KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC
CourtCourt of Appeals of Arizona
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket1 CA-CV 26-0325
JudgeD. Andrew Gaona
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
ADRIANA KOSTOV, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
GODADDY.COM LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
No. 1 CA-CV 26-0325
FILED 11-17-2026
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2025-028373
The Honorable Scott Sebastian Minder, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Adriana Kostov, Potts Point, NSW, Australia
Plaintiff/Appellant
Cozen O’Connor, New York, NY
By Jeffrey M. Monhait
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
KOSTOV v. GODADDY LLC, et al.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.
G A O N A, Judge:
¶1 Adriana Kostov sued GoDaddy.com, LLC, GoDaddy Inc.,
and Domains By Proxy, LLC (collectively “Domain Registration Entities”)
for negligence, cyberstalking, and cyber-harassment because they allegedly
hosted websites containing defamatory content about her. She asked the
superior court to order the Domain Registration Entities to remove the
allegedly defamatory content and disable the websites hosting it. She also
asked the superior court to compel the Domain Registration Entities to
provide her with information about the websites’ registrants.
¶2 The superior court dismissed Kostov’s complaint, finding that
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, barred
most of it. The court dismissed the rest of Kostov’s complaint after the
Domain Registration Entities provided Kostov the information she sought.
Because the superior court properly dismissed Kostov’s claims and wasn’t
required to hold oral argument or order mediation before doing so, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Parties.
¶3 GoDaddy.com, LLC (“GoDaddy”) is a domain name
registrar. See Leo India Films Ltd. v. GoDaddy.com, LLC, No. CV-19-04803,
2025 WL 2403149, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025) (identifying GoDaddy as a
domain name registrar).
¶4 Through a registrar like GoDaddy, website operators can
secure a domain name associated with a specific IP address, “permitting
users to navigate the internet using website URLs rather than a long string
of digits. In short, the domain names map to addresses where content is
stored.”
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¶5 A domain name registrar is distinct from a website host,
which leases server space to store a website’s underlying data. Blocker v.
Bandmine.com, No. 16-1709, 2017 WL 4287215, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2017),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-1709, 2017 WL 4287470 (D. Or.
Sept. 26, 2017). None of the Domain Registration Entities are website hosts:
GoDaddy is the domain registrar, and GoDaddy Inc. (“GDI”) and Domains
By Proxy, LLC (“DBP”) are distinct corporate entities that aren’t directly
involved with domain registration.1
¶6 Kostov made several content-abuse reports asking the
Domain Registration Entities to remove websites hosting defamatory
information about her, but they failed to do so. Kostov says their failure to
remove the websites is personally harmful and a public safety risk. She also
alleges that the Domain Registration Entities are the only ones who can
remedy the harm and that their failure to do so is “encouraging and
facilitating criminal activity.”
II. Kostov’s Claims.
¶7 Kostov sued the Domain Registration Entities seeking to hold
them liable for alleged defamatory content associated with four domain
names: (1) financescam.com; (2) cybercriminal.com;
(3) intelligenceline.com; and (4) criticalintel.com (collectively, “Websites”).
GoDaddy is the registrar of all four domains.
¶8 Kostov asserted claims for defamation, cyberstalking, cyber-
harassment, and negligence. She asked the superior court to order the
Domain Registration Entities to remove the defamatory content and disable
the Websites. She also asked the superior court to compel the Domain
Registration Entities to provide her with the Websites’ registrants’
information.
1 GoDaddy Inc. is the sole member of GoDaddy.com, LLC’s corporate
grandparent, so it’s a distinct entity from GoDaddy.com, LLC. DBP is an
indirect subsidiary of GDI that “offers private website registrations so that
the identity of the true owners and operators of a specific website are
concealed from the public” and “appears as the registrant, rather than the
individual, in public listings for that website.” Wallach v. Johnson, No. CV-
19-04564-PHX-DJH, 2019 WL 4977474, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 8, 2019)
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III. Procedural Background.
¶9 Kostov first sued “Go Daddy LLC” and “Secure Server” for
negligence, cyberstalking, cyber-harassment, and defamation. She alleged
those entities hosted the Websites containing defamatory content—posted
by unnamed individuals or entities—about her. Kostov later amended her
complaint to name the Domain Registration Entities and add a claim
requesting information about who owned the Websites’ domains.
