Musighi v. Graham CA2/5

Filed 11/6/26 Musighi v. Graham CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE ISAAC MUSIGHI, B349470, c/w B350961 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. v. 25SMCV01085) CURTIS GRAHAM et al., Defendants and Respondents. APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed. Isaac Musighi, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.  Law Office of Kyle Kveton and Kyle Kveton for Defendants and Respondents. ****** Two estranged brothers dissolved their jewelry business in 2013, ultimately settling division of the business through arbitration proceedings in 2016 and 2017. The brother dissatisfied with the result of those proceedings has spent most of the subsequent decade repeatedly suing his sibling and others involved in the arbitration. In this lawsuit, he has sued the sibling’s lawyers. The trial court granted the lawyers’ motion to dismiss that lawsuit under our anti-SLAPP1 law (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), and awarded them attorney fees. Concluding there was no error, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. Facts A. The brothers’ business Isaac Musighi (Isaac) and Parviz “Daniel” Mossighi (Daniel) are brothers who, beginning in the 1980s, together operated a wholesale diamond business.2 (Musighi v. Mossighi (March 24, 2022, B310927) [nonpub. opn.], p. 2; Musighi v. Mossighi (Oct. 9, 2025, B340672 [nonpub. opn.], pp. 2-3.) In 2013, they decided to part ways and dissolve the business. (Ibid.) 1 “SLAPP” is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” 2 Because they share a similar last name, we use the brothers’ first names to avoid confusion. No disrespect is intended. 2 B. The arbitration proceedings 1. The November 2016 arbitration In November 2016, Isaac and Daniel signed an arbitration agreement, pursuant to which a senior member of Diamond Club West Coast Inc., a professional organization of diamond merchants, would arbitrate the division of their business assets. (Musighi, supra, B310927, at p. 3; Musighi, supra, B340672, at p. 3.) The arbitration involved an auction between the brothers for ownership of the business; Isaac outbid Daniel. In December 2016, the arbitrator issued an award specifying that (1) Isaac owed Daniel around $9,018,291 to equalize the assets (in light of Isaac’s ownership of the business), (2) Daniel had to cease using the business’s name, (3) each brother would keep his own purchased inventory, except for a prized blue diamond that Daniel would hold but would sell to split the proceeds, (4) the brothers would split funds held in a specified bank account, and (5) each brother would be allocated specific outstanding accounts receivables. (Ibid.) 2. The May 2017 arbitration Dissatisfied with the original arbitration award and believing it to be a product of false financial data provided by Daniel (Musighi, supra, B310927, at p. 4; Musighi, supra, B340672, at pp. 3-4), Issac asked Daniel to engage in a further arbitration. The brothers signed a new arbitration agreement in April 2017, agreeing to reconvene the arbitration proceedings and to be bound by the results with “no right to further review.” (Musighi, supra, B310927, at p. 4; Musighi, supra, B340672, at p. 4.) Following that further arbitration, an amended award was issued in June 2017 that was nearly identical to the original award, except that it adjusted the payment plan under which 3 Isaac was to pay Daniel $9,018,291 and required Isaac to deliver the blue diamond to Daniel for a joint sale and altered the conditions of that sale. (Ibid.) C. Judicial confirmation of amended award In September 2017, Daniel petitioned the trial court to confirm the amended arbitration award and served Issac with a summons to appear in that proceeding. This was Daniel’s second petition: He filed the first in February 2017 to confirm the original arbitration award, but filed the second—the operative petition—after the amended arbitration award was issued in June 2017. Daniel retained Curtis Graham (Attorney Graham) to represent him in these matters. Isaac opposed the petition to confirm the amended arbitration award and simultaneously moved to vacate it; Issac asserted that the award had been secured by fraud. (Musighi, supra, B310927, at p. 4; Musighi, supra, B340672, at p. 4.) After a hearing at which Isaac appeared without his lawyer, the trial court confirmed the amended award and reduced it to a judgment in October 2017. D. Further efforts to overturn the confirmed judgment In the intervening nine years, Isaac has filed numerous lawsuits (and accompanying appeals) attacking the October 2017 judgment as well as subsequent settlement agreements he reached with Daniel. In most of those lawsuits, Issac sued Daniel. (Musighi, supra, B310927, at pp. 5-7; Musighi, supra, B340672, at pp. 4-8.) 4 II. Procedural Background A. Complaint On March 4, 2025, Issac for the first time sued Attorney Graham. In the operative first amended complaint,3 Isaac sued (1) Attorney Graham, (2) Dawn B. Eyerly, another lawyer who represented Daniel, and (3) Saul Ewing, LLP, the law firm where Attorneys Graham and Eyerly are currently employed4 (collectively, defendants). The operative complaint generally alleges that defendants5 “misuse[d] the judicial system to perpetrate and conceal fraudulent acts that resulted in the deprivation of [Isaac’s] rights, property and business interests” by “abus[ing] legal processes and knowingly participat[ing] in fraudulent schemes designed to mislead the court and harm [Issac].” More specifically, the operative complaint alleges that defendants: 3 With his original complaint, Isaac attached a compendium of 69 exhibits. He did not attach those to the operative complaint that he included in the appendix on appeal. Because the operative complaint appears to cite those exhibits, however, we will presume they are identical to the exhibits attached to the original complaint. 