Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON BOLORTSETSEG GANTUMUR, No. 88251-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION AMARTSENGEL SANJAA, Appellant. DÍAZ, J. — Amartsengel Sanjaa challenges the trial court’s entry of the final orders dissolving his marriage to Bolortsetseg Gantumur, creating a final parenting and child support plan, and distributing their property. Sanjaa principally argues that the trial court erred by entering RCW 26.09.0191 restrictions against him, by distributing the property in a manner that was not fair, just, and equitable, and by making the dissolution effective as of April 7, 2021. We disagree with each argument, affirm the trial court, and decline to award fees or any further relief to either party. I. BACKGROUND Gantumur and Sanjaa were married in Chicago, Illinois in 2006. Gantumur and Sanjaa are both citizens of Mongolia and came to the United States on student visas. The parties moved to Washington in 2007 and remained in the state until No. 88251-1-I/2 their separation. The parties have three children together: Anand, 1 E.A., and A.A. As testified at trial and found by various courts, during the marriage, Sanjaa subjected Gantumur to domestic violence. Gantumur testified that she and Sanjaa argued frequently, particularly about Sanjaa’s gambling and drinking, and Sanjaa turned physical during the arguments. In one particular incident, Sanjaa broke Gantumur’s nose while on a trip to Chicago, requiring her to seek medical attention. The trial court found Sanjaa’s explanation of this event not credible. Gantumur also testified that Anand, the parties’ eldest child, witnessed the domestic violence and refused to visit Sanjaa as a result. Gantumur and Sanjaa separated when Sanjaa was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on July 10, 2019. Gantumur hired a lawyer to fight the detention, but Sanjaa lost his appeal and was deported to Mongolia. After his deportation, Gantumur sent all of Sanjaa’s personal property, including a Chevrolet Silverado and a camper, to him in Mongolia via two international shipping containers. Gantumur also sent all of Sanjaa’s funds held at Banner Bank to him in Mongolia, despite not being court ordered to do so. In September 2020, Gantumur sent E.A. and A.A. to live in Mongolia, which at the time had no reported cases of COVID-19. She testified that this was a temporary decision to protect the two younger children from COVID-19 and was not meant to be a permanent transfer of custody. According to Gantumur, Sanjaa cut off contact between her and the 1 While he was still a minor during the dissolution proceedings, Anand is now over the age of 18. We refer to him by his first name to avoid confusion with his siblings. 2 No. 88251-1-I/3 children, and she was only able to communicate with E.A. though TikTok. 2 Sanjaa returned E.A. to the United States in April 2021, which only he agreed to do in exchange for money. When E.A. arrived in Washington, he had high cholesterol, a weight problem, and a limp. E.A. also had not attended school in multiple months, causing him to fall behind academically. Sanjaa kept A.A. in his custody and refused to return her to the United States until the trial court ordered him to do so in September 2024. Gantumur filed for dissolution on October 12, 2020. Gantumur obtained permission from the court to serve Sanjaa by publication and placed a notice in the Everett Daily Herald. Sanjaa did not respond and Gantumur obtained a decree of dissolution, parenting plan, and child support order by default on April 7, 2021. Gantumur remarried on May 15, 2021. In September, 2021, the parties agreed to vacate the final orders and set the matter for trial. Gantumur also filed a petition for dissolution in Mongolia. The court in Mongolia initially awarded sole custody of A.A. to Sanjaa. Gantumur appealed the court’s decision and the Mongolian court of appeals reversed and awarded custody of A.A. to Gantumur. In its decision, the court of appeals found: According to the comments and details given by involving parties, daughter [A.A.] has lived with her mother G. Bolortsetseg and older brothers A. Anand and [E.A.] until she was sent to her biological father S. Amartsengel in Mongolia in July 2021 when she was just a year old. However, G. Bolortsetseg did not send [A.A.] to Mongolia for permanent residence and she is a little child incapable of deciding who she really wants to live with because she’s only 5. Given these circumstances, it was not right to decide that she was to live apart from her mother and brothers. 2 TikTok is a mobile application for sharing short videos. 