Full Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Record No. 0813-25-3 MICHAEL JOHNSON, JR., ET AL. v. VIRGINIA TRUCK CENTER OF RICHMOND, INC., d/b/a EXCEL TRUCK GROUP Present: Judges Athey, Ortiz and Causey Argued at Lexington, Virginia Opinion Issued November 17, 2026 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BOTETOURT COUNTY Joel R. Branscom, Judge Michael Johnson, Jr., pro se; Betsy Jackson, pro se. Justin E. Simmons (Woods Rogers Vandeventer Black PLC, on brief), for appellee. PUBLISHED OPINION BY JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR. Michael L. Johnson, Jr. (“Johnson”) and his mother, Betsy Jackson (“Jackson”) (collectively, “the appellants”), pro se, appeal a judgment from the Circuit Court of Botetourt County (“Botetourt Circuit Court”) dismissing their lawsuit against the Virginia Truck Center of Richmond, Inc. (“VTCR”) on the grounds of issue preclusion. The appellants contend on appeal that the Botetourt Circuit Court erroneously dismissed their suit and improperly struck their written statement of facts, which was consequently excluded from the record on appeal. We first find no error by the Botetourt Circuit Court in striking the proposed written statement of facts. We also conclude that without such a written statement of facts we cannot address the appellants’ assignments of error. For those reasons, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND1 In April of 2023, Johnson brought his 2014 Cascadia Freightliner to VTCR and authorized repairs to the tractor-trailer. After VTCR completed several rounds of service and repairs, Johnson owed VTCR approximately $8,045.58 for the previously approved service and repairs. However, Johnson ceased communicating with VTCR and failed to pay the balance due and owing on his repair bill.2 As a result of Johnson’s failure to pay his balance due, on December 1, 2023, VTCR filed a warrant in debt action against Johnson in the General District Court of Botetourt County (“GDC”). VTCR alleged that Johnson breached its repair contract and sought “the amount of $8,045.58, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Approximately two weeks later, Johnson—now joined by Jackson—filed a complaint pro se in the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County (“Chesterfield Circuit Court”) seeking “the amount of $35,000.00” for “breach of contract regarding the services provided by [VTCR] . . . in repairing . . . Johnson’s truck” as well as for “negligence in the repairs performed by [VTCR].” VTCR responded on January 17, 2024, by filing several motions in the Chesterfield Circuit Court, including a motion to transfer venue from the Chesterfield Circuit Court to the Botetourt Circuit Court. Johnson subsequently responded in the GDC to VTCR’s warrant in debt on February 22, 2024. Similar to the appellants’ complaint in the Chesterfield Circuit Court, Johnson contended that 1 “When reviewing a [circuit] court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258 (2003). 2 Johnson did make previous payments for VTCR’s services. For example, Johnson paid for an initial round of services when he first brought his truck to VTCR. He also provided VTCR with a $7,500 deposit for repairs that VTCR estimated to exceed $10,000 in cost. Johnson later clarified that Jackson gave Johnson the $7,500 to make this deposit. -2- VTCR breached its “legally enforceable obligation to repair the truck,” which allegedly caused Johnson to suffer $35,000 in damages. Johnson also raised several “grounds of defense” in the warrant in debt action, including that VTCR’s “alleged injuries . . . were not caused by [Johnson], but instead were caused by [VTCR’s] negligence, conduct, actions, or inactions.” Johnson also asserted in response to the warrant in debt that VTCR was “barred” from obtaining damages because of “the doctrine of unclean hands” and VTCR’s “failure to mitigate [its] damages.” The GDC held a trial on VTCR’s warrant in debt on May 2, 2024. The GDC ultimately ruled in favor of VTCR and ordered Johnson to pay VTCR $8,045.58, plus pre- and post-judgment interest, for the unpaid repairs, in addition to costs and attorneys’ fees. The GDC subsequently entered its abstract of judgment on May 31, 2024, and Johnson failed to timely appeal the GDC ruling to the Botetourt Circuit Court. On June 6, 2024, VTCR filed a special plea of res judicata in the Chesterfield Circuit Court. VTCR specially pleaded that “[b]ecause [VTCR] and Johnson have