Alcala v. Bosco Auto Group
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 6, 2026
Docket25-40213
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
Case: 25-40213 Document: 50-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
____________ Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 25-40213 November 6, 2026
Summary Calendar
Thomas B. Plunkett, III
____________ Clerk
Virginia Alcala,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Bosco Auto Group,
Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:24-CV-6
______________________________
Before King, Higginson, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Virginia Alcala filed suit against Bosco Auto Group (Bosco) for an
alleged violation of the Truth in Lending Act pertaining to a vehicle purchase.
She also alleged similar claims regarding the same vehicle purchase against
Unity One Credit Union (Unity) in a separate lawsuit. In both cases, the
parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge (MJ) acting as the
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). See Rountree v. Dyson, 892 F.3d
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 25-40213
681, 683 (5th Cir. 2018). Ultimately, in a single memorandum opinion and
order, the district court granted Bosco’s and Unity’s motions to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and dismissed
Alcala’s claims with prejudice.
In this appeal, we review the dismissal of Alcala’s claims against Bosco
de novo, employing the same standard for a dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674, 678 (5th Cir.
2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a
claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation modified). There must be sufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). We afford her pro se pleadings
and briefs liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
None of Alcala’s arguments is availing. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in consolidating the claims against Bosco and Unity
because the claims contained common questions of law or fact. See Dupont
v. S. Pac. Co., 366 F.2d 193, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1966); Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
Furthermore, the text of the Truth in Lending Act contradicts her contention
that the right to rescission applies in this circumstance. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635(a). Similarly, her res judicata argument fails because res judicata was
not involved in the dismissal of the claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The dismissal of Alcala’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) did not
violate her right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Haase v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014). As for
Alcala’s due process argument, the record demonstrates that she had “the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations marks and
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No. 25-40213
citation omitted). Alcala’s contention that the magistrate judge was biased
and partial against her is unavailing. See United States v. Brocato, 4 F.4th 296,
304 (5th Cir. 2021); United States v. Scroggins, 485 F.3d 824, 829 (5th Cir.
2007). Finally, Alcala fails to show that the district court abused its
discretion in denying her post-judgment motion. See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v.
Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1993).
AFFIRMED.
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