Full Opinion

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE ADRIANA KOSTOV, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. GODADDY.COM LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees. No. 1 CA-CV 26-0325 FILED 11-17-2026 Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CV2025-028373 The Honorable Scott Sebastian Minder, Judge AFFIRMED COUNSEL Adriana Kostov, Potts Point, NSW, Australia Plaintiff/Appellant Cozen O’Connor, New York, NY By Jeffrey M. Monhait Counsel for Defendants/Appellees KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court MEMORANDUM DECISION Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. G A O N A, Judge: ¶1 Adriana Kostov sued GoDaddy.com, LLC, GoDaddy Inc., and Domains By Proxy, LLC (collectively “Domain Registration Entities”) for negligence, cyberstalking, and cyber-harassment because they allegedly hosted websites containing defamatory content about her. She asked the superior court to order the Domain Registration Entities to remove the allegedly defamatory content and disable the websites hosting it. She also asked the superior court to compel the Domain Registration Entities to provide her with information about the websites’ registrants. ¶2 The superior court dismissed Kostov’s complaint, finding that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, barred most of it. The court dismissed the rest of Kostov’s complaint after the Domain Registration Entities provided Kostov the information she sought. Because the superior court properly dismissed Kostov’s claims and wasn’t required to hold oral argument or order mediation before doing so, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND I. The Parties. ¶3 GoDaddy.com, LLC (“GoDaddy”) is a domain name registrar. See Leo India Films Ltd. v. GoDaddy.com, LLC, No. CV-19-04803, 2025 WL 2403149, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025) (identifying GoDaddy as a domain name registrar). ¶4 Through a registrar like GoDaddy, website operators can secure a domain name associated with a specific IP address, “permitting users to navigate the internet using website URLs rather than a long string of digits. In short, the domain names map to addresses where content is stored.” 2 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court ¶5 A domain name registrar is distinct from a website host, which leases server space to store a website’s underlying data. Blocker v. Bandmine.com, No. 16-1709, 2017 WL 4287215, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-1709, 2017 WL 4287470 (D. Or. Sept. 26, 2017). None of the Domain Registration Entities are website hosts: GoDaddy is the domain registrar, and GoDaddy Inc. (“GDI”) and Domains By Proxy, LLC (“DBP”) are distinct corporate entities that aren’t directly involved with domain registration.1 ¶6 Kostov made several content-abuse reports asking the Domain Registration Entities to remove websites hosting defamatory information about her, but they failed to do so. Kostov says their failure to remove the websites is personally harmful and a public safety risk. She also alleges that the Domain Registration Entities are the only ones who can remedy the harm and that their failure to do so is “encouraging and facilitating criminal activity.” II. Kostov’s Claims. ¶7 Kostov sued the Domain Registration Entities seeking to hold them liable for alleged defamatory content associated with four domain names: (1) financescam.com; (2) cybercriminal.com; (3) intelligenceline.com; and (4) criticalintel.com (collectively, “Websites”). GoDaddy is the registrar of all four domains. ¶8 Kostov asserted claims for defamation, cyberstalking, cyber- harassment, and negligence. She asked the superior court to order the Domain Registration Entities to remove the defamatory content and disable the Websites. She also asked the superior court to compel the Domain Registration Entities to provide her with the Websites’ registrants’ information. 1 GoDaddy Inc. is the sole member of GoDaddy.com, LLC’s corporate grandparent, so it’s a distinct entity from GoDaddy.com, LLC. DBP is an indirect subsidiary of GDI that “offers private website registrations so that the identity of the true owners and operators of a specific website are concealed from the public” and “appears as the registrant, rather than the individual, in public listings for that website.” Wallach v. Johnson, No. CV- 19-04564-PHX-DJH, 2019 WL 4977474, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2019) 3 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court III. Procedural Background. ¶9 Kostov first sued “Go Daddy LLC” and “Secure Server” for negligence, cyberstalking, cyber-harassment, and defamation. She alleged those entities hosted the Websites containing defamatory content—posted by unnamed individuals or entities—about her. Kostov later amended her complaint to name the Domain Registration Entities and add a claim requesting information about who owned the Websites’ domains. ¶10 In October 2025, the superior court dismissed Kostov’s original claims as barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“Section 230”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. This initial dismissal order didn’t address Kostov’s request for registrant information because that claim wasn’t yet in the case at the time the Domain Registration Entities moved to dismiss. ¶11 The superior court dismissed that remaining claim two months later because Kostov admitted that the Domain Registration Entities gave her the information she sought. In February 2026, the court entered final judgment dismissing Kostov’s complaint with prejudice. ¶12 Kostov timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. 