Full Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2082 ___________________________ AB Realty, LLC; Kay Anderson; Janae Anderson Plaintiffs - Appellants v. Scott Lane, in his individual capacity; Kevin Mulcahy, in his individual capacity; Hannah Wyble; Lori Vlach; Gerald Kuhn, in his individual capacity; The City of Omaha Defendants - Appellees ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Nebraska - Omaha ____________ Submitted: March 18, 2026 Filed: November 6, 2026 ____________ Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________ KOBES, Circuit Judge. The City of Omaha closed the Yale Park Apartment Complex for building- code violations. Yale Park’s owner AB Realty, LLC and tenants Kay and Janea Anderson sued the City, Omaha’s Assistant Director of Human Rights Gerald Kuhn, Housing Inspectors Scott Lane and Kevin Mulcahy, and citizens Hannah Wyble and Lori Vlach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. AB Realty, LLC and the Andersons1 appeal the dismissal of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Reviewing de novo, we affirm. Meinen v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 101 F.4th 947, 950 (8th Cir. 2024) (standard of review). I. We describe the facts alleged by AB Realty and established by the exhibits attached to or referenced in the complaint. See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012) (“[We] may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” (citation omitted)). During the summer of 2018, housing advocates Wyble and Vlack started talking to Yale Park tenants about their living conditions and took pictures of the building. They offered to document building code violations, helped tenants fill out complaint forms, and sent information about violations and complaints to the City— which began planning Yale Park’s closure. Omaha’s Chief Housing Inspector Lane applied for and received a warrant to inspect and search Yale Park, relying mostly on Wyble and Vlack’s information. Lane’s application cited suspected health and safety violations in 84 units. It contained factual errors, including a false statement that Kay denied Lane’s request to enter and inspect the building. Nonprofits and local media knew that the City planned to close Yale Park, but AB Realty and Kay did not. 1 Janea Anderson is a member and manager of AB Realty, LLC. Kay Anderson disputes his role in the company, but a state-court jury found he was either Yale Park’s owner or building manager. State v. Anderson, 10 N.W.3d 334, 360, 362 (Neb. 2024). As the district court noted, the “plaintiffs routinely fail to adequately distinguish between themselves as individual plaintiffs and the rights they each assert . . . repeatedly refer[ing] to themselves as a group and blend[ing] their rights and interests together.” Where their allegations and arguments overlap we refer to them collectively as “AB Realty.” -2- The City executed the warrant on September 20, 2018. Police and housing inspectors searched the property and tenants were forced to relocate. A few days later, the City mailed AB Realty a list of alleged code violations, citing carbon dioxide leaks, holes in the roof, non-functioning heat, exposed electrical wiring, broken windows, faulty plumbing, and moldy circuit breakers. The City ordered that Yale Park could not reopen until the violations were cured. AB Realty started work on repairs but wanted to challenge the code violations and the closure of the building. The City referred them to the Property Management Appeals Board, which handles building code disputes, and AB Realty appealed to the Board in January 2019. Meanwhile the City mailed AB Realty notices of around 2,000 total violations and prosecuted Kay for misdemeanor violations of the City’s property maintenance code. After finishing repairs, AB Realty reopened Yale Park in the spring of 2021 and filed this lawsuit. The district court2 granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss in part and stayed the case pending the resolution of Kay’s criminal case. After a jury found Kay guilty on a few counts but acquitted him of most, see State v. Anderson, 10 N.W.3d 334, 346 (Neb. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Anderson v. Nebraska, 145 S. Ct. 1331 (2025); see also Carter v. Ludwick, 139 F.4th 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2025) (taking judicial notice of related state supreme court opinion), the district court dismissed the remaining claims. II. AB Realty first argues the search warrant was invalid because Inspector Lane lied about asking for permission to enter Yale Park and falsely alleged that police were called to the complex, that the City had conducted inspections, that Kay used “threat tactics” against tenants, and that a gas leak caused an explosion. According 2 The Honorable Laurie Smith Camp, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska, now deceased, granted in part the motion to dismiss. The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, dismissed the remaining claims. -3- to AB Realty this rendered the warrant invalid under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978), which made the search unconstitutional, see, e.g., Cronin v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1187, 1195 (8th Cir. 2020). To establish a Franks violation, AB Realty must show that (1) Lane deliberately, knowingly, or recklessly made false statements in the supporting affidavit and (2) “the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to provide probable cause.” Williams v. City of Alexander, 772 F.3d 1307, 1311 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Probable cause for administrative inspection warrants “may be based on specific evidence of an existing violation or a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular establishment.” United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharms., Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 541 (8th Cir. 1981) (cleaned up); see also Camara v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). Even excluding the information disputed by AB Realty, the warrant application established probable cause for the inspection warrant. Lane wrote that he received code violation complaints for 84 of the 100 units and referenced holes in the building’s roof, untreated natural gas leaks, and Kay’s admission that he has been “lackadaisical” in completing maintenance requests. See Anderson, 10 N.W.3d. at 356–57 (finding the revised warrant still supported a probable cause finding in Kay’s criminal case). That was enough for probable cause. Pointing to state law that allows inspection warrants to issue “only upon showing that consent to entry for inspection purposes has been refused,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-832, AB Realty argues that the warrant was deficient because Lane never asked for consent. The Nebraska statute is beside the point; a violation of state law alone does not state a § 1983 claim. Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 800 F.3d 955, 965 (8th Cir. 2015) (“Section 1983 guards and vindicates federal rights alone.” (citation omitted)); Holloway v. Reeves, 277 F.3d 1035, 1038 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[A] suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can remedy only a violation of federal rights, and so any violations of rights guaranteed by local or state laws are irrelevant for present -4- purposes.” (citation omitted)). “[W]hether state law authorized the search [is] irrelevant” because “state law [does] not alter the content of the Fourth Amendment.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171–72 (2008). III. According to AB Realty, “[t]he Defendants effectively deprived the Plaintiffs of virtually all significant due process.” To state a procedural due process claim, AB Realty “must demonstrate that the state deprived [them] of some ‘life, liberty, or property’ interest” and “then establish that the state deprived [them] of that interest without sufficient ‘process.’” reVamped LLC v. City of Pipestone, 163 F.4th 462, 466 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 2676 (2026). And AB Realty must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[L]egal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” is not enough. Id. Reading AB Realty’s second amended complaint, we cannot decipher who is allegedly responsible for what due process violation. Among other things, it alleges that Wyble and Vlanch collected “invalid complaints” used to get the warrant; that the City closed the entire building rather than individual units; that all the tenants were evicted; that “Danger Closed” signs were wrongly posted on the buildings; that Yale Park was not allowed to reopen before every purported violation was corrected; that repairs were “delayed or impeded,” and that AB Realty was denigrated to potential contractors. These scattershot allegations involve different defendants and distinct interests, which change depending on which plaintiff is asserting them. See Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138, 142 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussing the difference between landlord and tenant rights); see also State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 244, 257 (Neb. 2020) (per curiam) (noting the difference “between the nature of rights held by an individual and by a business or other legal entity”). -5- Since AB Realty has failed to identify what constitutionally protected interests are at stake, see reVamped, 163 F.4th at 466, and who violated their due process rights and how, we cannot assess what process was constitutionally due, see Dover Elevator Co. v. Ark. State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 445–46 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Analysis of either a procedural or substantive due process claim must begin with an examination of the interest allegedly violated.”); Temple v. Mercier, 127 F.4th 709, 714 (8th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he extent of procedural safeguards required depends on the nature of the interest at stake.”); see, e.g., Rochling v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 725 F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2013) (dismissing a due process claim because plaintiffs “speculative and conclusory” allegations did not sufficiently state a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest), and we affirm the dismissal of these claims.3 IV. AB Realty finally alleges that “[t]he City’s actions constitute an effective and inverse taking, causing damage to AB Realty’s real property rights.” It is not clear what that means. 4 Under the Fifth Amendment, there are two kinds of takings: per se takings and regulatory takings. Hawkeye Commodity Promotions, Inc. v. Vilsack, 486 F.3d 430, 440 (8th Cir. 2007). AB Realty has not clarified which kind they are alleging and, like the district court, we are not convinced they properly pleaded either. 3 Since AB Realty’s claim fails the first step of our due process inquiry, we do not address their additional arguments that the City’s failure to follow its procedure for issuing code citations violates due process and that the City is liable for Wyble and Vlanch’s alleged due process violations even though they are private citizens. See Rochling, 725 F.3d at 931 (“A procedural due process analysis has two steps,” and “[t]he plaintiff must first show deprivation of a ‘constitutionally protected life, liberty or property interest.’” (citation omitted)). 4 If AB Realty means inverse condemnation, that is a state-law cause of action to remedy an alleged taking, not a type of taking. See, e.g., Am. Family Ins. v. City of Minneapolis, 836 F.3d 918, 923 (8th Cir. 2016) (discussing Minnesota’s inverse condemnation procedure). -6- At times, AB Realty seems to raise a per se takings claim. The operative complaint says “[t]he City effectively took the Yale Park Apartments by shutting them down,” “prevent[ed] AB Realty from using the Property to its highest and best use,” and “failed to institute condemnation proceedings,” despite “possess[ing] the power of eminent domain.” See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 148– 49 (2021) (physical appropriation is a per se taking); see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (a regulation which results in the total deprivation of the land’s productive use is a per se taking). But the “essential question” for a per se taking is “whether the government has physically taken property for itself or someone else.” Cedar Point Nursery, 594 U.S. at 149. AB Realty was and is the owner of Yale Park; there is no allegation that could support a finding that the City took AB Realty’s asserted “real property rights.” See id. That leaves a regulatory taking. “A lawful exercise of a state’s police power to regulate in the interest of public health and safety is generally not a [regulatory] taking,” reVamped, 163 F.4th at 469, and AB Realty has not argued that Yale Park’s closure amounted to one under Penn Central’s balancing test, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), so we agree that AB Realty has not stated a regulatory taking. See, e.g., Golden Glow Tanning Salon, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 52 F.4th 974, 981 n.8 (5th Cir. 2022) (regulatory taking argument waived on appeal where plaintiff did not argue Penn Central before the district court); cf. reVamped, 163 F.4th at 469 (Minnesota’s closure of a hotel did not amount to a taking because business owners are “not entitled to be free from temporary enforcement targeting well-documented safety deficiencies.”). V. Because AB Realty failed to plead a constitutional violation, we affirm the dismissal of all claims against all defendants. Kiefer v. Isanti County, 71 F.4th 1149, 1154 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Without a constitutional violation, there can be no § 1983 liability.”). ______________________________ -7-