3 No. 88251-1-I/4 6.2 Moreover, plaintiff G. Bolortsetseg was subject to S. Amartsengel’s violent behaviors during the period they lived together, and submitted evidences on his addiction to alcohol to the court. Primary court rejected such submission when deciding child custody even though defendant failed to deny this allegation by evidence. Sanjaa appealed to the Mongolian supreme court, which upheld the decision of the court of appeals. Trial in the Washington dissolution proceeding was held from December 16, 2024 to January 7, 2025. Both parties testified through the use of interpreters. No other witnesses testified. Following trial, the court entered a final divorce order with an effective date of dissolution of April 7, 2021. The trial court found that whereas Gantumur was credible, Sanjaa was not credible and was motivated by his desire to retaliate against Gantumur and to make more money. Accordingly, the court adopted Gantumur’s proposed property distribution and parenting plan. The trial court also adopted and incorporated by reference the findings and conclusions of the Mongolian court of appeals. The court awarded the condominium in Lynnwood, Washington to Gantumur and ordered that she be solely responsible for the remaining balance of the mortgage. The court awarded both parties all their personal property and bank accounts held in their current possessions. The court also awarded to Sanjaa the amount Gantumur had paid to ship his possessions to Mongolia, the amount she paid to remove the lien on the Silverado, and the amount she paid his immigration attorneys to fight his deportation. The court found that Sanjaa was intransigent but declined to award attorney 4 No. 88251-1-I/5 fees, as Sanjaa had no ability to pay them. However, the court included in its order the $5,000 in attorney fees it had previously ordered Sanjaa to pay for a last minute continuance that the court determined was requested in bad faith. The trial court ordered that all three children reside primarily with Gantumur in the United States and granted her sole decision making. The court entered restrictions against Sanjaa under RCW 26.09.191, based on its findings that Sanjaa had abandoned Anand and E.A. for an extended time and that Sanjaa had a history of committing domestic violence. The court ordered that A.A. reside with Sanjaa in Mongolia during the summer, with all costs of transportation to be paid by the receiving parent. The court did not order any residential time with E.A., but stated that Sanjaa could elect to spend time with all of the children should he visit Washington during the school year. Using the worksheets submitted by the State of Washington, the trial court ordered that Sanjaa pay one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) in child support per month until Anand turned 18, then one hundred dollars ($100) thereafter. Sanjaa appeals. II. ANALYSIS A. Parenting Plan: RCW 26.09.191 Restrictions This court reviews trial court decisions involving the welfare of children, including the creation of a parenting plan, for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Horner, 151 Wn.2d 884, 893, 93 P.3d 124 (2004). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Salas v. Hi-Tech Erectors, 168 Wn.2d 664, 668-69, 230 P.3d 583 5 No. 88251-1-I/6 (2010). “A court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). Initially, Sanjaa asserts that the trial court’s findings are not sufficiently specific to enable this court’s review. He asserts that CR 52(a) requires that the trial court articulate specific reasoning for its findings of fact and that subsection (a)(5) requires that “incorporated findings must detail evidentiary support.” CR 52(a) contains no such requirements. 3 CR 52(a)(2) states only that findings and conclusions are necessary “[i]n connection with all final decisions in . . . divorce proceedings.” Subsection (a)(5) says nothing at all about “incorporated findings.” Rather, CR 52(a)(5) states: Findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary: (A) Stipulation. Where all parties stipulate in writing that there will be no appeal. (B) Decision on motions. On decisions of motions under rules 12 or 56 or any other motion, except as provided in rules 41(b)(3) and 55(b)(2). (C) Temporary restraining orders. On the issuance of temporary restraining orders issued ex parte. 