Full Opinion

26-337 Silas Marungo v. Coletti UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: SUSAN L. CARNEY, MICHAEL H. PARK, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________ Edna Silas Marungo, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 26-337 Edmund Coletti, Kathleen Martucci, Marjorie King, M.D., Glenn Seliger, M.D., Yvonne Evans, and Jacqueline Velez, Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: THUY Q. PHAM, The Law Office of Thuy Q. Pham, New York, NY. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: TINA S. BHATT (Daniel Tarolli, on the brief), Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Halpern, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. Plaintiff-Appellant Edna Silas Marungo appeals from a judgment of the district court dismissing her complaint. This action is Silas Marungo’s second against employees of Helen Hayes Hospital (“HHH”), a New York State Department of Health rehabilitation center. In Doe v. Seliger, No. 25-159-cv, 2025 WL 3637085 (2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (summary order), we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants named in that suit. 1 Here, as in Doe, Silas Marungo brings claims alleging due process violations in connection with her care at HHH. The district court dismissed 1 Silas Marungo was the plaintiff in the Doe action but proceeded under a pseudonym in that case. 2 the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that the decision in Doe precluded Silas Marungo from relitigating whether her claims arose under the Medicare Act. Silas Marungo then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. This appeal followed. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues presented. “We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of . . . subject-matter jurisdiction.” Bugliotti v. Republic of Argentina, 67 F.4th 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2023). “Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to a prior judgment.” Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 6 F.4th 361, 374 (2d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). The district court dismissed the Doe action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it concluded that Silas Marungo’s claims arose under the Medicare Act and she had failed “to exhaust [her] administrative remedies” under that Act. Doe v. Martucci, No. 20-CV-02331, 2024 WL 5118505, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2024). Silas Marungo brings her due-process claims here based on the same facts that supported her due-process claims in Doe; those facts and claims were actually litigated and decided in Doe. See Doe v. Martucci, No. 20-CV-02331, 2024 WL 839258, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 3 2024). Silas Marungo has suggested no change in facts or law warranting a different outcome than in Doe. 2 Silas Marungo argues that the jurisdictional ruling was not essential to the Doe judgment; we disagree. The summary order in Doe affirmed the district court’s judgment of dismissal without prejudice, noting the district court’s conclusion “that it lacked jurisdiction over Doe’s first through fifth claims because they arose under the Medicare Act.” Doe, 2025 WL 3637085, at *1. The jurisdictional ruling was thus “necessary to support” the judgment. Bifolck v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 936 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 2019) (“An issue is ‘necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it.’” (emphasis omitted)). The parties do not dispute that the remaining requirements for issue preclusion are satisfied, so Silas Marungo cannot relitigate whether her due-process claims arise under the Medicare Act. We modify the judgment of the district court only to clarify that the claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 2017) 2 The district court noted that Silas Marungo completed the final level of administrative review after commencing this suit. On appeal, she does not argue that the exhaustion requirement is now satisfied, so we decline to address it. See Behrens v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 96 F.4th 202, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]here is no . . . obligation to find and exercise subject- matter jurisdiction on a basis not raised by the parties.”). 4 (“[A] complaint must be dismissed without prejudice where the dismissal is due to the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”); United States v. Adams, 955 F.3d 238, 250 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[W]e have long recognized the power to modify judgments to conform with the district court’s authority and to affirm them as modified.”). * * * We have considered Silas Marungo’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court AS MODIFIED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 5