Full Opinion

FIRST CIRCUIT 2026 CU 0715 C l DENNIS AUCOIN9 JR. i VERSUS NICOLE RUTH SPENCER Judgment Rendered: Appealed from the 20" Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Feliciana State of Louisiana Docket No. 47501 The Honorable Sydney Picou Walker, Judge Presiding Brian J. Prendergast Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee, Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dennis Aucoin, Jr. Robert C. Lowe Counsel for Defendant/Appellant, Melanie C. Lockett Nicole Ruth Spencer Nisha Kate New Orleans, Louisiana BEFORE: HESTER, MILLER, AND FIELDS, JJ. MILLER, J. Defendant/ Appellant, Nicole Ruth Spencer, appeals a judgment of the trial court awarding Ms. Spencer and Plaintiff/Appellee, Dennis Aucoin, Jr., joint care, custody, and control of their minor child and designating Mr. Aucoin as the domiciliary parent. For the following reasons, we affirm. Ms. Spencer (" the mother") and Mr. Aucoin (" the father") are the parents of O.P.D.A. l (" the child"), born in October 2022. On March 16, 2023, the father filed a " Petition for Declaration of Paternity, Custody and Other Ancillary Matters." The father alleged that he was able to exercise physical custody of the child in the past but had been recently denied custody by the mother. He requested a judgment establishing him as the child' s father; implementing a joint custody plan; and naming him as the domiciliary parent. He also requested a judgment regarding other matters, including telephone contact, exchange points, and tax dependency deductions. After a hearing on July 24, 2023, the trial court signed a stipulated judgment on August 23, 2023. 2 The judgment declared Mr. Aucoin to be the biological father of the child and further stated that he would maintain physical custody of the child every other week from Thursday to Sunday and that the exchange location would be in Metairie, Louisiana. Additionally, the judgment stated that the father would have the option to exercise physic al - custody of the child every Wednesday in Buras, Louisiana and any other time as mutually agreed upon by the parties. I Pursuant to Uniform Rules -- Courts of Appeal, Rule 5- 2, we refer to the minor child by her initials. 2 We note that an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, filed by the mother, was heard on the same day. On June 19, 2023, the mother filed her exception, contending that Louisiana was not the home state of the minor child when the father filed his petition, so the Twentieth Judicial District Court (" 20th JDC") did not have subject matter jurisdiction. She further stated that she filed a " Petition to Determine Paternity and Related Relief' in Florida on May 17, 2023. After a hearing, the trial court signed a judgment, dismissing the mother' s exception and finding that the 20th JDC had subject matter jurisdiction. 2 On November 27, 2023, the trial court held a custody review. After considering the stipulations of the parties made in open court, the trial court signed a stipulated judgment on July 22, 2024.3 The judgment stated that the parties were to continue joint care, custody, and control of the child, on an alternating weekly basis, with exchanges to take place on Friday; the parties were allowed to authorize any family members to facilitate the transport and exchange of the child; and each party was entitled to speak to the child twice per day. On May 9, 2024, the father filed a " Rule to Establish Principal Residence of the Child and Ancillary Matters." The father contended that the mother continued to insist that she had always been domiciled in Florida; did not dismiss a child support matter previously filed in Florida, as ordered by the court; and created turmoil between the parties by insisting that he meet her halfway between Brevard County, Florida and East Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. He further contended that he believed the mother was attempting to relocate the child to Florida and that it was in the child' s best interest for the child' s principal residence to be East Feliciana Parish. Accordingly, he requested that he be named domiciliary parent; that East Feliciana Parish be established as the child' s principal residence as defined by La. R.S. 9: 355. 1, which is referred to as the relocation statutes; that the mother be held in contempt for her failure to dismiss the child support matter; and that he be awarded attorney' s fees. Additionally, he asserted that two daily phone calls created unnecessary interruptions, and he requested that the amount of phone calls be reduced. On July 5, 2024, the mother filed a peremptory exception of no cause of action. She contended that the father sought to modify a stipulated judgment by requesting that he be designated as the domiciliary parent, but he did not allege that 3 We note that the judgment incorrectly states that the judgment was signed on July 22, 2023. I there was a material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of custody or that the proposed modification was in the best interest of the child. She further argued that, since the parties share custody of the child, the court could not designate a permanent residence for the child pursuant to the relocation statutes because the child had two permanent residences. Therefore, she argued that the father' s rule failed to state a cause of action against her. After a hearing on July 22, 2024, the trial court granted the mother' s exception of no cause of action and ordered that the father had 15 days to amend his " Rule to