Fletcher v. El Paso

25CA1964 Fletcher v El Paso 10-22-2026 COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS Court of Appeals No. 25CA1964 El Paso County District Court No. 25CV193 Honorable William Bain, Judge Debra Fletcher, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. El Paso County Assessor’s Office, Peggy Winter, Eric Guthrie, and Jeffrey Tebo, Defendants-Appellees. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED Division II Opinion by JUDGE JOHNSON Fox and Yun, JJ., concur NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 22, 2026 Debra Fletcher, Pro Se Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Meri V. Geringer, Senior County Attorney, Erika M. Keech, Senior County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Debra Fletcher (Fletcher), appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing her claims against defendants, the El Paso County Assessor’s Office (Assessor’s Office) and its employees, Peggy Winter, Eric Guthrie, and Jeffrey Tebo (collectively, the named employees). Fletcher alleged that the Assessor’s Office and the named employees improperly assessed the value of her property and that those employees engaged in willful and wanton conduct in the same process. We affirm. I. Background ¶2 Fletcher, a taxpayer in El Paso County, purchased a 320-acre parcel of land in El Paso County in 2010. In 2014, she began building a manufactured metal home on it (the property). In previous years, Fletcher would receive notices of valuations, appeal them, and on some occasions, the Assessor’s Office or other entities would reduce the assessed value. In 2023, Fletcher received the notice of valuation of her property in the amount of $92,932. Following the initial valuation, she filed a protest with the Assessor’s Office, which denied her request. Fletcher then contacted the Assessor’s Office and had several discussions with various personnel, including some of the named employees. When 1  she did not receive her requested relief through those interactions, she appealed to the El Paso County Board of Equalization (BOE), which reduced the property’s value to $78,751. Fletcher then appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA), which further reduced the assessed value to $55,000. ¶3 Following a protest of the BAA decision, which the BAA denied, Fletcher did not appeal that decision to this court, timely or otherwise. § 39-8-108(2), C.R.S. 2026 (“If the petitioner has appealed to the board of assessment appeals and the decision of the board of assessment appeals is against the petitioner, the petitioner may petition the court of appeals for judicial review according to the Colorado appellate rules . . . .”); § 24-4-106(11)(a), C.R.S. 2026 (“Whenever judicial review of any agency action is directed to the court of appeals, the provisions of this subsection (11) shall be applicable . . . .”). ¶4 Instead, Fletcher filed this lawsuit in district court. Fletcher asserted three claims for relief: (1) violation of section 39-1- 103(13)(c), C.R.S. 2026, alleging the Assessor’s Office failed to apply the cost approach to assess her real property’s value; (2) willful and wanton conduct by the named employees under the Colorado 2  Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) for improperly assessing her property; and (3) a procedural due process violation for failing to provide a written explanation of the value assessment and defects in hearing procedures. The Assessor’s Office and the named employees sought dismissal of all claims under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), which the district court granted. ¶5 On appeal, Fletcher, appearing pro se, raises several issues that can be distilled into two main contentions. First, she contends that the court improperly dismissed her complaint because it incorrectly interpreted section 39-1-103(13)(c) as applying only to personal property, thereby depriving her of fees under section 39-8- 109(1), C.R.S. 2026. Second, she argues that the negligence claim against the named employees was not barred by sovereign immunity because they acted in a willful and wanton manner. We reject both contentions and, therefore, affirm the district court’s judgment. II. Statutory Interpretations ¶6 We conclude that the court properly interpreted the relevant statutory provisions Fletcher challenges and, as a result, she is not entitled to her costs. 3  A. Additional Facts ¶7 After Fletcher successfully appealed to the BAA, she sought post-hearing relief, requesting recovery of costs she incurred during her various appeals. The BAA denied this request, relying on section 39-8-109(1), which states that “[t]he [property owner] and the county shall each be responsible for their respective costs in said court or board of assessment appeals, as the case may be.” In this case, Fletcher claims that she is entitled to costs under section 39-1-103(13)(c), asserting that the Assessor’s Office did not, in good faith, apply the correct property valuation method — the “cost approach” — as part of her property assessment. B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ¶8 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), applying the same standards as the district court. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 16. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if taken as true, establish plausible grounds for relief. Id. at ¶ 23 (citing Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24). The court must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint, “viewing 4  them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. ¶9 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also review de novo review. Reg’l Transp. Dist. v. Aurora Pub. Schs., 45 P.3d 781, 782 (Colo. App. 2001). “We seek to ascertain legislative intent, starting with the plain language of the statute and giving the words their ordinary meaning.” Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d 1207, 1220 (Colo. App. 2008). “If that language is unambiguous, we look no further.” Id. We examine the statute as a whole, giving harmonious effect to all parts of the scheme. Sentinel Colo. v. Rodriguez, 2025 CO 58, ¶ 18. We also presume that the General Assembly intended a just and reasonable result, favoring the public interest over private interests. See § 2-4-201(1)(b), (e), C.R.S. 2026. C. Analysis ¶ 10 In Colorado, property appraisals must be based on one of three methods: the market approach, the cost approach, or the income approach. Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a). But assessors are required to use the market approach to determine the “actual value” of real property. Colo. Const. art. X, § 20(8)(c). Under the market 5  approach, “actual value” is equivalent to market value. Xerox Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 87 P.3d 189, 193 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[A]ctual value is synonymous with market value.”). And market value is defined as “what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller under normal economic conditions.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Assessment Appeals v. Colo. Arlberg Club, 762 P.2d 146, 151 (Colo. 1988)). Accordingly, the market approach requires “analyz[ing] the sales of comparable properties in the market.” Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. S.T. Spano Greenhouses, Inc., 155 P.3d 422, 425 (Colo. App. 2006). ¶ 11 The General Assembly enacted various statutory provisions to implement these constitutional requirements. Consistent with those requirements, section 39-1-103(5)(a) states: “The actual value of residential real property shall be determined solely by consideration of the market approach to appraisal.” (Emphasis added.) Based on these constitutional and statutory provisions, case law is settled on this point. See Xerox Corp., 87 P.3d at 193. ¶ 12 But Fletcher relies on section 39-1-103(13)(c) to argue that the Assessor’s Office should have used the cost approach to assess her 6  real property and that, because the office failed to do so, she is entitled to recover her costs. The provision she relies on says, Assessing officers shall consider the cost approach to the appraisal of property, pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (13), in good faith and shall deny the use of the cost approach only upon just cause that the requirements set forth in this subsection (13) and in section 39-5-116 have not been complied with by a taxpayer. If it is determined at any time that an assessing officer wrongly denied the use of the cost approach, such assessing officer shall be held liable for all costs incurred by the taxpayer in protesting such assessment based on such denial. § 39-1-103(13)(c). Fletcher continues that the absence of a qualifying word such as “real” or “personal” before “property” in the first sentence of the statute unambiguously demonstrates the General Assembly’s intent to authorize the cost approach for assessing real property. ¶ 13 But we cannot read section 39-1-103(13)(c) in isolation. All of section 39-1-103 addresses personal — not real — property. Section 39-1-103(13)(a) states: “The general assembly hereby finds and declares that, in the consideration of the cost approach, market approach, and income approach to the appraisal of personal 7  property by assessing officers, the cost approach shall establish the maximum value of property . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Section 39-1- 103(13)(b) continues: “Therefore, in the assessment of taxable personal property, the assessing officer shall consider the value derived from the cost approach to be the maximum value of the property” if certain requirements are satisfied. (Emphasis added.) Then we get to the provision Fletcher relies on — section 39-1- 103(13)(c), which says, “Assessing officers shall consider the cost approach to the appraisal of property, pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (13), in good faith and shall deny the use of the cost approach only upon just cause that the requirements set forth in this subsection (13) . . . have not been complied with by a taxpayer.” (Emphasis added.) ¶ 14 Because “we must consider the interactions between [a] statute’s subparts,” Sentinel Colo., ¶ 18, section 39-1-103(13)(c) cannot be read without interpreting paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 39-1-103(13). And because section 39-1-103(13) never mentions “real” property, we conclude that it does not apply to Fletcher’s challenge to the assessed value of her real property. Thus, we agree with the district court’s statutory interpretation that 8  the Assessor’s Office was not required to use the cost approach and Fletcher