Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 522 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISIONS I & II No. CV-25-273 CONNIE AND DELMAR ALLEN Opinion Delivered October 28, 2026 APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE BENTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 04CV-22-647] CATHERINE AND JEFFREY WYANT APPELLEES HONORABLE CHRISTINE HORWART, JUDGE AFFIRMED WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge Appellants Connie and Delmar Allen (“Allen”) appeal the February 11, 2025 order of the Benton County Circuit Court resolving issues raised in their motion to enforce easement deed and motion for contempt. On appeal, Allen argues that (1) reversal is required because the circuit court’s ruling was unclear; (2) the circuit court improperly ignored the easement deed attached to the parties’ settlement agreement; and (3) the circuit court enforced an invalid settlement agreement. We affirm. In March 2022, Allen filed a complaint seeking a prescriptive easement over and across the property of the adjoining landowners, appellees Catherine and Jeffrey Wyant (“Wyant”). Allen alleged that his property is landlocked, with Wyant’s property providing the only route to access it, aside from reaching it by boat from Beaver Lake. Before the hearing on the complaint, the parties reached a settlement agreement that was incorporated into the amended final order entered by the circuit court on July 25, 2023. According 1 to the agreement, Allen would pay Wyant $8,000 for an easement; Wyant would execute an easement deed; both parties would agree to any gates on the road; and Allen would pay to have the easement surveyed and a formal legal description prepared. The settlement agreement included exhibit A, a diagram depicting the parties’ respective properties with a line drawn between two X’s along the southern border of Wyant’s property. Allen satisfied payment in accordance with the agreement, and Wyant signed and recorded the easement deed granting Allen an easement across Wyant’s property. The easement deed contained the following easement description: AN EIGHTEEN-FOOT-WIDE EASEMENT COMMENCING FROM OLD BILL EVANS ROAD THENCE WEST TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE WYANT PROPERTY AND THE BOUNDARY OF THE ALLEN PROPERTY MORE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED BY A SURVEY TO BE PREPARED BY GRANTEE AND TO BE MADE PART OF THE EASEMENT DEED UPON COMPLETION BY WAY OF SCRIVENER’S AFFIDAVIT. On February 15, 2024, Allen moved to enforce the easement deed, alleging that after a survey was conducted, Wyant refused the surveyed easement location and would not permit construction to begin. Wyant countered that the survey’s proposed easement location resulted in an easement that runs in a northwesterly direction from Old Bill Evans Road and cutting through his property, and not west from Old Bill Evans Road along his property’s southern boundary as detailed in the settlement agreement and in the easement deed. Wyant opposed the proposed easement location for noncompliance with the settlement agreement. Allen filed a motion for contempt alleging that despite the clear and unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement, Wyant willfully failed and refused to allow him to begin construction of the northwesterly easement. Allen also filed a motion for summary judgment stating that there is no genuine issue of material fact; the summary-judgment motion was denied. 2 Following the hearing on the motions for contempt and to enforce the easement deed, the circuit court denied the contempt citation and granted the motion to enforce easement deed, finding that the “modified dotted line on the southern boundary of Wyant’s southern border” shown in defendant’s exhibit 3 “most closely aligns with Exhibit A attached to the Settlement Agreement of the parties” and shall serve as the location for the easement. On appeal from the circuit court’s decision relating to the enforcement or interpretation of a settlement agreement, the circuit court’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.1 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.2 Determining the credibility of witnesses and resolving disputed facts is within the province of the finder of fact. 3 Allen first asserts that the circuit court’s ruling was unclear and should be reversed for clarification and further adjudication. He argues that the court’s ruling is “subject to multiple interpretations” because defendant’s exhibit 3 depicts two possible easement routes. Allen argues that he asked the court to clarify which easement it was ordering, but the court responded, “It was presented to me that Defendant’s 3 was the most closely correlated easement across [Wyant’s] property pursuant to the parties’ agreement. That was Mr. McKelvin’s testimony [the surveyor]. That’s what I’m going with.” 1 Mercy Hosp. Fort Smith v. Lesley, 2024 Ark. App. 315. 