Full Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 26-2661 ___________ ABRAHIM FATA, Appellant v. EDWIN ARCELLY; BOB KRASLEY; TRACEY KESTER; DOUG MATTE; JIM KREMERS; KYLE A. RUSSELL; MARSHA EVANS; JAY JENKINS; JOHN LENORD; ELIZABETH FLORES; DETECTIVE MANNING; JESSICA (S.P.O.R.E.); JOSE; HEATHER; SESA; PAUL; JESS; TIFFANY; HANNA; JAMES GOSS; MR. VALENTINE; MR. MEYERS ____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (E.D. Pa. No. 5:26-cv-02185) District Judge: Honorable Catherine C. Henry ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 1, 2026 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: November 5, 2026) ___________ OPINION* ___________ PER CURIAM * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Abrahim Fata appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. Fata is a frequent pro se litigator who has pursued numerous federal lawsuits and appeals in the last several years. He has repeatedly alleged the existence of a vast conspiracy involving dozens of individuals and entities, dating back to 2017, to cover up sexual abuse inflicted on his minor children and to cause Fata’s death. In this matter, Fata filed a complaint in the District Court in April 2026, bringing claims related to his sprawling conspiracy theory that spanned his incarceration in 2023 for a parole violation through his experiences at various shelters between 2025 and 2026. As relevant to this appeal, Fata asserted: (1) a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); (2) a claim of forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPA”); and (3) equal protection and due process claims relating to his release from incarceration.1 After granting Fata’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, the District Court screened his complaint and dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Fata timely appealed.2 1 Fata asserted additional claims in his complaint that he does not address in his appellate brief. He has thus forfeited those claims on appeal. See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that any issue that an appellant fails to develop in an opening brief is forfeited). We recite only the allegations necessary for our discussion. 2 Fata also filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Because Fata did not appeal from the denial of reconsideration, that decision is beyond the scope of this appeal and we do not address it. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). 2 We will affirm.3 As we have previously explained, Fata’s unsupported belief that a conspiracy has been targeting him for nearly a decade is not sufficient to state a claim for relief. See Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]o properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred,” which requires a plaintiff to plead “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.”) (citation modified); Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that a complaint that presents “conclusory allegations of concerted action but is devoid of facts actually reflecting joint action” is insufficient). Fata next challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his RICO claim, arguing that he sufficiently pleaded an injury under RICO to proceed. However, Fata does not challenge the District Court’s conclusion that his vague allegations failed to plausibly plead any of the other elements of a RICO offense. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985) (explaining that, to state a claim for a RICO violation under § 1962(c), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity”); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (requiring a complaint to include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). Fata also could not state a claim for damages under the TVPA, as he has maintained only that various defendants sought to keep him incarcerated or in crisis, but included no allegations that he was ever forced into labor or other activity prohibited by 3 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d Cir. 2020). 3 the TVPA. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581-95; Burrell v. Staff, 60 F.4th 25, 36-37 (3d Cir. 2023) (discussing claims of forced labor under the TVPA). Next, Fata could not state an equal protection claim based on his allegations that another inmate at his facility was released to a shelter despite prison staff telling Fata that he could not be released there. Fata made no allegations to explain how the other inmate was similarly situated to him. See Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 156 (3d Cir. 2018) (“To state a[n equal protection] claim under a class of one theory, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”) (citation modified). Fata newly argues on appeal that this other inmate had “an identical case profile,” see Appellant’s Br. at ECF p. 7, but even if he had included this statement in his complaint, it is too vague to sufficiently plead an equal protection claim. See Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection Clause when they are alike in all relevant aspects.”) (citation modified). Finally, Fata claimed that his procedural due process rights were violated when he attempted to seek early release from incarceration. But as the District Court explained, Fata did not have a liberty interest in early release under federal law because there is no federal constitutional right to parole, see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979), and parole is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest under Pennsylvania law, see Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996). Because Fata must have an underlying constitutionally protected interest to pursue a 4 procedural due process claim, he cannot state a claim based on any alleged mishandling of his early release plans. See Parker v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 158 F.4th 470, 481 (3d Cir. 2025) (“A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim consists of three elements: (i) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; (ii) by a state actor; (iii) without due process of law.”); Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 2014) (ruling that plaintiff did not have “a protected liberty interest in his prerelease status and anticipated transfer to a community correctional center”). Under the circumstances of this case, where Fata has not provided clarity on his conclusory, implausible allegations in any of his filings, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that leave to amend would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 2002). For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 5