was not entitled to recover costs under section 39-1- 103(13). ¶ 15 Based on the district court’s denial of any costs to Fletcher under section 39-1-103(13), it logically follows that section 39-8- 109(1) controls, requiring both the property owner and county to pay their own respective costs.1 III. Sovereign Immunity ¶ 16 Fletcher argues that the named employees are not entitled to sovereign immunity under the CGIA because they allegedly acted in a willful and wanton manner. She additionally argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing under Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), to resolve factual disputes regarding her allegations of willful and wanton conduct in the property assessment. Finally, she argues that, in dismissing her complaint, 1 Because we have already concluded Fletcher is not entitled to her costs under section 39-1-103(13), C.R.S. 2026, we need not address her contention that the district court improperly denied them under claim or issue preclusion. 9  the district court improperly resolved factual disputes instead of accepting her allegations as true. We are not persuaded. A. Standard of Review ¶ 17 Issues involving sovereign immunity as a defense present mixed questions of law and fact. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 14. “The district court makes ‘factual findings about its ability to hear the case’ and resolves ‘any factual dispute[s] upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn.’” Id. (citations omitted). We defer to the district court’s findings “unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. A court commits clear error “if there is no support for [its findings] in the record.” Dennis v. City & County of Denver, 2016 COA 140, ¶ 16, rev’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 37. Once questions of fact are resolved, we review questions of governmental immunity de novo. Id. at ¶ 17. ¶ 18 It is within the district court’s “discretion to decide whether a Trinity hearing is necessary, and ‘[w]e review the court’s decision on whether to conduct a Trinity hearing for an abuse of discretion.’” BNC Metro. Dist. No. 1 v. BNC Metro. Dist. No. 3, 2025 COA 52, ¶ 17 (citations omitted). If the facts are undisputed, the district court may resolve “the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law.” Id. 10  B. Analysis ¶ 19 The CGIA provides that “sovereign immunity shall be a bar” to claims of injury against a governmental entity or body that lie, or could lie, in tort. § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2026. Likewise, public employees are immune from liability in tort for acts that occur while the employees are performing their duties within the scope of their employment. § 24-10-118(1), (2)(a), C.R.S. 2026. There are circumstances, however, under which this immunity may be waived, as Fletcher alleges it is here, if a government employee’s act or omission causing the injury was willful and wanton. § 24-10- 118(1). ¶ 20 Although the CGIA does not define willful and wanton conduct, the supreme court has provided guidance. Martinez v. Est. of Bleck, 2016 CO 58, ¶ 30. Definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary and other statutes share one common element: “a conscious disregard of the danger.” Id.; Moody v. Ungerer, 885 P.2d 200, 205 (Colo. 1994). Martinez explained that willful and wanton conduct “must be not only negligent, but exhibit [a] conscious disregard for [the] safety of others,” or it must be “purposefully committed, which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done 11  heedlessly and recklessly, without regard to [the] consequences, or of the rights and safety of others, particularly the plaintiff,” or the actor was “wholly disregardful of the rights, feelings and safety of others . . . at times even imply[ing] an element of evil.” Martinez, ¶ 31 (citations omitted). ¶ 21 A division of this court summed up the standard to mean that public employees act willfully and wantonly when they are “consciously aware that their acts or omissions create danger or risk to the safety of others, and they then act, or fail to act, without regard to the danger or risk.” L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, ¶ 33 (quoting Gray v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 2012 COA 113, ¶ 39). A complaint must do more than make conclusory allegations; it must, at minimum, allege ‘“specific facts to support a reasonable inference’ that the employee was consciously aware that his or her acts or omissions created danger or risk to the safety of others, and that he or she acted, or failed to act, without regard to the danger or risk.