Full Opinion

25-2554-cv Mattera v. Westhampton Beach School District UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of November, two thousand twenty six. PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, STEVEN J. MENASHI, MATTHEW A. SCHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________ JUSTIN MATTERA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-2554-cv WESTHAMPTON BEACH SCHOOL DISTRICT, SUZANNE MENSCH, as President of the Board of Education of the Westhampton Beach School District, CAROLYN PROBST, as Superintendent of the Westhampton Beach School District, CHRISTOPHER HERR, as Principal of the Westhampton Beach High School, CHARISE MILLER, as Principal of the Westhampton Beach Middle School, MARY ANN AMBROSINI, as the Director of Pupil Personnel for the Westhampton Beach School District, ROBERT FINN, as Director of Guidance and Data Management for the Westhampton Beach School District, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________________________________ For Plaintiff-Appellant: CHRISTIAN KILLORAN, Killoran Law P.C., Remsenburg, NY. For Defendants-Appellees: JOSHUA S. SHTEIERMAN, Volz & Vigliotta, PLLC, Nesconset, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (DeArcy Hall, J.). Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the September 30, 2025 judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Justin Mattera (“Mattera”) is a special education math teacher for the Westhampton Beach School District (“Westhampton”). From 2009 until the 2 events underlying this lawsuit, Mattera taught Regents algebra and geometry in an integrated class setting with both learning disabled and non-learning disabled students. During the 2021–22 academic year, Westhampton created a new non- integrated math class for students who were struggling academically. Mattera believed this new class caused grade inflation, left students unprepared for future courses, and undermined the rights of learning disabled students. Mattera expressed these concerns to Westhampton at various times. Westhampton subsequently reassigned Mattera to teach a non-Regents geometry class for learning disabled students and four resource room classes. 1 Mattera sued Westhampton, alleging that his reassignment constituted retaliation for his advocacy for learning disabled students and therefore violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, and the First Amendment. Mattera also alleged that his reassignment constituted illegal interference with his advocacy under the ADA. 2 Westhampton moved to dismiss these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court 1 “Resource room” classes provide students with supplemental assistance in their other content-area classes and have very few students. 2 Mattera also sued Westhampton under several state laws, and the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. 3 granted the motion. Mattera appeals the district court’s decision. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm. We review the district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. Simon v. KeySpan Corp., 694 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). 3 As relevant here, to state a claim for retaliation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, Mattera must allege, among other things, that he suffered an adverse employment action. Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337, 353 (2d Cir. 2019). To be adverse in this context, the employment action must be “materially adverse.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 3 The district court said in its opinion that Mattera was proceeding pro se. However, it appears he was represented by counsel at the time he filed the operative complaint. See, e.g., Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conference, ECF No. 8 (counsel seeking leave to amend); D. Ct. Dkt. Entry No. 10 (counsel filed amended complaint). Nevertheless, we “liberally construe” the allegations of that complaint, “reading such submission[] to raise the strongest arguments [it] suggest[s].” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam). 4 (2006). 4 An undesirable reassignment cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim without some harm that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. (citation modified). Examples of materially adverse reassignments include those that create a disproportionately increased workload, Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 88 (2d Cir. 2015), result in less prestige, Kessler v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 207 (2d Cir. 2006), or involve a decrease in salary or a less distinguished title, Davis-Garett v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 921 F.3d 30, 43 (2d Cir. 2019). Mattera’s reassignment does not constitute an adverse employment action. Mattera alleges that he was reassigned from teaching Regents math to non-Regents math and four resource room classes. Even construing his complaint liberally, he does not allege any harm beyond receiving a less desirable assignment than he had previously received. On appeal, Mattera argues that his reassignment involved an increased workload and less prestige. But Mattera’s operative 4 Mattera contends that he must only plead “some ‘disadvantageous’ change” in his employment. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 354 (2024). The Court in Muldrow explicitly rejected importing this lower anti-discrimination standard into the retaliation context, instead affirming the “materially adverse” standard from Burlington Northern. Id. at 357. 5 complaint, even liberally construed, did not plead allegations giving rise to those inferences. Without more, Mattera’s reassignment as alleged in his complaint cannot form the basis of a retaliation claim. Mattera also fails to state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. A plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must allege that he engaged in speech protected from government regulation. Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2015). The First Amendment does not prevent the government from regulating the speech of a public employee when he makes “statements pursuant to [his] official duties.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Speech is pursuant to official duties when, “given the timing and circumstances of the speech itself, the speech at issue is speech the employee is expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job.” Dolce v. Connetquot Cent. Sch. Dist., 191 F.4th 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2026) (citation modified). Mattera spoke pursuant to his official duties as a public employee when he complained about Westhampton’s new class. Mattera alleges that he spoke out against Westhampton’s new class at monthly math department meetings. It goes without saying that teachers are expected to discuss teaching at department meetings. Because Mattera is expected to engage in such speech in the course of 6 carrying out his job, the First Amendment does not prevent his public employer from regulating such speech, and therefore it cannot give rise to a retaliation claim. Id. at 68. Finally, we do not address Mattera’s claim for interference under the ADA. The district court construed Mattera’s complaint to raise a claim asserting interference with his student’s rights and dismissed that claim for failure to allege any link between his conduct and his student’s rights. Mattera’s briefs did not challenge this aspect of the district court’s decision on appeal, and he has therefore forfeited any argument with respect to it. Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). We have considered Mattera’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 7