4 At the time he filed Daniel’s petition to confirm the amended award in September 2017, Attorney Graham worked at Freeman, Freeman & Smiley, LLP. That law firm is not named as a defendant here. 5 The operative complaint also contains several paragraphs of allegations describing Isaac’s “honesty and integrity” since childhood, Isaac’s mentorship of Daniel, and the “collusion” between Daniel and the arbitrator, but these allegations are not germane to any of the claims in the complaint. 5  -- “[K]nowingly fil[ed] a lawsuit based on a fraudulent arbitration award” that sought judicial confirmation of that award. -- “[D]epriv[ed] [Isaac] of proper notice of legal proceedings” by not serving Isaac with process regarding the lawsuit until September 2017, when the petition to confirm the amended award was filed. -- “[S]ubmitt[ed] false declarations under penalty of perjury,” from themselves, from Daniel and from the arbitrator— all meant to make the arbitration award appear legitimate. -- Worked with Daniel during the arbitration proceedings to “fraudulently” insert language in the April 2017 arbitration agreement making the award binding in order “to deceive the courts and mislead subsequent litigation” to confirm the award. -- “[F]alsely represented” facts during the October 2017 hearing to confirm the award. -- “[A]ctively interfere[ed] with [Isaac’s] business dealings” by “fil[ing] a [separate] lawsuit against Harry Winston [(a luxury jewelry retailer)] in New York” to seize the blue diamond “under false pretenses.” Based on these allegations, Isaac asserted causes of action for (1) abuse of process, (2) fraud upon the court, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (4) conspiracy to commit fraud, and (5) negligence. Isaac sought general damages of approximately $6 million as well as punitive damages. B. The anti-SLAPP motion On July 1, 2025, defendants filed a special motion to strike Isaac’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, asserting that 6 Isaac’s claims all arose out of their representation of Daniel in seeking confirmation of the amended arbitration award and that the litigation privilege barred all of those claims.6 After entertaining a full round of briefing and evidentiary objections to Isaac’s declaration, and after conducting a hearing, the trial court granted the motion on the grounds argued in the motion. The court also sustained nearly all of defendants’ evidentiary objections. C. Motion for attorney fees and costs On September 30, 2025, defendants filed a motion for prevailing-party attorney fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP law. Defendants’ counsel submitted a declaration describing his experience since admission to the State Bar in 1983, setting forth his billing rate of $495 per hour (which was the lower range of what he charges clients), and presenting a chart of tasks totaling 47.6 hours worked on the anti-SLAPP motion. Although no billing records were submitted, defendants’ counsel calculated the fees as totaling $23,562 and costs of $1,379.29. Isaac opposed the request for fees, asserting that the billed hours were “grossly inflated” and “poorly documented” and that the award should be reduced to, at most, $9,000 inclusive of costs. In reply, defendants pointed out (and corrected) Isaac’s use of “false quote[s]” and “misstatements of case authority” throughout his brief, which exemplified the reasonableness of the time it took 6 Defendants also denied liability, submitting evidence showing they did not represent Daniel in the arbitration, did not draft any of the agreements, and did not file any lawsuit in New York to recover the blue diamond (rather, a different law firm enrolled a sister-state judgment). 7 counsel to prepare the anti-SLAPP motion given Isaac’s litigation history. Following a hearing,7 the trial court granted defendants the full amount of fees and costs they requested. D. Appeals Isaac timely appealed both the order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and the order awarding defendants fees and costs. We consolidated the two appeals.8 DISCUSSION In his appeals, Isaac asserts that the trial court erred in (1) granting the anti-SLAPP motion and (2) awarding defendants attorney fees. I. Anti-SLAPP Motion A. Governing law The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics omitted (Baral).) Specifically, the anti-SLAPP statute protects— and thus “subject[s] to a special motion to strike”—any “cause of 7 Isaac had filed a supplemental declaration in further opposition to the motion for fees, which the court struck. 8 Isaac filed two further motions to augment the record on the eve of oral argument—on November 2, 2026, and November 3, 2026. We deny both requests because they are untimely (Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 2(b)) and because they seek notice of materials that are irrelevant to our disposition of the case. Isaac also filed a request to file a supplemental brief on the day of oral argument, which we deny as unauthorized by the California Rules of Court, rule 8.200, and as untimely. 