already litigated to final judgment the factual issues of whether the repairs it performed on the [t]ruck were necessary and proper and whether he was liable for payment of those repairs,” both of the appellants were “precluded from relitigating those factual issues in this case by the doctrine of res judicata.” VTCR specifically contended that the procedural posture of the case met the requirements for issue preclusion and requested that the Chesterfield Circuit Court dismiss the appellants’ suit with prejudice. VTCR also provided that Johonson adding Jackson as a party in the circuit-court action did not defeat res judicata because “she [wa]s a misjoined party” or, alternatively, “she [wa]s in privity with Johnson.” The Chesterfield Circuit Court subsequently held a hearing on June 20, 2024, to address all outstanding motions before ultimately granting VTCR’s motion to transfer venue to the Botetourt Circuit Court by order dated July 19, 2024. On April 23, 2025, the Botetourt Circuit Court held a -3- hearing to address VTCR’s special plea of res judicata. Immediately following the hearing, the Botetourt Circuit Court sustained VTCR’s special plea and dismissed the appellants’ lawsuit with prejudice. Although the appellants timely noted their appeal on May 16, 2025, they failed to contemporaneously file an appeal bond. On June 2, 2025, the appellants filed a proposed written statement of facts in the clerk’s office of the Botetourt Circuit Court that recounted the trial before the GDC, the hearing before the Chesterfield Circuit Court transferring venue to the Botetourt Circuit Court, and the hearing in the Botetourt Circuit Court concerning VTCR’s special plea of res judicata. In an accompanying cover letter, the appellants requested that the clerk of the Botetourt Circuit Court “present the Statement of Facts and Proposed Order to the trial judge for review and signature,” further noting that “[i]f the court does not sign or amend the Statement of Facts within 15 days, [the statement of facts] should be deemed correct under Rule 5A:8(d).” On June 10, 2025, the appellants filed a notice of filing written statement of facts that “g[a]ve notice that a Written Statement of Facts in lieu of a transcript was filed in the Circuit Court for Botetourt County on June 2, 2025, and was submitted to the trial judge for authentication.” On June 17, 2025, the appellants filed a corrected written statement of facts, altering some citations and making some changes to the factual narrative of the various proceedings. In an accompanying notice filed with the clerk’s office, the appellants stated that they were filing a corrected written statement of facts and “[p]ursuant to Rule 5A:8(c), the trial judge had fifteen (15) calendar days to sign, amend, or reject the statement.” At no point did the appellants request to set a hearing for the Botetourt Circuit Court to address either of their written statements of facts. On June 17, 2025, VTCR filed a motion in the Botetourt Circuit Court to strike the appellants’ written statement of facts, claiming that the appellants did not comply with all procedural requirements for permitting a written statement of facts to be introduced into the -4- appellate record. Specifically, VTCR contended that the appellants, in either their original or corrected written statement of facts, “failed to comply with the second element of Rule 5A:8(c)(1)—file a notice that the statement of facts ‘will be presented to the trial judge no earlier than 15 days nor later than 20 days after the filing date.’” VTCR also filed a list of objections to the appellants’ written statement of facts on the same day. Both the motion to strike the statement of facts and VTCR’s objections thereto were “sent by first-class mail” to the appellants on June 17, 2025. On July 2, 2025, the appellants responded that “[a]lthough [they] did not include the precise language ‘no earlier than 15 days and no later than 20 days after filing,’ [their] filing date was sufficient notice that presentment would occur within the rule’s timeline.” The appellants also highlighted that “[n]o prejudice has resulted to [VTCR], who received both filings in a timely manner.” In addition, the appellants acknowledged that “[w]hile Rule 5A:8(c)(1) states the party must set or request a hearing, the rule is silent on whether omission alone requires striking the statement.” The appellants also claimed that they initially received “[a] partial version” of VTCR’s motion to strike their written statement of facts on June 23, 2025, not receiving “a complete copy” until June 28, 2025. They further asserted that “[t]his piecemeal and delayed service materially impaired [their] ability to prepare a timely and complete response before the Rule 5A:8(d) deadline of July 7, 2025.”3 After noting that VTCR’s objections “largely seek to relitigate the facts of the trial,” the appellants also requested that the Botetourt Circuit Court deny VTCR’s motion to strike the written statement of facts. 