Full Opinion

25-2688-cv Palladino v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of October, two thousand twenty-six. PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, DENNY CHIN, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________________ RALPH PALLADINO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. No. 25-2688-cv AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY & MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, CARLA INSINGA, Defendants-Appellees. _________________________________________________ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: DAVID TYKULSKER, David Tykulsker & Associates, Montclair, New Jersey. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: CHERYL F. KORMAN, Brian L. Bank, Barry I. Levy, Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, New York. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Marrero, J.). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the May 13, 2025, and September 25, 2025, decisions and orders of the district court are AFFIRMED. 1 Plaintiff-Appellant Ralph Palladino, a retired officer of Local 1549 of Defendant-Appellee American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"), was found guilty, following a union disciplinary hearing, of violating AFSCME's Financial Standards Code. He was expelled from AFSCME and required to forfeit $29,980.55 in compensatory time payments he had received as part of his severance package when he retired. Palladino sued AFSCME and Defendant-Appellee Carla Insinga, the trial officer and decisionmaker at his hearing, alleging they violated the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (the "LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a), and the Labor Management Relations Act (the "LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The district court dismissed Palladino's LMRDA claim for failure to state a claim and his LMRA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court later 1 The district court did not enter final judgment in a separate document as required by Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). But "failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document when required by [Rule] 58(a) does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or order." Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B). Under Rule 58(c)(2)(B), the judgment became final 150 days after the order was entered on the docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). 2 denied as futile Palladino's motion for leave to amend his complaint. Palladino now appeals only the dismissal of his LMRDA claim and denial of leave to amend. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. DISCUSSION I. Applicable Law The Court reviews de novo both the dismissal for failure to state a claim and the denial of leave to amend based on futility. See Kane v. Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 106-07 (2d Cir. 2023). "Proposed amendments are futile if they would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 107 (quoting IBEW Loc. Union No. 58 Pension Tr. Fund & Annuity Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 783 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2015)). Here, because Palladino's proposed amended complaint largely tracks his original complaint, we discuss the dismissal and denial of leave to amend together. On appeal, Palladino argues that he plausibly alleged that AFSCME and Insinga denied him a "full and fair hearing," in violation of Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. Under that section: No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing. 3 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). The "full and fair hearing" requirement under the LMRDA incorporates traditional concepts of due process. United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d 370, 385 (2d Cir. 2001). This does not mean, however, that all the due process protections available in federal courts apply to union disciplinary proceedings. See id. "Such proceedings need only adhere to the 'basic principles of due process.'" Id. Moreover, "[w]hile we apply traditional due process concepts, we recognize that a union has a significant interest in controlling internal discipline, and so do not require the union's disciplinary proceeding to incorporate the same protections found in criminal proceedings." Id. (quoting Wellman v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 812 F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers, AFL-CIO v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 242-46 (1971) (discussing Congress's intent to allow unions to govern their own affairs). II. Application Palladino contends he was denied a "full and fair hearing" because: (i) Insinga was a biased trial officer, (ii) he was unfairly prosecuted, and (iii) the guilty determination rests solely on unreliable hearsay. The district court determined that Palladino failed to state a claim and that his proposed amendments were futile. We agree. 4 a. Biased Trial Officer Palladino first argues that Insinga was a biased trial officer who prejudged the evidence against him because, in a prior proceeding, she determined that the draft report detailing AFSCME's findings from its audit of Local 1549 (the "Draft Audit") was reliable. This argument fails. In the prior proceeding, AFSCME had placed Local 1549 into an administratorship and suspended all its officers. Insinga presided over the hearing, considered the Draft Audit (which was based on a review of Local 1549's records), found numerous violations of the AFSCME's Financial Standards Code, and concluded that the administratorship was valid. Insinga's involvement and findings in the prior proceeding did not disqualify her from presiding over Palladino's disciplinary proceedings, and he has failed to point to specific facts to give rise to a plausible inference that she was biased or had prejudged the charges against him. Moreover, Palladino appealed Insinga's decision at two different levels within AFSCME, and both appeals were denied. To the extent Palladino insists that alleged departures from union procedures establish an inference of bias, that argument also fails. The documentary evidence establishes that the charges were served on Palladino the same day that they were filed, in accordance with the union's constitutional requirements. Palladino thus had sufficient opportunity to exercise any right to strike Insinga as the trial officer; his 5 contrary argument conflates notice with receipt. Additionally, even if Palladino had established any violation of the union constitution, he has not established that any such violation denied him a "full and fair hearing" within the meaning of the LMRDA. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 247 F.3d at 387 ("A violation of a procedural provision of a union's constitution is actionable only if the violation deprived the party of a full and fair hearing under the LMRDA."). Accordingly, the district court correctly rejected Palladino's bias claim. b. Unfair Prosecution Palladino next argues that he was unfairly subjected to "selective prosecution" and "ex post facto prosecution" because AFSCME did not charge certain other individuals. See Appellant's Br. at 16-17, 27-31. He attempts to invoke the Equal Protection and Ex Post Facto clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Palladino has not cited any case within this Circuit recognizing such claims under Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. Nor has he alleged that he was prosecuted based on "impermissible considerations," as would be required to establish a claim of selective prosecution. See Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001). Section 101(a)(5) permits courts to examine whether a union member has been misled or otherwise prejudiced in the presentation of his defense, but not "to scrutinize the union regulations in order to determine whether particular conduct may be punished at all." Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 245. We therefore agree with the district 6 court that Palladino's sparse and speculative allegations regarding unfair prosecution -- in both the complaint and his proposed amendments -- fail to state a claim under Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. Moreover, Palladino was not singled out, as eight other officials and staff of Local 1549 were charged with violations; six of the other eight were also found guilty and disciplined. c. Unreliable Hearsay Finally, Palladino argues that he was deprived of due process because the "sole evidence" used to convict him was the "unreliable" Draft Audit. See Appellant's Br. at 32-35. This argument also fails. The LMRDA's guarantee of a "full and fair" disciplinary hearing "requires the charging party to provide some evidence at the disciplinary hearing to support the charges made." Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added). Palladino claims that the only evidence offered against him was hearsay; yet exhibits attached to his complaint and proposed amended complaint indicate that not only was the Draft Audit corroborated by witness testimony and supporting documentation, but also that Insinga did not rely exclusively on the Draft Audit to determine Palladino's guilt. Palladino attended the disciplinary hearing, entered his own exhibits into the record, testified in his defense, cross-examined the representative for the charging parties, and challenged the evidence against him. 7 The evidence presented at the hearing -- which was detailed in Insinga's thirty-eight-page written decision -- was sufficient under the LMRDA. See Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 246; see also Fitzsimons v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters, No. 23-815, 2024 WL 221550, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 22, 2024). Because his conviction was supported by some evidence, Palladino cannot plausibly allege that he was denied a "full and fair hearing" under Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. See Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 246 (limiting courts' review of evidence in union disciplinary proceedings, in light of the "apparent congressional intent to allow unions to govern their own affairs"). * * * We have considered Palladino's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 8