8 action . . . arising from any act of [a] person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni); City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420; Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 (Rusheen).) A claim “arises from” protected activity when “that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062 (Park).) As pertinent here, “protected activity” includes “any written or oral statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding” or “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body . . . .,” and reaches communications by attorneys in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (e)(1) & (2); City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 79; Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251 (Action); Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115.) “Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.’” [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni, at p. 1009; Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385; Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 9 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 (Navellier); Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) We review de novo an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) B. Isaac’s claims arise from conduct by defendants that is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute Isaac’s claims against defendants arise from protected activity. Those claims rest on defendants’ alleged conduct in knowingly filing Daniel’s lawsuit to confirm the amended arbitration award, depriving Issac of notice of that lawsuit, submitting false declarations in support of that lawsuit, manipulating documents in anticipation of that lawsuit, making false statements at the hearing on that lawsuit, and filing a separate lawsuit for Daniel in New York. Because the “filing . . . and prosecution of a civil action,” including an action to confirm an arbitration award, constitutes protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056; Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 90; Walter v. National Indemnity Co. (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 630, 634; cf. Sheppard v. Lightpost Museum Fund (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 315, 323), Isaac’s claims arise from protected activity. Although the operative complaint contains an allegation that defendants fraudulently inserted language into the amended arbitration agreement, that allegation is explicitly tied to defendants’ alleged intent to use that language to “deceive the courts and mislead subsequent litigation”—and not because that conduct had any effect on the arbitration proceedings themselves. (Cf. Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 703 [proceedings conducted pursuant to private contractual arbitration—rather than statutorily mandated arbitration—are 10 not “protected activity”]; Century 21 Chamberlain & Associates v. Haberman (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1, 5, 7.) Isaac resists our conclusion with three arguments. First, he argues that the trial court flouted the Supreme Court’s directive in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 and Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995 by treating the “litigation setting” of his claims as “dispositive,” and thus neglected to “identify the specific acts alleged to supply liability and then determine whether those acts themselves constituted protected activity.” This argument fails to appreciate that the litigation setting is dispositive because the allegations in this case all pertain to misconduct occurring during or in anticipation of litigation, such that the trial court’s failure to enumerate each of defendants’ alleged acts of litigation misconduct is of no consequence. Second, Isaac argues that his claims arise not from defendants’ “ordinary advocacy,” but from their “specific” “acts” of “judicial-process misconduct.” To the extent Isaac is arguing that defendants’ conduct was not protected activity because it was fraudulent and hence unlawful, he is wrong. Conduct that is otherwise protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law loses that status only if it is criminal and if its criminality is either conceded or conclusively established as a matter of law. (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320 (Flatley).) This high bar is not met here, as there is no conclusive or conceded criminal activity; indeed, defendants wholeheartedly denied drafting any arbitration agreements or untruthful declarations. Isaac’s allegations that defendants’ conduct is fraudulent (and unlawful) are insufficient to deprive that conduct of its protected status. (See Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 285 [“‘conduct that would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP 11 statute does not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged to have been unlawful or unethical’”].) Issac cites Kimmel v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 205, but that case dealt with whether the litigation privilege (not the anti-SLAPP law) covered the non-communicative act of surreptitiously recording telephone conversations, merely because it was done in anticipation of litigation; Kimmel is inapt on the question whether the conduct of the defendants in this case in anticipation of and during litigation is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law. Third, Isaac argues that the trial court “misidentified the gravamen” of his complaint by characterizing his claims as an “impermissible collateral attack” on multiple courts’ prior rulings upholding the amended award. At the hearing on the anti- SLAPP motion, the court observed that Isaac’s allegations against defendants looked to be “trying to collaterally attack a prior court’s ruling