3 The appellants—below and on brief in this Court—did not identify what was missing from the “partial version” received on June 23. -5- On July 7, 2025, the Botetourt Circuit Court, without holding a hearing, granted VTCR’s motion to strike the appellants’ written statement of facts “for failure to comply with the requirements of Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5A:8(c).”4 II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review “Whether the record is sufficiently complete to permit our review on appeal is a question of law” we assess de novo. Bay v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 529 (2012). In addition, interpretations of the Rules of Court are “question[s] of law” that are also subject to our de novo review. Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010) (applying de novo standard to interpret Rule 5A:18); see Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 517 (2008) (applying de novo standard to interpret Rule 5A:20). B. The Botetourt Circuit Court did not err in striking the appellants’ written statement of facts. The appellants contend that the Botetourt Circuit Court erred when it struck their written statement of facts “where the statement was timely filed” and “no hearing was held.” We disagree. The appellate record is a “written memorial” of a circuit court’s “proceedings and judgment in a case” and is tantamount to a “perfect history of the suit.” Thomas W. Powell, The Law of Appellate Proceedings in Relation to Review, Error, Appeal, and Other Reliefs Upon 4 On September 25, 2025, VTCR filed a motion in this Court to dismiss the pending appeal due to the appellants’ failure to file an appeal bond contemporaneously with their notice of appeal. On January 7, 2026, the appellants filed a motion to waive the requirement of an appeal bond for this case, which this Court denied. See Johnson v. Va. Truck Ctr. of Richmond, Inc., No. 0813-25-3 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2026) (order). However, in denying the motion, this Court also granted “[a]n extension of time . . . until February 20, 2026, to file the appeal bond with the clerk of the trial court.” Id. The appellants then filed their appeal bond in the Botetourt Circuit Court on February 12, 2026. Because the appellants filed their appeal bond within the new deadline established by this Court’s prior order, the appellants’ appeal bond was timely filed. Therefore, VTCR’s pending motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. -6- Final Judgments, ch.1, § 37, at 60 (1872). In pursuing that ideal, the Rules of Court permit the “record on appeal” to include either “the transcript of any proceeding or a written statement of facts, testimony, and other incidents of the case.” Rule 5A:7(a)(7). Both items aim “to put that into the record which would not otherwise be there or appear.” Shenandoah Milling Co. v. Phosphate Prods. Corp., 161 Va. 642, 651 (1933) (quoting Martin P. Burks, Pleading and Practice in Actions at Common Law § 271 (2d ed. 1921)). The method by which a transcript or written statement of facts becomes part of the record is contained in Rule 5A:8. If the appellant does not comply with the requirements delineated in Rule 5A:8, then the transcript or written statement of facts will not be a part of the record on appeal. Mayhood v. Mayhood, 4 Va. App. 365, 368-69 (1987) (“[A] written statement of facts becomes a part of the record only if all of the requirements of Rule 5A:8 are complied with by the parties and the trial judge.”). Rule 5A:8(c) governs the filing and certification of written statements of facts, thereby allowing such statements to “become[] a part of the record.” Rule 5A:8(c). Its purpose “is to provide an appellant a means to establish a record for appellate review without incurring the substantial expense of obtaining a transcript, which for some appellants may prevent their ability to appeal from an adverse judgment.” Shapiro v. Younkin, 279 Va. 256, 263 (2010).5 It “also provides litigants and trial courts guidance regarding the actions to take to ensure that the record on appeal is accurate and complete.” Id. Both of these functions aim to “enable [this Court] to effectively fulfill our function of appellate review.” Id. (quoting Lamb v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 161, 164 (1981)). 