Full Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA 30r" r ffl FIRST CIRCUIT 2026 CA 0464 VERSUS Judgment Rendered. - Appealed from the 21st Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Livingston State of Louisiana Case No. 148865, Div. E The Honorable Brenda Bedsole Ricks, Judge Presiding Wyman E. Bankston Counsel for Defendants/ Appellants Livingston, Louisiana Marshall Parker and Mark Parker Sherman Q. Mack Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Matthew H. Todd Mona Matherne Albany, Louisiana BEFORE® THE RIOT, GREENE, AND EDWARDS, JJ. q 1--ee 94'rK -5 2 THERIOT, J. In this property dispute, the defendants appeal a trial court judgment which held that a section of a rural road was private property and granted their neighbor a permanent injunction against them, enjoining the defendants from using and traveling on her property and from harassing her. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm. Legion Road is a rural :road that connects to Highway 16 in Livingston Parish. It was a gravel road until it was asphalted in 2001. Its first 1, 000 feet lie within the corporate limits of French Settlement, and the parties stipulated that up to the first 1, 000 feet, it is a public road. Plaintiff/Appellee Mona Matherne (" Mona") is a seventy -three- year- old woman who owns immovable property bearing the municipal address 18400 Legion Road in French Settlement, which she purchased in a cash sale on April 6, 2007 from her sister, Sarah Danette Aydell Carrier (" Danette").' Her property is situated along the eastern side of Legion Road, with the western border at the centerline of Legion Road. Danette also owned property across Legion Road from Mona, which Danette sold to her and Mona' s brother and sister-in-law, Olin and Heidi Matherne, who have since passed; today Mona' s grandson, Adrian Holden Holden"), owns the land. The eastern boundary of Holden' s property lies at the centerline of Legion Road. Mona' s land lies past the front 1, 000 feet of Legion Road, outside the corporate limits of French Settlement. Defendants/ Appellants Mark Parker (" Mark") and Marshall Parker Marshall"), father and son, are Mona' s neighbors. Mark owns immovable property situated across from Mona' s property, adjacent to Holden' s property. 1 Although Mona bought the property in 2007, Mona testified at the 2016 preliminary injunction hearing that she moved to Legion Road as a child and has lived there for most of her life. Her sister Danette also testified that their family owned this land and that they had lived on Legion Road their whole lives. K Marshall owns immovable property located at 18559 Aydell Lane in French Settlement, which was donated to him by Mark and other members of the Parker family on February 13, 2002. Marshall' s plot lies entirely inside of Mark' s land, close to the end of Legion Road. In 2002, Marshall spoke with Olin Matherne and negotiated an informal servitude of passage to access Legion Road. Marshall built a house on the land and a driveway to access Legion Road, and in August 2005, he obtained a " Thirty -Foot Private Servitude of Access" from Heidi Matherne, which granted him a servitude of passage from his property to the western boundary of Legion Road. Marshall used that driveway and Legion Road to access his property until June 2015, and no one ever told him that he was not allowed to use Legion 11XITIN On June 19, 2015, Mona filed a petition for permanent injunction and for damages against Mark and Marshall (" the Parkers"), seeking to enjoin the Parkers from using and traveling on Legion Road past the front 1, 000 feet, from using or traveling on her property, and from harassing her. In her petition, Mona alleged that Legion Road is a rural private roadway that is not owned or maintained by the Village of French Settlement, nor by Livingston Parish. She asserted that the Parkers, have access to the public road Aydell Lane, and " have absolutely no need whatsoever to use, travel, and enter upon the private roadway, Legion Road." Mona alleged that the Parkers trespassed onto the portion of Legion Road that is on her property and own dogs that trespass onto her property. Additionally, she alleged that Mark repeatedly threatened and stalked her, including two occasions where he brandished a firearm at her in May and July 2014. Mona also alleged that on October 9 and November 6, 2014, Mark stalked and threateningly followed her to Wal-Mart. Mona prayed for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the Parkers' use of the disputed portion of Legion Road and from abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening her. 3 The Parkers filed an answer on November 24, 2015, wherein they denied that Mona owned Legion Road and asserted three alternative