Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 25-3206 __________ JASMINE COLEMAN, Appellant v. CAPITAL ONE ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-00040) District Judge: Honorable Christine P. O’Hearn ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 27, 2026 Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed November 2, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se Appellant Jasmine Coleman appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her amended complaint and the denial of her motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. I. Coleman commenced her civil action against Capital One in the Superior Court of New Jersey, seeking damages arising from a credit line payment dispute. Capital One removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Before the District Court ruled on Capital One’s motion, Coleman sought leave to amend her complaint, which the District Court granted. Coleman filed her amended complaint. Capital One moved to dismiss it for failure to state a claim. The District Court granted the motion, dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice, granting Coleman leave to file a motion to amend, and warning Coleman that this would be her final opportunity to cure her claims’ deficiencies. Coleman then filed a motion to amend or correct her amended complaint, which the District Court denied. The District Court converted its prior dismissal to a dismissal with prejudice, and Coleman timely appealed.1 II. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 2016), and we review the denial of a motion for leave to 1 Coleman’s November 7, 2025 notice of appeal was timely as to the District Court’s October 7, 2025 order. The District Court’s order did not comply with the separate document rule, and thus the order was not deemed entered for purposes of the 30-day appeal deadline until 150 days after its entry on the docket. See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2007). 2 amend for abuse of discretion, see Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011). But our review is limited to the arguments that Coleman has preserved in her opening brief. See M.S. ex rel. Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that parties forfeit any argument that they do not raise in their opening brief); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that pro se litigants “must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants”). Coleman argues that the District Court abused its discretion by denying her motion to amend without explanation, and that the District Court erred by dismissing her amended complaint with prejudice without providing her notice and an opportunity to cure any deficiencies. Coleman’s arguments are belied by the record. When the District Court granted Capital One’s motion to dismiss, it explained why each of Coleman’s claims in her amended complaint failed to meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)’s plausibility standard. Coleman does not dispute any of these identified deficiencies now. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting that arguments not developed by an appellant are forfeited). And when the District Court gave Coleman time to file a motion to amend, it cautioned that it would be “her final opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 49 at 10 n.14. Furthermore, when the District Court denied Coleman’s motion to amend, it concluded that Coleman failed to correct the previously identified deficiencies in her amended complaint, and it explained why her proposed new claims could not survive 3 dismissal.2 See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (providing that leave to amend is futile if “the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted”). Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 54. We are satisfied that the District Court adequately explained its reasons for denying amendment. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 2 Coleman does not specifically challenge the District Court’s assessment of any of her claims for relief in her proposed second amended complaint. See Wettach, 811 F.3d at 115. 4