Full Opinion

Filed 11/16/26 Anbessie v. Vantress CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BINIYAM ANBESSIE, H053480 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV414553) v. ROBERT M. VANTRESS, Defendant and Respondent. This appeal concerns the third in a series of cases involving Biniyam Anbessie. In the first case, Anbessie was sued by a former business associate, and Anbessie paid a little more than $200,000 to settle the case. In the second case, Anbessie sued his primary lawyer in the first case for malpractice, and the lawyer paid Anbessie nearly $600,000 to settle. In this case, Anbessie sued Robert Vantress, his lawyer in the second case, for malpractice and fraud. The trial court sustained demurrers to both of Anbessie’s claims but granted leave to file an amended complaint concerning the fraud claim. Anbessie did not amend his complaint, and in March 2025 the trial court dismissed the case. Anbessie filed several motions to vacate, but on July 2, 2025, the trial court denied the motions. On appeal, Anbessie challenges dismissal of his fraud claim. However, Anbessie did not file a notice of appeal from the March 2025 dismissal order. Instead, on July 3, 2025, more than 90 days after the dismissal order, he filed a notice of appeal from the July 2, 2025 order denying the motions to vacate. As a consequence, the trial court’s orders sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the complaint are beyond the scope of this appeal. In addition, because Anbessie did not challenge the order denying his motions to vacate in either his opening or reply brief, he has forfeited any challenge to that order. Accordingly, the July 2, 2025 order denying the motions to vacate is affirmed. I. BACKGROUND A. The Yeung Case Anbessie owns Boss Auto, an internet-based auto dealership. In 2016 Hok Yeung sued Anbessie for breach of contract, fraud, and other claims arising out of money Yeung invested in Boss Auto. Anbessie retained David Henshaw to defend him. Apparently believing that Anbessie had stolen money from Yeung, Henshaw advised Anbessie that he was going to lose the case and should return Yeung’s money. Anbessie retained new counsel, but that counsel was unable to mount an effective defense, allegedly because Henshaw did not turn over his files in a timely fashion and the trial court refused to continue trial. As a result, Anbessie allegedly was forced to pay Yeung $205,000 to settle the case and avoid trial. B. The Henshaw Case In 2018, after settling with Yeung, Anbessie retained Vantress and sued Henshaw for malpractice. Vantress discovered that Yeung’s claims were subject to a complete defense that Henshaw had not discovered or even considered: the statute of frauds. In the ensuing bench trial, after testimony from Anbessie’s first three witnesses, the judge advised Henshaw that, unless he settled, she would be forced to inform the State Bar of his malpractice. The judge also told Anbessie that she was not going to award him all the damages he wanted. The parties subsequently reached a settlement in which Henshaw 2 paid Anbessie $590,000, nearly $500,000 more than Henshaw’s prior offer, and the case was dismissed in April 2022. C. The Vantress Case In May 2022, after Vantress had distributed to Anbessie his share of the settlement with Henshaw, Anbessie demanded that Vantress refund the fees that Anbessie had agreed to pay Vantress the month before. Vantress refused, and in April 2023 Anbessie sued Vantress. 1. Pleadings The initial complaint, which Anbessie filed pro per, was handwritten and contained a single sentence claiming fraud: “The defendant fraudulently removed evidences from my personal emails while representing me in my prior case … resulting in fraud damages.” In March 2024, Anbessie amended his complaint. The amended complaint, which used a standardized form, indicated that Anbessie was bringing three claims: general negligence, intentional tort, and “Emotional Stress and Financial loss!” For general negligence, Anbessie asserted malpractice: He alleged that Vantress “purposely and intentionally committed a legal malpractice by removing emails without my authorization” and “purposely hid these evidences from the court.” For intentional tort, Anbessie asserted fraud. He alleged that “[t]he defendant deceivingly and intentionally removed all my evidences from my personal Yahoo email account without my knowledge or authorization” and “wrote an email from my yahoo.com account to himself dated May 20, 2018” in which Vantress “fraudulently stated and wrote that I had authorized him to remove all my evidence” from the account and put them in Vantress’ account. Although the amended complaint claimed emotional distress and financial loss from the alleged fraud, it did not contain a separate claim for emotional distress and financial loss. However, the amended complaint did attach 44 pages of documents. 3 2. The November 2024 Demurrer Vantress demurred to the amended complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations barred both the malpractice and fraud claims and that the fraud claim was not pleaded with sufficient specificity. Anbessie filed a response and a declaration with over 80 pages of exhibits. In November 2024, the trial court sustained the demurrers. It ruled that Anbessie’s malpractice claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitation for legal malpractice claims, but the fraud claim was brought within the three-year period applicable to such claims. Nonetheless, the court sustained the demurrer to the fraud claim on the ground that Anbessie had not pleaded fraud with particularity. “In reading the pleading,” the court explained, “it is entirely unclear what the fraudulent conduct is (i.e., intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment) or in what way, or how, Defendant acted with the intent to injure Plaintiff.” (Boldface & underscoring omitted.) However, noting that Anbessie’s opposition appeared to include additional fraud allegations, the trial court gave Anbessie “the opportunity to amend his pleading to sufficiently allege fraud in line” with its order. