Full Opinion

USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 1 of 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 26-11809 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________ BUCCIE CLINE, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE PEP BOYS MANNY MOE & JACK LLC, SHERIFF OF ESCAMBIA COUNTY FLORIDA, Defendants-Appellees. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 3:26-cv-00565-MCR-ZCB ____________________ Before LUCK, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Buccie Cline, III, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil complaint, claiming violations of state USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 2 of 7 2 Opinion of the Court 26-11809 law and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Cline’s complaint alleged that on September 5, 2019, after his vehicle was serviced at a Pep Boys shop in Escambia County, he discovered an issue and returned to the store. According to Cline, he was met with hostility and a man- ager physically blocked his movement. Cline said that when law enforcement officers from the Escambia County Sheriff’s Office (“ECSO”) were summoned, they failed to meaningfully interview Cline or secure video evidence at the store, and they issued him a warning for trespassing. On January 28, 2026, Cline filed the instant pro se complaint, alleging that Pep Boys negligently returned his car to him in a dan- gerous state (Count I), committed battery by blocking his move- ment without consent (Count II), and discriminated by treating him differently from other customers, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III). He also claimed that the ECSO deprived him of liberty and equal protection without due process, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (Count IV), and that all defendants failed to preserve evidence (Count V). Be- cause Cline was proceeding in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the district court screened his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and it ultimately determined that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Cline argues that the district court erred by find- ing that: (1) the statute of limitations began to run on the day of the incident giving rise to his claims; and (2) he was not entitled to eq- uitable tolling. After thorough review, we affirm. USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 3 of 7 26-11809 Opinion of the Court 3 We review de novo “a district court’s interpretation and ap- plication of a statute of limitations.” Foudy v. Indian River Cty. Sher- iff’s Office, 845 F.3d 1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017). When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court “shall dismiss the case at any time if [it] determines that” the action “is frivolous or mali- cious” or “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). “[D]ismissal for failure to state a claim on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.” Karantsalis v. City of Miami Springs, Fla., 17 F.4th 1316, 1319–20 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard and will liberally construe them. Campbell v. Air Jam., Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). However, that “leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Id. at 1168–69 (citation modified). The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is “governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations,” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir. 1999), which, in Florida, is four years, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3); see Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003). Federal law, however, determines when the statute of limitations begins to run. Lovett v. Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003). We’ve held that, in § 1983 actions, “the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the facts which would support a cause USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 4 of 7 4 Opinion of the Court 26-11809 of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation modified). A plaintiff must know or have reason to know he was injured and must be aware or should be aware of who inflicted the injury. McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1309 (11th Cir. 2020). Once the plaintiff is aware of or has reason to know he was injured, and knows or reasonably should know who inflicted the injury, the claim begins to accrue. Id. “Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is typi- cally applied sparingly.” NuVasive, Inc. v. Absolute Medical, LLC, 71 F.4th 861, 875 (11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “It is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circum- stances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Id. at 875–76 (citation modified). Extraordinary cir- cumstances exist when there is “(1) some extraordinary circum- stance beyond the litigant’s control; and (2) the circumstance caused the filing delay.” Baezer v. Richmond Cnty. Constructors, LLC, 169 F.4th 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation modified). We’ve held that extraordinary circumstances may exist “where the de- fendant misleads the plaintiff, allowing the statutory period to lapse, or when the plaintiff has no reasonable way of discovering the wrong perpetrated against her . . . .” Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation modified). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling is warranted. Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993). USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 5 of 7 26-11809 Opinion of the Court 5 “The continuing violation doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue on an otherwise time-barred claim when additional violations of the law occur within the statutory period.” Ctr. For Biological Diver- sity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006). We’ve distin- guished between the continuing effects of a discrete violation, which do not extend the limitations period, and the continuation of a violation itself, which does extend the time period. Id. at 1335 (finding no continuing violation where the plaintiffs were com- plaining of the continuing effects of the failure of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior to designate a critical habitat for two endangered species of minnows by the statutory deadline). Further, we’ve limited the continuing violation doctrine to “situa- tions in which a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have been un- able to determine that a violation had occurred.” Id. If an event should have alerted a reasonable plaintiff to assert his rights, then the plaintiff cannot rely on the continuing violation doctrine. Id. Here, the district court did not err in dismissing Cline’s claim as time-barred. For starters, the court properly analyzed whether Cline failed to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) -- including fail- ing to satisfy the statute of limitations -- based on the face of his complaint. See Karantsalis, 17 F.4th at 1219–20. Further, the com- plaint squarely revealed that Cline did not satisfy the four-year Flor- ida statute of limitations that applied to his § 1983 claims. Chappel, 340 F.3d at 1283. Based on the complaint, Cline was aware on Sep- tember 5, 2019, that he had been damaged due to Pep Boy’s negli- gence and that he felt wronged by how Sheriff Chip Simmons of the ECSO handled the situation. Thus, the complaint makes clear USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 6 of 7 6 Opinion of the Court 26-11809 that Cline was aware that he was injured -- including the damage to his car, his movement being blocked, and police removing him from the store for trespassing -- and who had caused the injury -- Pep Boys employees and the ECSO -- over six years before he filed suit, so his claims began to accrue on that date. McGroarty, 977 F.3d at 1309. And while Cline may have preferred to have access to ad- ditional information or evidence before bringing suit, our case law makes clear that the statute of limitations begins to run once he is aware of his injuries and who caused them. See id. Its accrual does not turn on the “viability” of his claims. Id. Nor did the district court err by finding that Cline did not qualify for equitable tolling. As for Cline’s allegation that the de- fendants failed to preserve evidence, this claim does not rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance since, among other things, Cline failed to allege specifically how his lack of this preserved evi- dence caused his delayed filing. Baezer, 169 F.4th at 1088. Moreo- ver, even if the district court erred by making a factual determina- tion that he did not face extraordinary circumstances -- and we do not believe that it did -- he also needed to show diligence. NuVasive, 71 F.4th at 875–76. There is simply nothing in the complaint to support the argument that he was diligent in waiting over six years to file his claim. Id. The district court also properly determined that Cline was not experiencing a continuing violation. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335. While Cline’s designation as a trespasser may have contin- ued to have effects on him, this is not sufficient to transform his USCA11 Case: 26-11809 Document: 9-1 Date Filed: 11/13/2026 Page: 7 of 7 26-11809 Opinion of the Court 7 designation as a trespasser into a continuing violation of the torts he raised in his complaint. Id. Nor does the defendants’ failure to preserve evidence constitute a continuing violation because he has not established that “a reasonably prudent plaintiff would have been unable to determine” that a violation had occurred or to un- cover the lack of evidence. Id. Because the district court properly found, on the face of the complaint, that Cline was aware of his injuries and who caused them on September 5, 2019, and he did not file suit until January 28, 2026, the four-year statute of limitations was expired. The dis- trict court also properly found, based on the face of the complaint, that Cline did not qualify for either equitable tolling or the contin- uing violations doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint. AFFIRMED.