Herdler, G. v. Herdler, J.
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket903 EDA 2026
JudgeKing
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
GARRY HERDLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JENNIFER HERDLER : No. 903 EDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2026
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
No(s): 2019-06032
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2026
Appellant, Garry Herdler (“Husband”), appeals from the order entered
in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his pro se
petition seeking to vacate the divorce decree that had been previously entered
on November 5, 2025; and from the separate order finding him in contempt
of the equitable distribution order and divorce decree, and directing him to
pay $9,500.00 in attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm on the basis of the trial
court’s opinion.
The trial court aptly summarized the relevant facts and procedural
history of this matter and we adopt that opinion herein. (See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/14/26, at 1-6). By way of background, Husband and Jennifer
Herdler (“Wife”) were married on September 21, 1996, and are the parents of
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two children.1 The parties separated on March 26, 2017. On March 29, 2019,
Husband filed a divorce complaint, asserting the marriage was irretrievably
broken, and requesting equitable distribution of the marital property and
shared physical and legal custody of the children. Wife subsequently moved
to Chester County.
On March 12, 2025, the court entered an order scheduling a two-day
equitable distribution hearing for July 14, 2025 and July 15, 2025. The order
provided that continuance requests must be filed with the court and
accompanied by certificates of service, as well as emailed to the hearing
officer. Further, absent an emergency, the court stated that continuance
requests should be made no less than 48 hours prior to the hearing.
On June 19, 2025, Wife filed a motion seeking a continuance and her
request was granted. The court rescheduled the hearing for August 27, 2025
and August 28, 2025.
On August 27, 2025, Husband and Wife appeared before a hearing
officer for an equitable distribution hearing. At that time, Husband requested
a continuance and the request was denied. Husband attempted to argue
issues he had with Wife’s counsel, and other matters not appropriately before
an equitable distribution hearing officer. When further questioned, Husband
stated he would not participate in the hearing, both because of his issues with
counsel, and because he had an important board meeting to attend. When
____________________________________________
1 As of the date of this memorandum, both Children are emancipated and
custody is not at issue in this appeal.
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the hearing officer pointed out that Husband had not formally requested a
continuance, Husband claimed he had done so, but the request was not of
record. Finally, Husband marked and entered into evidence two exhibits
before leaving the courtroom. The hearing then proceeded in his absence on
August 27, 2025 and August 28, 2025.
On October 14, 2025, the hearing officer filed a thorough report and
recommendation; as well, the docket indicates that the order was emailed to
Husband at his listed email address, gpherdler@hotmail.com, the same day.
On October 31, 2025, Husband filed a document entitled “Emergency
Petition for Special Relief to Obtain Court Order Sealing All Filings, Documents,
and Testimony in Support Hearing (And Divorce Hearings); And Directing
[Wife] to Cooperate as Required in the 12/19/24 Confidentiality Agreement
(Court Approved),” requesting that the case be placed under seal. Wife filed
an answer and counterclaim on November 3, 2025.
As well, on November 3, 2025, Husband attempted to submit a filing to
the prothonotary that was rejected because he had chosen an incorrect
description for the filing and attempted to file it as an “Equitable Distribution
Report.”
On November 5, 2025, 22 days after the equitable distribution report
was filed, the court entered a decree in divorce and accepted the hearing
officer’s recommendation for division of the marital property and noted that
no exceptions had been filed within the requisite 20-day period.
On November 6, 2025, Husband untimely filed pro se exceptions to the
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hearing officer’s report and recommendation. On that document he set forth
his email address as jpherdler@hotmail.com. The filing also listed several
dates on which he claimed he had attempted to file exceptions.
On November 12, 2025, Husband filed a pro se emergency petition for
special relief, seeking to stay enforcement of the equitable distribution order
pending review of his exceptions and an upcoming short list conference
scheduled for December 8, 2025. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim to
the petition.
On November 13, 2025, Husband pro se filed an emergency petition,
asserting that Wife’s attorney was in contempt of a court order dated March
13, 2025.2
On December 8, 2025, Husband filed a pro se emergency petition to
vacate the divorce decree and for leave to file exceptions nunc pro tunc,
averring that the court had failed to mail the equitable distribution report to
Husband’s updated address; that Husband’s stepfather had died suddenly,
necessitating emergency travel; that the court had rejected his electronic
filings and committed other alleged procedural irregularities; and premature
issuance of a divorce decree while Husband’s exceptions remained unresolved.
Wife filed an answer and counterclaim to Husband’s contempt petition.
____________________________________________
2 Husband referred to a stipulation signed by the parties, and entered as a
court order, relating to a confidentiality agreement as to financial and other
sensitive information concerning Husband’s employment. The order provided
that violating the confidentiality agreement would result in a finding of
contempt of court.