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer with “15 days leave to amend” the fraud claim. 3. The March 2025 Dismissal Order Although in November 2024, shortly after the demurrer, Anbessie filed both a response and an amended response in opposition to the demurrer, he did not file an amended complaint within the 15 days the trial court afforded. Vantress advised the trial court of this failure, and the court told the parties that Vantress had good cause to bring a motion to dismiss. Shortly afterwards, Vantress filed an ex parte motion to dismiss, which Anbessie opposed. On March 25, 2025, the trial court issued an order granting the motion and dismissing the case with prejudice. The court found that Anbessie had no adequate 4 explanation for not filing a second amended complaint. The court recognized that in opposition to the demurrer Anbessie had filed documents with exhibits attached. However, it held that the evidence contained in this filing did not excuse Anbessie’s failure to plead fraud with particularity. The specificity requirement, the court observed, weeds out meritless claims and provides defendants with “ ‘ “definite charges which can be intelligently met.” ’ ” The court also observed that neither the court nor the defendant can be expected to “do the work of separating fact from fiction and reviewing actual hard evidence to determine if a plaintiff’s case has merit.” Accordingly, the trial court dismissed Anbessie’s case against Vantress with prejudice, and the following day Vantress served on Anbessie a notice of entry of the order. 4. The July 2, 2025 Order Denying the Motions to Vacate After the dismissal order, Anbessie filed three motions to vacate: a motion on April 3, 2025, an amended motion the next day, and a June 30, 2025 motion to vacate on grounds of extrinsic fraud filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). In the amended motion, Anbessie asserted that Vantress created fraudulent emails as well as concealing and deleting emails, presumably in connection with the case brought against Henshaw in 2018. Anbessie also alleged that the trial court relied on misrepresentations by Vantress, unfairly gave Vantress advice (to file a motion to dismiss), and either failed to consider or erroneously evaluated evidence in the record, which Anbessie contended deprived him of the opportunity to present key evidence. Anbessie asserted as well that his November 2024 response to the demurrer pleaded fraud with particularity. In the June 30, 2025 motion, Anbessie invoked Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) and asserted that Vantress fabricated emails and deleted others without authorization. 5 On July 2, 2025, the trial court denied all three motions to vacate. The court noted that, after the demurrer order granting leave to amend the fraud claim, Anbessie had not filed an amended complaint and that Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2) authorizes dismissal if a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend and no amendment is filed. The court also ruled that Anbessie had “offer[ed] no new or persuasive argument, evidence, or authority to reconsider or vacate that dismissal.” 5. The Appeal On July 3, 2025, the day after the trial court denied the motions to vacate, Anbessie filed a notice of appeal. The notice stated that the appeal was from the July 2, 2025 order and the “Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice under CCP [Code of Civil Procedure] § 473(d).” After the parties submitted briefing, we requested supplemental briefing concerning the scope of the issues on appeal. II. DISCUSSION In his opening brief on appeal, Anbessie argued that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to review the documents that he submitted in opposition to Vantress’ demurrer. Anbessie asserted that these documents should have been considered in determining whether he pleaded fraud with particularity. Anbessie also contended that the trial court erred in finding that he presented “ ‘no valid legal argument.’ ” In his reply brief, Anbessie expanded on these arguments and added new ones concerning negligence, amendment of the pleadings, Code of Civil Procedure section 581, and the trial court’s invitation to file the motion to dismiss. These arguments are all beyond the scope of the appeal noticed by Anbessie. Where, as here, an order denying a post-judgment motion to vacate is appealed, issues that could have been raised on appeal from the underlying judgment may not be raised. 6 Anbessie appealed from the July 2, 2025 order denying his motions to vacate, not the March 2025 dismissal order. Although Anbessie was served with a notice of entry of the dismissal order on March 26, 2026, he did not file a notice of appeal from the order. Indeed, Anbessie did not file a notice of appeal until July 3, 2025, the day after the trial court denied his motions to vacate. Moreover, Anbessie’s notice of appeal, which used a standard form, referenced the order denying his motions to vacate, not the dismissal order. In the section of the form stating that “[t]he judgment or order was entered on” Anbessie handwrote “7/2/25.” Similarly, in the section stating that “[t]he appeal is from the following order or judgment,” Anbessie did not check the box for “[j]udgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer.” Instead, he checked the “Other” box and wrote “Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Prejudice under CCP § 473(d).” And in his notice of designation of record, Anbessie stated that date of the “[j]udgment or order appealed from” was “July 2, 2025,” the date of the order denying the motions to vacate, and he did not designate either the dismissal order or the order sustaining the demurrer for inclusion in the clerk’s transcript. Consequently, it is clear that Anbessie’s appeal was from the order denying the motions to vacate, not