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 22 Fletcher’s complaint did not plead sufficient allegations of willful and wanton conduct by the named employees to satisfy the standards expressed in Martinez or Carricato. For example, she 12  alleged that “[d]efendants, in the course of their official duties and under color of state law, owed Plaintiff a statutory and professional duty to assess property accurately in accordance with Colorado law and accepted appraisal standards.” She continued, “Their ongoing failure to correct known errors, consider submitted evidence, or adhere to mandatory valuation methodologies constitutes a breach of that duty and supports Plaintiff’s claims of willful and wanton misconduct.” She also alleged that the named employees violated various statutory provisions and standards under the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). But simply asserting a violation of a statutory provision or standard, without specific facts showing conscious disregard of risk, is insufficient. See Warne, ¶¶ 9, 27 (a court need not accept as true allegations couched as legal conclusions, conclusory statements, or allegations lacking any factual support). ¶ 23 And disagreement with assessment value, methods, or practices, however erroneous Fletcher believes them to be, does not establish that the named employees were consciously aware their acts or omissions created a risk of danger to Fletcher. Even if Fletcher ultimately received a reduction in the assessed value of her 13  property — which she obtained through the BOE and BAA appeals — that outcome does not, without more, support that the named employees engaged in willful and wanton conduct. ¶ 24 Nonetheless, Fletcher contends that her due process claim bolsters her willful and wanton conduct allegations, asserting that the reduced assessment demonstrates noncompliance with the statutes and forced her into costly, time-consuming appeals. She contends that the court’s dismissal of her due process claim “would eliminate due process protection for anyone who eventually wins their case.” Under this claim, she alleged that she did not receive due process from the Assessor’s Office because it did not “explain[] in writing the basis for its valuation determinations, that the BOE referee had not reviewed plaintiffs [sic] proffered evidence prior to the hearing, [and] that the defendants withheld valuation data, did not disclose their methodology for valuing the property, and relied on false assumptions.” The district court dismissed her due process claim, finding no private cause of action under article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545, 550 (Colo. 1996). 14 ¶ 25 Regardless of whether Fletcher views her due process claim to be independent from or part of her CGIA claim, we discern no error by the court in dismissing it. As a general matter, agencies or entities acting in a quasi-judicial capacity must provide “notice and an opportunity to be heard as a matter of ‘fundamental fairness to those persons whose protected interests are likely to be affected by the governmental decision.’” Whitelaw v. Denv. City Council, 2017 COA 47, ¶ 8 (quoting Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622, 626 (Colo. 1988)). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Whiteside v. Smith, 67 P.3d 1240, 1248 (Colo. 2003) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). This makes the standard for due process “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Eason v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 70 P.3d 600, 607 (Colo. App. 2003). ¶ 26 Even applying Rule 12(b)(5) standards, the district court’s ruling remains correct: Fletcher had extensive written communications and meetings with the Assessor’s Office staff and pursued multiple levels of appeals. These facts undermine any 15  claim that her due process rights were violated. “[N]o particular or perfect procedure is required [to satisfy due process] so long as the elements of opportunity for hearing and judicial review are present.” Lamm v. Barber, 565 P.2d 538, 546 (Colo. 1977). While Fletcher argues that the required procedures were not followed and that she had to appeal to obtain what she believes to be the correct value, “[t]he [property valuation] statutes provide in detail for a notice, protest and appeal procedure through which a taxpayer may contest a county assessor’s original assessment and obtain judicial review if desired.” Id. at 547. Her desire to have different procedures or to obtain a value she agrees with initially simply does not, without more, give rise to a cognizable due process claim. ¶ 27 Finally, Fletcher contends that the district court erred by dismissing her claims without holding an evidentiary hearing under Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924. We disagree. ¶ 28 The purpose of a Trinity hearing is to resolve any disputed facts relating to whether a public entity or employee waived sovereign immunity under the CGIA. Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Colo. 2003). But the district court has discretion to determine whether a Trinity hearing is necessary, 16  and if the underlying facts are undisputed, it may resolve the jurisdictional issue as a matter of law. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, ¶ 10. ¶ 29 We acknowledge that Fletcher believes the allegations against the named employees are disputed, since the Assessor’s Office does not admit that the named employees violated the asserted statutory provisions or USPAP standards. But the relevant standard under the CGIA is whether Fletcher’s complaint alleged facts that, if proved true, constitute willful and wanton conduct — not merely whether a factual dispute exists. See Carricato, ¶ 33. The district court correctly concluded that Fletcher failed to plead sufficient facts of willful and wanton conduct, and therefore, it did not abuse its discretion by declining to hold a Trinity hearing. IV. Conclusion ¶ 30 The district court’s judgment is affirmed. JUDGE FOX and JUDGE YUN concur. 17