Full Opinion

Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED November 20, 2026 No. 26-20227 Thomas B. Plunkett, III Summary Calendar Clerk ____________ Keith Walker, Jr., Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:25-CV-4236 ______________________________ Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Keith Walker, proceeding pro se, sued the Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority (“MOHELA”) in Texas state court for alleged misconduct related to his private student loan obligations. Walker brought several claims against MOHELA, including a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act _____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 26-20227 (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. In response, MOHELA removed the action to federal court, and Walker filed an amended complaint. MOHELA moved to dismiss Walker’s amended complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed Walker’s amended complaint “because he sued the wrong party.” Walker then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court summarily denied. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv), 4(a)(7)(A)(i); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(4). On appeal, Walker pursues only his FCRA claim. Walker argues that the district court erred in dismissing his amended complaint and that he plausibly alleged an FCRA violation. MOHELA does not defend the district court’s reasoning but urges us to affirm on the alternative ground that Walker fails to plausibly allege an FCRA violation and that any further amendment would be futile. See Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Regardless of the district court’s analysis, we may affirm for any reason supported by the record.” (cleaned up)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We liberally construe pro se pleadings. See Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021). But we “may not consider new factual allegations made outside the complaint, including those made on appeal.” Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). As for the substance of the pleadings, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And we “can appropriately treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of fact.” City Nat’l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 2 Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 26-20227 As part of his FCRA claim, Walker must allege that a piece of information listed on his credit report was either false or misleading. See Reyes v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 140 F.4th 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2025); Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 267 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000). As we understand Walker’s amended complaint, he alleges that MOHELA inaccurately reported to credit agencies that he had private student loan obligations. But during the course of litigation, Walker conceded that MOHELA’s reporting on that point was correct. Because Walker’s amended complaint fails to specify any other false or misleading piece of information on his credit report, he fails to plausibly allege an FCRA violation. See Hammer v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2020). As for Walker’s Rule 59(e) motion, we review the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. See Johnston & Johnston v. Conseco Life Ins., 732 F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 2013). In his Rule 59(e) motion, Walker restates his argument from the motion to dismiss phase that MOHELA is a proper party. But Rule 59(e) “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). Even if we stretched the bounds of liberal construction and considered Walker’s Rule 59(e) motion under the more permissive Rule 15(a) standard, remand would be futile. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863–64 (5th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Walker’s district court and appellate briefs show that Walker does not dispute the accuracy of MOHELA’s reporting but would have preferred that MOHELA report more information about his financial circumstances. Walker’s concerns about “the completeness of his credit report,” however, cannot support a claim for misleading reporting under the FCRA. Hammer, 974 F.3d at 569; cf. Reyes, 140 F.4th at 286–89. 3 Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2026 No. 26-20227 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 4