Full Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0471n.06 No. 26-1179 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Nov 20, 2026 ) RICK STOVER KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN MICHAEL J. BOUCHARD, et al. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN Defendants-Appellees. ) ) OPINION ) ) Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and READLER, Circuit Judges. ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge I. Introduction This appeal comes before us after the district court dismissed Plaintiff Rick Stover’s1 Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because Stover did not sufficiently plead his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, we AFFIRM. II. Facts and Procedural History In November 2023, Rick Stover collapsed at the Oakland County Jail while serving a 30- day sentence. R. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 13. The jail personnel brought him to the hospital and he received treatment. Id. at ¶ 13. After his release, Stover developed atrial fibrillation (AFIB). Id. at ¶ 14. Stover eventually sued Oakland County, Sheriff Michael Bouchard, and an unspecified number of 1 The record refers to Appellant as “Strover” at various points. We use the name Stover because that is how the Complaint and Appellant’s Brief spell the name. No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al. John Doe deputies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. See R. 1. In his Complaint, Stover alleges that the jail personnel knew that he needed continuing medical treatment, in the form of medication, and that he requested additional medical treatment when he did not receive it. Id. at ¶¶ 10–12. Because he did not receive treatment, Stover alleges, his pre-existing Polycythemia Vera worsened and caused AFIB, which he did not have prior to incarceration. Id. at ¶¶ 13–15. The only claim before this Court is Stover’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim2 that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.3 III. Standard of Review “We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 318 (6th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, the complaint must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 Stover does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of his state law claim. 3 We note the Stover pled a “4th Amendment” Equal Protection claim. See R.1 at ¶ 17(a). We assume he meant to reference the Fourteenth Amendment although the Eighth Amendment is the proper constitutional provision to invoke since Stover was already convicted and serving his sentence when the alleged constitutional deprivation arose. Griffith v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). That is a distinction without a difference for this case because we apply the same deliberate indifference analysis under either amendment. Id. at 567; see also Poynter ex rel. Fernandez v. Shirley, 191 F.4th 745, 754 (6th Cir. 2026) (en banc). -2- No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al. IV. Analysis Stover might have a claim against the Defendants. Or he might not. We cannot tell because Stover has not properly pled his claims. We start with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules do not require a complaint to include “detailed factual allegations” to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation modified). Because Stover’s Complaint failed to meet this standard, his claims fail against each Defendant. At the outset, 42 U.S.C § 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover when a person acting under the color of state law deprives the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” First, we address Stover’s claims against Oakland County. Municipalities “may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978)). So, to hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional” violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. That the individual tortfeasor works for the municipality does not alone create liability for the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. In other words, “a -3- No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al. municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Here, Stover’s Complaint fails on all fronts. Stover alleges that the County is “vicariously liable for [the Deputies’] acts and/or omissions.” R. 1 at ¶ 7. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, squarely forecloses this argument. Likewise, Stover invokes the “policies, practices, and customs” language, but does not offer any facts to support his theory that the County has a policy, practice, or custom of depriving inmates of constitutional rights by withholding medical care. R. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 17(g). And for that reason he fails to meet the pleading requirements set out by Rule 8. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stover had four avenues to allege that the County employed an illegal policy, practice, or custom: “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Griffith v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 581 (6th Cir. 2020). Stover did not allege facts to develop any of those theories. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Stover’s claims against the County. Next, we address Stover’s claim against Sheriff Bouchard. “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (emphasis added). Stover did not make any allegations that Bouchard’s actions violated his constitutional rights. Nor did Stover advance a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against Bouchard, the other avenue available to hold supervisors liable. See Essex v. County of Livingston, 518 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2013). Stover having failed to make any actionable claim, the district court properly dismissed the claim against Bouchard. -4- No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al. Finally, we turn to the unspecified number of John Doe Defendants. Like Stover’s claim against Bouchard, Stover does not allege that any John Doe Defendant’s individual actions violated the Constitution, so his claims fail. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Complaint, rather, referred to “Defendant Deputies” generally. See, e.g., R. 1 at ¶¶ 17(c)–(e). And as the district court noted, even if the Complaint sufficiently alleged individual involvement by the John Doe Defendants, it does not adequately plead that they were deliberately indifferent to Stover’s medical needs. See Strover v. Bouchard, No. 2:25-CV-11133, 2026 WL 126148, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2026). The government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Thence, “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 104. A deliberate indifference inquiry includes both objective and subjective prongs: (1) “the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that the defendant’s “state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation modified). Stover’s vague allegations that the Defendants did not give him the medication he required fall short of establishing that the Defendants knew that failing to administer the medication would pose a substantial risk of serious harm and chose not to act anyway. “[I]t is difficult to know why someone did not act.” Poynter ex rel. Fernandez v. Shirley, 191 F.4th 745, 761 (6th Cir. 2026) (en banc). “Without [allegations] of what an individual knew when he failed to act, we lack,” support for the inference that the Defendants had “a sufficiently culpable mens rea.” Id. And Stover’s bald assertion that the Deputies’ “conduct showed intentional, outrageous, and reckless disregard” for his rights presupposes the Deputies’ mental -5- No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al. state without offering any further factual allegations to support his claim. Id. at ¶ 17(e). Left behind is a gaping hole of mens rea. “The [Deputies’] inaction could be purposeful. It could be reckless. Or it could be negligent.” Poynter, 191 F.4th at 761. Stover must allege more to make it plausible that deliberate indifference caused the John Does’ inaction. V. Conclusion Federal pleading standards are liberal, but nonetheless real standards. Plaintiffs who wish to avail themselves of federal court must put forth facts that support their claims and not just recite legal elements. Stover failed to do that, so we AFFIRM. -6-