the dismissal order. In his supplemental brief concerning jurisdiction, Anbessie contends that under Walker v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, his notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include the dismissal order (and that the time for appealing that order was tolled by his first motion to vacate). We agree that notices of appeal should be liberally construed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [“The notice of appeal must be liberally construed.”].) However, Anbessie does not explain how, even if liberally construed, his notice of appeal can be understood to include the dismissal order. Nor could he. Although the notice of appeal is itself dated March 25, 2025, the date the dismissal order was filed, everything else in the 7 notice indicates that it was from the July 2, 2025 order denying the motions to vacate. Furthermore, any ambiguity in the notice is dispelled by Anbessie’s designation of record, which, as noted above, states that the appeal is from the July 2, 2025 order and does not even designate the dismissal order for inclusion in the record. The liberal construction rule applies only where it is “ ‘ “reasonably clear” ’ ” that the appellant was trying to appeal from the underlying judgment. (Walker, at p. 18.) As the opposite is true here, we conclude that Anbessie’s appeal was from what the notice said it was: the July 2, 2025 order denying the motions to vacate. Anbessie’s arguments concerning the dismissal order and the order sustaining the demurrer that proceeded it are beyond the scope of his appeal from the July 2, 2025 order. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, the scope of appeal from post-judgment orders is limited. “To be appealable, a postjudgment order must satisfy two … requirements,” the first of which is that “the issues raised by the order must be different from those arising from an appeal from the judgment.” (Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651, fn. omitted; see also ibid. [noting that this requirement prevents “ ‘circumvention of time limitations for appealing from the judgment’ ”].) Accordingly, “an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment is deemed appealable only to the extent it raises new issues unavailable on appeal from the judgment.” (Maltka v. Helm (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082; see also Litvinuk v. Litvinuk (1945) 27 Cal.2d 38, 44 [“if the grounds upon which the party sought to have a judgment vacated existed before entry of judgment and would have been available upon an appeal from the judgment, an appeal will not lie from an order denying that motion”].) Here, the arguments raised in Anbessie’s opening brief and reply concern the order sustaining the demurrer and the dismissal order, all arguments that could have been raised on appeal from the dismissal order. Accordingly, those arguments do not raise new issues and are beyond the scope of the appeal from the order denying the motions to vacate. 8 Citing Thomson v. Continental Insurance Company (1967) 66 Cal.2d 738, Anbessie argues in supplemental briefing requested by the court that, even if this appeal is limited to the July 2, 2025 order denying his motions to vacate, he has raised an “equitable extrinsic-fraud challenge” which is cognizable on appeal from the order. This argument fails for several reasons. First, Anbessie did not assert extrinsic fraud in either his opening brief or his corrected reply, and new arguments may not be raised in supplemental briefing. (See, e.g., Naranjo v. Doctor’s Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 408, 420-421; People v. Vasquez (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1021, 1033, fn. 10; Muldrow v. Surrex Solutions Corp. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1398, fn. 17; Dahms v. Downtown Pomona Property & Business Improvement Dist. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 708, 711, fn. 1.) Second, while an order denying a motion to vacate may be appealed where it is asserted that extrinsic fraud rendered a judgment void (see, e.g., County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228), Anbessie contends that he stated a valid claim, not that the judgment is void. Finally, while Anbessie asserts that extrinsic fraud “impaired the fair presentation of the case” and that “the record needed to satisfy the pleading requirement was itself alleged to have been compromised,” he does not contend that any of this fraud occurred or was uncovered after the dismissal order. To the contrary, he contends that “the complaint alleged fraudulent removal of email evidence; amended allegations identified access/deletion and the disputed May 20[, 2018] authorization; and the April [2025] motion alleged misconduct affecting dismissal and a fair hearing.” The complaint and the “amended allegations” obviously do not raise new issues that could not have been raised on appeal from the March 2025 dismissal order, and while the April 2025 motion was filed after the dismissal order, all the documents attached to it were submitted to the trial court before the dismissal order. Thus, Anbessie’s extrinsic fraud argument is based 9 on issues that could have been raised on an appeal from the dismissal order and, thus, are beyond the scope of this appeal from the order denying his motions to vacate. Accordingly, we conclude that Anbessie has failed to raise any argument within the scope of his appeal from the July 2, 2025 order denying the motions to vacate and therefore that order should be affirmed. We also deny Anbessie’s request for leave to file a supplemental brief because the proposed brief concerns the demurrer, which is beyond the scope of this appeal. III. DISPOSITION The order of July 2, 2025 denying appellant’s motions to vacate is affirmed. 10 ____________________________ BROMBERG, J. WE CONCUR: ____________________________________ GREENWOOD, P. J. ____________________________________ DANNER, J. Anbessie v. Vantress H053480