5 Shapiro analyzes Rule 5:11, which applies to the Supreme Court of Virginia, and not Rule 5A:8. However, we have held that Rule 5:11 “corresponds to Rule 5A:8” and relied on cases interpreting Rule 5:11 to reach conclusions pertaining to Rule 5A:8. Wolfe v. Shulan Jiang, 83 Va. App. 107, 115 (2025). -7- Rule 5A:8(c) contains two subsections. Subsection (c)(1) establishes certain filing requirements for the proposed written statement of facts. Rule 5A:8(c)(1). Previously,6 an appellant satisfied subsection (c)(1) “when (1) [the written statement of facts] is filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court within [60] days after entry of judgment, [and] (2) a copy of the statement is mailed or delivered to opposing counsel along with a notice that the statement will be presented to the trial judge between fifteen and twenty days after filing.” Proctor v. Town of Colonial Beach, 15 Va. App. 608, 610 (1993) (en banc) (per curiam).7 Meanwhile, subsection (c)(2) requires that the proposed written statement of facts be “signed by the trial judge and filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court.” Rule 5A:8(c)(2). Satisfying both subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2) allows the proposed written statement of facts to “become[] a part of the record” for appeal. Rule 5A:8; see Mayhood, 4 Va. App. at 368‑69. Once subsection (c)(1) is satisfied, the appellant “has established prima facie compliance with the requirements of the rule.” Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610 (italics omitted). This designation is important; if an appellant establishes “prima facie compliance” by satisfying Rule 5A:8(c)(1), “the trial judge must sign the statement, correct the statement and sign the corrected statement, or, in cases where the judge cannot in good faith recall or accurately reconstruct the relevant proceedings, order a new trial.” Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added) (italics omitted); see Kyhl v. Kyhl, 32 Va. App. 53, 58‑59 (2000) (remanding a case for a new trial when the circuit court “could not recall or reconstruct all of the facts presented at trial”). So when an appellant establishes prima facie compliance with Rule 5A:8(c)(1), the rule “does not provide a means by 6 Rule 5A:8(c) was amended in 2025 to add an additional requirement to Rule 5A:8(c)(1). See Order Amending Rules of Court (Va. Jan. 15, 2025) (order). 7 Rule 5A:8(c) was amended in 2021—after this Court’s decision in Proctor—to change the time to file a written statement of facts from 55 days to 60 days. See Order Amending Rules of Court (Va. Nov. 1, 2021) (order). -8- which the trial judge, through design, inattention or inadvertence, may thwart an appeal by neglecting or refusing to sign the statement of facts.”8 Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610. In turn, when an appellant does “not establish[] prima facie compliance with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c)(1),” such noncompliance prevents the written statement of facts from becoming part of the record, irrespective of whether the written statement of facts bears the trial judge’s signature. Clary v. Clary, 15 Va. App. 598, 600 (1993) (en banc) (per curiam) (italics omitted); cf. Conaway v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 792, 794‑95 (1916) (explaining that a litigant “had . . . acquired a right to have them signed” because she “had done everything she was required to do under the law” in timely filing, with proper notice, a written statement of facts). So, for example, when an appellant fails to timely file his written statement of facts, he does not require the trial judge to assess the validity of the statements therein and certify their accuracy before ultimately striking the statement. See Davenport v. CBR Motorwerx, LLC, No. 0174-23-2, slip op. at 3 (Va. Ct. App. July 2, 2024) (“CBR’s written statement of facts . . . was . . . untimely filed, and the trial judge thus should not have signed it.”).9 The same is true when an appellant does not comply with the rule by not