Full Opinion

25-2605 Wilds-Bethea v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ PETER WILDS-BETHEA, * Plaintiff-Appellant, ELSA GULINO, MAYLING RALPH, Plaintiffs, v. No. 25-2605 * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee. _____________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: RACHEL V. STEVENS (Joshua S. Sohn, on the brief), Crowell & Moring LLP, New York, NY. For Defendant-Appellee: SHANE MAGNETTI (Richard Dearing, Claude S. Platton, on the brief), for Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Kimba M. Wood, Judge). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the September 18, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. This appeal marks the latest installment in a thirty-year-old class action brought by African-American and Latino public school teachers against the New York City Board of Education (the “BOE”). 1 In 2012, the district court granted judgment to the class as to liability on their claim that a BOE certification test had 1 Although “[t]he New York City Board of Education has been replaced by the Department of Education, . . . we will continue to use the original party’s name, as do the parties to this litigation.” United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 73 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011). 2 a racially disparate impact in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Since then, the district court has issued individual judgments with respect to approximately 4,700 current and former teachers who failed the exam. In this appeal, the only issue is whether the district court abused its discretion in granting Peter Wilds-Bethea, a named plaintiff and class representative, a $350,000 incentive award, which he contends is unreasonably low. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision. In successful class actions, named plaintiffs and class representatives may receive “fair and appropriate incentive awards” to “encourage [prospective] class representatives to participate in class action lawsuits.” 2 Moses v. N.Y. Times Co., 79 F.4th 235, 253 (2d Cir. 2023). Although we have “articulated no standard by which district courts can consider the grant of [incentive] awards,” district courts “generally rel[y] upon” the following four factors in calculating these awards: “(1) the existence of special circumstances including the personal risk (if any) incurred by the plaintiff[] in becoming and continuing as a litigant, (2) the time 2The source of authority for granting incentive awards where, as here, there is no common settlement fund is unclear. See 5 Newberg & Rubenstein on Class Actions § 17:4 (6th ed. 2025); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). Because the BOE does not contest the district court’s authority to grant an incentive award here, we do not pursue this issue further. 3 and effort expended by that plaintiff in assisting in the prosecution of the litigation or in bringing to bear added value (e.g., factual expertise), (3) any other burdens sustained by that plaintiff and, of course, (4) the ultimate recovery.” Fikes Wholesale, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 62 F.4th 704, 721 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). We review a district court’s calculation of an incentive award for abuse of discretion, reversing only if the “decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Moses, 79 F.4th at 241–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court, after receiving a detailed report from Special Master John S. Siffert explaining why a $350,000 incentive award was appropriate in this case, itself carefully considered the relevant Fikes Wholesale factors before deciding on the proper incentive award. For starters, the district court weighed the personal risk incurred by Wilds-Bethea in becoming and continuing as a litigant in this action. The district court expressly recognized that Wilds-Bethea “faced notable personal and professional risks by becoming a named plaintiff and class representative.” Sp. App’x at 4. In particular, the district court noted Wilds- 4 Bethea’s concern at the beginning of this litigation that his involvement “would impact his ability to secure future employment.” Id. The district court also thoughtfully considered Wilds-Bethea’s contributions to this lengthy and complicated litigation, emphasizing that he deserved a large incentive award because he “expended significant time and effort” during the liability phase. Id. This included sitting for two depositions, attending trial, meeting with class counsel, and communicating with class members. Id. The district court observed that Wilds-Bethea logged “235.5 hours” of work toward the class action “as of April 2021.” 