3 Sanjaa also cites to an alleged quotation from In re Dependency of A.M.F., 23 Wn. App. 2d 135, 144, 514 P.3d 755 (2022), stating “Conclusory oral remarks, lacking evidentiary grounding, cannot substitute for written findings of fact. Such findings are insufficient for appellate review.” As Gantumur correctly notes, A.M.F. contains no such quotation. On reply, Sanjaa states that the quotation was “impreci[se]” and that the case still stands for the same general proposition. It does not. The specificity of the court’s findings was not at issue in that case. 6 No. 88251-1-I/7 “Where a party fails to cite to relevant authority, we generally presume that the party found none.” State Constr., Inc. v. City of Sammamish, 11 Wn. App. 2d 892, 906, 457 P.3d 1194 (2020). Accordingly, we presume no authority exists to support Sanjaa’s argument. More substantively, Sanjaa asserts that the trial court erred by entering RCW 26.09.191 restrictions against him because they were based solely on “conclusory findings of domestic violence, neglect . . . and abandonment[.]” Under RCW 26.09.191, the trial court shall limit a parent’s residential time when it finds that a parent has engaged in “[w]illful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time;” or “[a] history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 7.105.010, an assault that causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm, or any sexual assault[.]” RCW 26.09.191(4)(a)(i), (iii). Here, the trial court found that Sanjaa abandoned Anand and E.A. and that Sanjaa had a history of domestic violence against Gantumur. Sanjaa, however, did not assign error to any of the trial court’s findings of fact. Where an appellant has not assigned error to the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are treated as verities on appeal. In re Marriage of Brewer, 137 Wn.2d 756, 766, 976 P.2d 102 (1999). As the trial court’s findings of fact underlying its conclusions that he committed domestic violence against Gantumur and abandoned his children are verities, the trial court did not err by entering .191 restrictions against him. To the extent that Sanjaa’s brief can be read to properly assert a challenge to the trial court’s findings of fact, his argument similarly is without merit. A trial 7 No. 88251-1-I/8 court’s findings of fact will be upheld so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Parentage of A.F.M.B., 1 Wn. App. 2d 882, 887, 407 P.3d 1161 (2017). Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record contains “evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” In re Marriage of Chandola, 180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014) (citing In re Marriage of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012)). The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. In re Marriage of Zigler & Sidwell, 154 Wn. App. 803, 812, 226 P.3d 202 (2010). Sanjaa asserts that the trial court’s finding that he engaged in domestic violence was based solely on its determination that he was not credible. The record demonstrates otherwise. During the trial, Gantumur testified extensively about the multiple acts of domestic violence Sanjaa subjected her to, including dragging her by the hair, punching, kicking, and pinching her after picking him up from the casino, choking her and threatening to kill her, threatening her during calls to her children, and breaking her nose while on a trip to Chicago. As to abandonment, and with respect to Anand, Gantumur testified that Sanjaa refused to speak to Anand until a court ordered him to do so and that he denied that Anand was his child. With respect to E.A., Gantumur testified that he returned from Mongolia with multiple health problems and not having engaged in any schooling. Sanjaa urges this court to discredit Gantumur’s testimony, but we do not reevaluate the credibility of witnesses or the weight and persuasiveness of the 8 No. 88251-1-I/9 evidence. See Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009). Instead, we must “defer to the trial court’s determinations on the persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony.” Id. The trial court found that Gantumur’s testimony about these events was credible. The evidence therefore supports the trial court’s findings that Sanjaa abandoned his children and engaged in acts of domestic violence, necessitating the imposition of restrictions under RCW 26.09.191. B. Property Distribution In a dissolution proceeding, the court will distribute property “either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable.” RCW 26.09.080. The trial court’s discretion to distribute property in a dissolution proceeding is “broad” because it is “in the best position to assess the assets and liabilities of the parties” to ascertain what is just and equitable. Brewer, 137 Wn.2d at 769. Thus, on appeal, we accord trial courts in dissolution proceedings “significant deference.” In re Marriage of Farmer, 172 Wn.2d 616, 630, 259 P.3d 256 (2011). We will only reverse a trial court’s distribution if there is a manifest abuse of discretion and the distribution is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Neumiller, 183 Wn. App. 914, 920, 335 P.3d 1019 (2014). We consider the trial court’s characterization of property to be relevant as we determine whether it abused its discretion, but it is not controlling. Brewer, 137 Wn.2d at 766. The ultimate question is whether the division is just and equitable. In re Marriage of Groves, 10 Wn. App. 2d 