Umeze v. New York City Department of Finance

25-1987-cv Umeze v. New York City Department of Finance et al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNY CHIN, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x BEN UMEZE, Plaintiff-Appellant, -v- No. 25-1987-cv NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS, PRESTON NIBLACK, FORMER COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, JAMES S. ODDO, FORMER COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS, THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AND ERIC ADAMS, FORMER MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RICHARD LEE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, AHMED TIGANI, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF BUILDINGS, ZOHRAN MAMDANI, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendants-Appellees. * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: BEN UMEZE, pro se, Bronx, New York. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: SARAH E. GILBERT, ASSISTANT CORPORATION COUNSEL (Edan Burkett, on the brief), for Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cronan, J.). * Richard Lee is the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Finance, Ahmed Tigani is the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Buildings, and Zohran Mamdani is the Mayor of the City of New York. They are substituted in place of Preston Niblack, James S. Oddo, and Eric Adams (collectively, the "Former Officials"), respectively, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above to reflect those substitutions and that the Former Officials no longer hold their respective offices. The Former Officials remain parties because the Court assumes they were also named in their personal capacities. See Appellant's Br. at 24-26 (discussing the Former Officials' alleged "personal involvement" and arguing they lack qualified immunity); see also Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1327 (2d Cir. 1993) (explaining that qualified immunity is a proper defense in individual-capacity claims, but not official-capacity claims). -2-  UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the July 30, 2025, order of the district court is AFFIRMED. 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Ben Umeze, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court's order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Umeze sued Defendants- Appellees the City of New York, the New York City Department of Finance, the New York City Department of Buildings, and several City officials (collectively, the "City"), alleging that they incorrectly reclassified the tax category of his real property, and asserting that they violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The City moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge (Parker, M.J.) issued a report and recommendation ("R&R") recommending granting the motion under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Umeze's claims were barred by the Tax Injunction Act ("TIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and the comity doctrine. Umeze v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Fin., No. 24 CIV. 5523 (JPC) (KHP), 2025 WL 2163516, at *1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2025). Umeze did not object to the R&R. 2 The district court (Cronan, J.) reviewed the R&R de novo, 1 The district court did not enter final judgment in a separate document as required by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). But "failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document when required by [Rule] 58(a) does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or order." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B). Under Rule 58(c)(2)(B), the judgment became final 150 days after the order was entered on the docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). 2 Although the "failure to object timely to a magistrate's report operates as a waiver of any further judicial review of the magistrate's decision," this waiver rule is non-jurisdictional. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Small v. Sec. of Health & Hum. Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). Here, we disregard Umeze's waiver and reach the -3- adopted it in its entirety, dismissed Umeze's complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denied leave to amend. Umeze v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Fin., No. 24 Civ. 5523 (JPC) (KHP), 2025 WL 2161289, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2025). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review "de novo . . . the grant of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion that 'is based solely on the complaint and the attached exhibits.'" Kellogg v. Nichols, 170 F.4th 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2026) (per curiam) (quoting SM Kids, LLC v. Google LLC, 963 F.3d 206, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2020)). "[W]e liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest." McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). The district court properly dismissed Umeze's complaint under Rule 12(b)(1). First, the district court correctly held that the TIA barred Umeze's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. "The [TIA] severely limits the power of federal courts to interfere with state taxation proceedings." Long Island Lighting Co. v. Town of Brookhaven, 889 F.2d 428, 431 (2d Cir. 1989). Under the TIA, "[t]he district courts shall merits. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Because the purposes of the waiver rule are not advanced when the district court has reviewed the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation de novo, we will disregard the procedural default rule and reach the merits of [the] case."). -4- not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. This prohibition is jurisdictional and bars district courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over taxpayer claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Bernard v. Vill. of Spring Valley, 30 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1994). Here, the relief Umeze sought fit squarely within this prohibition. Umeze alleged that the City had reclassified his lot into the incorrect tax category, causing him to overpay property taxes. He sought a declaration that the reclassification was "arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful" and an injunction requiring reclassification and refund. Compl. at 3-5. In other words, he sought precisely what the TIA prohibits: to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. As the district court correctly observed, New York provides adequate remedies to raise constitutional objections to property taxes, and Umeze has failed to show otherwise. See Abuzaid v. Mattox, 726 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 2013); Long Island Lighting, 889 F.2d at 431-33 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3001; N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 51; N.Y. Real Prop. Tax Law § 700 et seq.); see also Pan v. City of Niagara Falls, No. 23-7513, 2025 WL 1169057, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 22, 2025) (summary order). To be sure, the TIA does not warrant dismissal of claims just "because they pertain to state tax administration in the most general sense." Luessenhop v. Clinton Cnty., 466 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2006). But here, granting Umeze's request to reclassify -5- his property and refund his alleged overpayment would have resulted in a "federal court[] reducing the flow of money into state coffers--the evil that the TIA was intended to eradicate." Id. at 268. Second, to the extent Umeze sought damages, the district court properly abstained from exercising jurisdiction under the comity doctrine. "[F]ederal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over challenges to state tax assessments, regardless of the type of relief sought." Bernard, 30 F.3d at 297. In the same way the TIA prevents federal courts from giving injunctive or declaratory relief where "there is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in state court, . . . the principle of comity . . . prevents a taxpayer from seeking damages in a § 1983 action" where there is "a plain, adequate, and complete remedy" in state court. Long Island Lighting, 889 F.2d at 431; see Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, 575 U.S. 1, 15 (2015) (describing the non-jurisdictional comity doctrine). "There is 'no significant difference' between the 'plain, speedy and efficient' standard set forth in the [TIA] and the 'plain, adequate, and complete' standard governing comity." Long Island Lighting, 889 F.2d at 431 (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 n.8 (1981)). As discussed above, New York provides adequate procedures for challenging state taxes, including the opportunity to raise federal constitutional claims. See, e.g., id. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the TIA and the comity doctrine warranted dismissal of Umeze's complaint. Moreover, the district court -6- properly denied leave to amend because the complaint's jurisdictional defects do not appear to be curable, and Umeze has failed to propose any amendments indicating otherwise. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A] futile request to replead should be denied."). We have considered Umeze's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk -7-