on a confirmation of the arbitration award.” But that observation was not a basis for the court’s ultimate ruling, which appropriately applied the two-step analysis required by the anti-SLAPP law. (E.g., Silverado Modjeska Recreation & Park Dist. v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 282, 300 [trial court’s comments at oral argument are not binding; the final order governs]; Jesperson v. Zubiate- Beauchamp (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 624, 633 [same].) C. Isaac’s claims lack minimal merit Isaac has also not carried his burden of showing that his claims have minimal merit because they are barred by California’s litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). That privilege precludes imposing liability for any communication “(1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of 12 the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212; Action, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) Because defendants’ conduct in petitioning the trial court to confirm the arbitration awards—including drafting declarations in support of those petitions, presenting oral argument at hearings, and seeking to enforce the resulting judgment—are directly related to litigation, the privilege applies and bars Isaac’s claims. (See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360-361 [the litigation privilege is absolute and bars all tort claims except for malicious prosecution].) Isaac responds with two arguments. First, he argues that the trial court was required to accept his evidence as true, but instead the court impermissibly resolved disputed factual issues against him. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891 [“‘The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. . . . It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law’”].) This argument lacks merit. To begin, the trial court did not consider much of Isaac’s proffered evidence; the court excluded most of Isaac’s declaration—which was the sole proffered evidence of attorney misconduct—on evidentiary grounds, and Issac does not attack the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on appeal. More to the point, any factual dispute regarding whether defendants’ conduct was fraudulent has no effect on the application of the litigation privilege because that privilege applies even if defendants’ conduct had been fraudulent. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) Second, Isaac argues that the trial court erred in applying the litigation 13 privilege “categorically.” As discussed, the privilege is “absolute.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 322.) II. Award of Fees The anti-SLAPP law authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a defendant who prevails on their special motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c).) In seeking such fees, the prevailing defendant has the burden of establishing that the amount of fees is reasonable. (569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433 [“entitled ‘“only to reasonable attorney fees, and not necessarily to the entire amount requested”’”].) Trial courts use the lodestar method to calculate a reasonable amount. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131.) The party challenging an award of fees under the anti-SLAPP statute must establish abuse of discretion. (Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 285, 288.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees in this case. Counsel’s hourly billing rate ($495) is reasonable. As to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed (47.6), defendants’ counsel identified the tasks performed and the time spent on each task; 32 hours (the bulk of the hours billed) was not unreasonable to prepare an anti-SLAPP motion and respond to Isaac’s opposition, at least where such tasks involved unraveling years’ worth of Isaac’s allegations and rectifying factual and legal errors in Isaac’s brief. Isaac makes two arguments. First, he argues that defendants’ counsel did not provide “the kind of task-level scrutiny necessary to test” the reasonableness of the hours billed. However, a fee request need not be supported by contemporaneous billing records; counsel’s 14 declaration is enough. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699; Raining Data Corp. v. Berrenechea (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1375.) Second, Isaac argues that the trial court erred in awarding the full amount of fees defendants requested because the court, during the hearing on attorney fees, commented that the amount requested “facially looked unreasonable” because “some of the time spent . . . looked . . . a little bit excessive.” That comment is not inconsistent with the court’s ruling awarding the full amount of fees requested because, as the court went on to explain, the hours counsel actually spent were “reasonable” and not excessive in light of the “extra work” counsel had to put in to debunk the “countless cases that [Isacc] miscited[and] misquoted to the court,” which “ensure[d] that things were accurately presented to the court.” We reject Isaac’s related objection that the court’s justification for finding the hours requested to be reasonable constitutes an improper sanction against him for the false legal citations in his brief; if we were to accept this argument, time spent correcting misrepresentations to a court would be non- compensable. 15  DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. ______________________, P. J. HOFFSTADT We concur: _________________________, J. MOOR _________________________, J. KIM (D.) 16