Full Opinion

25-2176-cv Eaves v. Hub Int'l Group UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNY CHIN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x IASIA EAVES, Plaintiff-Appellant, -v- 25-2176-cv HUB INTERNATIONAL GROUP NORTHEAST INC., Defendant-Appellee.* - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x * The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: DARRAGH O’BOYLE (Kenneth F. McCallion, on the brief), McCallion & Associates LLP, New York, New York. FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: KIMBERLY N. DOBSON (Brittany R. Frank, on the brief), Littler Mendelson, P.C., Melville, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Azrack, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Plaintiff-Appellant Iasia Eaves appeals from a judgment entered August 12, 2025, in favor of Defendant-Appellee Hub International Group Northeast, Inc. ("Hub") dismissing her complaint for failure to prosecute and comply with court orders. By order entered August 11, 2025, the district court (Azrack, J.) granted Hub's motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with court orders. The district court observed that Eaves had repeatedly made meritless claims for various forms of relief, claims that were "denied no less than six separate times." Appellant's App. at 14. It found that "Plaintiff has repeatedly demonstrated her intent to flout Court orders and to engage in contumacious conduct." Id. at 15. It noted that the "delays caused by Plaintiff's non-compliance have routinely impeded this case from progressing." Id. at 15. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal. 2 Pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order. Because the sanction of dismissal with prejudice is particularly harsh, it is reserved for "extreme situations," Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 1996), and "only upon a finding of willfulness, bad faith, or reasonably serious fault," Rossbach v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 81 F.4th 124, 142 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Mitchell v. Lyons Prof'l Servs. Inc., 708 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 2013)) (citation modified). Courts evaluating a Rule 41 dismissal consider (1) the duration of noncompliance, (2) whether the plaintiff had notice that noncompliance would meet with dismissal, (3) the likelihood that the defendant will be prejudiced by further delay, (4) the balancing of the court's interest in docket management with the plaintiff's interest in being heard, and (5) whether the court adequately considered less drastic sanctions. Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535. No single factor is dispositive, and dismissal is reviewed in light of the record as a whole. Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014). While Rule 41 dismissals are reviewed for abuse of discretion, pro se litigants are entitled to "special leniency regarding procedural matters," and dismissal of a pro se complaint is warranted only when the circumstances are sufficiently extreme. LeSane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Lucas, 84 F.3d at 535). Such solicitude, however, does not excuse failure to comply with 3 "understandable procedural rules and mandatory deadlines." Kotler v. Jubert, 986 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2021); accord Publicola v. Lomenzo, 54 F.4th 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2022). Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to dismiss. First, Eaves's noncompliance with court orders resulted in a delay of almost nine months. On November 15, 2024, Hub requested a pre-motion conference seeking permission to move for summary judgment. On November 19, 2024, Eaves's then- counsel was relieved and Eaves was given until January 21, 2025, to advise the court whether she had obtained new counsel or was proceeding pro se. Despite numerous extensions, Eaves never found new counsel or advised that she would proceed pro se; instead, she repeatedly moved for other forms of relief, including the reopening of discovery (which had closed December 29, 2023), "[c]ompel[ling] the Court's [a]ssistance in [s]ecuring [l]egal counsel" or "[a]ppoint[ing] [c]ounsel," recusal of the magistrate judge (Shields, J.), and a protective order against two individuals who were not parties and had no apparent connection to the dispute between Eaves and Hub. Appellant's App. at 9-13. Eaves still had not complied with the order by June 23, 2025, when Hub filed a letter motion seeking, inter alia, to dismiss for lack of prosecution or, in the alternative, a conference to discuss filing its proposed summary judgment motion. The district court then gave the parties time to submit a joint proposed briefing schedule for Hub's proposed summary judgment motion, but Eaves did not cooperate. Hence, Hub renewed its request for dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, and 4 the district court granted the motion on August 11, 2025, almost nine months after Hub first requested a conference. See Ruzsa v. Rubenstein & Sendy Attys. at Law, 520 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2008) (observing that the pro se plaintiff "caused a 'delay of significant duration' in this litigation, as the proceedings ground to a halt for over seven months as a result of his inaction"); Lamont v. Edwards, 690 F. App'x 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (duration factor weighed in favor of dismissal when plaintiff "engaged in a persistent, six-month email campaign following the district court's first order on the matter despite repeated warnings"). Second, Eaves had ample notice that further noncompliance would result in dismissal. Indeed, she received at least four warnings that noncompliance would or could result in dismissal. Third, while its showing of prejudice is not strong, Hub fairly argues that it was prejudiced by the lengthy delay. See United States ex rel. Drake v. Norden Sys., Inc., 375 F.3d 248, 256-57 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that prejudice may be inferred from prolonged delay). Fourth, the court's interest in case management and docket control outweighed Eaves's interest in being heard. In addition to the delays, Eaves's noncompliance included repeated meritless requests for relief. These requests -- many of which sought relief that the court had already repeatedly denied -- required the expenditure of judicial resources. Finally, particularly in light of the considerable patience and forbearance exhibited by the district court -- which granted numerous 5 extensions, accepted late filings, and issued repeated warnings, even as Eaves's noncompliance continued -- we find that dismissal was the appropriate sanction. We recognize that dismissal with prejudice is a "harsh" remedy appropriate only upon a finding of "willfulness, bad faith, or reasonably serious fault." Mitchell, 708 F.3d at 467. Here, giving Eaves the benefit of the doubt because of the difficulties with her lawyers in the early stage of the case, even assuming she did not act in bad faith, weighing the above factors and viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that this was an extreme situation involving willful conduct and reasonably serious fault. Eaves repeatedly failed to comply with court orders, filed numerous meritless requests for relief, continued to file those requests after they were denied, and disregarded clear and explicit instructions and warnings. The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action. * * * We have considered Eaves's remaining arguments and conclude they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 6