providing the proper notice to opposing counsel. See Clary, 15 Va. App. at 600; cf. Va. Home for Incurables and Sheltering Arms Hosp. v. Coleman, 164 Va. 230, 242‑43 (1935) (holding, in part, that a trial judge did not need to sign a written statement of facts when they were filed without timely notice to opposing counsel). Amendments to Rule 5A:8, which went into effect in March of 2025, have introduced additional requirements into subsection (c)(1). See Order Amending Rules of Court (Va. Jan. 15, 8 To that end, “[i]f a judge . . . refuses to sign a proper [written statement of facts], or to proceed to settle the matter of a [written statement of facts] objected to, he may, in either case, be compelled by mandamus to act.” Page v. Clopton, 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 415, 428 (1878); accord Burks, supra, §§ 282, 410. 9 While not binding, unpublished cases may be cited as persuasive authority. See Rule 5A:1(f); see also Smith v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. App. 371, 383 n.4 (2023). -9- 2025) (order) [hereinafter 2025 Amendments]. Specifically, with the recent amendments, Rule 5A:8(c)(1) now additionally requires that “[t]he party filing the statement and notice must set or request a hearing within the time specified in [Rule 5A:8(c)(1)(ii)].” Rule 5A:8(c)(1); see 2025 Amendments. The recent amendments also provide that when objections are filed “the judge must set a hearing with notice to all parties, unless a hearing has already been scheduled,” within ten days of the date the objections were filed. Rule 5A:8(d).10 Because this Court has yet to interpret these amendments, we use this opportunity to clarify the meaning of Rule 5A:8(c) and when an appellant is in prima facie compliance with Rule 5A:8(c)(1) in light of the 2025 amendments. An appellant now establishes prima facie compliance with Rule 5A:8(c)(1) when: 1) the appellant files “within 60 days after entry of judgment . . . a copy” of the written statement of facts in the office of the clerk of the circuit court; 2) the appellant also files “within 60 days after entry of judgment . . . a notice that the statement will be presented to the trial judge no earlier than 15 days nor later than 20 days after the filing date” in the office of the clerk of the circuit court; 3) “[a] copy of the statement and notice” is “mailed or delivered to opposing counsel on the same day that they are filed in the office of the clerk of the trial court”; and 4) “[t]he party filing the statement and notice . . . set[s] or request[s] a hearing” to occur “no earlier than 15 days nor later than 20 days after the filing date.” Rule 5A:8(c)(1). It is only once an appellant satisfies these four conditions that an appellant establishes prima facie compliance with Rule 5A:8(c)(1). Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610. Hence, an appellant does “not establish[] prima facie 10 The 2025 amendments to Rule 5A:8 went into effect on March 17, 2025. See 2025 Amendments. “As a purely procedural rule, [the newly amended Rule 5A:8] affect[ed] pending cases.” Shevel’s, Inc.-Chesterfield v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 228 Va. 175, 181-82 (1984) (applying a new Rule of Court to a pending case); see Shiflet v. Eller, 228 Va. 115, 120 (1984). Here, the appellants filed their first written statement of facts on June 2, 2025—after the 2025 amendments went into effect. Hence, the amended Rule 5A:8 is applicable to this case. See Shevel’s, Inc.-Chesterfield, 228 Va. at 181-82. - 10 - compliance with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c)(1)” when any one of these four conditions goes unsatisfied. Clary, 15 Va. App. at 600 (italics omitted). Here, the appellants failed to establish prima facie compliance with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c)(1). The appellants’ initial written statement of facts provided notice that “[i]f the court does not sign or amend the Statement of Facts within 15 days, it should be deemed correct under Rule 5A:8(d)” and that it “was submitted to the trial judge for authentication.” The corrected version later provided notice that “[p]ursuant to Rule 5A:8(c), the trial judge had fifteen (15) calendar days to sign, amend, or reject the statement.” Setting aside the inaccuracy of the timelines detailed in these notices, see Rule 5A:8(c)(1)(ii), at least one notice did not provide that the appellants’ written statements of facts would be “presented” to the Botetourt