2 Id. 3 Id. 3 Allen argues that the written order drafted by Wyant stating that the easement is evidenced by “a modified dotted line on the southern boundary of” his property reflects Wyant’s interpretation, not what the circuit court actually held. We disagree. At the hearing, plaintiff’s exhibit 1 and defendant’s exhibits 2 and 3 were entered into evidence. Plaintiff’s exhibit 1, the first survey, depicts an easement that begins at a point on Old Bill Evans Road and runs generally in a northwesterly direction across Wyant’s property. The second survey, defendant’s exhibit 2, also depicts an easement that begins at a point on Old Bill Evans Road and runs in a northwesterly direction through a portion of Wyant’s property, terminating at a point further south than the easement in plaintiff’s exhibit 1. Defendant’s exhibit 3 depicts an easement that runs along the southern boundary of Wyant’s property in a westerly direction from Old Bill Evans Road. Although the line from plaintiff’s exhibit 1 is still depicted, only the southern easement is labeled as “Proposed 18' Access Easement.” The line that runs northwesterly is not designated as a proposed easement in defendant’s exhibit 3. Furthermore, the circuit court made clear in its oral ruling that it ordered the easement to correspond with the location indicated in exhibit A of the parties’ settlement agreement. Only the route along the southernmost border of Wyant’s property does so. There can be no genuine confusion that the southernmost dotted line on defendant’s exhibit 3 was the order of the court. Allen next argues that the circuit court improperly ignored or discounted the easement deed that was attached to the parties’ settlement agreement. Specifically, he asserts that the easement deed granted a “blanket easement” because it states that the precise location of the easement will be “more specifically described by a [future] survey.” A blanket easement is described as one in which the precise location of the easement is not specified but instead describes the entire tract of the 4 landowners.4 Stated again, a blanket easement is one that applies to an entire property rather than being limited to a specific, defined area. When the exact location of a right-of-way or easement is not described, its bounds will be determined by lines of reasonable enjoyment.5 Blanket easements are most common in the context of utility and pipeline easements. Allen states that according to the plain language of the easement deed, “[he] shall have an 18-foot easement over and across the entirety of [Wyant’s] parcel.” He contends that because the easement deed here failed to designate the location of the easement, he obtained a blanket easement, the location of which it could determine subject to reasonableness. Allen’s argument is not well taken. The easement deed and the settlement agreement both state the path and location of the easement. The deed’s description of the location is not as vague as Allen would have this court believe. It does more than simply name the dominant and servient tracts. The easement deed granted an easement described as “[a]n 18-foot-wide easement commencing from Old Bill Evans Road thence west to the boundary of [Wyant’s] property and the boundary of [Allens’] property.” The deed further stated that the location would be more specifically described by a survey to be prepared by Allen. The use of the phrase “more specifically” indicates that the location of the easement was already designated with some specificity. Also, the easement deed and settlement agreement expressly and unambiguously pinpointed the location and direction of the easement—the location is along the southern boundary of Wyant’s parcel, and the direction is west from Old Bill Evans Road. Further, the easement deed described in words the location of the easement depicted on the diagram 4 John H. Parker Constr. Co. v. Aldridge, 312 Ark. 69, 847 S.W.2d 687 (1993). 5 Bradley v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 280 Ark. 492, 659 S.W.2d 180 (1983). 5 in exhibit A. Both the easement deed and exhibit A of the settlement agreement indicate that the easement would follow a path running west from Old Bill Evans Road along the southern boundary of appellee’s property. The deed does more than designate the entire tract of the landowners. It identified a specific area or strip of Wyant’s land for the easement location. We affirm on this point. Allen’s last argument is that because there was no meeting of the minds, the circuit court enforced an invalid settlement agreement. This argument fails. Importantly, we observe that Allen himself moved to enforce the settlement agreement. He cannot now complain that the circuit court ultimately enforced the agreement. An appellant cannot complain of an erroneous action of the circuit court on appeal if it has induced or acquiesced in that action. 