in the amount of $77,461.86. On June 21, 2023, the court entered judgment in the Caples Action in favor of Caples and against Purcell in the amount of $168,107.40. Purcell and Caples appealed and cross-appealed from the entry of these judgments. The consolidated appeal proceeded before a three-judge panel of this Court. We subsequently granted en banc review, and reargument was heard by the Court en banc on July 22, 2026. This matter is now ripe for disposition. As Purcell has been assigned as the designated appellant, we address her issues first. Purcell raises the following issues on appeal: A. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in refusing to enter [JNOV] against [] Caples on her breach-of-fiduciary duty claim premised on the mere existence of a power of attorney, when no evidence was presented that [] Purcell acted as [] Caples’ agent, particularly in connection with the 50/50 equal disposition of the proceeds from the sale of a jointly-titled parcel of real estate, and there was no other legal or evidentiary basis to find the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by [] Purcell to [] Caples? B. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in submitting special verdict question No. 10 to the jury for determination (“Has Carole Caples proven her claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Katherine M. Purcell regarding the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the Fifth Street, Whitehall Property?”), given there cannot be a claim against [] Purcell for breach of fiduciary duty, when it is undisputed she did not act as [] Caples’ agent, particularly with respect to the 50/50 equal distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the jointly-titled real estate, and there - 12 - J-E02002-26 was no other legal or evidentiary basis to find the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by [] Purcell to [] Caples? C. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in submitting a breach of fiduciary duty jury instruction, and one which was also inaccurate and misleading, absent any evidence that, during the nine-month-long period she was [] Caples’ agent, [] Purcell exclusively exercised the powers granted to her, particularly with respect to the 50/50 equal distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the jointly-titled real estate, and there was no other legal or evidentiary basis to find the existence of a fiduciary duty owed by [] Purcell to [] Caples? Appellant’s Brief, at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). As all three issues relate to breach of fiduciary duty, and both the trial court and Purcell have combined these issues for review, we combine them for our analysis as well. Notably, the entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict “is a drastic remedy. A court cannot lightly ignore the findings of a duly selected jury.” A.Y. v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 224 A.3d 1, 12 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and ellipses omitted). A motion for [JNOV] is a post-trial motion which requests the court to enter judgment in favor of the moving party. There are two bases on which the court can grant [JNOV]: One, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse[ly] to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor; whereas with the second, the court reviews the evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure. In an appeal from the trial court’s decision to deny [JNOV], - 13 - J-E02002-26 we must consider the evidence, together with all favorable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Our standard of review when considering motions for a directed verdict and [JNOV] are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a [JNOV] only when we find an abuse of discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the same as that for a trial court. Concerning any questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. Concerning questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact.... A JNOV should be entered only in a clear case. Id. at 11-12 (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphases added). Here, the jury determined that Caples proved her claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Purcell regarding disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the Whitehall Property, and entered a verdict in Caples’ favor. Purcell subsequently filed a motion for post-trial relief, arguing, in relevant part, that JNOV should be entered in her favor and against Caples on Caples’ breach of fiduciary duty claim based on the disposition of the proceeds from the sale of the Whitehall Property given the absence of a fiduciary duty owed by Purcell to Caples. Purcell further argued that there was no basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim because it would have contradicted the assumption of joint ownership arising from the joint-titling of the Whitehall Property. See Purcell’s Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 2/9/23, at 2-7. As stated, the trial court denied the motion for post-trial relief. Importantly, the trial court noted “Purcell proffers the [JNOV] request as a - 14 - J-E02002-26 matter of law and not as a failure to meet the evidentiary standard for a breach of fiduciary.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at 23. This is true, as in all of Purcell’s issues related to breach of fiduciary duty, Purcell is critical of whether a fiduciary duty existed as a matter of law. The trial court concluded “the vast majority of the testimony presented at trial regarding the history of dealings between Purcell and Caples, leads this court to the conclusion that there could be no doubt that there existed a fiduciary relationship between Purcell and Caples.” Id. at 28. Accordingly, the court concluded Purcell was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as the jury’s verdict was supported by the record.1 See id. Notably, this was not a bench trial. The jury was the fact-finder in this case, and as such, was ultimately responsible for the finding that Purcell breached a fiduciary duty to Caples. Upon post-trial motions, the trial court’s only role was to decide whether the jury’s finding was incorrect as a matter of law, as that was the avenue pursued by Purcell in requesting JNOV. With a request for JNOV on the first basis−as a matter of law− “the court reviews the record and concludes that even with all factual inferences decided adverse[ly] ____________________________________________ 1 “[A trial] judge’s appraisement of evidence is not to be based on how he would have voted had he been a member of the jury, but on the facts as they come through the sieve of the jury’s deliberations.” Estate of Hicks v. Dana Companies, LLC, 984 A.2d 943, 951 (Pa. Super. 