Circuit Court, and none of them indicated that such presentment would occur “no earlier than 15 days nor later than 20 days after the filing date,” id. Instead, the notices simply declare that the Botetourt Circuit Court had a 15-day deadline for signing the written statement of facts, which does not comport with the notice that Rule 5A:8(c)(1)(ii) contemplates. This falls short of the rule’s requirement, and we cannot fashion an extra-textual exception on the appellants’ behalf. See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 506, 508 (1992) (noting that “[t]his Court has no authority to make exceptions to the filing requirements set out in” Rule 5A:8(c)). Moreover, the appellants also did not “set or request a hearing within the time specified in [Rule 5A:8(c)(1)(ii)].” Rule 5A:8(c)(1). The rule provides that the party filing the written statement of facts “must” set or request a hearing. Rule 5A:8(c)(1). The term “must” is “usually expressive of compulsion and [is] mandatory in meaning.” Huffman v. Kite, 198 Va. 196, 202 (1956). The mandatory nature of “must” is further illustrated in its dictionary definitions, which include “is commanded or requested to” and “is urged to: ought by all means to.” Must, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1993). So by not “set[ting] or request[ing] - 11 - a hearing” on the written statement of facts “within the time specified in [Rule 5A:8(c)(1)(ii)],” the appellants further failed to comply with the rule by leaving unsatisfied at least one of the rule’s mandatory elements. Rule 5A:8(c)(1). To the extent the appellants allege that their noncompliance is excused because “[n]o prejudice has resulted to [VTCR],” such an argument is misplaced. Rule 5A:8(c) requires no showing of prejudice. “From the plain language of the rule, it is clear that prejudice (or the lack thereof) is not a relevant inquiry regarding compliance with Rule [5A:8(c)].” Browning v. Browning, 68 Va. App. 19, 28 (2017). Accordingly, “we are limited to determining whether the [appellant complied with Rule 5A:8(c)(1) in filing the written statement of facts] and, if the [appellant did not comply with Rule 5A:8(c)(1)], what effect the absence of the [written statement of facts] from the record has on the appeal.” Id. As such, the appellants’ contention is unavailing. The appellants also take issue with the Botetourt Circuit Court striking their written statement of facts where “no hearing was held.” Presumably, this contention rests on the fact that the Botetourt Circuit Court, to the appellants, was obligated to set a hearing when VTCR filed their objections. See Rule 5A:8(d). And it is true that the recent amendments added that “the judge must set a hearing with notice to all parties” within ten days of the date the objections were filed. Rule 5A:8(d); see 2025 Amendments. But the new requirement for a trial court to set a hearing once objections are filed does not excuse appellants who still fail to comply with Rule 5A:8(c)(1). The trial judge’s signature is more than the means by which a written statement of facts becomes part of the record. The trial judge’s signature signifies that a given written statement of facts is “an accurate and complete statement of the facts and procedural history of the proceeding in the [circuit] court.” Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610. The trial judge’s signature can alternatively certify how the written statement is incomplete. See Rule 5A:8(d)(4); see also Shapiro, 279 Va. - 12 - at 266. And, crucial to this case, the rule itself indicates that “[t]he judge’s signature on a transcript or written statement, without more, constitutes certification that the procedural requirements of this Rule have been satisfied.” Rule 5A:8(d). Accordingly, the trial judge’s signature on a written statement of facts not only provides legitimacy to the substance of the written statement but also certifies that those contents were properly tendered. See Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610‑11. At the same time, the text of Rule 5A:8(d) contemplates that a trial judge must sign a written statement of facts after conducting a hearing on timely filed objections. See Rule 5A:8(d) (providing that “[a]fter the hearing [required by Rule 5A:8(d)]” the circuit court address the objections “and sign the transcript or written statement” (emphasis added)). Our caselaw similarly indicates that a trial judge must sign the written statement of facts