¶10 In October 2025, the superior court dismissed Kostov’s
original claims as barred by Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (“Section 230”), 47 U.S.C. § 230. This initial dismissal order didn’t
address Kostov’s request for registrant information because that claim
wasn’t yet in the case at the time the Domain Registration Entities moved
to dismiss.
¶11 The superior court dismissed that remaining claim two
months later because Kostov admitted that the Domain Registration
Entities gave her the information she sought. In February 2026, the court
entered final judgment dismissing Kostov’s complaint with prejudice.
¶12 Kostov timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. 12-2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶13 Kostov says the superior court erred in dismissing her
complaint because it (1) didn’t hold oral argument, (2) improperly applied
Section 230 and didn’t consider exceptions, (3) didn’t grant her request for
mediation, and (4) improperly suggested that she sue the website operators
rather than the Domain Registration Entities.
I. The Superior Court Didn’t Err in Deciding this Case Without Oral
Argument.
¶14 Kostov first contends that the superior court improperly
denied her requests to be “heard” on the issues by dismissing the case
without holding oral argument. But even if Kostov had requested oral
argument as the Rules of Civil Procedure require, the superior court had
discretion to resolve those motions without it.
¶15 To start, Kostov never properly requested oral argument on
the Domain Registration Entities’ motions to dismiss. Under the Rules, a
party must request oral argument in a filing’s caption. Ariz. Super. Ct. R.
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App. P. 11(b); 17C A.R.S. Super.Ct.Local Prac.Rules, Maricopa County, Rule
3.2(d). Kostov didn’t request oral argument in any of her various responses
to the Domain Registrar’s motions to dismiss. Instead, Kostov emailed the
superior court asking to be “heard on this matter.” And in the body of one
filing responding to the second motion to dismiss, Kostov said: “Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint . . . must be heard properly.”
¶16 Neither statement requests oral argument; a litigant can be
“heard” on a matter through written pleadings. But even assuming Kostov
requested oral argument, she didn’t do so as the Rules require.
¶17 Operating under that same assumption, there was still no
error. A court has discretion to decide a motion—like the Domain
Registration Entities’ here—without oral argument even if a party has
requested it. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(d); see also Cristall v. Cristall, 225 Ariz. 591,
596–97 ¶¶ 27–29 (App. 2010). The court didn’t abuse its discretion by doing
so here.
II. Section 230 Bars Kostov’s Claims.
¶18 Kostov next turns to the merits, arguing the superior court
erred by holding that Section 230 bars her substantive claims against the
Domain Registration Entities. She also contends the superior court failed to
address exceptions to Section 230 under which the Domain Registration
Entities could be liable for the Websites’ content.
¶19 We review the order dismissing Kostov’s complaint de novo.
Ctr. for Arizona Pol’y Inc. v. Arizona Sec’y of State, 262 Ariz. 371, 381–82 ¶ 15
(2026). Dismissal was appropriate if Kostov “would not be entitled to relief
under any interpretation of the facts susceptible of proof.” Id. at 381 ¶ 15
(quoting Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 356 ¶ 8 (2012)). And though
we “assume the truth of [Kostov’s] factual allegations and indulge
reasonable inferences from those facts,” we give no weight to mere
conclusory statements. Id. at 382 ¶ 15.
A. Section 230 applies to Kostov’s claims.
¶20 Under Section 230, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1). And “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Section 230 immunity applies when: (1) the
provider is an interactive computer service, (2) the plaintiff is seeking to
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treat the entity as the publisher or speaker, and (3) the information is
provided by another information content provider. Dyroff v. Ultimate
Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2019).
1. GoDaddy is an “interactive computer service.”
¶21 Section 230 defines an “interactive computer service” as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(2).
¶22 We agree with the federal courts that have determined that
GoDaddy is an “interactive computer service.” See, e.g., Rigsby v. GoDaddy,
Inc., 59 F.4th 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 2023) (“As a domain name registrar and
website hosting provider, GoDaddy ‘provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server’ and provides an ‘interactive
computer service’ under § 230(f)(2).”); Ricci v. Teamsters Union Loc. 456, 781
F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (same); Kruska v. Perverted Justice Found. Inc., No.
CV 08-0054-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 2705377, at *3 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2008)
(same); Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 n.2 (6th
Cir. 2014) (same). As these decisions hold, GoDaddy is an “interactive
computer service” because it provides or enables computer access by
multiple users by registering domain names for website operators. Domain
names facilitate access to a website via an easily recognizable name, rather
than relying on the string of numbers that make up the website’s IP address.