Establish Principal Residence of the Child and Ancillary Matters." On August 6, 2024, the father filed a " Motion and Order to File First Amending and Supplemental Petition." He alleged that there was a change in circumstances since the rendition of the trial court' s prior judgment, as well as violations of the judgment, which materially affected the best interest of the child and justified a modification of custody. In addition to the allegations he made in his original rule, he asserted that the mother interfered with the child' s healthcare and was inconsistent in her opinion on vaccinations and that the parties had not agreed where the child would be enrolled in school. He further amended his prior rule, contending that no parent was designated as the domiciliary parent in the initial custody order and requesting to be designated as the domiciliary parent pursuant to La. R.S. 9: 335( B)( 1). On June 20, 2025, the mother filed an " Answer to Rule to Establish Principal Residence of the Child and Ancillary Matters and First Amending and Supplemental Petition and Reconventional Demand." In her reconventional demand, the mother alleged that she moved about 500 miles closer to the exchange location in the parties' custody judgment. She contended that the father refused to communicate with her regarding the child; had the child vaccinated at a medical clinic in a different parish so she would not find out about it and the administration of the vaccines left a severe hematoma on the child; refused to honor the agreed upon exchange location; refused to coordinate with her for holidays; unnecessarily subjected the child to three hours of travel to an exchange she repeatedly told him that she could not make; refused or cut short daily phone calls allowed by the court; and is unable to co -parent. The mother argued that it is in the child' s best interest for her to be designated domiciliary parent, with reasonable custodial periods awarded to the father, and that a joint implementation plan with joint custody provisions and a holiday schedule be implemented. She further contended that it would be in the child' s best interest to reduce the number of physical exchanges per month. She requested that the exchange location be a midpoint between the parties' locations. The mother contended that she desired to obtain a passport for the child to travel, but the father refused to fill out the necessary documentation, and that he also refused to call the child by her legal name. Additionally, she requested that she be granted a right of first refusal when the father was not caring for the child; that the father be held in contempt for his intentional failure to comply with the court' s judgment regarding custody and child support; and that she be awarded attorney' s fees. The father filed an " Answer to Reconventional Demand" on June 25, 2025. The next day, on June 26, 2025, he filed a " Motion and Order to File Second Amending and Supplemental Petition." In addition to the allegations contained in his original rule and first supplemental and amending rule, the father alleged that the mother had relocated multiple times within two years; her nomadic lifestyle did not provide stability for the child; she had not maintained a consistent medical provider for the child; she was unable to maintain structure, continuity, and consistency; and she was unable to co -parent. On July 16 and 17, 2025, a bench trial was held on the father' s rule and the mother' s reconventional demand. On September 12, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment and joint custody implementation plan. The trial court awarded the parents E joint custody of the child, with the father designated as the domiciliary parent. The trial court ordered that the child was to primarily reside with the father, subject to custodial periods in favor of the mother; that each parent was granted the right to communicate with the child three times per week; that both parents were found to be in contempt of court for their willful failure to comply with the prior judgment; and that both parents were prohibited from having overnight guests, to whom they are not married or related, while the child is in their care. Additionally, the trial court set the exchange locations and implemented other guidelines and rules for the parties to follow. The trial court also signed reasons for Judgment on September 12, 2025. Further, on September 12, 2025, the trial court signed an amended judgment and joint custody implementation plan. The Judgment was amended to correct, clarify, and supplement the " Regular Custodial Periods" section, the " Christmas" section, the " Thanksgiving" section, and the " Summer Custodial Periods" section. On September 22, 2025, the mother filed a motion for new trial. She contended that both the September 12, 2025 judgment and the September 12, 2025 amended judgment contained substantive errors affecting custody and that the amended judgment was an absolute nullity. The mother asserted that a new trial was needed for the limited purpose of vacating the two prior judgments and having the trial court render one final, appealable judgment. On October 1, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment granting the mother' s motion for new trial and vacating the September 12, 2025 judgment and the September 12, 2025 amended judgment. On October 20, 2025, the trial court signed a judgment and joint custody implementation plan. The trial court awarded joint care, custody, and control of the child to both