after addressing all objections and deeming the filing “accurate and complete.” See Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 610. And a variety of commentators reached a similar conclusion, going so far to say that “[t]he judge is bound in duty to sign the [written statement of facts] when presented to him in due time, in case it is true.” Powell, supra, ch. 5, § 52, at 249; see Burks, supra, §§ 282, 410. The appellants’ argument would put trial judges in a pernicious bind if, after addressing all objections at the hearing required by Rule 5A:8(d), the judge is “bound in duty” to sign a written statement of facts put before the court in violation of procedural rules. Powell, supra, ch. 5, § 52, at 249. In essence, that situation would compel a judge to sign a written statement of facts when the requirements in Rule 5A:8(c)(1) remain unsatisfied. And as a result, a circuit court would be certifying something that it could not possibly certify: “that the procedural requirements of [Rule 5A:8] ha[d] been satisfied.” Rule 5A:8(d). Rather than placing circuit courts in such a position, we conclude that the recent amendments obligate a circuit court to set a hearing to address objections only to written - 13 - statements of facts that are prima facie compliant, meaning they were filed in satisfaction of Rule 5A:8(c)(1). See Scholz v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 145 Va. 694, 699‑700 (1926) (holding that a trial judge “is without power to sign” a written statement of facts when presented to the court in violation of procedural rules); Va. Home for Incurables and Sheltering Arms Hosp., 164 Va. at 243 (same); cf. Proctor, 15 Va. App. at 611 n.3 (concluding that “[Rule 5A:8(d)] is not implicated” when a party does not comply with procedural filing requirements). Hence, because the appellants did not prima facie comply with Rule 5A:8(c)(1) in filing their written statement of facts, the Botetourt Circuit Court was not required to hold a hearing before striking the written statement of facts even though VTCR filed objections contemporaneously with their motion to strike. Irrespective of VTCR’s list of objections, the appellants were still obliged to file a written statement of facts that was compliant with Rule 5A:8(c)(1). As outlined above, they did not. Thus, the appellants did not establish prima facie compliance with the requirements of Rule 5A:8(c)(1). As a result, the written statement of facts cannot become part of the record on appeal. See Mayhood, 4 Va. App. at 368-69.11 11 The appellants’ further argument regarding the purported delay in getting VTCR’s full motion to strike is also unpersuasive. “An appellate court must dispose of the case upon the record and cannot base its decision upon appellant’s petition or brief . . . .” Smith v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 630, 635 (1993). Here, the record does not indicate there was any delay in the appellants receiving VTCR’s full filings. The record indicates that VTCR sent its motion to strike the appellants’ written statement of facts “by first-class mail” the same day it was filed with the clerk of the Botetourt Circuit Court. But there is no record evidence that the appellants received only a portion of VTCR’s filings. Hence, we are compelled to conclude against the appellants on this issue because there is no record evidence supporting their contention. See Stewart v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 563, 569 (1990) (rejecting an appellant’s argument when the record did not support the factual allegations underpinning their argument). - 14 - C. The record is insufficient without a transcript or written statement of facts to adjudicate the remaining assignments of error. “When the appellant fails to ensure that the record contains transcripts or a written statement of facts necessary to permit resolution of appellate issues, any assignments of error affected by such omission will not be considered.” Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii). If a “transcript [or written statement of facts] is not part of the record and is indispensable to our resolution of [an appellant’s] assignments of error, we must deem the assignments of error waived” and “affirm the judgment of the [circuit] court.” Browning, 68 Va. App. at 32. A transcript or written statement of facts is indispensable when, in the absence of a transcript or written statement of facts, the record is not “complete to the degree necessary to adjudicate the appeal.