Full Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals Susan Koutsogiannis, Respondent, v. George Petros Koutsogiannis, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2023-000996 Appeal From Spartanburg County M. Todd Thigpen, Family Court Judge Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-459 Submitted September 1, 2026 – Filed October 21, 2026 AFFIRMED Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville, for Appellant. N. Douglas Brannon, of Kennedy & Brannon, P.A., of Spartanburg, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from a divorce decree following a trial. Appellant George Koutsogiannis (Husband) argues the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a pretrial order providing that Husband would be prohibited from submitting evidence as to the valuation of marital property if he did not cooperate with securing appraisals and attend mediation. Husband also argues the family court erred in its valuation of the marital property. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Susan Koutsogiannis (Wife) filed for divorce from Husband on September 24, 2021, requesting equitable division of the marital estate. Husband answered and counterclaimed, seeking divorce on the ground of adultery, equitable division of the marital estate, and an award of attorney fees and costs for defending against Wife's action. On November 1, 2022, the family court dismissed the case without prejudice because the parties did not request a final hearing within the 365-day benchmark imposed by the Supreme Court's family court benchmark administrative order. See RE: Family Court Benchmark, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated July 24, 2020. On December 5, 2022, Wife's attorney sent a letter to the family court explaining that Husband had relieved his trial counsel and refused to attend a mediation that was scheduled before the case was ultimately dismissed. The letter further explained that mediation was rescheduled for February 6, 2023, and requested that the family court reinstate the case. The family court did so on January 12, 2023, and additionally granted an extension to schedule a final hearing to March 1, 2023. Although there is no transcript for it in the record, the family court held a hearing on January 11, 2023, about reinstating the case. According to the family court's ensuing order—which was filed on March 23, 2023—Wife was present at the hearing along with her attorney, and Husband's new attorney was present, but Husband himself was not. This March 23 order stated that Husband's new attorney informed the court that he had been retained the day before the hearing and "believed that he could get [Husband] to cooperate in this matter." He also assured the family court that Husband was aware of the hearing, but he did not know why Husband failed to appear. The March 23 order also required Husband to cooperate in allowing the marital property to be appraised and to attend mediation. It also set the matter for a one-day trial on April 5, 2023, stated that no continuances would be granted for discovery purposes, and ordered: If [Husband] continues to refuse to cooperate with appraising real properties and/or refuses to attend [m]ediation in this matter, [Husband] shall be precluded from introducing any evidence regarding the value of marital property. [Wife] may affix her own stated values for marital property, both personal and real[,] and those values shall be accepted by the [c]ourt. Husband did not attend the mediation scheduled for February 6, 2023. At trial, Wife presented valuations of the marital property. Husband's attorney objected to the valuations of property because the valuations were based on recent values rather than the property's value when the parties filed for divorce. In response, Wife's attorney brought up the family court's pretrial order, and the family court read the above-quoted paragraph from the bench. Husband's attorney simply replied, "Understood." Wife's attorney then pointed out that Husband did not appear for mediation. Shortly thereafter, when Wife's attorney attempted to move her appraisal of one of the properties into evidence, Husband's attorney objected, arguing that the appraisal "was made not as of the date of filing or it's not set for the value for that date," further noting that real estate prices after the action commenced had "gone crazy." The family court again mentioned the pretrial order and admitted the appraisal while noting Husband's objection. The family court ultimately entered a divorce decree granting Husband a divorce on the ground of adultery and dividing the property between Husband and Wife. It further ordered Husband to pay $5,000 for the costs of appraisals and denied both parties' requests for attorney fees. Husband filed a motion to reconsider wherein he assigned numerous errors to the family court's analysis on the equitable division issues. He also argued the court erred by determining he was uncooperative with discovery and mediation and argued the "sanction" of prohibiting him from introducing his own evidence as to the valuation of the property subject to division was unsupported by the evidence and extreme. The family court denied the motion. This appeal followed. ISSUES ON APPEAL I. Whether the family court erred by barring Husband from presenting evidence regarding the valuation of the properties subject to equitable division when the pretrial order prescribing this penalty was entered without subject matter jurisdiction and thirteen days before the trial. II. Whether the family court erred in its identification of and assignment of value to the marital property. III. Whether the family court erred by denying Husband's request for an award of attorney fees and costs and requiring Husband to pay the entirety of the costs for the property appraisals. STANDARD OF REVIEW Appellate courts review the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the family court de novo. See Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 596, 813 S.E.2d 486, 486– 87 (2018) (per curiam). Evidentiary or procedural rulings by the family court are reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 594 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 486 n.2. LAW AND ANALYSIS I. Pretrial Order A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Husband argues that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the pretrial order regarding Husband's ability to introduce evidence concerning the valuation of the property subject to equitable division. Husband points out that this case was still dismissed without prejudice on January 11 when the family court held the hearing culminating in the pretrial order. To Husband, this raises a subject matter jurisdiction issue. Husband correctly points out that questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal. See McCain v. Brightharp, 399 S.C. 240, 247, 730 S.E.2d 916, 919 (Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). 