12-2101(A)(1). DISCUSSION ¶13 Kostov says the superior court erred in dismissing her complaint because it (1) didn’t hold oral argument, (2) improperly applied Section 230 and didn’t consider exceptions, (3) didn’t grant her request for mediation, and (4) improperly suggested that she sue the website operators rather than the Domain Registration Entities. I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Deciding this Case Without Oral Argument. ¶14 Kostov first contends that the superior court improperly denied her requests to be “heard” on the issues by dismissing the case without holding oral argument. But even if Kostov had requested oral argument as the Rules of Civil Procedure require, the superior court had discretion to resolve those motions without it. ¶15 To start, Kostov never properly requested oral argument on the Domain Registration Entities’ motions to dismiss. Under the Rules, a party must request oral argument in a filing’s caption. Ariz. Super. Ct. R. 4 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court App. P. 11(b); 17C A.R.S. Super.Ct.Local Prac.Rules, Maricopa County, Rule 3.2(d). Kostov didn’t request oral argument in any of her various responses to the Domain Registrar’s motions to dismiss. Instead, Kostov emailed the superior court asking to be “heard on this matter.” And in the body of one filing responding to the second motion to dismiss, Kostov said: “Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint . . . must be heard properly.” ¶16 Neither statement requests oral argument; a litigant can be “heard” on a matter through written pleadings. But even assuming Kostov requested oral argument, she didn’t do so as the Rules require. ¶17 Operating under that same assumption, there was still no error. A court has discretion to decide a motion—like the Domain Registration Entities’ here—without oral argument even if a party has requested it. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(d); see also Cristall v. Cristall, 225 Ariz. 591, 596–97 ¶¶ 27–29 (App. 2010). The court didn’t abuse its discretion by doing so here. II. Section 230 Bars Kostov’s Claims. ¶18 Kostov next turns to the merits, arguing the superior court erred by holding that Section 230 bars her substantive claims against the Domain Registration Entities. She also contends the superior court failed to address exceptions to Section 230 under which the Domain Registration Entities could be liable for the Websites’ content. ¶19 We review the order dismissing Kostov’s complaint de novo. Ctr. for Arizona Pol’y Inc. v. Arizona Sec’y of State, 262 Ariz. 371, 381–82 ¶ 15 (2026). Dismissal was appropriate if Kostov “would not be entitled to relief under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. at 381 ¶ 15 (quoting Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356 ¶ 8 (2012)). And though we “assume the truth of [Kostov’s] factual allegations and indulge reasonable inferences from those facts,” we give no weight to mere conclusory statements. Id. at 382 ¶ 15. A. Section 230 applies to Kostov’s claims. ¶20 Under Section 230, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). And “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Section 230 immunity applies when: (1) the provider is an interactive computer service, (2) the plaintiff is seeking to 5 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court treat the entity as the publisher or speaker, and (3) the information is provided by another information content provider. Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019). 1. GoDaddy is an “interactive computer service.” ¶21 Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). ¶22 We agree with the federal courts that have determined that GoDaddy is an “interactive computer service.” See, e.g., Rigsby v. GoDaddy, Inc., 59 F.4th 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2023) (“As a domain name registrar and website hosting provider, GoDaddy ‘provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server’ and provides an ‘interactive computer service’ under § 230(f)(2).”); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Loc. 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., No. CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 2705377, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2008) (same); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (same). As these decisions hold, GoDaddy is an “interactive computer service” because it provides or enables computer access by multiple users by registering domain names for website operators. Domain names facilitate access to a website via an easily recognizable name, rather than relying on the string of numbers that make up the website’s IP address. 