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99 (1986); see Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii). Here, the appellants’ remaining assignments of error are both related to the Botetourt Circuit Court’s determination that issue preclusion barred consideration of their suit. Specifically, they assert that the Botetourt Circuit Court erred “in dismissing the Complaint based on res judicata” and “by granting dismissal based solely on Defendant’s pretrial motion without allowing Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity to present evidence or proceed to trial on their claims.” Both assignments of error require this Court to inquire into the probity of the Botetourt Circuit Court’s decision to grant VTCR’s special plea of res judicata. “Res judicata involves both issue and claim preclusion.” Funny Guy, LLC v. Lecego, LLC, 293 Va. 135, 142 (2017). “Issue preclusion bars relitigation of common factual issues between the same or related parties.” Id. It specifically “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Lee v. Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 246 (2015) (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)). “In order to prove that a claim or issue is precluded by a former adjudication, ‘the record of the prior action must be - 15 - offered in evidence.’” Scales v. Lewis, 261 Va. 379, 383 (2001) (quoting Bernau v. Nealon, 219 Va. 1039, 1041 (1979)). A transcript or written statement of facts is indispensable in addressing whether the Botetourt Circuit Court erred in granting VTCR’s special plea of res judicata. Without a transcript or written statement of facts, we have no way of assessing what “common factual issues” the Botetourt Circuit Court may have found between the circuit-court suit and the GDC suit. Funny Guy, LLC, 293 Va. at 142. Nor can we assess the basis for its ruling on whether Jackson was simply misjoined to the circuit-court suit or whether she was Johnson’s privy. See Town of Iron Gate v. Simpson, 82 Va. App. 38, 50 (2024) (concluding that a transcript was indispensable when this Court could not articulate the specific basis for the lower-court’s ruling without one). We cannot even conclude whether the Botetourt Circuit Court had taken a record of the GDC suit into evidence to assess the facts litigated therein. See Scales, 261 Va. at 383 (listing several ways a record of a general district court’s proceedings may be presented to a circuit court during a hearing addressing res judicata). The Botetourt Circuit Court’s final order does not clarify these matters either. Instead of elaborating upon its ruling, the Botetourt Circuit Court’s final order simply noted that it was granting VTCR’s motion “[u]pon consideration of the papers submitted and the oral arguments presented[] and for the reasons stated from the bench.” (Emphasis added). This does not replace the role of a transcript or written statement of facts in the record on appeal. See Town of Iron Gate, 82 Va. App. at 50 (highlighting that a final order using similar language made this Court “unable to review fully the [appellant’s] arguments and court’s ruling below”). As such, we cannot review the correctness of the Botetourt Circuit Court’s holding regarding res judicata without a transcript or written statement of facts, meaning the record is not “complete to the degree necessary to adjudicate the appeal.” Turner, 2 Va. App. at 99. This - 16 - renders a transcript or written statement of facts “indispensable” for appellate review in this case. Browning, 68 Va. App. at 32. And because a transcript or written statement of facts is indispensable for resolving this appeal, “we must deem the assignments of error waived, and therefore, we affirm the judgment of the [circuit] court.” Id. III. CONCLUSION The newly amended Rule 5A:8(c)(1) delineates four requirements an appellant must follow to be prima facie compliant with the rule. See Rule 5A:8(c)(1). Because the appellants did not fully comply with Rule 5A:8(c)(1), the Botetourt Circuit Court did not err in striking their written statement of facts, precluding it from “becom[ing] a part of the record” on appeal. Rule 5A:8(c). And since the written statement of facts is indispensable to the resolution of the appellants’ assignments of error, we cannot address their arguments. See Browning, 68 Va. App. at 32. For these reasons, we affirm the Botetourt Circuit Court’s judgment. Affirmed. - 17 -