parents, with the father designated as the domiciliary parent. The trial court ordered that the child was to primarily reside with the father, subject to custodial periods in favor of the mother. The trial court ordered that the mother would receive custody of the child on alternate weekends from Friday to Sunday and I that the mother' s regular custodial periods were to take place in Louisiana. The trial court also established a custody schedule for holidays and implemented other guidelines and rules for the parties to follow. Additionally, the trial court granted each parent the right to communicate with the child by telephone or FaceTime three times a week and ordered the exchanges to take place in Covington, Louisiana or Metairie, Louisiana depending on the circumstances. The mother appeals, contending that the trial court erred in modifying custody because it did not have subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, the mother contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the relocation statutes and in rendering a custody judgment that is not in the child' s best interest. DISCUSSION Subject Matter Jurisdiction In her first assignment Of error, the mother contends that the trial court erred in modifying custody on and after November 27, 2023, without subject matter jurisdiction, as defined under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (" UCCJEA"') Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties, and to grant the reliefto which they are entitled. La. C. C.P. art. 1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C. C. P. art. 2. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties or waived; a judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. See La. C. C. P. art. 3; In re Guardianship of G.F.G., 2025- 0850 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 12/ 30/ 25), 2025 V& 3765090, 4 ( unpublished). The issue of subject matter jurisdiction addresses the court' s 7 authority to adjudicate the cause before it; the issue may be considered at any time, even by the court on its own motion, at any stage of an action. Id. A court' s power to grant relief is premised upon its subject matter jurisdiction over the case or controversy before it. In re Guardianship of G.F. G., 2025 WL 3765090 at * 4. A final judgment shall be annulled if it was rendered by a court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction. See La. C. C. P. art. 2002( A)(3). The UCCJEA, adopted by both Louisiana and Florida, governs jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes. See La. R.S. 13: 1813; Cochran v. Foreman, 2019- 0527 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 3/ 4/ 22), 341 So. 3d 625, 627; Fla. Stat. § 61. 501 ( 2025). A Louisiana court may have subject matter jurisdiction over child custody matters, but be required to decline that jurisdiction based on jurisdictional limitations imposed by the UCCJEA. Cochran, 341 So. 3d at 627. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is subject to a de novo review. Louisiana Environmental Action Network, Inc. v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, 2019- 1551 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 9/ 23/ 20), 314 So. 3d 841, 848. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 1813 governs initial child custody jurisdiction and provides, in pertinent part: A. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 13: 1816,[ 4] a court of this state has jurisdiction to make ars. initial child custody determination only if: 1) This state is the home state [5] of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding .... 2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction ... ; and a) The child and the child' s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence. 4 Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 1816 governs temporary emergency jurisdiction. s Under La. R.S. 13: 1802( 7)( a), " home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. La. R.S. 13: 1802( 7)( a). E b) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child' s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. B. Subsection A of this Section is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this state. C. Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is not necessary or sufficient to make a child custody determination. The mother alleges that at the time of the July 24, 2023 hearing and the August 23, 2023 judgment, she and the child had lived in Florida for four months. The mother contends that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine custody when it entered the initial stipulated judgment on August 23, 2023, because the child was born in Louisiana and had not lived in any state for more than six months. However, she argues that the July 22, 2024 judgment and the October 20, 2025 judgment are absolutely null because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the custody proceedings after she and the child resided in Florida for more than six consecutive months. The mother argues that the child and one parent, herself, had no significant connection with Louisiana after April 2023, and substantial evidence regarding the child' s care, protection, training, and personal relationships were no longer available in Louisiana at the time the court rendered the July 22, 2024 judgment and the October 20, 2025 judgment. Louisiana Revised Statutes 13: 1814 governs exclusive, continuing jurisdiction and provides: A. Except as otherwise provided in R.S. 13: 1816, a court of this state which