grounds under which they contend the public has a right to use the roadway. The trial court held a preliminary injunction hearing on February 29 and March 1, 2016. At the hearing, the Parkers argued that Mona does not own Legion Road and that the public has gained a servitude to use Legion Road through tacit dedication under Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a) due to Livingston Parish' s continued maintenance of the road. At the close of arguments, the trial court permitted the parties to submit the matter on affidavits, and both parties submitted post -hearing memoranda. The trial court granted Mona' s request for injunctive relief on May 19, 2016. In the judgment, the trial court faund that the work performed by Livingston Parish on Legion Road was sparse and random in nature and that it was not enough to reasonably conclude that Mona had actual or constructive knowledge that the Parish' s maintenance work was sufficient to create a public servitude. The Parkers sought a supervisory writ from this Court. This Court granted the writ application on October 18, 2016; it found that the judgment failed to describe the act or acts being enjoined in reasonable detail, as well as whether the injunction was preliminary or permanent, and remanded the matter to the trial court for clarification. On December 8, 2016, the trial court issued a clarified ruling granting Mona' s request for a preliminary injunction, which also enjoined the Parkers from using property owned by Mona and from " abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening" her. It also prohibited the Parkers from going within one hundred yards of Mona' s residence and place of employment. The Parkers then moved for an appeal on January 27, 2017, which was granted by the trial court. This Court dismissed the appeal because it was untimely pursuant to Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3612( C). 0 A bench trial on the mefits of Mona' s request for a permanent injunction was held on September 6, 2024. The trial court rendered a judgment and written reasons granting Mona' s request for a permanent injunction on December 30, 2024. It found that the portion of Legion Road past the first 1, 000 feet is private property and not a public roadway. The permanent injunction enjoins the defendants from using and accessing Legion Road past the first 1, 000 feet; from abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening Mona; and from going within one hundred yards of Mona' s residents and employment. However, the judgment was not signed until August 13, 2025. On September 19, 2025, the Parkers filed a motion for devolutive appeal. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR The Parkers listed two assignments of error. They aver that ( 1) the trial court erred in finding that any part of the asphalted portion of Legion Road is a private road not subject to public use, and that (2) the trial court erred in finding that Mona met the required burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to the issuance of injunctive relief. DISCUSSION Tacit Dedication In their first assignment of error, the Parkers argue that the trial court erred in finding that the disputed portion of Legion Road was private and not subject to public use. The Parkers argue that Legion Road was tacitly dedicated to Livingston Parish under Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a). They assert that the entirety of Legion Road was asphalted by Livingston Parish in 2001 and that the Parish maintained and repaired the road both when it was a gravel road and after the asphalting. Mona argues that the Parkers failed to meet their burden under Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a) because Livingston Parish' s maintenance of 5 Legion Road was merely sparse and sporadic. She asserts that the maintenance or records did not show that the Parish performed any road repair, paving, structural maintenance past the front portion of Legion Road, and these activities did not extend to the disputed section of the road. Furthermore, Mona asserts that she privately funded paving the back part of Legion Road in 2002. She further argues that maintenance of the road as a whole consisted predominantly of mowing. She also points out that Livingston Parish made no public claim to Legion Road in these proceedings. The dedication of property for public use may be accomplished in four ways: statutory dedication, formal dedication, implied dedication, and tacit dedication." Himel v. Bourque, 2014- 1811 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 11/ 15), 185 So3d 42, 45. See also Stonegate Homeowners Civic Assn v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge, 2001- 2883 ( La. App. I Cir. 12/ 20/ 02), 836 So. 2d 440, 