1 We hold that the family court had subject matter jurisdiction. "Subject matter jurisdiction is 'the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237–38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (quoting Bank of Babylon v. Quirk, 472 A.2d 21, 22 1 On the other hand, questions of jurisdiction other than subject matter jurisdiction are subject to issue preservation requirements. See Brown v. Brown, 392 S.C. 615, 621 n.1, 709 S.E.2d 679, 683 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (finding that the argument on appeal "concern[ed] jurisdiction, generally, which is bound by preservation rules, and not subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time"). Husband did not preserve any attack on the family court's jurisdiction. (Conn. 1984)). "The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of a proceeding is determined by the Constitution, the laws of the state, and is fundamental." Anderson v. Anderson, 299 S.C. 110, 115, 382 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1989). Divorce and equitable division of marital property cases are, as a general class, exclusively within the power of the family court to adjudicate. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(2) (2010) (providing the family court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine actions for divorce and settlement of all equitable rights of the parties, including for the real and personal property of the marriage). Consequently, we affirm as to this issue. B. Timing of the Pretrial Order and Severity of the Sanction Husband characterizes the family court's refusal to allow him to introduce evidence about the valuation of the marital property as a sanction. Husband argues that even if the family court had subject matter jurisdiction when it issued the pretrial order, the pretrial order was invalid because no factual findings were made to support the sanction it imposed. Husband also argues the pretrial order’s requirement that he attend mediation or suffer a sanction cannot fairly be enforced because the order was not entered until over a month after the mediation already occurred. Regardless of any merit these arguments may have, they were not made to the family court. During the trial, Husband's counsel commenced no meaningful attack on the family court's pretrial order whatsoever; rather, when the family court clarified its understanding of the order, Husband's counsel simply replied, "Understood." Thus, these arguments are not preserved.2 See Foster v. Foster, 393 S.C. 95, 99, 711 S.E.2d 878, 880 (2011) ("In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must both raise that issue to the trial court and obtain a ruling."). II. Property Valuations Husband's brief on appeal notes simply that he filed a motion to reconsider below and claims these points "are incorporated into th[e] brief." The brief then lists 2 Husband's argument that the sanction was not supported by the circumstances was raised to the family court in his motion for reconsideration, but issue preservation rules generally prohibit a party from raising an issue for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. See Kosciusko v. Parham, 428 S.C. 481, 507, 836 S.E.2d 362, 376 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding an issue was unpreserved when the appellant raised his argument to the family court for the first time in a motion for reconsideration). each real property that the family court addressed and lists a variety of conclusory arguments for each. The entire section cites just one case and even then, only once.3 Reviewing the motion to reconsider that Husband purports to incorporate by reference, there is not a single citation to any authority. Consequently, these arguments are all abandoned. See R & G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 437, 540 S.E.2d 113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); see also Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 327 n.1, 730 S.E.2d 282, 284 n.1 (2012) (providing that when an appellant's "argument in her brief is purely a recitation of facts, devoid of any citation to legal authority, with [only a] summary conclusion," the argument has been abandoned). III. Attorney Fees and Costs Husband argues the family court erred by ordering him to reimburse Wife for the cost of the appraisals and by refusing to grant him attorney fees. Husband's only argument on this point, however, is that "the justification is based on the pretrial order" that Husband's first argument attacks. Husband makes no other arguments. Thus, Husband has tethered the success of this argument to the success of his attack on the pretrial order. Because we reject that argument, we likewise reject this one.4 CONCLUSION For these reasons, the order of the family court is 3 The brief cites Buist v. Buist, 399 S.C. 110, 730 S.E.2d 879 (Ct. App. 2012), aff'd as modified, 410 S.C. 569, 766 S.E.2d 381 (2014). Although Buist discussed equitable division, the error its analysis addressed was that "[t]he family court did not identify all the parties' marital property[] but instead selectively divided certain real and personal property without determining the fair market value of all the property." 399 S.C. at 118, 730 S.E.2d at 883. Thus, we are unable to find any support for Husband's argument in Buist. 4 Husband also argues that the family court erred by failing to consider the parties' life insurance policy. This argument was never raised to the family court and is consequently not preserved for appellate review. See Foster, 393 S.C. at 99, 711 S.E.2d at 880 ("In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must both raise that issue to the trial court and obtain a ruling."). AFFIRMED.5 GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ, concur. 5 We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.