6 Furthermore, Allen contends that after the settlement agreement was signed and attached to the order of the court, the parties went back and forth on the specific location of the easement, serving as proof that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties. Whether there is a meeting of the minds is a question of fact.7 During this action, Allen moved for summary judgment, stating that “there is no genuine issue of fact as to the Parties’ unambiguous Settlement Agreement.” Again, Allen cannot now argue that an issue of fact exists regarding the settlement agreement and contract formation. 6 See Rothwell v. Rothwell, 2025 Ark. App. 613, 725 S.W.3d 901. 7 Id. 6 Also, an argument that a contract lacked a meeting of the minds must be preserved at the circuit court level before it can be raised on appeal. Arguments not raised below are waived. 8 Because Allen did not object at the first opportunity, this issue is not preserved for review on appeal. Moreover, Allen suggests that although the parties agreed on an easement, there was no meeting of the minds regarding the precise location of the easement. We disagree. Exhibit A of the parties’ settlement agreement shows the easement path drawn by a line with two X’s on either end running along Wyant’s southernmost boundary and west from Old Bill Evans Road to the boundary of the Allen’s property. Exhibit A is also congruent with the location details in the easement deed describing the path as running west from Old Bill Evans Road. The record indicates that the placement of the easement only became an issue once Allen discovered that the agreed-on route carried a high cost due to factors such as sloping and water drainage. Because Allen agreed to purchase an easement along an expensive route does not make the contract unenforceable. Affirmed. TUCKER, WOOD, and HIXSON, JJ., agree. BARRETT, J., concurs. HARRISON, J., dissents. STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the circuit court’s order. I write separately to address the dissent’s characterization of the agreement and its reliance on cases concerning the reasonable location of an undefined easement. 8 Turnbo v. Hamlett, 2024 Ark. App. 128, 686 S.W.3d 813. 7 The dissent miscomprehends the nature of this case. The case below and this appeal concern the enforcement of a settlement agreement, not the creation of an easement. Allen filed a complaint against Wyant to enforce the parties’ previous settlement agreement. After hearing the testimony of both parties and surveyors and reviewing the various surveys, the circuit court determined that the easement along the southern boundary of Wyant’s property most closely aligned with Exhibit A attached to that agreement. The dissent relies on cases holding that when the location of an easement is undefined, its location must be reasonable for both parties. See Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 175, 939 S.W.2d 858, 860 (1997). However, those cases are inapposite. Here, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that included a diagram depicting the contemplated location of the easement and also described the location as extending west from Old Bill Evans Road. Although the parties contemplated a subsequent survey, the settlement agreement and easement deed sufficiently identified the easement’s location. As the majority explains, the deed’s language that a more specific description would be provided did not leave the easement’s location entirely undetermined. The dissent also emphasizes that multiple surveys were prepared to determine the easement’s location. The deed expressly provided that the easement would be more specifically described by a survey. The circuit court considered the proposed locations and determined which one most closely aligned with the parties’ agreement. A court cannot make the parties’ contract but, instead, can only construe and enforce the contract the parties have made. Terra Land Servs., Inc. v. McIntyre, 2019 Ark. App. 118, at 12, 572 S.W.3d 424, 432 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Smelser, 375 Ark. 216, 289 S.W.3d 466 (2008)). In a proceeding to enforce a settlement agreement, the circuit court’s role was 8 to interpret the parties’ agreement, not to rewrite the terms of the agreement and to select a different easement location simply because it might be more convenient or advantageous to one of the parties. The dissent dismissively compares Exhibit A to a drawing made on a Waffle House napkin. While the drawing may have been crude, the parties nonetheless specifically incorporated the drawing into the settlement agreement as Exhibit A. The circuit court relied on it in determining the location of