443, writ denied, 2003- 0786 ( La. 5/ 9/ 03), 843 So. 2d 407; Melancon v. Giglio, 96- 2507 ( La. App. I Cir. 3/ 13/ 98), 712 So. 2d 535, 539. Tacit dedication of a road pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a) creates a predial servitude of passage in favor of the public, with ownership of the land remaining with the adjoining landowner. See Pierce v. - I Cir. 10/ 31/ 16), 207 So. 3d 1069, 1075. See also McCoy, 2016- 0243 ( La. A pp. A.N. Yiannopoulos, 4 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Predial Servitudes § 11: 22 ( 4th ed. 2016) (" The public acquires by virtue of tacit dedication a servitude of passage, as well as a servitude of public utility.... [ O] wnership of the land on which the road or street is built is not conveyed to the public; therefore, the land becomes a private thing subject to public use.") ( Footnotes omitted). The statute' s purpose is protection of the public fisc, guarding against the use of public monies for the benefit of private landowners. Mizell v. Willis, 2020- 0915 ( La. App. I Cir. on 7/ 29/ 21), 329 So. 3d 302, 307, it)rit denied, 2021- 01245 ( La. 12/ 7/ 21), 328 So. 3d 422 ( citing Moret v. Williams, 582 So.2d 975, 977 ( La. App. I Cir. 1991)). Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a) provides: All roads and streets in this state which have been or hereafter are kept up, maintained, or worked for a period of three years by the authority of a parish governing authority within its parish, or by the authority of a municipal governing authority within its municipality, shall be public roads or streets, as the case may be, if there is actual or constructive knowledge of such work by adjoining landowners exercising reasonable concern over their property. Therefore, tacit dedication has a two- pronged burden of proof. a party must prove that ( 1) a road was maintained by a parish or municipal governing authority for at least three years, and ( 2) the adjoining landowners had actual or constructive knowledge of that maintenance. See La. R.S. 48: 491( B)( 1)( a); Mizell, 329 So. 3d at 9111YA As to the first requirement, sufficient public maintenance for three years, an occasional " brushing up" or " token maintenance" of private property is not sufficient to invoke the provisions of La. R.S. 48: 491( B)( 1)( a) and establish a tacit dedication of a servitude of passage. Mizell, 329 So. 3d at 307 ( citing IP Timberlands Operating Co. v. De Sot© Parish Police Jury, 552 So.2d 605, 607 La. App. 2 Cir. 1989); Guzzardo v. Campo, 486 So. 2d 912, 914 ( La. App. I Cir. 1986), writ denied, 488 So. 2d 1026 ( La. 1986)). As for the statute' s second requirement, "[ a] tacit dedication is one which arises from silence, inactivity— one arising without express contract" or agreement." Goree v. Midstates it Corp., 205 La. 988, 1003, 18 So. 2d 591, 596 ( La. 1944). Therefore, it does not require intent of the landowner to dedicate the property when there has been sufficient maintenance without protest. Mizell, 329 So. 3d at 307 ( citing Himel, 185 So. 3d at 47). When the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge of maintenance by the governing body, acquiescence in the maintenance can be inferred from the absence of protest by the landowner. Moret, 582 So.2d at 977 ( citing Vaughn v. 7 Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195., 1198 ( La. App. 2 Cir. 1977), writ denied, 350 So. 2d 896 ( La. 1977)). The issue of whether public maintenance is sufficient to support a tacit dedication is an issue of fact that falls squarely within the purview of the trial and thus the " manifest error" or " standard of review court, clearly wrong" applies. Mizell, 329 So. 3d at 307. Where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. Id. (citing Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 ( La. 1989)). Under the manifest error standard of review, a reviewing court may not merely decide if it would have found the facts of the case differently. Hayes Fund for First United Methodist Church of Welsh, LLC v. Kerr-McGee Rocky Mountain, LLC, 2014- 2592 ( La. 12/ 8/ 15), 193 So. 3d 1110, 1115. Rather, this court employs a two-part test for the review of a factfinder' s determinations. See Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development, 617 So. 2d 880, 882 ( La. 1993), To reverse a trial court' s factual conclusions, the appellate court must satisfy a two- step process based on the record as a whole: there must be no reasonable factual basis for the trial court' s conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2018- 1510 ( La. App. I Cir. 5/ 31/ 19), 277 So. 3d 1193, 1196. This test requires a reviewing court to review the record in its entirety to determine whether the trial court' s finding was manifestly erroneous. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. In this case, the trial court found that the Parkers failed to carry their burden of proving that Legion Road was tacitly dedicated under Louisiana Revised Statutes 48: 491( B)( 1)( a). Having examined the entirety of the record, including the evidence and testimony from the 2024 trial, we find that the trial court had a reasonable factual basis to do so. M At trial, the Parkers introduced into evidence the affidavit and testimony of Sam Digirolamo, who served a:;15 Director of the Livingston Parish Department of Public Works from 2012 to 2024. In his affidavit and during his testimony at the September 6, 2024 trial, Digirolamo attested that Legion Road was public and maintained by Livingston Parish. He stated that it was a gravel road until 2001, when the Village of French Settlement asked Livingston Parish to use capital outlay funds to pave the entire length of Legion Road, including the disputed portion, which lies outside the Village' s corporate limits. Attached to the affidavit was a document listing the cost estimates and actual construction costs of roads in Livingston Parish, and it listed Legion Road as having an estimated cost of 30, 000 to asphalt and an actual, cost of $14, 513. At trial, Digirolamo testified that there was no record that any private funds were contributed to asphalting Legion 611714 Digirolamo further attested in his affidavit that Livingston Parish has regularly maintained the entirety of Legion Road since 2001, including " mowing and dressing ditches, removing trash along the road, and repair and patching of the asphalt road surface." The Parkers introduced into evidence a list of maintenance totals for Legion Road from 2006 to 2015, which showed that Livingston Parish had mowed it twelve times over the years, dressed ditches once in March 2007, removed trash once in May 2012, and maintained the road once in August 2014. However, on cross examination at trial, Digirolamo admitted that the maintenance log merely listed cost estimates for work proposed to be done, not work that was actually done. He also admitted that it could be possible that Livingston Parish does not maintain Legion Road past the first 1, 000 feet. At the 2024 trial, Marshall testified that he had seen Livingston Parish workers repairing cracks on the disputed portion of Legion Road. The Parkers introduced into evidence a photo that Marshall took around 2020 or 2021 of M several men performing what Marshall speculated was some kind of maintenance on Legion Road. Mona testified that the men had an order to come and fill cracks in and that when she saw the workers, she called Livingston Parish and her attorney to have them removed ftom her part of Legion Road. At trial, Mona introduced into evidence a letter dated April 7, 2015, and signed by Huey Comeaux, the Assistant Director of the Livingston Parish Department of Public Works who worked under Digirolamo in 2015. Comeaux stated that Legion Road is not a parish -owned road. Mona also introduced a letter dated April 8, 2015, from Toni 13. Guitrau, then the Mayor of the Village of French Settlement, which stated that the Village does not own or maintain Legion Road past the first 1, 000 feet. Current mayor Haley Taylor testified at the September 6, 2024 trial that the Village of French Settlement still does not own or maintain the disputed portion of Legion Road. Mona testified at trial that Livingston Parish did not asphalt the disputed portion of Legion Road. Rather, she asserted that the Parish only planned to asphalt the first 1, 000 feet of the road within the limits of the Village of French Settlement. Mona testified that. in 2001, a neighbor and then -councilman, Bobby Bowman (" Bowman"), approached her and her brother Olin, asking if they wanted the road asphalted up to their property. Mona and her significant other of 35 years, Larry Shriver (" Shriver"), both testified that Mona and Olin paid $ 1, 500 to have the disputed portion of Legion Road asphalted and that she continues to own it. On cross- examination at trial, Mona stated Bowman gave her and Olin a receipt for the asphalting work, but the receipt was lost in the flood of 2016. She acknowledged that there is no documentation from Livingston Parish reflecting that she contributed money to asphalt a portion of Legion Road. Bowman died in 2002, so his testimony is unavailable to this Court. Mona and Shriver both recalled 10 that the asphalt for all of Legion Road, including the disputed portion, was laid as part of one continuous job. Additionally, Mona presented evidence that Livingston Parish does not maintain the disputed portion of` Legion Road. Mona and Shriver both testified that Mona has mowed the grass on either side of the road for over 40 years and continues to do so. Mona' s sister Danette testified that prior to their father' s death in 1976, their father maintained the road and cut the grass. Danette also testified that the school bus does not pick up any children who live on the road, and they must walk to its intersection with Highway 16 to get on the bus. Both parties in this matter presented conflicting evidence to the trial court. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. See Jones v. Bravata, 2018- 0837 La. App. I Cir. 5/ 9/ 19), 280 So. 3d 226, 233, writ denied, 2019- 01850 ( La. 2/ 26/ 20), 294 So. 3d 477. Based on our review of the record, we likewise cannot conclude that the trial court' s view of the evidence, finding that Legion Road was not tacitly dedicated to Livingston Parish, was manifestly erroneous. This assignment of error lacks merit. Permanent Injunction In their second assignment of error, the Parkers assert that the trial court erred in finding that Mona was entitled to injunctive relief. They argue that Mona failed to meet her burden of proof for a permanent injunction under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3 601 because she failed to offer evidence sufficient to demonstrate harassment by them or that she would suffer irreparable harm if her request for injunctive relief was denied. Mona argues that the evidence at trial proved " a sustained pattern of threatening and intimidating conduct that the District Court, sitting as the trier of 11 F--ct, was entitled to credit and upon which it was entitled to find a reasonable basis for irreparable harm." Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3601 provides, in pertinent part, that "[ a] n injunction shall be ' Issued in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant[.]" Traditionally, an injunction has been held to be a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy which should only issue where the petitioner is threatened with irreparable harm and has no adequate remedy at law. See Blackwood v. Reeves, 2023- 0504, 2023- 0505, 2023- 0506, 2023- 0507 ( La. App. I Cir. 2/ 29/ 24), 387 So. 3d 620, 630 ( citing Kruger v. Garden Dist. Assn, 2000- 1135 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 1/ 17/ 01), 779 So.2d 986, 991, writ denied, 2001- 0733 ( La. 5/ 4/ 01), 791 So. 2d 658). Irreparable harm means the loss cannot be adequately compensated through money damages or measured by a pecuniary standard. See Davenport v. Chew, 2023- 0036 ( La. App. I Cir. 9/ 15/ 23), 375 So. 3d 973, 976 ( citing Concerned Citizens for Proper Planning, LLC v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2004- 0270, 2004- 0249 ( La. App. I Cir. 3/ 24/ 05), 906 So. 2d 660, 664). However, a petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief without the requisite showing of irreparable harm when the conduct sought to be restrained is unconstitutional or unlawful, i.e., when the conduct sought to be enjoined constitutes a direct violation of a prohibitory law and/ or a violation of a constitutional right. Id. (citing Concerned Citizens, 906 So. 2d at 664). Courts are generally reluctant to issue an injunction to restrain torts such as defamation or harassment. See Blackwood, 387 So.3d at 626 ( citing Lassalle v. Daniels, 96-0176 La. App. I Cir. 5/ 10/ 96), 673 So. 2d 704, 709, writ denied, 96- 1463 ( La. 9/ 20/ 96), 679 So. 2d 435, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1117, 117 S. Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 848 1997)). The request for a permanent injunction in an ordinary proceeding can only be granted after a trial on the merits, where the burden of proof must be founded on 12 a preponderance of the evidence, rather than a prima facie showing. See Blackwood, 387 So. 3d at 626 ( citing Hughes v. Muckelroy, 97- 0618 ( La. App. I Cir. 9/ 23/ 97), 700 So. 2d 995., 998). " Appellate courts review a trial court' s granting of a permanent injunction utilizing the manifest error standard." Id. at 630 citing Mary Moe, L.L.C. v. Louisiana Bd. of Ethics, 2003- 2220 ( La. 4/ 14/ 04), 875 So. 2d 22, 29). Again, to reverse a trial court' s factual conclusions, the appellate court must find that there is no reasonable factual basis for the trial court' s conclusion, and the finding must be clearly wrong. Walton, 277 So. 3d at 1196. Mona testified at trial that Mark harassed her on a number of occasions. She stated that Mark would ride down Legion Road on his ATV with a firearm in his front basket or on his lap. Mona testified that this made her feel scared and intimidated. She also testified that in August 2014, Mark trespassed onto her property by riding down Legion Road in his truck and waiting at a nearby building for " quite a while[.]" Mona further testified that the Parkers