Green v. Residential Acceptance
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-30149
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 26-30149 Document: 92-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/18/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 26-30149 November 18, 2026
Summary Calendar
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________ Clerk
Marcia Michelle Green,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Residential Acceptance Corporation; Village Capital &
Investment, L.L.C.; DHI Title Louisiana; Midland
Mortgage,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:24-CV-341
______________________________
Before King, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Marcia Michelle Green, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint with prejudice and its denial of her post-judgment
motion for leave to amend. We AFFIRM.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 26-30149
I
In August 2023, Green obtained a residential loan and mortgage with
Residential Acceptance Corporation (“RAC”). Green alleged that she
believed the mortgage was a direct loan of cash to her that she would use to
pay for her house, but she “never saw nor signed a check,” as the note was
used to pay for the property in full. The mortgage was transferred to Village
Capital & Investment, L.L.C. (“Village Capital”), and then to Midland
Mortgage.
On May 1, 2024, Green sued RAC, Village Capital, DHI Title-
Louisiana, and Midland Mortgage in federal court. The defendants moved
to dismiss Green’s complaint. In response, Green amended her complaint.
The amended complaint reprised previously alleged facts and asserted seven
claims: extortionate credit transactions; violations of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”), and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”); fraudulent
conversion of the promissory note; misrepresentation of material fact; and
breach of contract.
In light of the amended complaint, the district judge denied the
motions to dismiss without prejudice. The defendants each filed new
motions to dismiss, asserting, among other grounds, failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The motions were referred to the
magistrate judge, who recommended dismissing Green’s claims with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. Green objected. The district court, after
de novo review, adopted the magistrate judge’s reasoning, granted the
motions to dismiss, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Green moved for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) and for leave to file
a second amended complaint under Rule 15(a). Her motion was referred to
the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge recommended denying the
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motion and entered his report and recommendation, in which he determined
that Green’s proposed amended complaint did not address the previous
shortcomings and was thus futile. Green objected. The district court, after
de novo review, adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied
Green’s motion. Green timely appealed.
II
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. McKay v. LaCroix, 117
F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009).
A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper where a plaintiff failed to plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Green fails to do so for each of
her seven claims.
The amended complaint fails to state a claim for extortionate credit
transaction allegations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 892-94. These are criminal
statutes under which Green cannot assert a claim. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 79-80 (1975); Berry v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2022 WL 728969, at *5 (5th Cir.
Mar. 10, 2022).
As to Green’s FDCPA claims, such claims can only be asserted
against debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6) (defining debt collector);
Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). Green does
not allege that Village Capital, RCI, or Midland Mortgage is a “debt
collector.” The alleged facts instead show that they were lenders or
mortgage servicing companies collecting on debt they were owed. Lenders
or mortgage servicing companies collecting on debt they are owed cannot be
held liable under the FDCPA. See Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
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582 U.S. 79, 83, 89-90 (2017); Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208
(5th Cir. 1985). Green thus failed to state a claim under the FDCPA.
Green’s FCRA claim also fails. A claim under the FCRA must show
that inaccurate information was knowingly furnished to a credit agency.
15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(A). Green does not allege what information, if any,
was furnished, nor how it was inaccurate. This is insufficient to state a claim.
TILA requires proper, conspicuous, and timely disclosure of finance
charges and terms, such as fees, amount financed, and annual percentage.
12 C.F.R. § 1026. Green attached to her amended complaint the “Closing
Disclosure” she signed, that shows, among other terms, “Loan Terms,”
“Projected Payments,” “Closing Cost Details,” and “Loan Disclosures.”
Green alleges no facts to show that these disclosures violated TILA in any
way and thus fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for a
violation of TILA.
The amended complaint fails to state a claim for “fraudulent
conversion of note.” Although unclear, this claim appears to be based on the
transfer of the loan, which was explicitly permitted by the loan
documentation. To prevail on a conversion claim under Louisiana law, a
plaintiff must prove that (1) the plaintiff owned or had the right to possess
some property; (2) the defendant’s misuse of the property was inconsistent
with the plaintiff’s right of ownership; and (3) the misuse constituted a
wrongful taking. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Perry Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 783
F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1986). Green’s alleged facts do not support an
inference of liability as to any defendant on any of the required elements here.
Turning to Green’s claim for misrepresentation of a material fact, this
too fails. To state a claim for misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant misrepresented, or omitted, a material fact. Guidry v. U.S.
Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of
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Shreveport, 792 So.2d 33, 49 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2001). Green’s amended
complaint alleges that the two misrepresented material facts are that RAC
was not a lender and that “banks do not have the power to loan money.” Yet
the alleged facts show that RAC was a lender and that banks do have the
power to loan money. Green has thus failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted.
Finally, Green does not plausibly allege a breach of contract. To state
a claim for breach of contract, the plaintiff must show, among other things,
breach by the defendant. See Louque v. Allstate Ins. Co., 314 F.3d 776, 782
(5th Cir. 2002). Green alleges no such breach here and thus fails to state a
claim for breach of contract.
Because Green failed to state any claim upon which relief can be
granted, we AFFIRM.
III
Green next appeals the district court’s denial of her post-judgment
motion for leave to amend. When leave is sought to amend pleadings after
the entry of a final judgment, it is treated as a motion under Rule 59(e).
Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 954, 864 (5th Cir. 2003). But “under
these circumstances, the considerations for a Rule 59(e) motion are governed
by Rule 15(a).” Id. (citation modified). We thus consider the district court’s
denial of Green’s motion for leave to amend under the Rule 15(a) framework.
When denial of leave to amend under Rule 15(a) is due to futility, as is
the case here, our review is de novo. Terry Black’s Barbecue, L.L.C. v. State
Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 459 (5th Cir. 2022). Green’s
proposed second amended complaint would not survive another Rule
12(b)(6) motion, as she still fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Amendment thus would have been futile. Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v.
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Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (“An
amendment is futile if it would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”)
AFFIRMED.
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