the easement. The simplicity of the drawing does not make it any less a part of the parties’ agreement. Finally, the dissent emphasizes the expense and difficulty of construing the easement along the southern boundary. The dissent also questions whether the easement can be constructed at that location. However, those concerns do not establish that the circuit court clearly erred in interpreting the parties’ agreement. The fact that the easement may be more expensive or difficult to construct than Allen anticipated does not alter the terms of the agreement. See Carden v. McDonald, 69 Ark. App. 257, 263, 12 S.W.3d 643, 647–48 (2000) (citing Helms v. Helms, 317 Ark. 143, 875 S.W.2d 849 (1994)). An unfavorable outcome does not make the agreement unenforceable. BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge, dissenting. The circuit court imposed a right-of-way to drive off a cliff into a 60-to-80-foot gorge. The majority affirms it on the strength and detail of what could satirically pass for a watercolored-napkin drawing completed at a Waffle House booth. Unless the Allens fill the gorge, they will have to boat to their property. To fill the gorge will take an exorbitant expense and effort relative to the right-of-way’s cost to obtain in the first place. The bargained-for easement is, then, something of a legal mirage. Jarring. But true. * 9 We have said that an express right-of-way is defined or “specifically described” if a surveyor could go onto the land and locate it from the deed description. Doug’s Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 79 Ark. App. 28, 35, 83 S.W.3d 425, 429–30 (2002) (citing Wilson v. Johnston, 66 Ark. App. 193, 990 S.W.2d 554 (1999)). Add a second surveyor and the test is clearer: could they independently locate the same easement? If not, no problem. Unlike a deed conveying a fee interest, the grant of an easement does not fail for want of a specific description. Instead, the missing detail can be supplied after the grant by this rule of law: Where such right-of-way is reserved, or expressly granted and not defined, the owner of the servient estate, in the first instance, has the right to delimit it, and, in the event of his failure to do so, it may be selected by the grantee of the easement; but, in either case, the location must be a reasonable one, taking into consideration the interest and convenience of both the dominant and servient estates. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Benson, 319 Ark. 68, 73, 889 S.W.2d 756, 759 (1994) (emphasis original) (quoting Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 271, 261 S.W. 645, 648 (1924)). That rule contemplates that parties will supply any undefined particulars, even if some particulars are defined: “Where the grant of a right-of-way is not bounded in the deed it is to be bounded by lines of reasonable enjoyment.” Hatfield v. Ark. W. Gas Co., 5 Ark. App. 26, 28, 632 S.W.2d 238, 240 (1982) (supplying a reasonable width where none was defined). Key concepts alert: Reasonable Location, convenience & enjoyment. Do the Allens get to check any facet of Reasonableness for the $8,000 paid to the Wyants? Certainly not. Did the circuit court hold that the easement it imposed was reasonable? No, it did not. That is why its decision, and the majority’s opinion, run against common sense and the law as the Arkansas Supreme Court has laid it out. 10 The majority holds that the easement deed and settlement agreement “expressly and unambiguously” put the location of the easement “along the southern boundary of Wyant’s parcel.” Not so. At least, not exactly so. If the agreement had done that, then the parties would have had no need for a survey or more specifics. Nor would three competing surveys have been generated. And a truly “unambiguous” and “express” settlement agreement wouldn’t have birthed an action to enforce it and a resulting appeal that split a six-judge panel. The easement deed specifies an 18-foot width for the right of way. It must begin at Old Bill Evans Road (the Road) and run west to “the boundary of the Allen property and the boundary of the Wyant property.” The deed makes no reference whatsoever to the Wyants’ south boundary. On its four corners, the deed cannot “specifically describe” just one easement. The property boundary where the easement must end is 1015.38 survey feet long. Though the surveys plot only three points along the Road where the easement must start, that is enough to show it extends at least 50 feet north of the Wyants’ south boundary and runs within the property for at least 280 feet.1 Even the known 50-foot northern stretch of the Road offers many places to put an 18-foot west-running easement. In fact, it could accommodate two of them with room to spare. So no surveyor could determine from the deed alone where on the Road the easement should begin. 