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On December 9, 2025, Husband filed an additional pro se petition,
seeking vacatur of the divorce decree and leave to file exceptions nunc pro
tunc, alleging extrinsic fraud, fatal defect, extraordinary cause, and hearing
officer errors and omissions. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim.
On January 22, 2026, Wife filed a petition for contempt and
enforcement. Ultimately, the court consolidated all outstanding matters for a
hearing.
On February 18, 2026, the parties appeared before the court for a
hearing, at which both Husband and Wife testified, and were each represented
by counsel. Prior to testimony, Husband’s counsel represented to the court
that Husband was seeking to vacate the divorce decree pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 3332, not to open the decree. Husband asserted that the hearing
officer’s refusal to grant him a continuance on August 27, 2025, constituted
extrinsic fraud. In the alternative, Husband asserted that he had attempted
to “submit” timely exceptions but that they were not accepted, and that this
constituted either extrinsic fraud or a fatal defect of the record.
On February 20, 2026, the court denied Husband’s pro se petition to
vacate the divorce decree and declared that it lacked jurisdiction to review
Husband’s petition for leave to file exceptions nunc pro tunc. As well, the
court entered an order finding Husband in contempt of the November 5, 2025
divorce decree and equitable distribution award, finding Husband had willfully
refused to comply with the decree. Thus, the court ordered Husband to
comply with the divorce decree and equitable distribution award and pay
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$9,500.00 to Wife within 10 days of the order as reimbursement for her
attorney’s fees.
On March 19, 2026, Husband timely filed a counseled notice of appeal
from the court’s orders. On March 23, 2026, the court ordered Husband to
file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. On
April 10, 2026, Husband timely complied.
On appeal, Husband raises the following issues for review:
The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in denying
Husband’s petition to vacate the divorce decree based on
extrinsic fraud and/or a fatal defect on the face of the
record.
The trial court erred/abused its discretion by violating
Husband’s due process rights in not allowing him to testify
regarding all the petitions pending before the court on
February 18, 2026.
The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in finding
Husband in contempt of the equitable distribution order as
Husband clearly demonstrated an inability to comply with
the terms of the order.
The trial court erred and/or abused its discretion in ordering
Husband to pay attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of
$9,500.00.
(Husband’s Brief at 5).
Initially, this Court has observed:
We review an order denying a motion to open or vacate a
divorce decree for an abuse of discretion. Danz v. Danz,
947 A.2d 750, 752 (Pa.Super. 2008). “Petitions to open the
decree must be filed within 30 days. During this 30–day
period, the court holds wide discretion to modify or rescind
its decree.” Melton v. Melton, 831 A.2d 646, 651
(Pa.Super. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “The trial
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court’s broad discretion is lost, however, if the court fails to
act within 30 days. After this 30-day period, an order can
only be opened or vacated if there is fraud or some other
circumstance so grave or compelling as to constitute
extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.”
Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Section 3332
of the Domestic Relations Code governs motions to open or
vacate divorce decrees and states that, after 30 days, a
petitioner must allege extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or
a fatal defect on the face of the record in order to obtain a
vacatur of the divorce decree. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3332.
Specifically, Section 3332 provides:
A motion to open a decree of divorce or annulment
may be made only within the period limited by 42
Pa.C.S. § 5505 (relating to modification of orders) and
not thereafter. The motion may lie where it is alleged
that the decree was procured by intrinsic fraud or that
there is new evidence relating to the cause of action
which will sustain the attack upon its validity. A
motion to vacate a decree or strike a judgment alleged
to be void because of extrinsic fraud, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter or a fatal defect
apparent upon the face of the record must be made
within five years after entry of the final decree.
Intrinsic fraud relates to a matter adjudicated by the
judgment, including perjury and false testimony,
whereas extrinsic fraud relates to matters collateral to
the judgment which have the consequence of
precluding a fair hearing or presentation of one side
of the case.
23 Pa.C.S. § 3332.
In this context, “extrinsic or collateral fraud” refers to
“conduct of the prevailing party which has prevented a fair
submission of the controversy.” Justice v. Justice, [612
A.2d 1354, 1358 (Pa.Super.] 1992) (citations omitted) (per
curiam). “The fraud in such case is extrinsic or collateral to
the question determined by the court.” Id. (citations
omitted).
Maldonado v. Maldonado, 340 A.3d 1049, 1052, appeal denied, ___ Pa.
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___, 352 A.3d 450 (2025) (emphasis in original omitted).
As well, regarding findings of contempt,
“In reviewing a trial court’s finding on a contempt petition,
we are limited to determining whether the trial court
committed a clear abuse of discretion. This Court must
place great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial
[court] when reviewing an order of contempt.” P.H.D. v.