249, 254, 447 P.3d 643 (2019). We evaluate whether property division is fair and equitable based on all the facts and 9 No. 88251-1-I/10 circumstances. In re Marriage of Stachofsky, 90 Wn. App. 135, 147, 951 P.2d 346 (1998). The party seeking review has the burden to provide and perfect the record so that we have all the relevant evidence before us. RAP 9.2(b); State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d 607, 619, 290 P.3d 942 (2012); Stiles v. Kearney, 168 Wn. App. 250, 259, 277 P.3d 9 (2012). “An insufficient appellate record precludes review of the alleged errors.” Stiles, 168 Wn. App. at 259. Here, the trial court admitted 125 exhibits during the course of trial, a significant number of which concerned the parties’ assets and liabilities. Sanjaa did not designate any of them on appeal. For this reason alone, we could decline to review Sanjaa’s claim of error with respect to the distribution of property. We nonetheless review Sanjaa’s claim under the record provided. First, Sanjaa asserts that the trial court erred by using the date of separation instead of the date of the petition in determining when the community ceased to exist. RCW 26.16.140 states, “When spouses or domestic partners are living separate and apart, their respective earnings and accumulations shall be the separate property of each.” Sanjaa cites no authority in support of his argument that the trial court should have used a different date to characterize the parties’ property. His argument is without merit. Second, Sanjaa asserts that the trial court’s division of property was not fair, just, and equitable because it awarded the majority of the property to Gantumur. In particular, Sanjaa contends that the trial court’s finding that he possessed 10 No. 88251-1-I/11 $84,128.98 in “cash” was not supported by the evidence. 4 Substantial evidence supports a finding when the record contains “evidence sufficient to persuade a fair- minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Chandola, 180 Wn.2d at 642 (citing Katare, 175 Wn.2d at 35). There is such evidence here. Gantumur testified extensively about the numerous money transfers she made in 2020, totaling $40,300.00, transferring the balance of Sanjaa’s Banner Bank account to him in Mongolia. Gantumur also testified that she paid off the $16,622.00 remaining on the loan on the Silverado that she sent to Sanjaa in Mongolia, that she spent over $12,000 shipping two cargo containers worth of Sanjaa’s property to him in Mongolia, that she placed approximately $2,994.00 in an account for Sanjaa to access while he was detained by ICE, and that she paid the fees incurred by Sanjaa’s immigration attorneys. As the trial court noted in its findings, Gantumur’s testimony was supported by receipts and other documents that were submitted as exhibits. Taken together, this evidence amply supports the trial court’s decision to credit Sanjaa with $84,128.98 in liquid assets. Third, Sanjaa contends that the division of property is not fair, just, and equitable because the trial court did not consider the parties’ income disparity. 5 The “economic circumstances of each spouse” is one of four non-exclusive factors 4 Sanjaa also contends that the trial court failed to credit him with the income he was earning from the Lynnwood condominium. As Sanjaa never testified that he was earning income from the Lynnwood condominium, this argument is without merit. 5 Sanjaa additionally contends that the trial court failed to consider that Gantumur was comingling her current business and personal funds. Sanjaa does not explain how this is relevant to the distribution of property. 11 No. 88251-1-I/12 to be considered by the trial court in determining whether the division of property is just and equitable. RCW 26.09.080. Despite Sanjaa’s claim to the contrary, the trial court did take the economic circumstances of each spouse into consideration. The trial court found that Sanjaa was likely underreporting his income as he was untruthful to the court in Mongolia about his earnings, failed to provide full financial documentation, failed to show the amount of tips he was earning as a taxi driver, if any, and did not present evidence of how much he was earning through the kiosk he owned. The court also noted that the cost of living is significantly lower in Mongolia than in Snohomish County. Additionally, the trial court found that Gantumur had been supporting the Lynnwood condominium with her own funds, as she had not received any money from Sanjaa since the date of separation. 6 Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to Gantumur, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the division of property was fair, just, and equitable. Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 812. As reflected on the summary of assets and liabilities attached to the dissolution decree, the trial court divided the parties’ community property nearly equally. Although Gantumur received a large share of the assets, the trial court’s distribution also assigned all of the outstanding community debts to Gantumur. Further, all of the distributed property was already in the hands of the respective party to whom it was awarded, thereby avoiding any 6 On reply, Sanjaa argues that the trial court mischaracterized the Lynnwood condominium by attributing part of its current value as Gantumur’s separate property. “An issue raised and argued for the first time in a reply brief is too late to warrant consideration.” Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992). 12 No. 88251-1-I/13 further international asset transfers. Sanjaa fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its significant discretion in distributing the parties’ property. C. Effective Date of the Dissolution Sanjaa asserts that the trial court erred by issuing a nunc pro tunc dissolution order rendering the dissolution of the party’s marriage effective as of April 7, 2021, as it had no legal justification for doing so. We disagree. The trial court has discretion to enter a dissolution decree nunc pro tunc “where it is necessary to effectuate an important public policy (i.e., avoidance of bigamy or bastardy) or where necessary to correct a clerical or ministerial error.” In re Marriage of Pratt, 99 Wn.2d 905, 909-10, 665 P.2d 400 (1983). As Sanjaa acknowledges, avoidance of bigamy is an important public policy warranting the issuance of a nunc pro tunc dissolution decree. See also Rabbage v. Lorella, 5 Wn. App. 2d 289, 301, 426 P.3d 768 (2018). Because Gantumur remarried on May 15, 2021, the nunc pro tunc decree was necessary to avoid bigamy. 7 And contrary to Sanjaa’s assertion, he suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court’s decision to make the decree effective as of April 7, 2021, because the date of dissolution is irrelevant to the classification of the parties’ assets as community or separate property. See supra Section II.B. The trial court did not err by issuing a decree of dissolution effective April 7, 2021. 7 Sanjaa nonetheless asserts that a nunc pro tunc decree may only be entered when necessary for public policy reasons and when the circumstances involve mistake, inadvertence, or neglect. Assuming without deciding that the trial court must find mistake, inadvertence, or neglect before it may enter a dissolution decree nunc pro tunc, the court did so here, finding that Gantumur’s entry of a default order and the timing of her remarriage were the result of “pro se mistakes.” 13 No. 88251-1-I/14 D. Attorney Fees on Appeal Gantumur requests an award of attorney fees under RAP 18.9 against Sanjaa for filing a frivolous appeal. RAP 18.9(a) authorizes the appellate court, on its own initiative or on motion of a party, to order a party or counsel who files a frivolous appeal to pay sanctions, including compensatory damages to the opposing party. “An appeal is frivolous if there are no debatable issues on which reasonable minds might differ and it is so totally devoid of merit that there is no reasonable possibility of reversal.” In re Marriage of Schnurman, 178 Wn. App. 634, 644, 316 P.3d 514 (2013). While we reject Sanjaa’s arguments, the appeal was not frivolous, and we deny Gantumur’s request for fees. Gantumur also requests a determination that Sanjaa is a vexatious litigant and that this court issue restrictions against him accordingly. Under RCW 26.51.030(1), a party to litigation may seek an order restricting abusive litigation “if the parties are current or former intimate partners and one party has been found by the court to have committed domestic violence against the other party.” When a party moves for an order restricting abusive litigation, the court must “attempt to verify that the parties have or previously had an intimate partner relationship and that the party raising the claim of abusive litigation has been found to be a victim of domestic violence by the other party.” RCW 26.51.040(1). If the court “verifies that both elements are true, or is unable to verify that they are not true,” it must “set a hearing to determine whether the litigation meets the definition of abusive litigation.” Id. Although “any court of competent jurisdiction” may order a hearing to be held, this court does not conduct factual hearings. See Dalton M, LLC v. N. 14 No. 88251-1-I/15 Cascade Tr. Servs., Inc., 2 Wn.3d 36, 54, 534 P.3d 339 (2023) (holding “appellate courts are not fact-finders”). Gantumur’s request is denied without prejudice to seek any relief that may be appropriate in the trial court. III. CONCLUSION We affirm the decision of the trial court and decline to award fees to Gantumur, and the other relief she seeks. WE CONCUR: 15