Full Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT No. 26-1268 ADENIKE AJAYI, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Appellant v. CULA, LLC _____________________________ On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, D.N.J. Judge Julien X. Neals, No. 2:23-cv-04014 Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER, Circuit Judge, and BRANN, Chief District Judge† Submitted: Nov. 20, 2026; Filed: Nov. 20, 2026 _____________________________ NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION* CHAGARES, Chief Judge. Adenike Ajayi leased a new car from CULA, LLC (“CULA”). Ajayi later got into an accident and totaled the car. The insurance company paid off the loan balance due on the lease and then sent the remaining excess value of the car to CULA. Ajayi filed a lawsuit against CULA on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, claiming entitlement to the excess insurance proceeds. The District Court dismissed Ajayi’s second amended class action complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. † Honorable Matthew W. Brann, Chief District Judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent. * I. 1 Ajayi leased a new Toyota RAV4 in June 2022. The car dealership provided Ajayi a lease agreement with CULA, a company that specializes in vehicle leasing. Among other things, the lease designated CULA as “Loss Payee with respect to . . . comprehensive insurance and ‘[c]ollision insurance’” and required Ajayi to appoint CULA as “attorney-in-fact to negotiate and settle . . . any amounts due under the insurance [Ajayi] is carrying under this Lease.” Appendix (“App.”) 139 ¶ 24, 141 ¶ 30. It obligated Ajayi to purchase insurance coverage naming CULA as an insured during the lease term and designating CULA as “Loss Payee.” App. 138–39 ¶ 19. The lease also provided that the lease terminates “[i]f the Vehicle is a Total Loss.” App. 140 ¶ 26. Ajayi purchased insurance coverage from GEICO. She was involved in a car accident in October 2022. She filed an insurance claim, and GEICO deemed the car a total loss. Shortly thereafter, CULA informed Ajayi by email that “[i]f your primary insurance claim pays more than the balance due to your financial institution, the excess funds belong to CULA as owner of the vehicle and additional insured/loss payee.” App. 135 ¶ 6. GEICO valued the car at $57,128.63, although $46,578.65 remained on the lease. GEICO paid off the lease and sent a check to CULA for the car’s excess value of $10,549.98. Ajayi filed a lawsuit against CULA on behalf of herself and those similarly 1 We write for the parties and therefore recite only those facts pertinent to our decision, which we take from the operative complaint. 2 situated, seeking recovery of the excess value payment. She claimed breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and violation of New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-1–20. 2 Applying New Jersey law, as required by the lease, the District Court dismissed Ajayi’s second amended complaint and denied her leave to amend because she had failed to cure the deficiencies identified in her first amended complaint. This timely appeal followed. II. 3 Ajayi’s claims turn on her theory that, as “Loss Payee,” CULA was entitled to recover the remaining debt Ajayi owed on the lease loan and nothing more. Her second amended complaint presented several claims aimed at recovering the excess value payment from CULA, but the District Court concluded that she failed to state any viable claims for relief. We agree. Ajayi claimed that CULA breached the lease. The District Court concluded that Ajayi failed to state a breach of contract claim because, among other things, she did not 2 Ajayi has abandoned her unjust enrichment claim on appeal. We therefore will not address it. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s dismissal de novo, considering whether the complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim. Klotz v. Celentano Stadtmauer & Walentowicz LLP, 991 F.3d 458, 462 (3d Cir. 2021). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. 3 plausibly plead that CULA did not adhere to the lease’s terms. See Globe Motor Co. v. Igladev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016) (observing that one element of a breach of contract claim is that the defendant did not do what the contract required). Ajayi’s breach theory turns on the meaning of “loss payee.” She argues that, although “loss payee” is undefined in the lease, the phrase means as matter of law that CULA is “entitled to insurance proceeds only to the extent of the debt owed to it by the insured.” Ajayi Br. 21. Ajayi relies on In re Tower Air, Inc., for the proposition that a “loss payee is a mere appointee to receive the proceeds to the extent of his interest.” 397 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if we were to agree with Ajayi that Tower Air is applicable (despite it being a bankruptcy case applying principles of Arizona law), Tower Air does not define the extent of CULA’s interest under the lease, and Ajayi identifies no lease term supporting the limited interest that she advocates. The lease provides, to the contrary, that CULA was the lessor of the vehicle and that, after Ajayi’s accident rendered the vehicle a total loss, Ajayi’s lease automatically terminated. Because CULA owned the vehicle and Ajayi had no remaining interest in it after the lease terminated, CULA’s interest extended to the vehicle’s full value. The District Court therefore properly determined that Ajayi’s second amended complaint did not plausibly plead a breach of contract based on CULA’s retention of the excess insurance proceeds. Ajayi next claimed that CULA’s retention of the excess insurance funds breached its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. To state such a claim, she was required to plead that CULA engaged in conduct denying her the benefit of the parties’ intended 4 bargain. See Robey v. SPARC Group LLC, 311 A.3d 463, 477 (N.J. 2024). Yet there is nothing in the second amended complaint to plausibly show that Ajayi was denied any benefit of her bargain with CULA. Accordingly, this claim also was properly dismissed. The District Court rejected Ajayi’s breach of fiduciary duty claim, concluding that it is precluded by New Jersey’s economic loss doctrine, which “prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic loses to which their entitlement flows only from a contract.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 618 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Spring Motors Distrib., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985). Ajayi responds that the economic loss doctrine is not applicable because CULA’s purported fiduciary duty to her “arose from its legal status as Plaintiff’s attorney-in-fact . . . not from an ordinary contractual promise in the Lease.” Ajayi Br. 42–43. In support, she cites several inapposite cases concerning extra-contractual duties, such as the duty that an attorney owes to her client. But CULA’s role as “attorney-in-fact” and Ajayi’s claim of entitlement to the excess insurance funds both arise directly from the lease. Because CULA did not owe Ajayi any duty that did not arise from the lease, the District Court correctly concluded that New Jersey’s economic loss doctrine barred the breach of fiduciary duty claim. Finally, the District Court concluded that Ajayi failed to plead a violation of New Jersey’s CFA. To proceed beyond the pleading stage, Ajayi was required to plead an unconscionable commercial practice that caused her an ascertainable loss. See D’Agostino v. Maldonado, 78 A.3d 527, 536–37 (N.J. 2013). Yet the CFA is constrained to fraudulent, deceptive, or other similar nefarious practices, and a simple breach of 5 contract or breach of warranty does not qualify per se. Id. at 540. Here, Ajayi did not plead that CULA engaged in an unconscionable practice under the CFA or, indeed, even a simple breach of contract or warranty. The claim therefore was properly dismissed. III. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Ajayi’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We therefore will AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment. 6