Full Opinion

J-S31017-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 LAUREL COMMONS MHC, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JAMES WALTERS : : Appellant : No. 225 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered January 9, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s): 24 13561 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 29, 2026 Appellant, James Walters, appeals from the January 9, 2026 judgment entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas (“CCP”). He challenges the legality of his eviction from the mobile home lot owned by Appellee, Laurel Commons MHC, LLC. Upon review, we conclude that Appellant has waived the sole issue raised in this appeal. We, thus, affirm the trial court’s order granting Appellee the right to possess the mobile home lot. Appellee owns a mobile home park located at 1025 Barberry Avenue in Berks County. On April 15, 2020, Jorge M. Figueiredo and Appellant entered into a month-to-month lease with Appellee for the lot on which Mr. J-S31017-26 Figueiredo’s mobile home sits. Appellant lived in the mobile home from May 2020 until at least November 12, 2025.1 On July 2, 2024, Appellee served written notice upon Appellant and Mr. Figueiredo stating that it was terminating the lease for various violations and instructing Appellant and Mr. Figueiredo to vacate the mobile home park no later than “the lease expiration of August 1, 2024.” Trial Ct. Op, 3/25/26, at 4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant did not vacate the mobile home park as instructed. Therefore, on August 2, 2024, Appellee initiated eviction proceedings against Mr. Figueiredo, Appellant, and Cheryl Kull, whom Appellee alleged was an unauthorized occupant of the mobile home. The magisterial district court entered judgment in favor of Appellee. On August 19, 2024, Appellant appealed to the CCP.2 On August 30, 2024, Appellee filed its complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking possession of the lot and money damages. On September 19, 2024, Appellant, acting pro se, filed an answer and new matter. On September 27, 2024, Appellee filed an answer to the new matter. The court ultimately scheduled a non-jury trial for November 12, 2025. ____________________________________________ 1 On the day of his CCP trial, Appellant was still living in the mobile home; it is not clear if or when he vacated it. 2 Neither Mr. Figueiredo nor Ms. Kull appealed to the CCP. -2- J-S31017-26 On November 6, 2025, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of Appellant. Counsel did not request a continuance of the trial and did not amend any of Appellant’s pro se filings. The trial court held a bench trial on November 12, 2025, at which Appellee presented testimony from its property manager and Mr. Figueiredo as well as documentary evidence supporting the above facts. On November 17, 2025, the trial court issued a decision and verdict that awarded possession to Appellee, but declined to award Appellee monetary damages. The trial court determined that “a termination notice was served upon [Appellant] on July 2, 2024. [Appellant] did not vacate the Leased Premises.” Trial Ct. Decision and Verdict, 11/17/25, at 5. For that reason, the court concluded that Appellant was “in breach of the Lease. This breach was material and, therefore, [Appellant] must vacate the Leased Premises.” Id. The trial court also found that Appellee had presented no credible evidence that it suffered any damages as a result of receiving the August 2024 payment late. Id. at 5-6. On December 1, 2025, Appellant filed a counseled post-trial motion, seeking the entry of judgment in his favor by arguing for the first time that 68 P.S. § 398.3, which is the eviction provision of the Manufactured Home Community Rights Act (“MHCRA”), prevented Appellee from evicting Appellant or terminating or failing to renew his lease. Post-Trial Mot., 12/1/25, at ¶¶ 27-35. The trial court summarily denied the post-trial motion. -3- J-S31017-26 Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court opined that Appellant waived any issue regarding the MHCRA’s applicability to his case. Trial Ct. Op., 3/25/26, at 5-8. In this appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 1. Did the trial court err in: a. Entering judgment for possession in favor of the Appellee and against the Appellant in this eviction action as eviction was not warranted under the [MHCRA]? b. Determining this issue was waived in the trial court? Appellant’s Br. at 5 (suggested answers omitted). Appellant argues that the court erred in refusing to grant his post-trial motion seeking the entry of judgment in his favor because Appellee did not satisfy the requirements of the MHCRA’s eviction requirements. Id. at 13-19. He baldly contends that he was not required to raise Appellee’s failure to meet the requirements of the MHCRA before the court rendered its verdict because the MHCRA “is the law which authorizes the Plaintiff to evict the Appellant if certain conditions are met” and “Appellee did not prove the facts they pleaded which would warrant eviction.” Appellant’s Br. at 21 (emphasis in original). We review the denial of a post-trial motion for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 984 (Pa. Super. 2005) (applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a challenge to the order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict). In this -4- J-S31017-26 context, an “[a]buse of discretion occurs if the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Id. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(b)(1) “provides in relevant part that a ground may not serve as the basis for post-trial relief . . . unless it was raised in pre-trial proceedings or at trial.” Straub v. Cherne Indus., 880 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. 2005). “Raising an objection in pre-trial proceedings or at trial provides the trial court with the opportunity to correct any errors.” Id. Accordingly, we have repeatedly determined that appellants waived issues on appeal by asserting those issues for the first time in post-trial motions. See Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 697-98 (Pa. Super. 2019); E.S. Mgmt. v. Gao, 176 A.3d 859, 864-65 (Pa. Super. 2017); Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 630 (Pa. Super. 2012). Here, the trial court opined, inter alia, that Appellant’s argument based on the MHCRA was waived because he asserted it for the first time in his post- trial motion. Trial Ct. Op. at 6-8. The trial court observed that Appellant did not mention the MHCRA in his answer, his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, or at trial. We agree with the trial court that Appellant waived his argument that the trial court erred in not applying the eviction provisions in the MHCRA. Appellant’s brief has not identified any portion of the certified trial record where he preserved any issues regarding the MHCRA’s applicability to the instant action. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (requiring an appellant to specify where -5- J-S31017-26 in the record he preserved an issue raised on appeal). After our thorough review of the pleadings and the trial transcript, we are unable to find any reference that Appellant made to the MHCRA except for the first time in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion or err as a matter of law in denying Appellant’s post-trial motion. We, thus, affirm the judgment entered in Appellee’s favor. Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/29/2026 -6-