Full Opinion

FILED NOVEMBER 19, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE GABRIEL GAMEZ, ) ) No. 41021-8-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) Respondent. ) HILL, J. — Gabriel Gamez petitioned the Spokane County Superior Court for an order to declare an unlawful detainer judgment and two traffic infractions void because he is not a “person” under the relevant statutes. He also sought an order that would declare him immune from future actions initiated by the State. The State moved to dismiss Gamez’s petition under CR 12(c), which the court granted. Gamez appeals. We affirm. No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State BACKGROUND In 2022, the Spokane County Superior Court entered a default judgment against Gabriel Gamez in an unlawful detainer action and ordered him to pay rent and costs. Gamez moved to vacate and dismiss the unlawful detainer because he was not a person under RCW 1.16.080 or RCW 59.18.030(21) and therefore was not a resident under chapter 59.12 RCW or chapter 59.18 RCW. The court denied the motion on procedural grounds and, because his position that State eviction laws do not apply to him, lacked any basis in fact or law. Later, Gamez challenged traffic infractions in Spokane County and Kittitas County. According to Gamez, he informed the court that he was not a person for purposes of the relevant motor vehicle statutes, but to no avail. In September 2024, Gamez filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), chapter 7.24 RCW. Gamez argued he was not subject to lawsuits under the Revised Code of Washington or the Washington Administrative Code because he is not a “person” under RCW 1.16.080. Specifically, Gamez sought to void the unlawful detainer judgment and two traffic violations on the basis that he was not a person, operator, driver, or resident under the relevant statutes. Further, he wanted the court to “enjoin” the State from suing him in the future. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 10. The State filed a motion under CR 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Gamez’s claim that he was sovereignly immune and not subject to suit was not supported 2 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State by law or fact. The State also argued Gamez did not have standing to request the court declare him sovereignly immune from suit and to enjoin the State from suing him in the future. The superior court granted the State’s motion. Gamez appeals. ANALYSIS Standard of Review We review a trial court’s dismissal on a CR 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. P.E. Sys., LLC v. CPI Corp., 176 Wn.2d 198, 203, 289 P.3d 638 (2012). We treat a CR 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings identically to a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. The primary distinction between these rules is a motion under CR 12(c) is made after the pleadings are closed, and a motion under CR 12(b)(6) is made after the complaint but before the answer. Howell v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 7 Wn. App. 2d 899, 910, 436 P.3d 368 (2019). We dismiss a complaint under CR 12(c) when the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that can justify recovery. Id. We assume the facts alleged, as well as hypothetical facts, are true, and view these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. However, we need not accept the nonmoving party’s legal conclusions as true. Id. Jurisdiction Gamez argues the State fails to demonstrate that the trial court, in both the traffic violation and unlawful detainer proceedings, had jurisdiction over him. Gamez contends 3 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State he was acting as a private person in his private capacity. He believes he does not fall under the definition of terms like “individual” and “person.” Gamez fails to provide authority to support his alleged distinction between public and private persons, why the statutes would not reach his conduct, or how he meets the definition of a private person. Because Gamez does not provide citation to relevant authorities to support his assertion, we need not consider this argument. See RAP 10.3(a)(6). Even if we were to reach this argument, Gamez plainly falls within the statutory definitions under the unlawful detainer and motor vehicle statutes. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. State v. Evergreen Freedom Found., 192 Wn.2d 782, 789, 432 P.3d 805 (2019). Our primary objective when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature’s intent. Lenander v. State Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 186 Wn.2d 393, 405, 377 P.3d 199 (2016). We first look to the plain meaning of the statute. Id. “Legislative definitions included in the statute are controlling, but in the absence of a statutory definition, we give the term its plain and ordinary meaning as defined in the dictionary.” State v. Econ. Dev. Bd. for Tacoma- Pierce County, 9 Wn. App. 2d 1, 10, 441 P.3d 1269 (2019). Under the general provisions of the Revised Code of Washington, the definition of a “person” includes an individual. RCW 1.16.080(1). Under the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act, chapter 59.18 RCW, the legislature also defines the term “person” to include an individual. A “tenant” is “any person who is entitled to occupy 4 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State a dwelling unit primarily for living or dwelling purposes under a rental agreement.” RCW 59.18.030(34). The