Full Opinion

25-1985 Peters v. City of Torrington UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. Present: SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________ GERALD J. PETERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 25-1985 CITY OF TORRINGTON, WILLIAM BALDWIN, JR., in his individual and official capacities, ERIC DAIGLE in his individual and official capacities, DAIGLE LAW GROUP, LLC, in its individual and official capacities, TORRINGTON BOARD OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendants-Appellees. __________________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: TIMOTHY BRIGNOLE, Brignole, Bush & Lewis, LLC, Hartford, CT. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES CITY OF TORRINGTON, WILLIAM MEGAN L. NIELSEN (Michael BALDWIN JR. IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, AND J. Rose, on the brief), Rose TORRINGTON BOARD OF PUBLIC SAFETY: Kallor LLP, Hartford, CT. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ERIC DAIGLE, IN HIS KATHERINE E. RULE (Kristan INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, AND DAIGLE LAW M. Jakiela, on the brief), GROUP, LLC, IN ITS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES: Howd & Ludorf, LLC, Wethersfield, CT. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Shea, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Gerald Peters appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Peters, a sergeant in the Torrington Police Department, subdued an arrestee with pepper spray on May 23, 2020. After an internal investigation, Police Chief William Baldwin suspended Peters. A subsequent investigation by the State’s Attorney’s Office found no probable cause to charge Peters with a crime, and he was reinstated. On December 24, 2020, Peters notified Baldwin that he intended to file a legal claim. A week later, Baldwin hired Eric Daigle and Daigle Law Group (the “Daigle Defendants”) to conduct another investigation of Peters’ use of force on the arrestee. Daigle found that Peters violated the department’s General Orders, and Baldwin terminated him on May 11, 2021. Peters filed a grievance and ultimately prevailed at arbitration in February 2023. The arbitrator ordered the City of Torrington (the “City”) to reinstate him with back pay and benefits. But Baldwin forbade him to return to work, and the City applied to vacate the award in Connecticut Superior Court. The award was vacated in July 2023. Peters appealed this decision, and the City moved to dismiss his appeal. In 2025, Peters prevailed on appeal and the arbitration award was reinstated. 2 On July 23, 2024, while his appeal was pending, Peters sued the City, its Board of Public Safety, Baldwin, and the Daigle Defendants in Connecticut Superior Court. Defendants removed the case to federal court, and Peters filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2024. He alleged violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-51q. Defendants moved to dismiss his constitutional claims as untimely and the district court granted their motion on August 5, 2025. This appeal followed. “We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, including its legal interpretation and application of a statute of limitations.” Mallet v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 126 F.4th 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2025). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Walker v. Senecal, 130 F.4th 291, 297 (2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1983 claims accrue when a “plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.” Smith v. Campbell, 782 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2015). The district court properly concluded that Peters’s claims accrued no later than May 11, 2021, the day the City fired him allegedly for exercising his First Amendment rights. It is undisputed that the applicable statute of limitations was three years. Peters sued on July 23, 2024, more than three years after his claims accrued, so they are time-barred. Peters argues that the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolls the statute of limitations on his Section 1983 and Section 31-51q claims. Under Connecticut state law, that doctrine applies “where it may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negligent act or omission that caused injury.” Essex Ins. Co. v. William Kramer & Assocs., 205 A.3d 534, 541 3 (Conn. 2019) (alteration omitted). For the continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply, the defendant must have “(1) committed an initial wrong upon the plaintiff; (2) owed a continuing duty to the plaintiff that was related to the alleged original wrong; and (3) continually breached that duty.” Flannery v. Singer Asset Fin. Co., 94 A.3d 553, 570 (Conn. 2014). The second element requires “evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act.” Saint Bernard Sch. of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of Am., 95 A.3d 1063, 1077 (Conn. 2014). Special relationships are those with “a fiduciary or otherwise confidential foundation,” “characterized by a unique degree of trust and confidence between the parties, one of whom has superior knowledge, skill or expertise and is under a duty to represent the interests of the other.” Essex Ins. Co., 205 A.3d at 542. We assume without deciding that this state-law doctrine applies to federal Section 1983 claims. 1 The continuing course of conduct doctrine is inapplicable for two reasons. First, Peters was fired on May 11, 2021, so it is not “impossible to pinpoint the exact date” on which his constitutional wrong occurred. Id. at 541. Second, Peters fails to allege a continuing duty. He argues that Baldwin and the City’s role as parties to a collective bargaining agreement created a special relationship and an ongoing duty to him (as a counterparty) to abide by that agreement. But counterparties to a labor contract bargain at arm’s length and such a “mere contractual 1 The district court concluded that the continuing course of conduct doctrine does not apply to Section 1983 suits because it is a “state-law concept” and “federal law governs when the statute of limitations begins to run.” App’x at 437; cf. Barnes v. City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2023). On the other hand, federal courts apply a state’s “generally applicable tolling provisions . . . under § 1983.” Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2023). We have not previously decided whether the doctrine is a tolling provision that applies to Section 1983 claims or an accrual rule that does not. We do not answer that question today because Peters cannot satisfy the doctrine in any event. 4 relationship does not create a fiduciary or confidential relationship.” Saint Bernard Sch., 95 A.3d at 1078. So even if the continuing course of conduct doctrine were applicable here, it would not toll the statute of limitations. Next, Peters argues that the federal continuing violation doctrine delayed the accrual of his cause of action. This doctrine can provide “an exception to the normal knew-or-should-have- known accrual date” of a Section 1983 claim. K.W. ex rel. K.A. v. City of New York, 177 F.4th 127, 150 (2d Cir. 2026). It applies to claims “composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful practice,” “not to discrete unlawful acts.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 309 (2d Cir. 2020) (alteration omitted). We cabin continuing violations “exclusively to claims that by their nature accrue only after the plaintiff has been subjected to some threshold amount of mistreatment.” Mehrotra v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 186 F.4th 120, 126 (2d Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted). Peters’ claims are not like that. He alleges constitutional violations stemming from his termination, which occurred on May 11, 2021. Peters alleges that “[t]he termination was wrongful and retaliatory.” App’x at 172. Accepting that allegation as true, the termination alone would have given rise to an actionable claim. “[W]here the continuing violation doctrine applies, the limitations period begins to run when the defendant has engaged in enough activity to make out an actionable claim.” Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Finally, Peters does not plead enough conduct within the statute of limitations for a First Amendment retaliation claim. In a public-employment retaliation case, the plaintiff must show “[1] that the [conduct] at issue was protected, [2] that he suffered an adverse employment action, and [3] that there was a causal connection between the protected [activity] and the adverse 5 employment action.” Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2011). “A plaintiff may prove causation by . . . showing that the adverse employment decision and the protected activity were close in time.” Specht v. City of New York, 15 F.4th 594, 605 (2d Cir. 2021). But all the alleged acts occurred more than two years after Peters’ protected activity. That is too remote for us to infer causation, see id., and Peters offers no direct evidence of it. Defendants’ actions in the statutory period cannot support a Section 1983 claim. * * * We have considered Peters’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 6