Full Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 424 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III No. CV-25-457 CHENG VANG Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 26PR-24-439] AARON CANTERBURY HONORABLE CECILIA DYER, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge Cheng Vang appeals the Garland County Circuit Court order dismissing his petition to set aside an adoption decree of a minor child. On appeal, Vang argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition and not granting his request to open the adoption records. We affirm. On July 31, 2024, Vang filed a petition to set aside an adoption decree of a minor child whom he allegedly fathered. He claimed that he had a sexual relationship with the child’s biological mother, Aaron Canterbury, resulting in Canterbury’s pregnancy and the birth of the child on December 23, 2023. Vang claimed that Canterbury notified him of the pregnancy in April 2023, but in August, Canterbury told him that the pregnancy was aborted. In March 2024, Vang learned from third parties that Canterbury did not abort the pregnancy but instead had the child. Vang alleged that he filed a paternity petition in the Garland County Circuit Court, but Canterbury moved to dismiss the petition due to the adoption. Vang complained that he had not been notified of the adoption proceeding, and he asserted claims for fraud and equitable estoppel against Canterbury. He also asked the court to release the minor child’s adoption records pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-217(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2025).1 On November 20, the circuit court held a hearing on Vang’s request for the adoption records. At the hearing, the parties indicated that in the separate paternity proceeding, they had “agreed in an agreed order to dismiss the paternity action because there was an adoption that had been granted.”2 Following the hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying Vang’s request for the adoption records, finding that good cause did not exist pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A). On March 26, 2025, Canterbury moved to dismiss Vang’s petition pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Canterbury argued that Vang had no basis to set aside the adoption decree because, under the adoption statute, Vang was not entitled to notice of the adoption, and his consent to the adoption was not required. 1 Vang also filed the petition against the adoptive parents as Jane Roe and John Doe. 2 In Vang’s appellate brief, he states that he filed the paternity petition on April 5, 2024, and that the paternity case was dismissed in June 2024. However, the pleadings from the paternity case are not in the record. 2 On April 26, the court held a hearing and, on April 22, entered an order granting Canterbury’s motion and dismissing Vang’s petition. This appeal followed. In reviewing a circuit court’s decision on a motion to dismiss under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this court treats the facts alleged in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parnell v. FanDuel, Inc., 2019 Ark. 412, 591 S.W.3d 315. In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Id. at 3, 591 S.W.3d at 318. We look only to the allegations in the complaint and not to matters outside the complaint. Henson v. Cradduck, 2020 Ark. 24, 593 S.W.3d 10. We treat only the facts alleged in the complaint as true but not a plaintiff’s theories, speculation, or statutory interpretation. Id. The standard of review for the grant of a motion to dismiss is whether the circuit court abused its discretion. Id. We consider questions of law de novo. Brown v. Towell, 2021 Ark. 60, 619 S.W.3d 17. On appeal, Vang argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his petition to set aside the adoption decree. Vang acknowledges that under the adoption statute, he was not entitled to notice of the minor child’s adoption and that his consent to the adoption was not required. He also admits that he did not file with the putative father registry. He nonetheless argues that the circuit court should have denied the dismissal motion and held a hearing on his claims for fraud and equitable estoppel. We find it helpful to first discuss the relevant provisions of the adoption statute. Since adoptions were unknown to the common law, they are governed entirely by statute Ducharme 3 v. Gregory, 2014 Ark. App. 268, 435 S.W.3d 14. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9- 206(a)(2) (Supp. 2025) provides that unless consent is not required under section 9-9-207, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if written consent to a particular adoption has been executed by the father of the minor if: (A) The father was married to the mother at the time the minor was conceived or at any time thereafter; (B) The minor is his child by adoption; (C) He has physical custody of the minor at the time the petition is filed; (D) He has a written order granting him legal custody of the minor at the time the petition for adoption is filed; (E) A court has adjudicated him to be the legal father prior to the time the petition for adoption is filed; (F) He proves a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship existed with the minor before the petition for adoption is filed; or (G) He has acknowledged paternity under § 9-10-120(a); Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-207(a) (Supp. 2025) provides that consent to adoption is not required of: (1) a parent who has deserted a child without affording means of identification or who has abandoned a child; (2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the parent for a period of at least one (1) year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree; (3) the father of a minor if the father’s consent is not required by § 9-9-206(a)(2); 4 (4) a parent who has relinquished his or her right to consent under § 9-9-220; (5) a parent whose parental rights have been terminated by order of court under § 9-9-220 or § 9-27-341; (6) a parent judicially declared incompetent or mentally defective if the court dispenses with the parent’s consent; (7) any parent of the individual to be adopted, if the individual is an adult; (8) any legal guardian or lawful custodian of the individual to be adopted, other than a parent, who has failed to respond in writing to a request for consent for a period of sixty (60) days or who, after examination of his or her written reasons for withholding consent, is found by the court to be withholding his or her consent unreasonably; (9) the spouse of the individual to be adopted, if the failure of the spouse to consent to the adoption is excused by the court by reason of prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability, incapacity, or circumstances constituting an unreasonable withholding of consent; (10) a putative father of a minor who signed an acknowledgement of paternity but who failed to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the juvenile prior to the time the petition for adoption is filed; or (11) a putative father of a minor who is listed on the Putative Father Registry but who failed to establish a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with the juvenile prior to the time the petition for adoption is filed. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-9-207(b) provides that “except as provided in §§ 9-9-212 and 9-9-224, notice of a hearing on a petition for adoption need not be given to a person whose consent is not required or to a person whose consent or relinquishment has been filed with the petition.” Section 9-9-212(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 2025) provides that at least twenty days before the date of the adoption hearing, notice of the filing of the petition and of the time 5 and place of hearing shall be given by the petitioner to any putative father3 who has signed an acknowledgement of paternity or has registered with the state’s putative father registry.4 In this case, Vang concedes that under the adoption statute, his consent to the adoption was not required. He also concedes that because he did not register with the putative father registry, the adoption statute did not require the adoptive parents to notify him of the adoption. Given these circumstances, Vang does not have standing to challenge the adoption decree. See In re Adoption of Z.K., 2018 Ark. App. 533, 565 S.W.3d 524; see also In re Adoption of Reeves, 309 Ark. 385, 831 S.W.2d 607 (1992). In Z.K., the appellant claimed to the biological father of a child who was conceived and born while the biological mother was married to another man. 2018 Ark. App. 533, 565 S.W.3d 524. The appellant did not register with the putative father registry or sign an acknowledgment of paternity, and the biological mother and her husband, who was presumed to be the father, consented to the adoption. Id. We held that because the appellant 3 A putative father is defined throughout the Arkansas Code as any man not legally presumed or adjudicated to be the biological father of a child but who claims or is alleged to be the biological father of the child. In re Adoption of Z.K., 2018 Ark. App. 533, 565 S.W.3d 524 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-501(11) (Repl. 2015); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-43-901(h) (Repl. 1999)). 4 In adoptions involving a child “born to a mother unmarried at the time of the child’s birth,” which is the circumstance in this case, there is a requirement that a certified statement regarding information about the child contained in the Arkansas Putative Father Registry, or the absence of any such information, be obtained before entry of an adoption decree. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-224 (Supp. 2025). 6 was not entitled to notice of the adoption petition and his consent to the adoption was not required, the appellant did not have standing to challenge the adoption decree. Similarly, here, because Vang was not entitled to notice of the adoption and his consent to the adoption was not required, he did not have standing to set aside the adoption decree. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by dismissing Vang’s petition. Vang additionally argues that the circuit court erred by refusing to open the minor child’s adoption records. He notes that he filed a paternity petition in a separate case, and he asserts that without the records, he does not know whether the adoption petition was filed before or after his paternity petition. Adoption records shall be closed, confidential, and sealed unless authority to open them is provided by law or by order of the court for good cause shown. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-217(a)(2)(A). In this case, given that Vang does not have standing to challenge the adoption decree, we cannot say the circuit court erred by refusing to open the adoption records. Affirmed. KLAPPENBACH, C.J., agrees. VIRDEN, J., concurs. BART F. VIRDEN, Judge, concurring. I reluctantly agree with the majority. I’m not sure if there is a scale by which to measure reluctance, but if there is, this one is way up there. I feel comfortable saying that our decision to affirm is in accordance with the law, but it just seems wrong. To wit: Vang, upon learning of Canterbury’s pregnancy, offered marriage. Canterbury was not interested. Fair enough. Vang was rather insistent to the point that 7 Canterbury threatened to seek a restraining order. According to the complaint, which we must take as factually true, Canterbury told Vang that the pregnancy had been terminated and even described the trauma associated with the abortion. Vang thereafter abandoned his pursuit of and ceased contact with Canterbury. Approximately eight months after Vang last had any contact with Canterbury, Vang learned that Canterbury had, in fact, given birth to a baby girl—Vang’s child. Our holding today is essentially that because Vang didn’t register with the putative father registry or sign an acknowledgment of paternity, he was not entitled to notice, nor was his consent required in the adoption of his own daughter. The absurdity of the outcome in this case is obvious. Why would Vang register as a putative father to a child he was told had been aborted? How and why would he have signed an “acknowledgement of paternity” for a child that he understood had never been born? How and why would he have offered support for or contacted a child that he was told didn’t exist? Canterbury—and by extension, the adoptive parents—committed fraud against Vang, resulting in his failure to take certain actions to protect his rights, and the state of our current law will not right the injustice here because Vang, unfortunately, has been left with no standing to challenge the adoption. LaCerra, Dickson, Hoover & Rogers, PLLC, by: Traci LaCerra, for appellant. Mann & Kemp, PLLC, by: Angela Mann, for appellee. 8