Bethea v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket25-2605
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
25-2605
Wilds-Bethea v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand twenty-six.
PRESENT:
REENA RAGGI,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
PETER WILDS-BETHEA, *
Plaintiff-Appellant,
ELSA GULINO, MAYLING RALPH,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 25-2605
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: RACHEL V. STEVENS (Joshua S. Sohn, on the
brief), Crowell & Moring LLP, New York,
NY.
For Defendant-Appellee: SHANE MAGNETTI (Richard Dearing,
Claude S. Platton, on the brief), for Steven
Banks, Corporation Counsel of the City of
New York, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Kimba M. Wood, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the September 18, 2025 judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
This appeal marks the latest installment in a thirty-year-old class action
brought by African-American and Latino public school teachers against the New
York City Board of Education (the “BOE”). 1 In 2012, the district court granted
judgment to the class as to liability on their claim that a BOE certification test had
1 Although “[t]he New York City Board of Education has been replaced by the Department of
Education, . . . we will continue to use the original party’s name, as do the parties to this
litigation.” United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 73 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011).
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a racially disparate impact in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Since then, the district court has issued individual judgments with respect to
approximately 4,700 current and former teachers who failed the exam. In this
appeal, the only issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in granting
Peter Wilds-Bethea, a named plaintiff and class representative, a $350,000
incentive award, which he contends is unreasonably low. We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to
which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
In successful class actions, named plaintiffs and class representatives may
receive “fair and appropriate incentive awards” to “encourage [prospective] class
representatives to participate in class action lawsuits.” 2 Moses v. N.Y. Times Co., 79
F.4th 235, 253 (2d Cir. 2023). Although we have “articulated no standard by which
district courts can consider the grant of [incentive] awards,” district courts
“generally rel[y] upon” the following four factors in calculating these awards:
“(1) the existence of special circumstances including the personal risk (if any)
incurred by the plaintiff[] in becoming and continuing as a litigant, (2) the time
2The source of authority for granting incentive awards where, as here, there is no common
settlement fund is unclear. See 5 Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 17:4 (6th ed. 2025);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). Because the BOE does not contest the district court’s authority
to grant an incentive award here, we do not pursue this issue further.
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and effort expended by that plaintiff in assisting in the prosecution of the litigation
or in bringing to bear added value (e.g., factual expertise), (3) any other burdens
sustained by that plaintiff and, of course, (4) the ultimate recovery.” Fikes
Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 62 F.4th 704, 721 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). We review a district court’s
calculation of an incentive award for abuse of discretion, reversing only if the
“decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or cannot
be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Moses, 79 F.4th at 241–42
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court, after receiving a detailed report from Special Master
John S. Siffert explaining why a $350,000 incentive award was appropriate in this
case, itself carefully considered the relevant Fikes Wholesale factors before deciding
on the proper incentive award. For starters, the district court weighed the personal
risk incurred by Wilds-Bethea in becoming and continuing as a litigant in this
action. The district court expressly recognized that Wilds-Bethea “faced notable
personal and professional risks by becoming a named plaintiff and class
representative.” Sp. App’x at 4. In particular, the district court noted Wilds-
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Bethea’s concern at the beginning of this litigation that his involvement “would
impact his ability to secure future employment.” Id.
The district court also thoughtfully considered Wilds-Bethea’s contributions
to this lengthy and complicated litigation, emphasizing that he deserved a large
incentive award because he “expended significant time and effort” during the
liability phase. Id. This included sitting for two depositions, attending trial,
meeting with class counsel, and communicating with class members. Id. The
district court observed that Wilds-Bethea logged “235.5 hours” of work toward the
class action “as of April 2021.” 3 Id. at 4–5. But even beyond the hours Wilds-
Bethea has dedicated to this action, the district court also noted the additional
burdens associated with this decades-old litigation. See id. at 4 (“Peter Wilds-
Bethea has been involved in this class action for close to thirty years, serving as a
class representative for more than twenty-three years, and as the sole class
representative for the remedial phase of this action.”).