has made a child custody determination consistent with R.S. 13: 1813 or 1815 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until: 1) A court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection Nvith this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child' s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or 0 2) A court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child' s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state. B. A court of this state which has made a child custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this Section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under R.S. 13: 1813. Herein, no court of this state made a judicial determination that the child, the father, or the mother lacked a significant connection with this state or that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child' s care, protection, training, and personal relationships. See La. R.S. 13: 1814( A)( 1). Further, neither a court of this state nor a court of another state has determined that the child, the father, or the mother do not presently reside in this state. See La. R.S. 13: 1814( A)(2). To divest a Louisiana court of its own exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, it plainly requires a judicial determination by a Louisiana court, which has not occurred herein. See La. R.S. 13: 1814( A). Therefore, we find that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, as defined under the UCCJEA. This assignment of error is without merit. Relocation Statutes In her second assignment of error, the mother contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the relocation statutes. She asserts that the trial court failed to recognize the proceeding as a request for relocation and consequently failed to consider the relocation factors of La. R.S. 9: 355. 14. The mother further asserts that the father placed relocation at issue in his rule when he contended that it was in the child' s best interest for East Feliciana Parish to be established as the principal residence of the child under La. R. S. 9: 355. 1. She contends that the father' s direct invocation of the relocation statutes in his pleading put relocation at issue and required the trial court to consider the relocation factors in its determination. 10 On the other hand, the father contends that, in his rule, he initially asked the trial court to establish East Feliciana Parish as the principal residence of the child as defined by La. R.S. 9: 955. 1. He further asserts that in response to his rule, the mother filed an exception of no cause of action and argued therein that the relocation statutes concern a proposed change in domicile for the child, and since no such proposal existed, he failed to state a cause of action. The father contends that after the mother filed her exception, he filed his first amending and supplemental petition, which removed his prior reference to the relocation statutes and replaced it with a request that the court designate him as the domiciliary parent of the child. Generally, the relocation of a child' s principal residence to a location out of state or in state is governed by Louisiana' s relocation statutes, La. R.S. 9: 355. 1- 9: 355. 19. La. R.S. 9: 355. 2. When the relocation of the child' s principal residence is contested, La. R.S. 9: 355. 10 requires that the relocating parent prove that the proposed relocation is: ( 1) made in good faith; and (2) in the best interest of the child. Thus, Louisiana' s relocation statutes retain the " best interest of the child" standard as the fundamental principle governing decisions made pursuant to its provisions. Bridges v. Bridges, 2020- 0300 ( La. App. V Cir. 11/ 10/ 20), 316 So. 3d 17, 24. We find that the father is correct in that his amended and supplemental petition removed his prior reference to the relocation statutes and replaced it with his request to be named domiciliary parent. See La. C.C. P. arts. 1151 and 1155. Further, even if the father had failed to amend and supplement his petition, we find that, as argued by the mother in her exception, the relocation statutes would not apply in this case. Here, the parents had joint care, custody, and control of the child, and no domiciliary parent had ever been established. The facts of this case are similar to those outlined in Beem v. Beem, 2020- 0897 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 4/ 20/ 21), 324 So. 3d 682. In Beem, the trial court' s initial judgment was a stipulated judgment that granted the parents joint and shared physical custody of their two children, but it named no domiciliary 11 parent. 324 So. 3d at 684- 85. Thereafter, each parent filed motions to be designated as the domiciliary parent. Id. at 685. After a hearing, the trial court named the father as the domiciliary parent, and the mother appealed. Id. In conducting its analysis, this court considered whether the party seeking modification of the stipulated judgment proved that there was a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the children since the original custody decree was entered and whether the proposed modification was in the best interest of the children. Beem, 324 So. 3d at 687- 88. While Beem does not involve one parent living in a state other than Louisiana, it does address the burden of proof for establishing a domiciliary parent. Therefore, even if the father had not amended and supplemented his petition, we find that the relocation statutes are not pertinent to the analysis in this case. This assignment