LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 25-1044
JudgeDavid D. Weinzweig
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
VICTORIA LEWIS, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
AVANT GARDE, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 25-1044
FILED 11-18-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-036147
The Honorable Michael Valenzuela, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Victoria Lewis, San Diego CA
Plaintiff/Appellant
Law Offices of Scott M. Clark, P.C., Phoenix
By Scott M. Clark, William D. Welch, Brett Meyer, Jared W. Harris, Justin
Heath Lines, Victoria D’Amato, David L. Riahi, Christopher M. Rogers
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
LEWIS v. AVANT GARDE, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Vice Chief Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Anni Hill Foster
joined.
W E I N Z W E I G, Vice Chief Judge:
¶1 Victoria Lewis appeals the superior court’s grant of summary
judgment dismissing her claims against Avant Garde. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Lewis lived in a Phoenix apartment managed by Avant
Garde. On October 7, 2024, Avant Garde filed an eviction action in justice
court after Lewis did not pay rent for two months. Nine days later, the
justice court ruled in favor of Avant Garde and authorized it to remove
Lewis from the property on or after October 22, 2024.
¶3 The parties entered into a post-judgment agreement allowing
Lewis to stay in exchange for the full monetary judgment, but she only
made a partial payment.
¶4 Avant Garde proceeded with the eviction and executed the
writ on November 12, 2024. Arizona law required it to hold Lewis’s
property for 14 days before disposal, and it disposed of the property on
December 3, 2024. Emails in the record showed that Lewis first contacted
Avant Garde about her property on November 29, 2024, and then did not
respond to Avant Garde’s follow-up communications. Both before and
after the lockout, Lewis filed several motions to vacate the eviction
judgment, arguing among other things that her partial payment should stay
the eviction. The justice court denied them. Lewis did not appeal the
eviction judgment.
¶5 Lewis filed suit in the superior court, alleging that Avant
Garde wrongfully evicted her, kept her from retrieving her property and
improperly disposed of it. During the proceedings, Lewis filed a motion
seeking return of her belongings, access to the apartment and a disability
accommodation. The superior court treated that pleading as a motion for a
temporary restraining order and set a hearing. She later filed a pleading
titled “Amended Civil Complaint,” which alleged she was a vulnerable
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Decision of the Court
adult, and a “Motion for Continuance,” which attached a notarized request
for a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) that she had filed in the eviction case. At
the hearing on Lewis’s motions, the court granted the GAL request under
Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17.1 and stayed the proceedings.
¶6 The GAL later withdrew the guardianship petition because
Lewis moved to California. With the GAL’s role concluded, Avant Garde
successfully moved for summary judgment. Lewis did not respond. The
superior court found Lewis’s wrongful eviction claims precluded by the
justice court’s final judgment in the eviction action. The court also found
Avant Garde complied with the statutory timing requirements and Lewis
failed to present any evidence that Avant Garde wrongfully withheld the
property. The court denied the rest of Lewis’s motions.
¶7 Lewis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-
2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶8 Lewis argues the superior court erred by (1) applying claim
preclusion to her wrongful eviction claim, (2) granting summary judgment
without resolving disputed facts about Avant Garde’s statutory
compliance, (3) staying the proceedings to appoint a GAL and (4) failing to
address her outstanding motions.
I. Claim Preclusion.
¶9 Lewis claims the superior court erroneously applied claim
preclusion because the post-judgment issues were not adjudicated in the
justice court. We review the application of claim preclusion de novo. Hall
v. Lalli, 191 Ariz. 104, 106 (App. 1997). Under that doctrine, “a final
judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their
privies bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Airfreight Exp. Ltd. v.
Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 108, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (citation
omitted). The party invoking the doctrine must establish “(1) an identity of
claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered and the current
litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the previous litigation, and
(3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” Lawrence T. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 246 Ariz. 260, 262–63, ¶ 8 (App. 2019) (quoting In re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rts. to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. 64,
69–70, ¶ 14 (2006)).
¶10 The superior court found Lewis’s wrongful eviction claims
barred by claim preclusion. We agree. The parties were identical. Lewis
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Decision of the Court
raised the same partial-payment argument in her post-judgment motions
in the eviction action, and the justice court rejected it. Lewis did not appeal.
II. Statutory Compliance.
¶11 Lewis next argues the superior court erred in granting
summary judgment because the record left unresolved whether Avant
Garde complied with the statutory requirements for handling a tenant’s
property after an eviction. Summary judgment is proper if the moving
party shows no genuine dispute of material fact and is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We review de novo. Jackson v.
Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019).
