Duane Cox v. Cmsnr. IRS
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date FiledOctober 30, 2026
Docket25-1271
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
____________
No. 25-1271 September Term, 2026
USTC-5488-23W
Filed On: October 30, 2026
Duane Morley Cox,
Appellant
v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Appellee
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT
BEFORE: Pillard, Wilkins, and Garcia, Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
This appeal was considered on the record from the United States Tax Court and
on the briefs filed by the parties and the supplements to appellant’s reply brief. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34(j). Upon consideration of the foregoing and
the motion for default judgment and supplement thereto, it is
ORDERED that the motion for default judgment be denied. Appellant has not
shown he is entitled to the requested relief. It is
FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Tax Court’s orders filed
June 18, 2025, and October 20, 2025, be affirmed. Appellant has shown no error in the
Tax Court’s conclusions that (1) the proceeds in dispute did not exceed $2 million, and
(2) the administrative record does not support a conclusion that the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) proceeded in an action against a taxpayer based on information
supplied by appellant. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623(b)(1), (5); Lissack v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 125 F.4th 245, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[A]n administrative action ‘proceeds
based on’ a whistleblower’s information when that information has substantially
contributed to the IRS’s administrative action and its ultimate recovery.”). Appellant
argues that the IRS should have considered his allegations about criminal activity and
about tax years other than the ones for which the IRS opened an investigation.
However, the Tax Court is not authorized to direct the IRS to proceed with an action or
to collect more proceeds. Cohen v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 550 F. App’x 10, 11
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Luu v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, No. 23-1149, 2024
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
____________
No. 25-1271 September Term, 2026
WL 959876, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2024) (per curiam). And appellant has not shown
that his drug-related criminal allegations were relevant to the action against the target
taxpayers, which was based on inventory issues. Additionally, appellant has not
pointed to evidence casting doubt on the examiner’s explanation that the IRS’s action
was based on its receipt and independent assessment of the target corporation’s
amended tax returns, rather than any information appellant provided about inventory
issues.
Appellant also has not shown that the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying
his motions seeking discovery and supplementation of the record. See Shands v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 111 F.4th 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (Tax Court’s denial of
discovery motions is reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1178
(2025); Est. of Insinga by Gilmore v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 149 F.4th 709, 718
(D.C. Cir. 2025) (same, for denial of motion to supplement record). Because the Tax
Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting appellant’s arguments about extra-record
evidence, appellant has not shown any error in the denial of his motion to remand for
the Whistleblower Office to reconsider his claim in light of such evidence. Finally,
appellant has not shown that the Tax Court abused its discretion in denying
reconsideration. See Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 749 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(denial of reconsideration motion is typically reviewed for abuse of discretion); see also
26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (courts of appeals review Tax Court decisions “in the same
manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried
without a jury”).
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk
is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution
of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App.
P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
Per Curiam
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