unlawful detainer statute regulates tenants of real property. RCW 59.12.030. Under Washington’s motor vehicle statutes, an “operator” or “driver” means “every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” RCW 46.04.370. A “person” includes natural persons. RCW 46.04.405. A “natural person” means a human being. RCW 46.04.356. Here, the statutory definitions for “person,” “driver,” “operator,” and “tenant” are unambiguous. Gamez meets the definition of a “person” under the relevant statutes and is not immune from their applicability. While Gamez claims he is a private person and therefore immune from their reach, we need not accept these legal conclusions as true for purposes of CR 12(c). Consequently, we hold the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over Gamez in each of the judgments he contests in this appeal. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act Gamez next contends the trial court erred by failing to liberally construe the UDJA. Specifically, he claims he presented an actual dispute about his status as a private person, and the court failed to accept his allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to him. We disagree. While the trial court was required to view the facts in the light most favorable to Gamez, it was not required to accept his legal conclusion concerning his alleged status as a “private person.” For the reasons stated above, the trial 5 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State court properly rejected Gamez’s argument regarding his status as a “non statutory person.” Gamez also contends he was entitled to equitable relief because no adequate legal remedy exists. The State responds Gamez is not entitled to equitable relief to invalidate prior court orders because he has an adequate legal remedy. Specifically, the State argues he has a remedy available under UDJA, or he could have appealed prior orders or sought relief under CR 60. We agree. Because Gamez had an adequate legal remedy, the court did not err in refusing to exercise its equitable powers. See M.G. by Priscilla G. v. Yakima School Dist. No. 7, 2 Wn.3d 786, 799, 544 P.3d 460 (2024). Procedural and Substantive Rights Gamez next contends the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice was procedurally and substantively improper on several grounds. He contends the trial court did not afford him a proper hearing or the ability to amend his pleadings, which violated article I, sections 1, 30, and 3 of the Washington State Constitution. In support of this argument, he cites Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 897 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018), arguing a trial court’s dismissal with prejudice without giving leave to amend is an abuse of discretion. However, Gamez does not cite to any authority demonstrating that a trial court’s refusal to grant leave to amend when not requested by the party is an abuse of discretion. When a party fails to provide legal citation in support of an argument, we assume they have 6 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State found none. 21st Mortg. Corp. v. Nicholls, 25 Wn. App. 2d 795, 806, 525 P.3d 962 (2023). As a result, this argument fails. Next, Gamez argues the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice violated Washington’s standards of fairness, due process, and procedural equity. He contends the State deprived him of his substantive rights because his “sovereignty supersedes the State’s.” Br. of Appellant at 10. He also contends the State “abridged, among others, Gamez’s right to petition, to redress grievances, to liberty, to be heard, to be let alone, to be happy, to be secure, as well as his right to due process.” Id. He also argues the trial court adopted the State’s proposed order without independent analysis or oral argument, depriving him of his opportunity to be heard. Beyond these bare legal conclusions, Gamez does not cite to authority to support these arguments or identify how the trial court violated these rights, and we decline to review them. RAP 10.3(a)(6). Justiciability The State contends Gamez’s request to declare him sovereignly immune and enjoin future lawsuits against him is not justiciable. Gamez argues this matter is justiciable because he asked the court to declare a specific right under RCW 7.24.020. We agree with the State. In his UDJA petition, Gamez requested an order declaring him sovereignly immune and “enjoining” the State “from instigating suit against Petitioner before 7 No. 41021-8-III Gamez v. State sufficiently ascertaining as to whether Petitioner is, in law and in fact, acting in the capacity of a statutory ‘person’ and liable to suit.” CP at 10. A justiciable controversy requires the following: (1) “. . . an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which will be final and conclusive.” Walker v. Munro, 124 Wn.2d 402, 411, 879 P.2d 920 (1994) (quoting Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wn.2d 594, 599, 800 P.2d 359 (1990)). Gamez’s request for the trial court to prohibit the State from initiating future actions against him is not justiciable because it concerns a possible, hypothetical, and speculative event. 1 Affirmed. A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040. _________________________________ Hill, J. WE CONCUR: _________________________________ _________________________________ Staab, C.J. Cooney, J. 1 The State also argues the relief requested by Gamez is barred by collateral estoppel. We need not reach this argument. 8