of error is without merit. Best Interest of the Child In her third assignment of error, the mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in rendering a custody judgment and implementation order that was contrary to the child' s best interest. The mother contends that the evidence weighs in favor of her being designatLed as the domiciliary parent and establishing Florida as the child' s residence. Each child custody case must be viewed in light of its own particular set of facts and circumstances, with. the paramount goal of reaching a decision that is in the best interest of the child. See La. C. C. art. 131; Sharp v. Jordan, 2024- 0175 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 9/ 20/ 24), 405 So. 3d 657, 662, writ denied, 2024- 01288 ( La. 12/ 27/ 24), 397 So. 3d 1222. It is the child' s emotional, physical, material and social well-being and health that are the court' s very purpose in child custody cases; the court must protect the child from the real possibility that the parents are engaged in a bitter, 1St vengeful, and highly emotional conflict. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2023- 0087 (La. App. Cir. 6/ 2/ 23), 370 So. 3d 61, 71- 72. 12 The burden of proof applicable to a request to change legal or physical custody depends on whether the prior custody award was a considered decree. Sharp, 405 So. 3d at 662. A parent seeking modification of a considered decree bears the heavy burden of proving that a change of circumstances has occurred, such that the continuation of the present custody arrangement is so deleterious to the child as to justify a modification of the custody decree, or of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the harm likely caused by a change of environment is substantially outweighed by its advantages to the child. Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1200 ( La. 1986); Elliott v. Elliott, 2010- 0755 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 9/ 10/ 10), 49 So. 3d 407, 412, writ denied, 2010- 2260 ( La. 10/ 27/ 10), 48 So. 3d 1088. In contrast, a parent seeking modification of a non -considered decree need only prove that there has been a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child since the prior custody decree and that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Sharp, 405 So. 3d at. 662- 63. Here, the July 22, 2024 agreement reached between the parties concerning the child' s physical custody was a stipulated judgment. Thus, the parent seeking modification of the judgment needed to prove that there has been a change in circumstances materially affecting the welfare of the child since the prior custody decree and that the proposed modification is in the best interest of the child. Here, both parents are seeking modification. The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the best interest of the child given each unique set of circumstances. Sharp, 405 So. 3d at 663. The trial court' s determination on child custody matters is entitled to great weight, and its discretion will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Id. In most child custody cases, the trial court' s determination is based heavily on factual findings. It is well- settled that an appellate court cannot set aside a trial court' s findings of fact in the absence of manifest error or unless those findings are clearly 13 wrong. A court of appeal cannot simply substitute its own findings for that of the trial court. Id. Absent a showing of good cause, the court shall render a joint custody implementation order when joint custody is decreed. See La. R.S. 9: 335( A)( 1). The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. La. R.S. 9: 335( A)(2)( a). To the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the child, physical custody of the child should be shared equally. La. R.S. 9: 33 5( A)(2)( b). In a decree ofjoint custody, the court shall designate a domiciliary parent. La. R.S. 9: 335( B)( 1). Louisiana Civil Code article 134( A) directs courts to consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child, including: 1)The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children' s Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration. 2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child. 3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child. 4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs. 5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment. 6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes. 7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child. 8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any party. 9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody. 14 10) The home, school, and community history of the child. 11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a preference. 12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party, except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reckless, reasonable concerns for the child's safety or well-being while in the care of the other party. 