2 Here, Regrettably, the survey maps only show the Road where it intersects a proposed easement 1 route. Two proposed routes intersect it 280 feet apart; maps in the record that do not purport to be drawn to scale show the Road turn sharply north near what appears to be the Wyants’ eastern boundary. 2If an easement corresponds to a feature that exists on the land—an old road, say—it can be specifically described by reference to the feature despite lacking explicit details in the grant. See Branscum v. Nelson, 2022 Ark. App. 354, 654 S.W.3d 343 (remanding to determine width of prescriptive easement along readily identifiable road). This was a new grant on an imaginary line. 11 the circuit court was presented with three easement-placement options—each backed by a separate survey—and a fourth option to choose “none of the above” and send the parties back to the drawing board. (That’s what I would do today.) The circuit court did not determine whether the route it chose was reasonable, as the supreme court ordered to be done on remand in the first Carroll Electric appeal. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Benson, 312 Ark. 183, 848 S.W.2d 413 (1993). And it chose the most unreasonable option to one of the parties. The majority follows suit. But why choose an option that would be wholly unreasonable, maybe even unusable, for one of the settling parties while providing a practical windfall to the other? I agree the Allens’ “meeting of the minds” argument fails. But it fails because the parties’ minds did not have to meet on the location of the right-of-way. In fact, after the Allens accepted the deed, the parties did just what the grantor and grantee of a right-of-way with no definite location would have done. And what the law permits them to do. The Allens hired a road contractor to mark out a convenient route between the specified Road and the specified boundary line in the right general direction. Their first pick was the centerline of an existing road the Road crosses. They needed a survey, and the easement deed anticipated they would affix one. Why? Because they would have to decide on and describe a course along the land. And the Wyants objected to their proposed routes, consistent with their right to delimit where the easement could go. E.g., Ark. Valley Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Brinks, 240 Ark. 381, 400 S.W.2d 278 (1966). Whether it was the Allens or the Wyants who ultimately chose the route, “[t]he location must be reasonable in either case[,]” Bradley v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 280 Ark. 492, 496, 659 S.W.2d 180, 182 (1983), because they had not agreed where exactly it would go. There’s that pesky concept of reasonableness again. 12 Had the majority not found a “specifically described” easement, that legal backstop would have guaranteed both sides “a convenient, reasonable, and accessible way” considering the relative hardships to both, if they could not agree on a location. Benson, 319 Ark. at 72, 889 S.W.2d at 759 (emphasis original); Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 939 S.W.2d 858 (1997). Eventually, someone told the surveyors to draw an easement along the southernmost 18 feet of the Wyants’ property. The circuit court did not find that the parties had agreed to a specifically described easement there. But it found that, of the three routes surveyed, one “most closely aligns with the Exhibit ‘A’ attached to the settlement agreement”—the Waffle House exhibit. Again, it recognized the mere appearance of an easement, not a viable property right of ingress/egress that could actually be deployed by real people and in a reasonable manner for some reasonable cost. Here is the Waffle House exhibit: Given three choices, it was inevitable one would “most closely” align with that drawing. The test, though, was whether the parties’ agreement identified one specific easement that could be located on the ground. It simply did not. The Waffle House exhibit shows the Wyants wanted to put the easement as far south as they could. The circuit court could weigh that desire heavily when it selected 13 a mutually reasonable place to put it. But on a featureless rectangle that gives no hint about the corresponding topography, the exhibit did not locate the easement so specifically that nothing the Wyants wanted—the start point, the end point, the bearing—would have to give if it proved unusable for the Allens. These surveys measure to the hundredth of a survey foot; the rectangle marked “Wyant” is a parcel one quarter mile tall. I doubt any two surveyors in the world could agree exactly how far from Wyants’ south boundary this ballpoint easement is supposed to begin. But none of them should put it zero feet away, where the Allens’ easement is now. And if they did, it could not be sustained