Moda v. Mazgani
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket25-5650
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 19 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: MAHVASH MAZGANI, No. 25-5650
D.C. No.
Debtor. 2:25-cv-02230-WLH
__________________________________
KEVIN MODA, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
MAHVASH MAZGANI; GREGORY
KENT JONES,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Wesley L. Hsu, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted November 17, 2026**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER, OWENS, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Kevin Moda appeals from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy
court’s (1) dismissal of his adversary proceeding against Mahvash Mazgani and
(2) denial of his motion for reconsideration. As the parties are familiar with the
facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we affirm.
We independently review the bankruptcy court’s decision without deference
to the district court and apply the same standard of review applied by the district
court. In re Tillman, 53 F.4th 1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 2022). The standard of review
for dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) is abuse of discretion.
Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Lichtenegger, 913 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2019).
The standard of review for denials of motions for reconsideration under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) is also abuse of discretion. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Mahogany Meadows Ave. Tr., 979 F.3d 1209, 1218 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. As a threshold matter, Moda has forfeited the seven arguments that he
raises for the first time on appeal. “Absent exceptional circumstances, we
generally will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal . . . .” In
re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 217 F.3d 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, Moda’s
arguments are unrelated to the issues on appeal.
2. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Moda’s
complaint under Rule 41(b). The court reasonably concluded that all five factors
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favored dismissal: (1) the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation,
(2) the court’s need to manage its docket, (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant,
(4) the public policy favoring merits decisions, and (5) the availability of less
drastic sanctions. Moneymaker v. CoBen (In re Eisen), 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th
Cir. 1994).
First, the court reasonably determined that the public interest in expeditious
resolution favored dismissal. The court explained that the rights of the parties
would be determined in state court, and given these unusual circumstances, could
have no practical effect on the parties in the adversary proceeding.
Second, the court reasonably determined that it had spent a “huge amount of
time and resources” on Moda’s proceedings and that dismissal therefore would
relieve the court of further disruption. See id. at 1452.
Third, the court reasonably determined that the risk of prejudice to Mazgani
was “obvious and serious.” “A defendant suffers prejudice if the plaintiff’s actions
impair the defendant’s ability to go to trial or threaten to interfere with the rightful
decision of the case.” Adriana Int’l Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th
Cir. 1990). Moda’s delay tactics and violations of the automatic stay impaired
Mazgani’s ability to advance to trial and interfered with the rightful decision of the
case.
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Fourth, the court reasonably determined that the public policy favoring
merits decisions was weak. “[T]his factor ‘lends little support’ to a party whose
responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose
conduct impedes progress in that direction.” In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Fifth, the court reasonably determined that less drastic sanctions were
unavailable. This factor concerns “whether the district court discussed or tried
alternatives, or warned the plaintiffs of the chance of dismissal.” Hernandez v.
City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998). The court tried the alternative
of monetary sanctions with limited success and twice warned Moda that he needed
to show cause why it should not dismiss his complaint.
Because all five factors favored dismissal, the bankruptcy court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the adversary proceeding.
3. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying Moda’s
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e). Amendment under Rule 59(e) is
appropriate if (1) the court is presented with new evidence, (2) the court committed
clear error or made a decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an
intervening change in controlling law. Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d
734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). Moda did not present new evidence or argue that there
was any intervening change in law. And the court reasonably determined that
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dismissal was not “manifestly unjust” given the “history of [Moda’s] abuse of the
legal system both in this Court and the District Court and the burden his improper
conduct had on both this Court and the debtor.”
AFFIRMED.1
1
All pending motions are denied. See Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, 38, 39, 52, 58 63, 66 82,
84, 90, 91, 93.
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