Rick Stover v. Michael Bouchard
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket26-1179
JudgeAlice M. Batchelder; Karen Nelson Moore; Chad A. Readler
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 26a0471n.06
No. 26-1179
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Nov 20, 2026
)
RICK STOVER KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
MICHAEL J. BOUCHARD, et al. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
Defendants-Appellees. )
) OPINION
)
)
Before: BATCHELDER, MOORE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge
I. Introduction
This appeal comes before us after the district court dismissed Plaintiff Rick Stover’s1
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because
Stover did not sufficiently plead his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, we AFFIRM.
II. Facts and Procedural History
In November 2023, Rick Stover collapsed at the Oakland County Jail while serving a 30-
day sentence. R. 1 at ¶¶ 8, 13. The jail personnel brought him to the hospital and he received
treatment. Id. at ¶ 13. After his release, Stover developed atrial fibrillation (AFIB). Id. at ¶ 14.
Stover eventually sued Oakland County, Sheriff Michael Bouchard, and an unspecified number of
1
The record refers to Appellant as “Strover” at various points. We use the name Stover because that is how the
Complaint and Appellant’s Brief spell the name.
No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al.
John Doe deputies in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. See R.
1.
In his Complaint, Stover alleges that the jail personnel knew that he needed continuing
medical treatment, in the form of medication, and that he requested additional medical treatment
when he did not receive it. Id. at ¶¶ 10–12. Because he did not receive treatment, Stover alleges,
his pre-existing Polycythemia Vera worsened and caused AFIB, which he did not have prior to
incarceration. Id. at ¶¶ 13–15.
The only claim before this Court is Stover’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim2 that the Defendants
violated his constitutional rights under the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.3
III. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state
a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).” Robbins v. New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC, 854 F.3d 315, 318
(6th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” In re
Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, the complaint
must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
2
Stover does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of his state law claim.
3
We note the Stover pled a “4th Amendment” Equal Protection claim. See R.1 at ¶ 17(a). We assume he meant to
reference the Fourteenth Amendment although the Eighth Amendment is the proper constitutional provision to invoke
since Stover was already convicted and serving his sentence when the alleged constitutional deprivation arose. Griffith
v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020). That is a distinction without a difference for this case because
we apply the same deliberate indifference analysis under either amendment. Id. at 567; see also Poynter ex rel.
Fernandez v. Shirley, 191 F.4th 745, 754 (6th Cir. 2026) (en banc).
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IV. Analysis
Stover might have a claim against the Defendants. Or he might not. We cannot tell because
Stover has not properly pled his claims. We start with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Rules do not require a complaint to include
“detailed factual allegations” to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but “a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(citation modified). Because Stover’s Complaint failed to meet this standard, his claims fail against
each Defendant.
At the outset, 42 U.S.C § 1983 allows a plaintiff to recover when a person acting under the
color of state law deprives the plaintiff of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.” First, we address Stover’s claims against Oakland County. Municipalities
“may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation
of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978)). So, to
hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that “action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional” violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
“Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its
policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force
of law.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. That the individual tortfeasor works for the municipality does
not alone create liability for the municipality. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. In other words, “a
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municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. Here,
Stover’s Complaint fails on all fronts.
Stover alleges that the County is “vicariously liable for [the Deputies’] acts and/or
omissions.” R. 1 at ¶ 7. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, squarely forecloses this argument. Likewise,
Stover invokes the “policies, practices, and customs” language, but does not offer any facts to
support his theory that the County has a policy, practice, or custom of depriving inmates of
constitutional rights by withholding medical care. R. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 17(g). And for that reason he fails
to meet the pleading requirements set out by Rule 8. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stover had
four avenues to allege that the County employed an illegal policy, practice, or custom: “(1) the
existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision
making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or
supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
violations.” Griffith v. Franklin County, 975 F.3d 554, 581 (6th Cir. 2020). Stover did not allege
facts to develop any of those theories. Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing
Stover’s claims against the County.
Next, we address Stover’s claim against Sheriff Bouchard. “Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant,
through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (emphasis added). Stover did not make any allegations that Bouchard’s
actions violated his constitutional rights. Nor did Stover advance a failure-to-train-or-supervise
claim against Bouchard, the other avenue available to hold supervisors liable. See Essex v. County
of Livingston, 518 F. App’x 351, 355 (6th Cir. 2013). Stover having failed to make any actionable
claim, the district court properly dismissed the claim against Bouchard.
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Finally, we turn to the unspecified number of John Doe Defendants. Like Stover’s claim
against Bouchard, Stover does not allege that any John Doe Defendant’s individual actions
violated the Constitution, so his claims fail. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. The Complaint, rather,
referred to “Defendant Deputies” generally. See, e.g., R. 1 at ¶¶ 17(c)–(e). And as the district court
noted, even if the Complaint sufficiently alleged individual involvement by the John Doe
Defendants, it does not adequately plead that they were deliberately indifferent to Stover’s medical
needs. See Strover v. Bouchard, No. 2:25-CV-11133, 2026 WL 126148, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 16,
2026).
The government has an “obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing
by incarceration.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Thence, “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners” violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 104. A deliberate
indifference inquiry includes both objective and subjective prongs: (1) “the inmate must show that
he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and (2) that the
defendant’s “state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation modified). Stover’s vague allegations that the
Defendants did not give him the medication he required fall short of establishing that the
Defendants knew that failing to administer the medication would pose a substantial risk of serious
harm and chose not to act anyway.
“[I]t is difficult to know why someone did not act.” Poynter ex rel. Fernandez v. Shirley,
191 F.4th 745, 761 (6th Cir. 2026) (en banc). “Without [allegations] of what an individual knew
when he failed to act, we lack,” support for the inference that the Defendants had “a sufficiently
culpable mens rea.” Id. And Stover’s bald assertion that the Deputies’ “conduct showed
intentional, outrageous, and reckless disregard” for his rights presupposes the Deputies’ mental
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No. 26-1179, Stover v. Bouchard, et al.
state without offering any further factual allegations to support his claim. Id. at ¶ 17(e). Left behind
is a gaping hole of mens rea. “The [Deputies’] inaction could be purposeful. It could be reckless.
Or it could be negligent.” Poynter, 191 F.4th at 761. Stover must allege more to make it plausible
that deliberate indifference caused the John Does’ inaction.
V. Conclusion
Federal pleading standards are liberal, but nonetheless real standards. Plaintiffs who wish
to avail themselves of federal court must put forth facts that support their claims and not just recite
legal elements. Stover failed to do that, so we AFFIRM.
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