2009). With this standard in mind, as aforesaid, the experienced trial judge in this case, the Honorable Melissa T. Pavlack, denied the motion for JNOV. - 15 - J-E02002-26 to the movant the law nonetheless requires a verdict in his favor.” A.Y., 224 A.3d at 11 (citation omitted). Based on our standard of review, we conclude the trial court properly found that the evidence adduced in this case, giving all reasonable inferences to Caples as the verdict winner, is more than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Purcell owed a fiduciary duty to Caples and that Purcell breached that duty. The trial court found Purcell’s arguments were “fundamentally flawed,” because Purcell only asserted that no fiduciary duty was owed by Purcell to Caples since Purcell was not acting as Caples’ agent and not exercising powers as Power of Attorney (POA) at the time that the Whitehall Property was sold. Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at 23. Importantly, our Supreme Court, in Yenchi v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 161 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2017), as cited by the trial court, has explained that a fiduciary duty can arise in a few different circumstances, including but not limited to between a principal and agent: A fiduciary duty is the highest duty implied by law. A fiduciary duty requires a party to act with the utmost good faith in furthering and advancing the other person’s interests, including a duty to disclose all relevant information. This highest duty will be imposed only where the attendant conditions make it certain that a fiduciary relationship exists. In some types of relationships, a fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law. Principal and agent, trustee and cestui que trust, attorney and client, guardian and ward, and partners are recognized examples. The unique degree of trust and confidence involved in these relationships typically allows for one party to gain easy - 16 - J-E02002-26 access to the property or other valuable resources of the other, thus necessitating appropriate legal protections. Where no fiduciary duty exists as a matter of law, Pennsylvania courts have nevertheless long recognized the existence of confidential relationships in circumstances where equity compels that we do so. Our courts have found fiduciary duties in circumstances where the relative position of the parties is such that the one has the power and means to take advantage of, or exercise undue influence over, the other. The circumstances in which confidential relationships have been recognized are fact specific and cannot be reduced to a particular set of facts or circumstances. We have explained that a confidential relationship “appears when the circumstances make it certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust, justifiably reposed[.]” … While cases involving fiduciary relationships are necessarily fact specific, they usually involve some special vulnerability in one person that creates a unique opportunity for another person to take advantage to their benefit. This Court has recognized that while disease or advancing age “do not by themselves create a confidential relationship with another,” such limitations “may support an inference of confidentiality” if they bear on a party’s “capacity to understand the nature of the transaction in question.” Family relationships or close personal friendships, while also not dispositive of the existence of a confidential relationship, have also often played significant roles in particular determinations. Yenchi, 161 A.3d at 819-821 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphases added). Accordingly, based upon the evidence presented at trial, while the jury could have found that a fiduciary duty existed based on Purcell’s role as her mother’s agent under the POA, that relationship was not necessarily dispositive. The jury also could have found, based upon the extensive evidence presented at trial, that Purcell and Caples were in a confidential relationship. - 17 - J-E02002-26 Notably, the test for a confidential relationship is disjunctive, needing only one of the following to show an unfair advantage: (1) overmastering influence, (2) weakness, (3) dependence, or (4) trust. See Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95, 101 (Pa. Super. 2001). Upon reviewing the record, we commend the trial court on its thorough recitation of the facts in this case, which properly laid out the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, as we must. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at 3-10. Viewing the record in this manner, there was corroborating testimony presented that it was understood by all, including Purcell, that Caples placed Purcell’s name on the deed for the Whitehall Property because it was a family practice, and Caples expected this would help facilitate Purcell evenly dividing the house between the three daughters in the event their mother moved or passed away. See N.T., Jury Trial, 1/27/23, at 52 (Caples testifying that she put Purcell’s name on the deed because her late husband had told her to put somebody else—one of the girls—on the deed if she were ever going to buy a house alone; and that she placed Purcell on the deed with the intent that if Caples were to pass away while still owning the house, Purcell would divide the property evenly between all three sisters); see also N.T., Jury Trial, 1/26/23, at 106 (D’Allesandro testifying, “Our understanding was that [Purcell] would be able to take care of the selling of the home and attributing the funds to Mom’s estate. Where they would be divided equally … That’s what - 18 - J-E02002-26 everyone’s understanding was.”); see also N.T., Jury Trial, 1/27/23,