3 Id. at 4–5. But even beyond the hours Wilds- Bethea has dedicated to this action, the district court also noted the additional burdens associated with this decades-old litigation. See id. at 4 (“Peter Wilds- Bethea has been involved in this class action for close to thirty years, serving as a class representative for more than twenty-three years, and as the sole class representative for the remedial phase of this action.”). Finally, given that the district court chose to grant Wilds-Bethea the highest incentive award ever bestowed on a class representative in the Southern District of New York, see id. at 5, there can be no doubt that the district court understood 3Although Wilds-Bethea asserts that his time records are incomplete, he provided the district court with no estimate of any additional hours he dedicated to this class action. 5 the remarkable recovery achieved in this action. As Wilds-Bethea himself observes, this class action has resulted in individual damages awards for approximately 4,700 plaintiffs totaling over $2 billion. In light of that impressive outcome, the district court understandably chose to grant Wilds-Bethea a correspondingly large incentive award of $350,000. Wilds-Bethea, however, regards this record-setting award as woefully inadequate. He instead seeks an award many multiples higher: $2.9 million. Id. at 4. Wilds-Bethea offers two principal arguments to support this enormous and unprecedented demand. Neither is persuasive. First, Wilds-Bethea asserts that he deserves an additional $2,550,000 because his contributions to the case dwarfed those of the other two named plaintiffs – Elsa Gulino and Dianne Nia Greene – who each received incentive awards of $272,996. But Gulino (who served as a named plaintiff for nearly six years and class representative for nearly two years) and Greene (who served as a named plaintiff for about four years) participated in this litigation at its early stages, when the risks of associating with the case were high. Indeed, the risks to Gulino and Greene may have been greater than those faced by Wilds-Bethea because just two months after the complaint was filed, Wilds-Bethea gave up his substitute teaching 6 position and was hired by the BOE as a guidance counselor – a position he held for twenty years until his retirement. Wilds-Bethea also makes much of the fact that, unlike Gulino and Greene, he has been involved in this case for the duration of the litigation, which has now spanned thirty years. That is undoubtedly true. But the past ten years of this action have focused on the individualized damages determinations for more than 4,700 plaintiffs – a process that did not involve Wilds-Bethea. Moreover, the district court did award a higher incentive fee to Wilds-Bethea in light of his more significant contributions to the litigation. And while Wilds-Bethea dismisses the $77,004 difference between his award and those of Gulino and Greene as paltry, his award is nearly thirty percent higher than those of the only other incentive award recipients in this case. Second, Wilds-Bethea asserts that the district court abused its discretion by awarding him “a mere 0.0175% of the ultimate $2 billion recovery,” which he maintains is “inconsistent with existing caselaw” because it “fail[s] to consider the ultimate aggregate recovery of the class.” Wilds-Bethea Br. at 17–18, 20. But this approach confuses class action incentive awards with awards for whistleblowers and qui tam plaintiffs, the latter of whom are, by statute, “entitled to receive a 7 portion of the amount recovered” by the government for frauds identified by the whistleblower. United States v. L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, Inc., 921 F.3d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2019). While qui tam bounties serve “[t]o incentivize private persons to uncover, report, and prosecute [civil fraud] claims for the benefit of the United States,” id., incentive awards for class action plaintiffs serve a very different and far more modest purpose – namely, to “encourage [prospective litigants] to participate in class action lawsuits” in the future, Moses, 79 F.4th at 253. Wilds-Bethea ultimately contends that the incentive award in this case – the largest ever granted in the Southern District of New York– would “chill those who might otherwise assume the burden of pursuing justice.” Wilds-Bethea Br. at 3. It is hard to imagine how that could possibly be true, and Wilds-Bethea has certainly offered no evidence to suggest that this bold statement is anything more than hyperbole. In sum, the district court carefully considered all the relevant factors before determining that the record-setting award of $350,000 “rewards [Wilds-Bethea] for the work he performed on the class’s behalf [but] is no more than necessary to incentivize class representatives to perform such work in future cases.” Sp. App’x at 5. Although Wilds-Bethea may ultimately disagree with the district court’s 8 assessment of these factors, this is precisely the sort of weighing that is entrusted to the discretion of the district court. On this record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse that discretion in issuing Wilds-Bethea a $350,000 incentive award. * * * We have considered Wilds-Bethea’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 9