Full Opinion

Case: 26-40030 Document: 45-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals ____________ Fifth Circuit FILED No. 26-40030 November 9, 2026 Summary Calendar Thomas B. Plunkett, III ____________ Clerk Virginia Alcala, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Unity One Credit Union, Defendant—Appellee. ______________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-495 ______________________________ Before King, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam:* Virginia Alcala filed suit against Unity One Credit Union (Unity) raising various claims pertaining to a vehicle purchase. She also alleged similar claims regarding the same vehicle purchase against Bosco Auto Group (Bosco) in a separate lawsuit. In both cases, the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge (MJ) acting as the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). See Rountree v. Dyson, 892 F.3d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 2018). * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 26-40030 Document: 45-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 No. 26-40030 Ultimately, in a single memorandum opinion and order, the district court granted Unity’s and Bosco’s motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed Alcala’s claims with prejudice. In this appeal, we review the dismissal of Alcala’s claims against Unity de novo, employing the same standard for a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). There must be sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). We afford her pro se pleadings and briefs liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). None of Alcala’s arguments is availing. The text of the Truth in Lending Act contradicts her contention that the right to rescission applies in this circumstance. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). She therefore does not identify what other relief she sought under the Truth in Lending Act or how she stated a claim to that relief. See Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008). Alcala did not allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act because she failed to plead sufficient factual content to allow the reasonable inference that Unity was a debt collector under the statute, including failure to allege facts supporting that the loan was in default at the relevant time. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). Contrary to her assertion, the district court adequately considered the factual allegations contained in her claims alleging violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Regarding her assertion that the district court erred by not considering whether the underlying 2 Case: 26-40030 Document: 45-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 11/09/2026 No. 26-40030 financial instrument qualified for holder in due course protection, her argument is unavailing because the district court’s dismissal of her suit was not premised on such a defense. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; United States v. Second Nat’l Bank of N. Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 1974). Additionally, Alcala fails to show that her amended complaint stated a claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 1995), or a claim under for unlawful repossession under Texas law, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.609. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the claims against Unity and Bosco because the claims contained common questions of law or fact. See Dupont v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1966); Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Alcala’s suit with prejudice, as there is no indication from the briefing that she has not pled her best case. See Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1999). Alcala’s contention that the MJ was biased and partial against her is unavailing. See United States v. Brocato, 4 F.4th 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Scroggins, 485 F.3d 824, 829 (5th Cir. 2007). Lastly, Alcala’s argument that we should invoke our inherent power to sanction Unity’s counsel is unpersuasive. See Fletcher v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 168 F.4th 231, 239-40 (5th Cir. 2026). AFFIRMED. 3