both followed her, and specifically that Marshall Parker once followed her to Wal- Mart. Additionally, she testified that a few years before trial, Mark tried to run her off the road in a no - passing zone in Gonzales on the way to Tureau' s Grocery. Mona said that she made an incident report in Ascension Parish. Mona testified that the Parkers discharged firearms near her property " all the time." She further testified that when she recently went to her mailbox, Mark began doing wheelies and waving his gun, which made Mona feel scared and intimidated. Mona testified that for the most part, the preliminary injunction solved the problems she had with the Parkers, except for a few recent incidents. On cross examination, Mona acknowledged that Mark never pointed the gun at her, just held it in his lap or hands. She also admitted that on all of the occasions 13 when Mark rode his ATV to the fence line where her property meets his, he always stayed on his side of the fence. At the September 6, 2024 trial, Marshall testified that he has never harassed Mona. Since the preliminary injunction was granted in 2016, Marshall has not used Legion Road; instead, he has accessed his property by travelling on Aydell Lane to Mark' s land and using an old tractor path through a half mile long pasture. At trial, Mark testified that he never harassed Mona or her grandson Holden. Mark denied intending to harass Mona with a firearm. He testified that he sometimes does ride an ATV around his property with a gun in his lap. Mark stated that until the 2016 flood, he owned cattle on his land, would check the fences and cattle daily, and always brought some kind of firearm with him to protect the cattle and chickens from coyotes and Boxes. Mark denied attempting to run Mona off the road on the way to Tureau' s Grocery and doing wheelies on his ATV near her home. He also denied following Mona to Wal-Mart in Gonzales; Mark stated that he frequented that Wal- Mart location for his own shopping and banking. Both parties in this matter presented conflicting evidence to the trial court. Again, where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder' s choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous. See Jones, 280 So.3d at 233. Considering the evidence in the record, we find that the trial court' s findings are reasonably supported by the record, and we cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong in finding that Mona was entitled to permanent injunctive relief against the Parkers. This assignment of error also lacks merit. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the trial court' s August 13, 2025 judgment finding that Legion Road is private property past the first 1, 000 feet. We also affirm the trial court' s granting of a permanent injunction against Mark and Marshall Parker, enjoining them from using or accessing Legion Road past the first 14 1, 000 feet and prohibiting them from abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening Mona Matherne, and from going within 100 yards of her residence and employment. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Mark and Marshall Parker. AFFIRMED. 15 STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT W, 014&" 1.,. M aA ' 4 1J GREENE, I,, agreeing in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority's decision to affirm the portion of the judgment that finds Legion Road is private property past the first 10, 000 feet. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion to the extent it affirms the judgment granting a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from, inter alia, " abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening plaintiff." An applicant must show that irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant before an injunction may be issued. See La. C. C. P. art. 3601. See also Blackwood v. Reeves, 2023- 0504 La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 29/ 24), 387 So -A 620, 626. Traditionally, an injunction has been held to be a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy which should only issue where the petitioner is threatened with irreparable harm and has no adequate remedy at law. Id. at 630. Courts are generally reluctant to issue an injunction to restrain torts such as defamation or harassment. 161., s:, it 626. Appellate courts review a trial court's granting of a permanent injunction utilizing the manifest error standard. Id. I do not find that the petitioner satisfied her burden of proving that she was entitled to permanent injunctive relief against the defendants, particularly as it relates to the injunction against " abusing, harassing, stalking, following, or threatening" her, and I find that the trial court was clearly wrong in finding otherwise.