R.R.D., 56 A.3d 702, 706 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied,
[626 Pa. 678,] 94 A.3d 1010 [(2014)].
“To be in contempt, a party must have violated a court
order, and the complaining party must satisfy that
burden by a preponderance of the evidence.
Specifically, the complainant must prove certain
distinct elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice
of the specific order or decree which he[, or she,] is
alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act
constituting the contemnor’s violation was volitional;
and (3) that the contemnor acted with wrongful
intent.
[J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en
banc)] (citations, quotation marks, and original brackets
omitted).
Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa.Super. 2023).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Raymond
McGarry, we conclude Husband’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion
comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented.
In his first issue, Husband argues that the court erred and abused its
discretion by denying his petition to vacate the divorce decree. According to
Husband, the hearing officer’s denial of his same-day request for a
continuance prevented him from attending the equitable distribution hearing
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and constituted extrinsic fraud. Husband alleges that he provided extensive
testimony regarding his pro se attempts to timely file his exceptions to the
equitable distribution report, and that Wife would not have been prejudiced
by the filing of the exceptions nunc pro tunc.
Here, the court explained that Husband did not file a request to open
the divorce decree within 30 days, and that Husband sat on his rights at a
time when the court had latitude to provide relief. (See Trial Court Opinion,
5/14/26, at 7-19). As a result, Husband was required by statute to show
either extrinsic fraud, or a fatal defect on the record. (See id.) The court
concluded that Husband had failed to show extrinsic fraud because Wife did
nothing to prevent a fair submission of the controversy; rather, Husband’s
own actions were to blame. (Id.) As well, there was no fatal defect on the
face of the record. (Id.) Although Husband argued that the prothonotary’s
rejection of his November 3, 2025 filing constituted such a defect, it was not
clear what Husband attempted to file on November 3, 2025, despite the
court’s attempts to have Husband clarify. (Id.) The court found Husband’s
testimony incredible and the evidence he presented unconvincing that he had
attempted to file exceptions. (Id.) Rather, the evidence suggested that on
November 3, 2025, Husband had attempted to file exhibits. (Id.) As a result,
Husband could not prove that he timely filed exceptions to the equitable
distribution order, but for an improper rejection by the prothonotary. (Id.)
Therefore, the court properly denied Husband’s petition to vacate the divorce
decree. See Maldonado, supra.
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In Husband’s second issue, he argues that the court erred and violated
his due process rights by not allowing him to testify regarding all petitions
pending before the court on February 18, 2026. The court explained that
Husband did not preserve this issue for appeal, constituting waiver.
Specifically, the trial court explained that Husband failed to seek the
introduction of testimony or witnesses relevant to the various petitions. The
record supports this conclusion. (See Trial Court Opinion at 19-20). See also
Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues cannot be raised for first time on appeal).
Even if not waived, the issue lacks merit. Because the court ruled that the
decree could not be vacated, it lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of any
other petitions, and it would have been improper to permit testimony on these
subjects. (See Trial Court Opinion at 19-20).3
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3 As well, we note that Husband has arguably waived this issue for purposes
of appeal based on deficient briefing. The Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide that an appellant’s argument section “shall be divided into as many
parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each
part—in distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point
treated therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.” See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). See also Iron Age Corp. v.
Dvorak, 880 A.2d 657, 665 (Pa.Super. 2005) (observing that this Court will
not consider merits of argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory
authority); Eichman v. McKeon, 824 A.2d 305 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal
denied, 576 Pa. 712, 839 A.2d 352 (2003) (observing that failure to cite
relevant legal authority constitutes waiver of claim on appeal).
Here, Husband’s brief raises four claims in his statement of questions, but his
argument section contains only two sections. As well, Father has failed to cite
to relevant legal authority concerning the alleged due process violations. Nor
has Husband identified the witnesses he was prevented from presenting at the
February 18, 2026 hearing. Thus, Husband has arguably waived his due
process claim for these reasons as well.
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In Husband’s third issue and fourth issues combined, he argues that the
court erred and abused its discretion in finding Husband in contempt of the
equitable distribution order, as he had demonstrated an inability to comply
with the terms of the order. Specifically, Husband references his testimony
that if the order were carried out, he would be forced to file for bankruptcy,
and further claims that the bank account referenced in the equitable
distribution report was depleted by the time of the report. As well, Husband
asserts the court erred by ordering him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of
$9,500.00 as a result of the contempt. Nevertheless, the court explained that
Husband’s testimony did not suggest an inability to pay but that he did not
think it was the best use of his money. (See Trial Court Opinion at 22-25).
The court detailed Husband’s history of objecting to and arguing with court
orders and his “combative demeanor and his dismissive attitude” toward the
equitable distribution order. (See id.) The court concluded: “The
determination of contempt is fully supported by Husband’s testimony.