2. GoDaddy isn’t the publisher.
¶23 Kostov also posits that the Domain Registration Entities are
the Websites’ “publisher,” and thus don’t enjoy Section 230 immunity.
¶24 Kostov conflates the Domain Registration Entities’ role in
registering the Websites’ domain names with domain owners’ role in
actually publishing content on the Website themselves. See Ricci, 781 F.3d at
28 (Section 230 barred claim that GoDaddy was liable for refusing to
remove an allegedly defamatory newsletter); Rigsby, 59 F.4th at 1008
(GoDaddy isn’t the publisher when they register the domain name and the
content is posted by a third-party registrant).
3. GoDaddy wasn’t acting as an information content
provider.
¶25 Finally, GoDaddy isn’t an “information content provider” as
Kostov claims it is based on her allegation that it “continue[d] to allow” the
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Websites to publish allegedly defamatory content. A “website does not
create or develop content when it merely provides a neutral means by
which third parties can post information of their own independent
choosing online.” Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Kostov
doesn’t allege that the Domain Registration Entities contributed to the
Websites’ content; indeed, the Domain Registration Entities simply
registered the Websites’ domains. This isn’t enough to be an “information
content provider” under Section 230.
¶26 Because the Domain Registration Entities meet all three
criteria for Section 230 immunity, the superior court correctly held that
Section 230 barred Kostov’s claims for defamation, cyberstalking, cyber-
harassment, and negligence.
B. Kostov waived her arguments about Section 230 exceptions.
¶27 Kostov also argues that the superior court erred by not
considering several exceptions to Section 230. Kostov didn’t make these
arguments in the superior court until she responded to the Domain
Registration Entities’ proposed form of judgment. The superior court,
however, had dismissed her claims under Section 230 nearly five months
earlier (and dismissed the remaining claim requesting registrant
information four months earlier).
¶28 All that remained was the entry of judgment, and it wasn’t
until Kostov responded to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed
judgment when she said she had “no opportunity to present exceptions to
the CDA.”
¶29 Kostov had several opportunities to present arguments about
possible exceptions to the Domain Registration Entities’ Section 230
immunity, including her (1) complaint, (2) amended complaint, and (3) two
responses to the Domain Registration Entities’ motion to dismiss under
Section 230. Yet she waited until after the court resolved those and all that
remained was the ministerial act of entering judgment.
¶30 Parties must present arguments to the superior court in a
timely manner to preserve them on appeal. Cont’l Lighting & Contracting, Inc.
v. Premier Grading & Utils., LLC, 227 Ariz. 382, 386 ¶ 12 (App. 2011).
Substantive issues first raised in response to the Domain Registration
Entities’ proposed judgment were untimely. Cf. Matter of Guardianship of
Gruler, 262 Ariz. 284, 292 ¶ 35 (App. 2026) (Rule 58(a)(2)(B) allows parties
to object to a proposed judgment only, not its substance).
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¶31 By failing to raise arguments about Section 230 exceptions
before the superior court dismissed her claims, Kostov waived those
arguments on appeal. Though we hold that Kostov waived these
arguments, we note that we considered them and would also reject them
on the merits.
III. The Superior Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion by Declining to
Order Mediation.
¶32 Merits aside, Kostov challenges the superior court’s decision
to dismiss her complaint with prejudice rather than ordering mediation.
She requested mediation as an alternative measure of relief when
responding to the Domain Registration Entities’ proposed judgment. For
the reasons we identify above, that request came too late.
¶33 In any event, the superior court “may,” but need not, refer a
case to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution procedures. A.R.S.
§ 12-134. “May” generally indicates “permissive intent and a grant of
discretion.” Garcia v. Butler, 251 Ariz. 191, 194 ¶ 13 (2021). And the superior
court here didn’t abuse its discretion by not referring to mediation a case it
dismissed months before.
IV. The Superior Court’s Suggestion that Kostov Sue Other Parties
Was Dicta.
¶34 Kostov’s final argument is that the superior court erred by
commenting that “[Kostov] may wish to sue the website/owners instead”
in its order resolving the Domain Registration Entities’ second motion to
dismiss.
¶35 The superior court’s suggestion in its interlocutory order is
obiter dicta and “lack[s] the force of an adjudication.” Barrows v. Garvey, 67
Ariz. 202, 206 (1948) (citation omitted). It resolved no issue before the court
and isn’t adverse to Kostov in any way. Kostov’s attempt to convert the
superior court’s helpful suggestion into reversible error thus fails.
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CONCLUSION
¶36 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR
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