Sajid Raza v. State of New Jersey
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket26-2210
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 26-2210
__________
SAJID RAZA,
Appellant
v.
ADAM ZUCKER a/k/a/ADAM SCOTT ZUCKER, as Executor of the Estate of
JEFFREY C. ZUCKER, Deceased; BRENDEN D. MOLES; SHEERA G. ENGRISSEI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-09712)
District Judge: Honorable Edward S. Kiel
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 18, 2026
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 19, 2026)
___________
OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Sajid Raza, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims against various attorneys involved in litigating Raza’s criminal and
civil cases. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Raza filed a complaint in the District Court against a New Jersey state court Judge,
numerous New Jersey prosecutors and other state officials in their individual and official
capacities, and various private attorneys and individuals who were involved in Raza’s
civil and criminal court proceedings. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and the District
Court dismissed, with prejudice, Raza’s claims against the Judge and the state defendants
in their individual capacities. The Court dismissed Raza’s other claims without prejudice,
granting leave to amend so that Raza could cure deficiencies that the Court identified at a
hearing. Raza then filed an amended complaint against a handful of state entities (the
state of New Jersey, Gloucester Township, and Camden County), state officials (a police
officer and an assistant public defender) and several private attorneys; the Court then
granted dismissal motions filed by the state entities and state officials, dismissing those
parties with prejudice.
With the District Court’s leave, Raza filed a second amended complaint (SAC),
alleging two § 1983 claims of conspiracy and malicious prosecution against the private
attorneys who represented him during his criminal and landlord-tenant court proceedings;
he further alleged a handful of New Jersey state-law claims stemming from the same
incidents. Defendants filed motions to dismiss, and the Court, finding that Raza’s SAC
2
was still deficient, dismissed his federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed his state-
law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court. This timely appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a complaint dismissed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770
F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2014). We accept the facts pleaded in the plaintiff’s complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Fleisher v. Standard
Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012).
III.
As an initial matter, Raza states in his opening brief that he seeks to challenge the
District Court’s dismissal of his initial and first-amended complaints. However, he fails
to develop any arguments that relate to the defendants who were dismissed through those
orders. Therefore, he has forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of his original and first
amended complaints. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). To the extent
that Raza presents the District Court’s earlier dismissals as proof that the deficiencies in
his SAC were curable, and that the District Court was therefore too harsh when it
dismissed that complaint with prejudice, that argument fails because, as noted below,
further amendment would have been futile.
The District Court properly determined that Raza’s § 1983 claims, alleging that his
attorneys engaged in malicious prosecution and conspiracy, are too vague and conclusory
to survive dismissal. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that a
plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
3
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The District Court
determined that Raza’s conspiracy allegations lacked any factual basis, and were in fact
thoroughly undermined by the documents he included as exhibits with his complaint. See
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.
1993) (noting that, “[t]o decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the
allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of
public record”). For example, Raza complained that his attorney failed to file a bail
motion on his behalf,1 and that his favorable presentence report was never presented to
the state criminal court to support a bail effort. However, as the District Court noted,
Raza specifically attached to his SAC a transcript from a bail hearing that took place on
January 10, 2020, where his attorney argued a bail motion on his behalf. Another bail
motion hearing took place months later in April 2020. Contrary to his assertions, Raza’s
presentence report, which classified him as having no prior criminal record, was
mentioned multiple times at different hearings in support of his bail motions. When
questioned by the District Court Judge about his allegations, Raza’s responses did not
offer clarity and were instead fanciful and conclusory, such as his assertion that his
lawyer conspired with a judge to “plot[] [his] murder in jail without trial.” ECF Doc. 119
at 5. In sum, Raza’s complaint failed to plead any factual content that allows a Court to
reasonably infer that his attorneys conspired against him, and in fact Raza’s SAC
included documentation that contradicts those very claims.
1
It is difficult to determine that this is what he was alleging based on his SAC, but he
clarified as much at a hearing that took place before the District Court Judge.
4
The District Court also properly dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, as
none of the attorneys named as defendants in Raza’s SAC were plausibly alleged to be
state actors or prosecutors, and were thus not involved in initiating or continuing any
prosecution against Raza. See Benn v. Universal Health Sys., Inc., 371 F.3d 165, 169-70
(3d Cir. 2004) (“To establish a claim under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show that the
defendants 1) were state actors who 2) violated [her] rights under the Constitution or
federal law.”); see ECF Doc. 119 at 14. Given the dismissal of Raza’s two federal claims,
we discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision not to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); see also Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 567 (3d Cir. 2017).
On appeal, Raza’s primary argument is that the District Court abused its discretion
by failing to provide him further leave to amend. While Raza is correct that pro se
pleadings should be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than those
prepared by attorneys, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), it is still the case
that a pro se litigant “must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Considering the
fanciful nature of his § 1983 allegations, and after granting Raza leave to amend his
complaint twice, the District Court did not err in declining to provide further leave to
amend. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002); see also
LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council, 985 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir. 2021) (noting
that amendment would be futile where a plaintiff had been granted leave to amend twice
and offered no news facts in support of amendment).
5
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
6