because this bargained-for easement must be at a reasonable location and be reasonably convenient to both the Allens and the Wyants. Both families gave up something in the bargained-for exchange and settlement agreement. Or so two levels of courts should have recognized. * To my concurring colleague. I appreciate the concern, but I comprehend this case with pristine clarity. My colleague concludes, “An unfavorable outcome does not make the agreement unenforceable,” and therefore misses the circuit court’s error and the thrust of my dissent. I am not arguing that the agreement should not be enforced; quite the contrary. I would enforce the agreement. But I would do so in accord with Arkansas property law, which happens to embody good ol’ fashioned economic sense and fair play when parties exchange a deed for a right-of-way without committing to exactly where it will go. I’ll explain. The Allens moved to enforce an easement deed the parties had annexed and incorporated as Exhibit B to their settlement agreement. The Wyants agreed to and did sign the deed in exchange for $8,000. The unscaled map above was Exhibit A to the settlement agreement. The agreement 14 incorporated it for a particular purpose—to identify the parcels involved. (Hence the names.) It made sense to do that because the Allens owned two landlocked parcels; only one was at issue in this deal. The differentiation and identification of which Allen parcel was in play was therefore critical. That said, the parties clearly knew they’d need to memorialize the course of the easement for their successors in interest. They agreed that a scrivener’s affidavit would supplement the deed with a specific location after a survey. I discussed this point above and reiterate it here. Back to the hand-penned line on Exhibit A. The parties’ agreement did not incorporate the line on Exhibit A for any purpose. The deed didn’t either. But even if it had, the twain would not specifically describe the location of a right-of-way under the “can-a-surveyor-locate-it?” standard.3 Surely that statement is beyond dispute in the sense that atoms exist and memento mori. None of my colleagues has explained how the squiggly line above, on a parcel a quarter-mile tall, “specifically describes” an arrow-straight easement along the southern boundary. Yet, despite the lack of specifics, the deal did not implode. On this my colleagues and I agree. Why not? Because where the deed did not specifically provide otherwise, the law supplied something mutually convenient. Enter the rule of reasonableness, which presents the opportunity— indeed, the directive—to fill the descriptive gap as a matter of law. That rule is why the conveyance of an undefined or partly undefined right-of-way can be enforced and not scuttled altogether. That 3Doug’s Elec. Serv., Inc., supra. Courts elsewhere have relied on maps not drawn to scale as evidence that an easement corresponded to a feature depicted in a survey, Cassani v. Northfield Sav. Bank, 893 A.2d 325 (Vt. 2005) (existing road), or an area specifically described in a deed. Bouchard v. Abbott, 488 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. 1985) (easements to use beach and lake). I am not aware of any opinion holding that such a map or drawing specifically described a new easement along an imaginary line. 15 rule is why I would direct the circuit court to enforce the agreement and locate the easement, but in line with Arkansas law, not in contravention of it. The reversible error here is that the circuit did not correctly apply the law to the record and select a right-of-way that was, for both parties, “convenient, reasonable, and accessible” while considering the relative hardships to both parties if they could not agree on a location. Benson, 319 Ark. at 72, 889 S.W.2d at 759 (emphasis original). Nor has the majority done so. That’s the whole waffle. * The majority’s decision recognizes only the illusion of property rights. It does not, however, confer any practical or meaningful legal benefit to the Allens. Instead, it has blessed a right-of-way route that could not be traversed but by giants, seraphim, or a person who is willing and able to have “several hundred loads” of red-clay dirt trucked into an area where it is “extremely difficult” to come up with that material and the dump trucks to haul it. Several hundred loads of dirt. Extremely difficult task. That holding makes no good economic sense and is not otherwise a correct application of the law to this record. Perhaps the Arkansas Supreme Court will review this decision, connect the property-law dots the majority has not, and impose a just and reasonable result. I respectfully dissent. Matthews, Campbell, Rhoads, McClure & Thompson, P.A., by: Sarah L. Waddoups, for appellants. Watkins, Boyer, Gray & Curry, PLLC, by: Jennifer E. Gray, for appellee. 16