Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE VICTORIA LEWIS, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. AVANT GARDE, et al., Defendants/Appellees. No. 1 CA-CV 25-1044 FILED 11-18-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2024-036147 The Honorable Michael Valenzuela, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Victoria Lewis, San Diego CA Plaintiff/Appellant Law Offices of Scott M. Clark, P.C., Phoenix By Scott M. Clark, William D. Welch, Brett Meyer, Jared W. Harris, Justin Heath Lines, Victoria D’Amato, David L. Riahi, Christopher M. Rogers Counsel for Defendants/Appellees LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al. Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined. W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge: ¶1 Victoria Lewis appeals the superior court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing her claims against Avant Garde. We affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Lewis lived in a Phoenix apartment managed by Avant Garde. On October 7, 2024, Avant Garde filed an eviction action in justice court after Lewis did not pay rent for two months. Nine days later, the justice court ruled in favor of Avant Garde and authorized it to remove Lewis from the property on or after October 22, 2024. ¶3 The parties entered into a post-judgment agreement allowing Lewis to stay in exchange for the full monetary judgment, but she only made a partial payment. ¶4 Avant Garde proceeded with the eviction and executed the writ on November 12, 2024. Arizona law required it to hold Lewis’s property for 14 days before disposal, and it disposed of the property on December 3, 2024. Emails in the record showed that Lewis first contacted Avant Garde about her property on November 29, 2024, and then did not respond to Avant Garde’s follow-up communications. Both before and after the lockout, Lewis filed several motions to vacate the eviction judgment, arguing among other things that her partial payment should stay the eviction. The justice court denied them. Lewis did not appeal the eviction judgment. ¶5 Lewis filed suit in the superior court, alleging that Avant Garde wrongfully evicted her, kept her from retrieving her property and improperly disposed of it. During the proceedings, Lewis filed a motion seeking return of her belongings, access to the apartment and a disability accommodation. The superior court treated that pleading as a motion for a temporary restraining order and set a hearing. She later filed a pleading titled “Amended Civil Complaint,” which alleged she was a vulnerable 2 LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al. Decision of the Court adult, and a “Motion for Continuance,” which attached a notarized request for a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) that she had filed in the eviction case. At the hearing on Lewis’s motions, the court granted the GAL request under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17.1 and stayed the proceedings. ¶6 The GAL later withdrew the guardianship petition because Lewis moved to California. With the GAL’s role concluded, Avant Garde successfully moved for summary judgment. Lewis did not respond. The superior court found Lewis’s wrongful eviction claims precluded by the justice court’s final judgment in the eviction action. The court also found Avant Garde complied with the statutory timing requirements and Lewis failed to present any evidence that Avant Garde wrongfully withheld the property. The court denied the rest of Lewis’s motions. ¶7 Lewis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12- 2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶8 Lewis argues the superior court erred by (1) applying claim preclusion to her wrongful eviction claim, (2) granting summary judgment without resolving disputed facts about Avant Garde’s statutory compliance, (3) staying the proceedings to appoint a GAL and (4) failing to address her outstanding motions. I. Claim Preclusion. ¶9 Lewis claims the superior court erroneously applied claim preclusion because the post-judgment issues were not adjudicated in the justice court. We review the application of claim preclusion de novo. Hall v. Lalli, 191 Ariz. 104, 106 (App. 1997). Under that doctrine, “a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Airfreight Exp. Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 108, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). The party invoking the doctrine must establish “(1) an identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” Lawrence T. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 260, 262–63, ¶ 8 (App. 2019) (quoting In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 69–70, ¶ 14 (2006)). ¶10 The superior court found Lewis’s wrongful eviction claims barred by claim preclusion. We agree. The parties were identical. Lewis 3 LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al. Decision of the Court raised the same partial-payment argument in her post-judgment motions in the eviction action, and the justice court rejected it. Lewis did not appeal. II. Statutory Compliance. ¶11 Lewis next argues the superior court erred in granting summary judgment because the record left unresolved whether Avant Garde complied with the statutory requirements for handling a tenant’s property after an eviction. Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows no genuine dispute of material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review de novo. Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019). ¶12 Arizona law required Avant Garde to hold Lewis’s property for 14 calendar days after retaking the apartment before disposing of it. A.R.S. § 33-1370(F). Lewis’s complaint and Avant Garde’s statement of facts both placed the lockout on November 12, 2024, and the disposal on December 3, 2024, which was 21 days later. These undisputed facts established compliance with § 33-1370(F). ¶13 Lewis did not respond to Avant Garde’s motion or file a controverting statement of facts. When a party does not respond to a properly supported motion, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against that party.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Even so, the superior court considered the exhibits attached to Lewis’s later filings, including her October 17, 2025 supplemental Rule 60(b) filing, and found nothing that created a genuine dispute. The exhibits neither supported a different timeline nor showed that Avant Garde withheld her property during the holding period. ¶14 Lewis’s reply brief argues that § 33-1370 also required Avant Garde to inventory her property, tell her where it was stored and at what storage cost, use reasonable care, give her access to essential items and surrender the property within five days of a written demand. Her opening brief mentioned “inventory issues” only in passing and did not develop these theories, so we do not consider that argument. See Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (App. 2022). III. Guardian ad Litem. ¶15 Lewis next claims the superior court improperly stayed the proceedings to appoint the GAL. A GAL investigates whether an individual is incapacitated or in need of protection and requires a guardian, conservator or other protective order. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17.1(a), (d). Any 4 LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al. Decision of the Court party may move to appoint a GAL, and the court stays the proceedings if one is appointed. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17.1(a), (c). ¶16 Here, Lewis’s motion for continuance attached a notarized request for a GAL. The superior court treated the request as a motion under Rule 17.1, appointed a GAL to investigate and stayed the proceedings. That was not error. The GAL withdrew the guardianship petition about six months later because Lewis had moved to California. ¶17 Beyond that, Lewis does not explain how the stay prejudiced her claims. We reverse only for prejudicial error, which Lewis has not shown. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27; United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 295 (App. 1983). IV. Remaining Motions and Due Process. ¶18 Lewis last argues she was denied due process because the superior court failed to address her outstanding motions. We review due process claims de novo. Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 544, ¶ 6 (App. 1999). Due process requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Curtis v. Richardson, 212 Ariz. 308, 312, ¶ 16 (App. 2006). ¶19 Lewis received due process. The superior court denied her motion for 60-day judicial review as moot. It denied her August 2025 motion to dismiss because she sought dismissal and other remedies at the same time and, to the extent she sought summary judgment, did not comply with Rule 56. It denied her October 2025 supplemental Rule 60(b) motion because the issues related to her precluded wrongful eviction claim and because Rule 60(b) relief had to be sought in the justice court. It then denied all other affirmative relief not expressly granted. And Avant Garde’s summary judgment motion gave her notice and the opportunity to respond. She never did. V. Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. ¶20 ARCAP 13 requires every brief filed in this court to include appropriate references to the portions of the record on which they rely. ARCAP 13(d). A brief may alternatively cite to the party’s appendix so long as it complies with ARCAP 13.1(c)(1). ARCAP 13(d). ¶21 Avant Garde’s answering brief does not provide any record citations or references to its appendix. Failure to provide record citations in an answering brief can be deemed a confession of error or may result in 5 LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al. Decision of the Court the waiver of the appellee’s arguments or sanctions. ARCAP 25; Varco, Inc. v. UNS Elec., Inc., 242 Ariz. 166, 170, ¶ 12 n.5 (App. 2017) (noting the court “could find [the appellee’s] arguments waived” because its answering brief failed to cite the record as required by ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) and (b)(1) but considering them in its discretion). Because Lewis has not presented a debatable issue, however, a confession of error is not appropriate. We remind counsel that this court’s rules are not optional and counsel must follow them in the future. ARCAP 25. CONCLUSION ¶22 We affirm. Avant Garde requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party in a dispute arising out of contract. See A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01(A). We deny its request for attorney fees in our discretion. As the prevailing party, Avant Garde is entitled to its costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21. We deny its request to remand for an amended fee application in the superior court, which entered a final judgment resolving all pending matters. We also deny Lewis’s April 10, 2026 and September 30, 2026 requests for judicial notice because the documents are either already in our record or irrelevant to this appeal. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 6