Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 26-1642 __________ JOSEPH PILCHESKY, Appellant v. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; MICHELLE HENRY, Attorney General of PA, in her official capacity; PHILLIP MCCARTHY, Deputy Attorney General, in his official capacity and individual capacity; CARI L. MAHLER, Senior Deputy Attorney General, in her official capacity and individual capacity; JACOB FRASCH, Deputy Attorney General, in his official and individual capacity ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 1:24-cv-02258) District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Saporito ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 21, 2026 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: November 5, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Appellant Joseph Pilchesky, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his amended complaint. For the following reasons, we will affirm. Pilchesky filed an amended complaint against the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) and then-Attorney General Michelle Henry, Deputy Attorney General Phillip McCarthy, Deputy Attorney General Cari L. Mahler, and Deputy Attorney General Jacob Frasch under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging various constitutional violations related to their participation in his prosecution and conviction for the unauthorized practice of law. Specifically, Pilchesky alleged that defendants McCarthy and Mahler violated his rights by selectively targeting him for prosecution; seizing his computer and searching it for evidence; engaging in plea negotiations with him; filing pleadings in the trial court, on appeal, and in post-conviction proceedings; and making false statements in court. Pilchesky alleged that defendant Frasch similarly violated his constitutional rights by filings documents as OAG’s counsel in Pilchesky’s prior federal civil action challenging the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s interpretation of the statute at issue in his criminal case.1 Pilchesky further alleged that defendant Henry is responsible for this conduct as their supervisor. The defendants moved to dismiss Pilchesky’s complaint. The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge, who issued a report, recommending that the amended complaint be dismissed with prejudice because (1) OAG was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, (2) the individual defendants were entitled to prosecutorial immunity, (3) 1 See Pilchesky v. Henry, No. 25-1811, 2026 WL 473510 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2026) (per curiam). 2 Pilchesky failed to allege Henry’s personal involvement, and (4) Pilchesky failed to allege a sufficient claim of fraud upon the court against defendant Frasch. Following an independent review of the Magistrate Judge’s report and the record, including Pilchesky’s objections, the District Court adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety, granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and directed the Clerk to close the case. Pilchesky timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing Pilchesky’s amended complaint and may affirm on any basis supported by the record. See Host Int’l, Inc. v. MarketPlace PHL, LLC, 32 F.4th 242, 247 n.3 (3d Cir. 2022). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Pleadings of pro se litigants are construed liberally, but “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts for their complaints to support a claim.” See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013). On appeal, Pilchesky purports to argue that the District Court erred when it (1) asserted that the amended complaint “fails to state sufficient facts to state a claim,” (2) determined his claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity and prosecutorial immunity, (3) dismissed his claims against defendant Frasch, and (4) “blindly” adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. However, Pilchesky’s brief is largely devoted to conclusory accusations that the defendants lied and attempts to incorporate by reference the arguments he made in the District Court. Such references do not satisfy the 3 rules of appellate procedure. See Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 111, 130 (3d Cir. 2017). Pilchesky did not develop his arguments that the Magistrate Judge “sua sponte asserted” that the amended complaint failed to allege sufficient facts and that the District Court incorrectly dismissed his claims against defendant Frasch2 and has therefore forfeited these issues. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). As to the remaining issues, we reject Pilchesky’s arguments and affirm the District Court’s order. First, we agree with the District Court that OAG and the individual defendants in their official capacities are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2010) (“State governments and their subsidiary units are immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment.”). We likewise agree that McCarthy and Mahler are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for the claims Pilchesky raised against them in their individual capacities.3 On appeal, Pilchesky argues that the alleged “false statements” and 2 Even if Pilchesky had properly challenged the District Court’s dismissal of his claims against Frasch on appeal, his only factual allegations are that Frasch made false statements and “bogus legal conclusions” during the prior federal civil action. The District Court liberally construed these factual allegations as an attempted claim of fraud upon the court and found that Pilchesky failed to state such a claim. We agree that Pilchesky did not allege the kind of “egregious misconduct” that satisfies the “demanding standard for independent actions alleging fraud upon the court.” See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005). 3 Although the District Court also dismissed claims against defendant Henry in her individual capacity, we are not convinced Pilchesky brought claims against her in her individual capacity. Indeed, the caption expressly lists defendant Henry only “in her official capacity.” To the extent Pilchesky sought to hold her liable in her individual capacity, we agree with the District Court that Pilchesky’s claim “cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior” and Pilchesky did not allege her personal 4 “targeting” of Pilchesky for prosecution do not fall within the scope of the defendants’ prosecutorial duties. To the contrary, the alleged conduct falls squarely within the prosecutorial function, so they are entitled to absolute immunity. See Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160–61 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity “for work intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” including “claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, . . . presenting a state’s case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present evidence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 137 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding prosecutors participating as advocates in post-conviction proceedings are entitled to absolute immunity). Absolute immunity attaches to these prosecutorial functions even if, as Pilchesky claims, they include allegedly false statements. See Fogle, 957 F.3d at 160. Finally, Pilchesky argues that the District Court “blindly” adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report because the order was issued the day after Pilchesky’s objections were filed. This is not supported by the record. The District Court gave “reasoned consideration” to the Magistrate Judge’s report, expressly stating that it had conducted an independent review of the report and the record, including Pilchesky’s objections. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2017). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. involvement. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 5