Walker v. MO Higher Educ Loan Auth
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-20227
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 20, 2026
No. 26-20227 Thomas B. Plunkett, III
Summary Calendar Clerk
____________
Keith Walker, Jr.,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Missouri Higher Education Loan Authority,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:25-CV-4236
______________________________
Before Clement, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Keith Walker, proceeding pro se, sued the Missouri Higher Education
Loan Authority (“MOHELA”) in Texas state court for alleged misconduct
related to his private student loan obligations. Walker brought several claims
against MOHELA, including a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
No. 26-20227
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. In response, MOHELA removed the
action to federal court, and Walker filed an amended complaint.
MOHELA moved to dismiss Walker’s amended complaint for
failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court
dismissed Walker’s amended complaint “because he sued the wrong party.”
Walker then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court summarily denied.
Walker filed a timely notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv),
4(a)(7)(A)(i); Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(4).
On appeal, Walker pursues only his FCRA claim. Walker argues that
the district court erred in dismissing his amended complaint and that he
plausibly alleged an FCRA violation. MOHELA does not defend the
district court’s reasoning but urges us to affirm on the alternative ground that
Walker fails to plausibly allege an FCRA violation and that any further
amendment would be futile. See Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 734
(5th Cir. 2017) (“Regardless of the district court’s analysis, we may affirm
for any reason supported by the record.” (cleaned up)); Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
We liberally construe pro se pleadings. See Butler v. S. Porter, 999 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2021). But we “may not consider new factual allegations
made outside the complaint, including those made on appeal.” Dorsey v.
Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
As for the substance of the pleadings, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And we “can
appropriately treat statements in briefs as binding judicial admissions of
fact.” City Nat’l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted).
2
Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
No. 26-20227
As part of his FCRA claim, Walker must allege that a piece of
information listed on his credit report was either false or misleading. See Reyes
v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 140 F.4th 279, 286 (5th Cir. 2025); Washington
v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 267 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000). As we
understand Walker’s amended complaint, he alleges that MOHELA
inaccurately reported to credit agencies that he had private student loan
obligations. But during the course of litigation, Walker conceded that
MOHELA’s reporting on that point was correct. Because Walker’s
amended complaint fails to specify any other false or misleading piece of
information on his credit report, he fails to plausibly allege an FCRA
violation. See Hammer v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 974 F.3d 564, 569 (5th
Cir. 2020).
As for Walker’s Rule 59(e) motion, we review the district court’s
denial for abuse of discretion. See Johnston & Johnston v. Conseco Life Ins., 732
F.3d 555, 562 (5th Cir. 2013). In his Rule 59(e) motion, Walker restates his
argument from the motion to dismiss phase that MOHELA is a proper
party. But Rule 59(e) “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal
theories, or arguments that could have been offered or raised before the entry
of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004).
Even if we stretched the bounds of liberal construction and considered
Walker’s Rule 59(e) motion under the more permissive Rule 15(a) standard,
remand would be futile. See Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 863–64
(5th Cir. 2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Walker’s district court and
appellate briefs show that Walker does not dispute the accuracy of
MOHELA’s reporting but would have preferred that MOHELA report
more information about his financial circumstances. Walker’s concerns
about “the completeness of his credit report,” however, cannot support a
claim for misleading reporting under the FCRA. Hammer, 974 F.3d at 569;
cf. Reyes, 140 F.4th at 286–89.
3
Case: 26-20227 Document: 38-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 11/20/2026
No. 26-20227
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
4