13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties. 14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each party. The weight to be given to each factor is left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court is not bound to make a mechanical evaluation of or provide a literal articulation of all of the factors and is not required to specifically explain its weighing and balancing of the factors. Rather, the trial court should decide each case on its own facts and circumstances in light of Article 134 and other relevant factors. Leger v. Leger, 2022- 1113 ( La. App. Pt Cir. 3/ 13/ 23), 363 So. 3d 519, 529, writ denied, 2023- 00512 ( La. 6/ 26/ 23), 363 So. 3d 1231. In analyzing the first factor, the trial court found there was no danger or potential for the child to be abused by either parent. However, the trial court noted concerns with behavior exhibited by both parents. Specifically, the trial court expressed concern with the father having unsecured firearms; not securing the child' s car seat; allowing the child to be transported in an expired car seat; and playing on an Wad while driving the child, which included him watching a baseball game and typing. Additionally, the trial court expressed concern with the fact that the mother allowed the child to be on a boat without a lifejacket; posts photos of the child online; and allowed the child to be around the guests staying at her bed and breakfast. In considering the second factor, the trial court found that both parents have a tremendous amount of love and affection for the child and are equally bonded 15 to her. In analyzing the third factor, the trial court found that it did not weigh heavily whether the parents gave the child love, affection, and spiritual guidance and whether they continued the education and rearing of the child since the child was only two years old. The trial court noted that the mother enrolled the child in a Christian school and that the ffither brings the child to socialize with her cousins and other children. Turning to the fourth ffictor, the trial court stated that both parties have the capacity and disposition to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs. The court stated that the father owns a successful logging company and that the mother earns money from numerous sources. Additionally, the trial court found that both parents are involved in the child' s medical care and are responsible as far as taking her for medical treatment. For the fifth factor, the trial court found that the length of time that the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment weighed heavily in favor of the father. The trial court noted that the father can provide a stable environment and desires to maintain continuity. In contrast, the trial court stated that the mother resides in a rental property in Florida, although she owns a home in Louisiana. Next, in Analyzing the sixth factor, the trial court stated that the permanence, as a family unit, Of the existing or proposed custodial home weighed in favor of neither parent because neither parent is married. Turning to the seventh factor dealing with the moral fitness of each party insofar as it affects the welfare of the child, the trial court stated that it does not find that either party' s behavior warrants a ruling against them based on this factor. However, the trial court noted that the mother' s conduct on social media was concerning and the father' s remarks about the mother in front of the child were inappropriate. Next, for the eighth factor, the trial court determined that whether the parents had a history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity was not 16 applicable. In considering the ninth factor, the trial court found that there was no evidence presented at trial to indicate that either parent did not have the mental or physical capacity to care for the minor child or that they were in poor mental or physical health. Moreover, considering the tenth and eleventh factors, the trial court determined that the home, school, and community history of the child and the preference of the child were not applicable since the child is only two years old. In considering the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent, which is the twelfth factor, the trial court noted that it had concerns with the parents' anger with each other. The trial court stated that the father' s anger is evidenced by his repeated use of foul language and name calling directed at the mother, and the mother' s anger is evidenced by her testimony regarding the father' s failure to visit the child and the fact that she drives most of the way for exchanges. The court found that this factor weighed in & vor of the father, particularly due to the mother' s testimony that the trial court was taking her child from her for no reason and the fact that the mother left Louisiana to live in Florida. For the thirteenth factor, the trial court found that the distance between the residences of the parents weighed in favor of the father. Last, in analyzing the fourteenth factor, the court determined that the responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each parent did not weigh heavily in favor of either parent. The trial court found that both parents have equally cared for the child, except for the four-month time period when the mother solely had the child. Having carefully reviewed the record before us and the trial court' s very thorough reasons for judgment, it is evident that the trial court sufficiently considered all relevant factor's in making its determination herein. Accordingly, while the record shows that the mother and the father are both capable and 17 responsible parents of the child, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the parties joint custody with the father designated as domiciliary parent. CONCLUSION For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court' s October 20, 2025 judgment is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Nicole Ruth Spencer. K