Husband did not show that he had an inability to pay. He just didn’t agree
with the order.” (Id. at 25). Thus, the court concluded that Husband had
willfully failed to comply with the order, justifying the finding of contempt and
imposition of attorney’s fees and costs. On this record and for the reasons
outlined in the trial court’s opinion, we cannot say the court abused its
discretion in finding Husband in contempt. See Rogowski, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Orders affirmed.
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Date: 11/20/2026
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2019-06032-0155 02:12 Page
Opinion, PM 1
$0.00. The filer certifies that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy of the
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION — FAMILY DIVISION
GARRY HERDLER NO. 2019-06032
V.
JENNIFER HERDLER ; 903 EDA 2026
1925(a) OPINION
McGARRY J. MAY 14, 2026
INTRODUCTION
Appellant/Plaintiff, Garry Herdler (“Husband”), has filed this appeal
from two separate orders, both entered February 20, 2026,! after a Protracted
Hearing was held.
On February 20, 2026, several orders were issued following a
Protracted Hearing that resolved multiple petitions. Husband appeals from two of
Case# 2019-06032-155 Docketed at Montgomery County Prothonotary on 05/14/2026 2:41 PM, Fee
these orders. First, he appeals from the Order denying his Motion to Vacate the
Divorce Decree, wherein he sought to vacate the divorce decree entered on
November 5, 2025, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §3332. Husband claimed that the
divorce decree should be vacated based on extrinsic fraud and a fatal defect on the
record. Having denied the Motion to Vacate, the Order also determined that this
Court lacked jurisdiction to review Husband’s Petition for Leave to File Exceptions
I This Court notes that filing a single notice of appeal from multiple orders is discouraged. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp.
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur, Co., 263 A.2d 448, 452 (Pa. 1970). Nevertheless, “appellate courts have not generally quashed such
appeals, provided that the issues involved are nearly identical, no objection to the appeal has been raised, and the period for
appeal has expired.” In Interest of P.S., 158 A.3d 643, 648 (Pa. Super. 2017).
RULE 236 NOTICE PROVIDED ON 05/14/2026
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$0.00. The filer certifies that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy of the
Nunc Pro Tunc, Husband’s Emergency Petition in Divorce, and Husband’s
Answer/Response and Exceptions to Equitable Distribution.
Second, Husband appeals from the Order entered on February 20,
2026, granting Wife’s Petition in Contempt and Enforcement and granting Wife’s
counterclaims requesting attorney’s fees in the amount of $9,500.
On appeal, Appellant challenges the denial of his Motion to Vacate the
Divorce Decree. He also contends that his due process rights were violated when he
was allegedly not permitted to testify as to all of his petitions at the Protracted
Hearing. Further, Husband asserts that this Court abused its discretion by granting
Wife’s Petition for Contempt and granting attorney’s fees.
For the following reasons, Appellant’s issues do not warrant relief and
the February 20, 2026 Orders should be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Case# 2019-06032-155 Docketed at Montgomery County Prothonotary on 05/14/2026 2:41 PM, Fee
On March 29, 2019, Husband filed a divorce complaint which in part
requested equitable distribution of the marital assets. On March 12, 2025, a two-
day equitable distribution (“ED”) hearing was scheduled for July 14, 2025 and July
15, 2025. The order provided that “[a]ll continuance requests shall be made by filing
an ED Motion for Continuance with a Certificate of Service on the docket.” The
order further directed that any continuance request be emailed to the Hearing
Officer (“HO”). The order warned that absent an emergency, continuance requests
should be made no less than 48 hours prior to date of the hearing.
Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania: Case Records of the Appellate and Trial Courts that require filing confidential information and documents differently than non-confidential information and documents. 2019-06032-0155 Opinion, Page 3
$0.00. The filer certifies that this filing complies with the provisions of the Public Access Policy of the
On June 19, 2025, Wife filed a motion for a continuance in the manner
required, and a continuance was granted. The ED hearing was rescheduled for
August 27, 2025 and August 28, 2025. See, ED Scheduling Order, filed 6/24/25.
As scheduled, the ED hearing was held on August 27, 2025 and August
28, 2025 in front of HO Lynn A. Snyder, Esquire. Husband appeared at the hearing,
and he requested a continuance. Husband claimed that he had submitted a prior
request, but the HO denied the continuance request having not received any such
request prior to the start of the ED hearing.
A Report and Recommendation Upon Equitable Distribution, Alimony,
Counsel Fees and Costs (“ED Order”) was entered on the docket on October 14,
2025. The docket reflects that the ED Order was emailed to Husband at
gpherdler@hotmail.com on that same day. The 20 days in which to file exceptions to