¶12 Arizona law required Avant Garde to hold Lewis’s property
for 14 calendar days after retaking the apartment before disposing of it.
A.R.S. § 33-1370(F). Lewis’s complaint and Avant Garde’s statement of
facts both placed the lockout on November 12, 2024, and the disposal on
December 3, 2024, which was 21 days later. These undisputed facts
established compliance with § 33-1370(F).
¶13 Lewis did not respond to Avant Garde’s motion or file a
controverting statement of facts. When a party does not respond to a
properly supported motion, “summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against that party.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Even so, the superior
court considered the exhibits attached to Lewis’s later filings, including her
October 17, 2025 supplemental Rule 60(b) filing, and found nothing that
created a genuine dispute. The exhibits neither supported a different
timeline nor showed that Avant Garde withheld her property during the
holding period.
¶14 Lewis’s reply brief argues that § 33-1370 also required Avant
Garde to inventory her property, tell her where it was stored and at what
storage cost, use reasonable care, give her access to essential items and
surrender the property within five days of a written demand. Her opening
brief mentioned “inventory issues” only in passing and did not develop
these theories, so we do not consider that argument. See Ramos v. Nichols,
252 Ariz. 519, 523, ¶ 11 (App. 2022).
III. Guardian ad Litem.
¶15 Lewis next claims the superior court improperly stayed the
proceedings to appoint the GAL. A GAL investigates whether an
individual is incapacitated or in need of protection and requires a guardian,
conservator or other protective order. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17.1(a), (d). Any
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party may move to appoint a GAL, and the court stays the proceedings if
one is appointed. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 17.1(a), (c).
¶16 Here, Lewis’s motion for continuance attached a notarized
request for a GAL. The superior court treated the request as a motion under
Rule 17.1, appointed a GAL to investigate and stayed the proceedings. That
was not error. The GAL withdrew the guardianship petition about six
months later because Lewis had moved to California.
¶17 Beyond that, Lewis does not explain how the stay prejudiced
her claims. We reverse only for prejudicial error, which Lewis has not
shown. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27; United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 140 Ariz. 238, 295 (App. 1983).
IV. Remaining Motions and Due Process.
¶18 Lewis last argues she was denied due process because the
superior court failed to address her outstanding motions. We review due
process claims de novo. Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 544, ¶ 6 (App.
1999). Due process requires “notice and an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Curtis v. Richardson, 212
Ariz. 308, 312, ¶ 16 (App. 2006).
¶19 Lewis received due process. The superior court denied her
motion for 60-day judicial review as moot. It denied her August 2025
motion to dismiss because she sought dismissal and other remedies at the
same time and, to the extent she sought summary judgment, did not
comply with Rule 56. It denied her October 2025 supplemental Rule 60(b)
motion because the issues related to her precluded wrongful eviction claim
and because Rule 60(b) relief had to be sought in the justice court. It then
denied all other affirmative relief not expressly granted. And Avant
Garde’s summary judgment motion gave her notice and the opportunity to
respond. She never did.
V. Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
¶20 ARCAP 13 requires every brief filed in this court to include
appropriate references to the portions of the record on which they rely.
ARCAP 13(d). A brief may alternatively cite to the party’s appendix so long
as it complies with ARCAP 13.1(c)(1). ARCAP 13(d).
¶21 Avant Garde’s answering brief does not provide any record
citations or references to its appendix. Failure to provide record citations
in an answering brief can be deemed a confession of error or may result in
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Decision of the Court
the waiver of the appellee’s arguments or sanctions. ARCAP 25; Varco, Inc.
v. UNS Elec., Inc., 242 Ariz. 166, 170, ¶ 12 n.5 (App. 2017) (noting the court
“could find [the appellee’s] arguments waived” because its answering brief
failed to cite the record as required by ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) and (b)(1) but
considering them in its discretion). Because Lewis has not presented a
debatable issue, however, a confession of error is not appropriate. We
remind counsel that this court’s rules are not optional and counsel must
follow them in the future. ARCAP 25.
CONCLUSION
¶22 We affirm. Avant Garde requests its attorney fees and costs
on appeal as the prevailing party in a dispute arising out of contract. See
A.R.S. §§ 12-341, -341.01(A). We deny its request for attorney fees in our
discretion. As the prevailing party, Avant Garde is entitled to its costs upon
compliance with ARCAP 21. We deny its request to remand for an
amended fee application in the superior court, which entered a final
judgment resolving all pending matters. We also deny Lewis’s April 10,
2026 and September 30, 2026 requests for judicial notice because the
documents are either already in our record or irrelevant to this appeal.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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