Rouzard v. United States

Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 1 Filed: 11/10/2026 NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ DIANSKY ROUZARD, Plaintiff-Appellant v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee ______________________ 2026-1233 ______________________ Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims in No. 1:24-cv-02111-RAH, Judge Richard A. Hertling. ______________________ Decided: November 10, 2026 ______________________ DIANSKY ROUZARD, Oviedo, FL, pro se. RICHARD L. PARKER, Tax Litigation Branch, Civil Divi- sion, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by CLINT CARPENTER, BRETT SHUMATE, JOSHUA WU. ______________________ Before PROST, TARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 2 Filed: 11/10/2026 2 ROUZARD v. US Diansky Rouzard filed an action in the Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court) in which, as now relevant, he sought refunds for what he alleged were overpayments of income tax he made to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for two tax years. The Claims Court dismissed his claims for fail- ure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. Rouzard v. United States, 179 Fed. Cl. 209 (2025) (Deci- sion). We now affirm that dismissal. I A Mr. Rouzard’s lawsuit concerns income taxes he paid for the 2019 and 2022 tax years. For the 2019 tax year, Mr. Rouzard reported $30,046 in gross wages. Supplemental Appendix (S. Appx.) 32. After reducing that income by the then-standard deduction of $12,200, Mr. Rouzard reported $17,846 in taxable income, and his resulting tax-liability calculation of $1,945 was entirely offset by a child tax credit, leaving him with no owed taxes. S. Appx. 32–33. Mr. Rouzard, however, also reported $30,046 in “2019 esti- mated tax payments and amount applied from 2018 re- turn,” S. Appx. 35—matching his total income for the year. Thus, his return requested a tax refund of $30,046 to offset his existing payments and ensure his self-reported tax lia- bility remained at $0. S. Appx. 33. Mr. Rouzard’s return for the 2019 tax year was dated February 22, 2023, and received by the IRS on March 1, 2023. S. Appx. 32–33. The IRS rejected Mr. Rouzard’s re- turn and issued a CP13 Notice—a form issued when the IRS corrects mistakes on a tax return but finds no refund owed by the IRS and no additional amount owed by the tax- payer—that calculated Mr. Rouzard’s “[t]otal payments and credits” to be $0, so that he was not owed a refund. S. Appx. 92–93. The CP13 Notice informed Mr. Rouzard that, if he “[doesn’t] agree with the changes . . . made,” he can “contact [the IRS] by January 12, 2024[,] to resolve the er- rors.” S. Appx. 92. Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 3 Filed: 11/10/2026 ROUZARD v. US 3 For the 2022 tax year, Mr. Rouzard filed an initial re- turn on February 12, 2023, reporting $4,376 in taxable in- come, leading to a total tax liability of $0 after applying the standard deduction. S. Appx. 41–43. The IRS accepted Mr. Rouzard’s return and recognized that it had already re- ceived $713 in withholdings for that year, which it credited to him to reduce his tax deficiency for the 2021 tax year. S. Appx. 61. On May 26, 2023, Mr. Rouzard amended his 2022 return, newly reporting a total income of $49,094— listed in full as “other income” “redeem[ed] in lawful money per Title 12 [U.S.C. §] 411,” S. Appx. 62–64 (capitalization altered)—and claiming $49,094 in tax payments, referring to “Form(s) 1099,” S. Appx. 67. (No such forms are attached to the 2022 returns submitted to us.) Subtracting his self- reported tax liability of $4,130, Mr. Rouzard, in his amended return, requested a refund of $44,964. S. Appx. 62, 67. As with the 2019 return, the IRS concluded that it had no record of Mr. Rouzard’s $49,094 in tax payments and thus could not provide Mr. Rouzard with the requested $44,964 refund. See S. Appx. 60–61. The agency concluded that Mr. Rouzard’s 2022 tax liability remained at $0. S. Appx. 60. B Invoking 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), Mr. Rouzard took his tax dispute to the Claims Court on December 20, 2024, and on January 2, 2025, he filed an amended complaint seek- ing, as relevant here, a refund of federal income tax amounting to $75,010—the combined amount of Mr. Rouzard’s requested tax refunds for the 2019 and 2022 tax years. 1 The Claims Court ordered the government to file 1 He presented other claims to the Claims Court, which dismissed them. Even when we construe his briefs to us liberally, we agree with the government that he did not adequately present a challenge to the dismissal of those Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 4 Filed: 11/10/2026 4 ROUZARD v. US dispositive motions regarding those claims by September 29, 2025, and later granted a motion by the government to extend the deadline to October 6, 2025. The government missed the extended deadline due to an illness of its coun- sel, and it requested leave to file its dispositive motion out of time. Despite objection from Mr. Rouzard, the Claims Court granted leave to file the out-of-time motion, and the government filed its motion to dismiss Mr. Rouzard’s re- maining tax-dispute claims on October 8, 2025. The