2. GoDaddy isn’t the publisher. ¶23 Kostov also posits that the Domain Registration Entities are the Websites’ “publisher,” and thus don’t enjoy Section 230 immunity. ¶24 Kostov conflates the Domain Registration Entities’ role in registering the Websites’ domain names with domain owners’ role in actually publishing content on the Website themselves. See Ricci, 781 F.3d at 28 (Section 230 barred claim that GoDaddy was liable for refusing to remove an allegedly defamatory newsletter); Rigsby, 59 F.4th at 1008 (GoDaddy isn’t the publisher when they register the domain name and the content is posted by a third-party registrant). 3. GoDaddy wasn’t acting as an information content provider. ¶25 Finally, GoDaddy isn’t an “information content provider” as Kostov claims it is based on her allegation that it “continue[d] to allow” the 6 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court Websites to publish allegedly defamatory content. A “website does not create or develop content when it merely provides a neutral means by which third parties can post information of their own independent choosing online.” Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Kostov doesn’t allege that the Domain Registration Entities contributed to the Websites’ content; indeed, the Domain Registration Entities simply registered the Websites’ domains. This isn’t enough to be an “information content provider” under Section 230. ¶26 Because the Domain Registration Entities meet all three criteria for Section 230 immunity, the superior court correctly held that Section 230 barred Kostov’s claims for defamation, cyberstalking, cyber- harassment, and negligence. B. Kostov waived her arguments about Section 230 exceptions. ¶27 Kostov also argues that the superior court erred by not considering several exceptions to Section 230. Kostov didn’t make these arguments in the superior court until she responded to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed form of judgment. The superior court, however, had dismissed her claims under Section 230 nearly five months earlier (and dismissed the remaining claim requesting registrant information four months earlier). ¶28 All that remained was the entry of judgment, and it wasn’t until Kostov responded to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed judgment when she said she had “no opportunity to present exceptions to the CDA.” ¶29 Kostov had several opportunities to present arguments about possible exceptions to the Domain Registration Entities’ Section 230 immunity, including her (1) complaint, (2) amended complaint, and (3) two responses to the Domain Registration Entities’ motion to dismiss under Section 230. Yet she waited until after the court resolved those and all that remained was the ministerial act of entering judgment. ¶30 Parties must present arguments to the superior court in a timely manner to preserve them on appeal. Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc. v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011). Substantive issues first raised in response to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed judgment were untimely. Cf. Matter of Guardianship of Gruler, 262 Ariz. 284, 292 ¶ 35 (App. 2026) (Rule 58(a)(2)(B) allows parties to object to a proposed judgment only, not its substance). 7 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court ¶31 By failing to raise arguments about Section 230 exceptions before the superior court dismissed her claims, Kostov waived those arguments on appeal. Though we hold that Kostov waived these arguments, we note that we considered them and would also reject them on the merits. III. The Superior Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to Order Mediation. ¶32 Merits aside, Kostov challenges the superior court’s decision to dismiss her complaint with prejudice rather than ordering mediation. She requested mediation as an alternative measure of relief when responding to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed judgment. For the reasons we identify above, that request came too late. ¶33 In any event, the superior court “may,” but need not, refer a case to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution procedures. A.R.S. § 12-134. “May” generally indicates “permissive intent and a grant of discretion.” Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 194 ¶ 13 (2021). And the superior court here didn’t abuse its discretion by not referring to mediation a case it dismissed months before. IV. The Superior Court’s Suggestion that Kostov Sue Other Parties Was Dicta. ¶34 Kostov’s final argument is that the superior court erred by commenting that “[Kostov] may wish to sue the website/owners instead” in its order resolving the Domain Registration Entities’ second motion to dismiss. ¶35 The superior court’s suggestion in its interlocutory order is obiter dicta and “lack[s] the force of an adjudication.” Barrows v. Garvey, 67 Ariz. 202, 206 (1948) (citation omitted). It resolved no issue before the court and isn’t adverse to Kostov in any way. Kostov’s attempt to convert the superior court’s helpful suggestion into reversible error thus fails. 8 KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al. Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶36 We affirm. MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR 9