Finally, given that the district court chose to grant Wilds-Bethea the highest
incentive award ever bestowed on a class representative in the Southern District
of New York, see id. at 5, there can be no doubt that the district court understood
3Although Wilds-Bethea asserts that his time records are incomplete, he provided the district
court with no estimate of any additional hours he dedicated to this class action.
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the remarkable recovery achieved in this action. As Wilds-Bethea himself
observes, this class action has resulted in individual damages awards for
approximately 4,700 plaintiffs totaling over $2 billion. In light of that impressive
outcome, the district court understandably chose to grant Wilds-Bethea a
correspondingly large incentive award of $350,000.
Wilds-Bethea, however, regards this record-setting award as woefully
inadequate. He instead seeks an award many multiples higher: $2.9 million. Id.
at 4. Wilds-Bethea offers two principal arguments to support this enormous and
unprecedented demand. Neither is persuasive.
First, Wilds-Bethea asserts that he deserves an additional $2,550,000 because
his contributions to the case dwarfed those of the other two named plaintiffs – Elsa
Gulino and Dianne Nia Greene – who each received incentive awards of $272,996.
But Gulino (who served as a named plaintiff for nearly six years and class
representative for nearly two years) and Greene (who served as a named plaintiff
for about four years) participated in this litigation at its early stages, when the risks
of associating with the case were high. Indeed, the risks to Gulino and Greene
may have been greater than those faced by Wilds-Bethea because just two months
after the complaint was filed, Wilds-Bethea gave up his substitute teaching
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position and was hired by the BOE as a guidance counselor – a position he held
for twenty years until his retirement.
Wilds-Bethea also makes much of the fact that, unlike Gulino and Greene,
he has been involved in this case for the duration of the litigation, which has now
spanned thirty years. That is undoubtedly true. But the past ten years of this
action have focused on the individualized damages determinations for more than
4,700 plaintiffs – a process that did not involve Wilds-Bethea. Moreover, the
district court did award a higher incentive fee to Wilds-Bethea in light of his more
significant contributions to the litigation. And while Wilds-Bethea dismisses the
$77,004 difference between his award and those of Gulino and Greene as paltry,
his award is nearly thirty percent higher than those of the only other incentive
award recipients in this case.
Second, Wilds-Bethea asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
awarding him “a mere 0.0175% of the ultimate $2 billion recovery,” which he
maintains is “inconsistent with existing caselaw” because it “fail[s] to consider the
ultimate aggregate recovery of the class.” Wilds-Bethea Br. at 17–18, 20. But this
approach confuses class action incentive awards with awards for whistleblowers
and qui tam plaintiffs, the latter of whom are, by statute, “entitled to receive a
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portion of the amount recovered” by the government for frauds identified by the
whistleblower. United States v. L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, Inc., 921 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
2019). While qui tam bounties serve “[t]o incentivize private persons to uncover,
report, and prosecute [civil fraud] claims for the benefit of the United States,” id.,
incentive awards for class action plaintiffs serve a very different and far more
modest purpose – namely, to “encourage [prospective litigants] to participate in
class action lawsuits” in the future, Moses, 79 F.4th at 253.
Wilds-Bethea ultimately contends that the incentive award in this case – the
largest ever granted in the Southern District of New York– would “chill those who
might otherwise assume the burden of pursuing justice.” Wilds-Bethea Br. at 3. It
is hard to imagine how that could possibly be true, and Wilds-Bethea has certainly
offered no evidence to suggest that this bold statement is anything more than
hyperbole.
In sum, the district court carefully considered all the relevant factors before
determining that the record-setting award of $350,000 “rewards [Wilds-Bethea] for
the work he performed on the class’s behalf [but] is no more than necessary to
incentivize class representatives to perform such work in future cases.” Sp. App’x
at 5. Although Wilds-Bethea may ultimately disagree with the district court’s
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assessment of these factors, this is precisely the sort of weighing that is entrusted
to the discretion of the district court. On this record, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse that discretion in issuing Wilds-Bethea a $350,000 incentive
award.
* * *
We have considered Wilds-Bethea’s remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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