Claims Court granted the government’s motion and dismissed the refund claims for 2019 and 2022 on De- cember 3, 2025. Decision, 179 Fed. Cl. at 212–17. It rea- soned that Mr. Rouzard had not plausibly alleged facts that could satisfy the requirement (for such a refund recovery in court) of having “duly filed” an administrative claim with the agency because he filed with the agency only “[u]nsupported assertions” with no meaningful documenta- tion for the assertion that he had made claimed overpay- ments. Id. at 215. The Claims Court addressed the following documents, which Mr. Rouzard attached in his opposition to the motion to dismiss: (1) an October 9, 2025 tax compliance report; (2) a November 14, 2023 record of account; (3) a screenshot showing the processing of Mr. Rouzard’s amended 2022 tax return; (4) the CP13 Notice given to Mr. Rouzard; and (5) two 1099-A forms directed, respectively, to 2019 and 2022. 2 The court determined that other claims in this court. Government Response Br. at 1– 2 n.2. 2 Form 1099-A provides a way to report to the IRS whether one “lend[s] money in connection with [his or her] trade or business and, in full or partial satisfaction of the debt, . . . acquire[s] an interest in property that is security for the debt.” About Form 1099-A, Acquisition or Abandon- ment of Secured Property, IRS.GOV (Mar. 30, 2026), https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-a. Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 5 Filed: 11/10/2026 ROUZARD v. US 5 the first four documents were “either not relevant to prov- ing that his administrative claims were duly filed or . . . insufficient to meet that burden.” Id. at 216. As for the fifth submission, the Claims Court determined that the two 1099-A forms give no indication that they were actually re- ceived by the agency or that the disputed sums were paid by Mr. Rouzard, withheld, or remitted to the agency. Id. Accordingly, the Claims Court concluded that Mr. Rouzard “ha[d] not provided ‘facts sufficient to apprise the [IRS] Commissioner of the exact basis of the 2019 and 2022 re- fund claims’”—thus failing to meet the requirement of duly filed administrative claims—and dismissed Mr. Rouzard’s refund claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC). Id. at 216–17 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402–2(b)(1)). The Claims Court entered final judgment on December 4, 2025, and Mr. Rouzard timely appealed to this court the same day. We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). II We review the Claims Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2023). “Where juris- diction was not determined based on resolution of factual disputes, we decide de novo the correctness of a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim.” Id. We review the Claims Court’s docket-management decisions for an abuse of discretion. Nuance Communications, Inc. v. ABBYY USA Software House, Inc., 813 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016). A Mr. Rouzard first contends that the Claims Court in- correctly held that he had not presented enough to survive the dismissal motion given the requirement of a duly filed administrative claim. He argues that the tax returns he Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 6 Filed: 11/10/2026 6 ROUZARD v. US filed themselves “clearly specified the refund amounts sought and the basis for overpayment.” Rouzard Opening Br. at 4. He also states that the IRS’s “administrative tran- scripts and correspondence” confirm the processing of his tax filings and that the “CP13 adjustment further demon- strates substantive agency review.” Id. at 4–5. He urges this court to accept that his claims were thus “duly filed” and that the Claims Court erred in holding otherwise. See id. at 5. We reject Mr. Rouzard’s contention. This case involves one of the long-established “require- ments for filing refund claims in court.” Dixon, 67 F.4th at 1159–60. “No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of” a tax refund “until a claim for re- fund . . . has been duly filed with the Secretary [of the Treasury], according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursu- ance thereof.” 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (emphasis added). As relevant here, this “duly filed” requirement, which con- cerns the “adequacy of the filing” made to the agency, does not determine the Claims Court’s “jurisdiction,” Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th 1008, 1011–12 (Fed. Cir. 2022), but it remains critical when invoked by the government in de- fending a Claims Court action. Failure to plead enough to meet the requirement if taken as true warrants dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1012. To be duly filed, a claim with the agency must “set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof.” 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402–2(b)(1). This is a specificity requirement: A return “must contain suffi- cient data to allow calculation of tax” and evince “an honest and reasonable intent to supply information [that is] re- quired by the tax code” and that “rise[s] to the level of spec- ificity required by regulation.” Waltner v. United States, 679 F.3d 1329, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 7 Filed: 11/10/2026 ROUZARD v. US 7 The Claims Court correctly determined that nothing in the record provided facts “sufficient to apprise the Commis- sioner of the exact basis” of the 2019 and 2022 refund claims. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.6402–2(b)(1). We agree that none of the documents filed with the Claims Court meets the specificity requirement. Mr. Rouzard’s October 9, 2025 compliance report indicates only that his 2022 return was “timely filed by the due date” but provides no concrete fac- tual basis for entitlement to a refund. S. Appx. 84. His November 14, 2023 record of account for tax year 2019 in- dicates that his refund was filed and repeats the infor- mation in his tax return, including his self-calculated refundable credit of $30,046. S. Appx. 86–87, 90. Im- portantly, the record of account identifies no transactions corroborating Mr. Rouzard’s claimed $30,046 tax payment. S. Appx. 86. The provided screenshot shows only that the IRS received and processed Mr. Rouzard’s amended 2022 tax return. S. Appx. 83. Nor does the CP13 Notice plausi- bly support Mr. Rouzard’s overpayment. See S. Appx. 92– 93. In fact, it shows the opposite: The IRS believed Mr. Rouzard’s purported $30,046 overpayment to be an error on his tax return and concluded that no refund was owed to him. S. Appx. 92 (“[W]e don’t owe [Mr. Rouzard] a re- fund. . . . [Mr. Rouzard] incorrectly calculated the pay- ments section.”). Regarding Mr. Rouzard’s 1099-A forms, the documents do not bear any indication of having been received by the IRS. The 2019 return makes no reference to any such form. The 2022 original and amended returns make no reference to a 1099-A form, though the amended return refers to (but does not attach) “Form(s) 1099.” S. Appx. 67. Even on their face, moreover, they state simply “Credits used on Student Loan” (for 2019) and “Credits used on [redacted]” (for 2022), with no indication how the amounts had been paid to the IRS—the essential premise for Mr. Rouzard’s claims for refunds. S. Appx. 95, 97. Nor does Mr. Rouzard’s unelaborated reference to 12 U.S.C. § 411 fill the gap. The Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 8 Filed: 11/10/2026 8 ROUZARD v. US plausibility line that must be crossed to avoid FRCP 12(b)(6) dismissal is not crossed by this record for the im- portant specificity requirement of “duly filed” claims that inform the agency of the basis for a refund. Mr. Rouzard argues that (1) “constructive disallow- ance” occurred that “triggered [his] statutory right to sue” and (2) the “variance doctrine was improperly applied” and “does not bar his claims.” Rouzard Opening Br. at 2, 5. These arguments are inapposite to the basis of the Claims Court’s holding. As to his “constructive disallowance” ar- gument, the conclusion of the Claims Court is not that Mr. Rouzard lacked the statutory right to sue (and thus that the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction), but rather that Mr. Rouzard’s filings were, as a substantive matter, inadequate to show plausible entitlement to relief—even taking all well-pleaded facts as true. Decision, 179 Fed. Cl. at 215– 17. And we see no reliance by the Claims Court on the “variance doctrine” as barring his claims—instead, his claims were dismissed because he failed to allege plausible facts to show any entitlement to a tax refund. B Mr. Rouzard argues that the Claims Court committed reversible procedural error by allowing the government to file its motion to dismiss two days after the court-set dead- line. Rouzard Opening Br. at 2. We see no abuse of discre- tion by the Claims Court. We have often explained that trial courts, including the Claims Court, have broad discretion and inherent power to manage their own dockets. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 848–49 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936)). Here, the Claims Court exercised its in- herent management authority by allowing the filing of an out-of-time motion two days after the Claims Court’s dead- line had passed. Mr. Rouzard has articulated no basis by which this extension has caused him prejudice; indeed, a Case: 26-1233 Document: 34 Page: 9 Filed: 11/10/2026 ROUZARD v. US 9 similar extension was given to Mr. Rouzard to file his reply. See S. Appx. 31. Thus, there is no unequal application of procedural rules here, as Mr. Rouzard claims (and Mr. Rouzard has not asserted that he sought, and failed to re- ceive, a similar extension). See Rouzard Opening Br. at 6. We find no abuse of discretion in the Claims Court’s ruling that an extension due to an “unforeseen illness,” with no assertion of prejudice to the other party, does not warrant the striking or denial of the government’s motion. Decision, 179 Fed. Cl. at 214 n.5. And we agree with the government that the Claims Court did not, as Mr. Rouzard claims, disregard his objection to the extension, given that it both considered and rejected his objection. See Govern- ment Response Br. at 30; S. Appx. 10. III We have considered Mr. Rouzard’s remaining argu- ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the deci- sion of the Claims Court is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs. AFFIRMED